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The thesis is an attempt to find a satisfactorv grounding for universal moral rights. It 
attempts to ground universal moral rights in a revised Trersion of the framework of moral 
reasons offered by T.M. Scanlon in What We Oiw to Each Oflzer. In doing so it takes on several 
related projects. It makes a case for why rights generally, and unilrersal rights in particular, 
are an essential part of a proper moral theory. It then attempts an extended argument in 
support of whv the method of grounding universal rights at wluch I eventuallv arrive is 
superior to competitors. The argument encompasses both why I believe that universal rights 
need to be grounded in an objectii-e meta-ethcs, and why I take the sort of irrealist 
co,oniti\-ism advanced by Scanlon to be the most promising form of moral objectilrism. The 
argument is admittedly defeasible: it is not so ambitious as to try to eliminate every 
competing rights theory, but it purports to be strong enough to show that m\7 theory enjovs 
si,gnificant adivantages over manv others. In the course of making this argument I align 
myself with the natural law tradition, and claim that mv position is best understood as a new 
natural law theor\?. The thesis goes on to defend many elements of the Scanlonian picture of 
moral reasons, but also to relyise that picture in important ways, particularly by arguing that 
Scanlon’s contractualism is best understood to be underpinned bv an account of the sacred 
offered by Ronald Dworlun, and that some moral reasons are reasons we all share. The final 
chapter of the thesis shows how rights are derived from Scanlonian reasons, and particularly 
how7 universal rights are derived from shared reasons. 
I n t rod uction 
It is the aim of this thesis to provide a justification of universal moral rights. In the 
process of attempting to do this it will also examine both the nature and content of those 
rights, and of non-universal rights as well. Clearlv ths  is a daunting project, but I think it is 
equal117 clear that there is an urgent need for such a project todav, both within the realm of 
academic philosophy and outside of it. There is little agreement among moral philosophers 
about how rights are best justified, or indeed whether we need to speak of rights at all. Even 
among those who speak of moral rights, some do not believe there are anv universal moral 
rights. To say the least, the thesis addresses an issue which is 17ery much alive in 
contemporarv moral phlosophv. The need for an examination of the justification of universal 
moral rights mav be even more urgent outside of academic philosophy. In the past several 
decades rights-talk has become nearly ubiquitous in geopolitics, and much of ths  talk has 
focused on the alleged importance of universal rights of the lund delineated in the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights. Yet comparati.iielv little effort has been devoted to explaining 
houi it is that these alleged rights are justified. Politicians and others who advocate universal 
rights seem often to think that the intuitive plausibility of rights is a sufficient condition for 
their validitv, but this is plainly inadequate. Universal rights are not intuitivelv plausible to 
everyone, and especiallv not to those eager to perform the kind of acts that would be 
considered rights .iFiolations! In addition, there are legitimate concerns among some groups 
that the global establishment of 'human rights' is really just a form of cultural imperialism, 
with one cultural tradition trving to establish a domination over others. These concerns will 
not be addressed successfullv - <  bv rights defenders through appeals to the intuitive plausibilit~ 
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of universal rights. The concept of universal moral rights must be defended bv philosophical 
argument. 
Briefly and generally, my view is that in order for uniirersal moral rights to have a 
sufficiently firm basis they must be grounded in an objective meta-ethical foundation. Moral 
rights must be derived from moral values, and universal moral rights must correspondingly 
be derived from moral values that are universally \did,  i.e. objective. I suggest that this is 
best done bv expressing values in terms of reasons, and universal values in terms of shared 
reasons. For example, if it is true that everyone has a reason to respect the freedom of others, 
then perhaps there could be a universal right to have one's freedom protected that is derived 
from the reason. The right does not follow analvticallv from the reason, as we shall see. But I 
hope to make the case that, if we accept the existence of shared reasons, there is a 
preponderance of arguments in favour of the acceptance of universal rights that follow from 
those reasons. 
I will take the opportuniw to clarify at the outset some of the rights terminology 
featured in the thesis. When we speak of rights in general we mean advantageous positions 
that are conferred on some possessor bv law, morals, rules, or other norms. The wav in whch 
these positions are advantageous could sometimes be understood in terms of mere 
permissions, though I will usuallv speak of them in a stronger sense as claims we have on 
others. As I have already indicated, mv thesis mostlv concerns moral rights, and when I 
speak of 'rights' I will mean moral rights, unless I indicate otherwise. Moral rights, a subset 
of rights, are those advantageous positions that are conferred on a possessor by a given moral 
framework. Unilrersal moral rights are those moral rights that are shared bv evervone. In the 
thesis I take note of the fact that 'ever\7one' here might refer to all persons, all human beings, 
all sentient creatures, or some other group. I suggest a preference for the view that at least 
some of our universal rights extend to at least some animals. 
We must not forget about the existence or importance of legal rights, though I will say 
little about them in the thesis. Legal rights are advantageous positions conferred on some 
possessor the law. Like moral rights, the~r can be ad1,antageous both in the sense of being 
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permissions, and in the stronger sense of being claims on others. It is of the utmost 
importance that universal moral rights become universallv recognised legal rights, because it 
is through the law that rights become enforceable bv the state (or perhaps bv an international 
bod~7 such as the UN), and such enforcement will often be necessarv. The reason I sav little 
about legal rights is not because they are unimportant, but because a consideration of them 
and their relation to moral rights is conceptually posterior to the discussion that comprises my 
thesis. 
Another clarification about terminologv. Some mav wonder whv I choose to speak of 
unillersal moral rights and not ’human rights.’ The latter term is after all in greater vogue on 
the geopolitical scene. The reason I avoid the term ’human rights’ is because it carries some 
implications that seem at odds with my treatment of universal rights. First, human rights are 
usually understood to be possessed by all and only human beings (and not bv animals, for 
example). But I suspect that some unilTersa1 moral rights do extend to (some) animals, while I 
1eai.e open the possibili& that other moral rights that I call universal are not shared even b17 
all human beings. To speak of ’human rights’ in these instances might be misleading. Also, 
human rights are often understood to be possessed bv humans bccatisc tha /  arc h t i i r m i z ,  and for 
no other reason. I think that universal moral rights are possessed by creatures ultimatelv 
because others have reasons to treat them in certain wa\7s, reasons that do not stem wholl~7 
from the fact that the creatures in question are members of a @Ten species such as hoirio 
sayicm. So again the label ’human rights’ might carry misleading implications for us. Having 
said this, many of the universal moral rights that I claim to exist are consistent with the list of 
human rights set out in the UN Declaration, and I would be happy if one effect of mv work is 
to encourage people to take that declaration more seriously. 
A chapter-by-chapter s u m a r v  will provide an outline of the thesis in greater detail. 
Chapter 1 attempts to establish that moral rights generally, and universal moral rights in 
particular, are essential in moral theorv. The claim that moral rights generally are essential in 
moral theory has been labelled by Joel Feinberg the moral impoverishment thesis, and the 
chapter is largely a defence of Feinberg’s argument. In the course of defending Feinberg I 
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suggest that his own argument is inadequate in some important respects, and introduce new 
arguments to strengthen the moral impoverishment thesis. I support the claim that rights are 
essential because they are the best way to achieve self-respect and respect for others, and then 
engage in a defence of the claim that these two forms of respect are essential goods. The 
justification of this latter claim is made via a defence of Ronald Dworkin’s account of the 
sacred, which is also used to establish the equalitv of persons. This establishment of equalib 
opens the door to the possible existence of universal rights, and I suggest that universal rights 
play a particularly important role in a proper understanding of moral theorv. 
Notwithstanding these arguments, however, the chapter emphasises that rights, including 
uni\rersal rights, are necessary but not sufficient in moralitv, i.e. other moral concepts are 
needed. 
Chapter 2 provides an account of the general strategy that is needed for the 
establishment of universal moral rights. I argue that if universal moral rights exist, they must 
in some sense be derived from unilrersal moral Idues. These values must be universal in the 
sense implied by moral objectivitv. Thus an exploration of whether there are in fact universal 
moral rights will require both an exploration of whether moralitv is objective, and of whether 
universal moral rights can be derived from objective moral values in the wav I ha\Fe 
suggested they must be. I point out that ths  strategy of rights justification, far from being 
completely new, places me broadly w i t h  the natural law tradition, and that my strategv has 
a particular affiniw with that of Grotius. But I go on to criticise particular attempts to derive 
rights from natural law (including that of Grotius) in order to show that a new effort is 
needed. 
Chapter 3 examines whether morality can be objective, and which version of moral 
objectiviv is best. It argues that attempts to explain objectivitJ- in metaphysical terms, with 
values as part of the ‘fabric of the world,’ have been unsuccessful, and that it is unclear how 
such a strategy could ever escape the argument from queerness advanced by John Mackie. 
This includes the strategv of drawing an analogv between values and secondarv qualities, and 
the more naturalistic strategr emploved by Peter Railton and others. I ar, cue that a more 
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promising approach is found in the strategy of irrealist co,gniti\Tism, which emphasises the 
universality of reasons. Speaking of values in terms of reasons, and particularly shared 
reasons, provides US with a sort of objectivity which avoids the metaphysical tangles of other 
views. 
Chapter 4 is a defence of a particular view of irrealist cognitilTism, namelv the 
contractualism of T.M. Scanlon. I first defend Scanlon’s view of moral reasons. This includes 
a defence of both h i s  view that desire has little role to p l a ~  in our recognition of reasons or our 
motivation to act on them, and his view that at least some reasons possessed bv a given agent 
exist external to that agent’s awareness of them. I then defend his claim that the contractualist 
formula determines whch acts qualify as right and which qualify as wrong. I argue that the 
justification of contractualism is aided bv an appeal to Dworkin’s account of the sacred, which 
can use full^ be seen as an underpinning of contractualism. I also endorse the view that 
contractualism on Scanlon’s account proKrides an explanation for how one agent’s reason can 
0 oi1-e another agent a duk.  Having reintroduced Dworkin’s account, I then argue that it 
combines with contractualism to suggest that some reasons that agents have are reasons 
possessed not just bv one indiT4dual or a small group but bv evervone. I go on to suggest 
what some of these shared reasons are. 
Chapter 5 is an account of my own rights view. It introduces rights into the 
Scanlonian framework that was defended, and partlv relised, in the previous chapter. It does 
this by suggesting that rights are themselves a subclass of reasons, and that they are derived 
from reasons to reject given sets of principles in particular situations. Rights are defeasible, 
and their defeasibilitv is governed bv the reasonable rejectabilik of given sets of moral 
principles. I argue that although there is no logical necessity that rights be derived in the w a y  
I have suggested, they should be so derived because the cumulative weight of arguments 
suggests that rights are an essential part of a proper understanding of moral theory. Some of 
these arguments have already been offered in the first chapter, and here I add others that 
apply more specificallv to wavs that Scanlon’s contractualism benefits from the addition of 
rights. I go on to show that universal rights are derived from shared reasons in the same wav 
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that non-universal rights are derived from reasons that are not shared, and that the story of 
the defeasibility of universal rights also parallels that of non-universal rights. I then offer 
wThat purports to be at least a partial list of universal rights, and consider two objections to my 
view. 
A conclusion then briefly summarises what has been accomplished, and what 
remains to be done if the project is to reach the sort of fruition that I hope for it. It notes that 
ambitious though the thesis may be, it leaves significant questions about rights inadequately 
addressed or even wholly unaddressed. Some suggestions are made concerning the value of 
the thesis to rights theorists and others. The hope is expressed that the problem of universal 




The Importance of Rights’ 
The thesis begins with an attempt to justify the intuition that moral rights p l a ~  an 
essentially important role in moral theory. I go on to suggest that it is not only moral rights 
iY aenerall~7 that are essentially important, but unilTersa1 moral rights as well. The reason for 
beginning this wav should be clear. In a thesis that discusses the justification of universal 
moral rights, we must first establish whether it is necessarv (or el’en important) to speak of 
such rights at all. Once the first step of establishing the importance of rights is accomplished 
we can discuss justificatory matters safe in the knowledge that our project has been shielded 
from the charges of irrelevance or insi,pificance. 
Mv argument for the importance of rights is essentiallv a defence of the moral 
impoIrerishment thesis advanced bi. Joel Feinberg.’ Feinberg has argued that worlds without 
moral rights are moral117 impoverished, because beings in these worlds cannot enjov respect 
from others, self-respect, and dignity. Although I think the claim about dignitv is perhaps 
redundant in an argument that already speaks of respect from others and self-respect, I think 
there is something deeply true about the claim that there is a strong connection between 
moral rights and the two forms of respect Feinberg mentions. However, Feinberg’s argument 
in support of these connections s e e m  inadequate, as we shall see, and an important part of 
my discussion will be an attempt to improve upon h i s  defence of the moral impoverishment 
thesis. 
A modified version of this chapter has been accepted for publication as ‘Evil and the Need For I 
Universal Moral hghts,’  in the forthcoming This Cini,eedcd Gal-dciz: Evil in Theolo,q-\*, Philosoph)*, 
aizd Practice, ed. Stephen Morris (Amsterdam: Rodopi. 2002). See Appendix A. 
- ‘The Nature and Value of Rights,’ Jorrrizal of lalue Iizquii?* 3 ( 1970)- reprinted with postscript in Joel 
Feinberg, Rights, Jusfice. aizd the Bolrlzds qfiibei-c. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), 
133-1 55. All page references to this paper refer to the reprinted version. 
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My focus on Feinberg is not meant to signify an unawareness of or lack of respect for 
other literature on the subject that has been important in its own wav. Manv other theorists 
have made important contributions on the subject of the importance of rights. Robert Nozick 
has suggested that we need rights as ’side-constraints’ in order to uphold the Kantian notion 
that individuals are ends in themselves. Ronald Dworkin thinks that rights are needed to 
embody the kind of deep moral principles that we need to adjudicate difficult legal cases. 
Joseph Raz thinks that we need rights in order to ground some duties, duties that are 
themselves essential in morality. Like Feinberg, James Griffin thinks rights are necessarv as 
protections of certain goods, though while Feinberg speaks of respect from others and self- 
respect, Griffin prefers to speak of the (not wholly dissimilar) goods of personhood and equal 
regard for persons. I think there is much of value in these accounts, and several of the ideas 
presented by these thinkers are addressed in pages to come? 
Before proceeding I would like to offer an important clarification. One project I am 
not undertaking in ths  discussion is a defence of the claim that morality must be right-based. I 
will in fact argue in the following chapter that it is a mistake to t r 1 7  to base moralitv on rights. 
The issues of whether rights are important in moralih., and whether morality is based upon 
rights, are two that are easilv codated but are best kept separate. Obviouslv, it is true that if 
moralitv is based on rights, rights would clearlv be important. But rights can be important 
(eiren essentially so) in moral theory without being the most fundamental concepts in that 
theory, and this is in fact something I hope to show in the discussion that follows. 
1 .I Feinberg’s argument: promise 
I will examine the promise of Feinberg’s argument before moving in the next section 
to its limitations. But in order to discuss the argument at all we must be clear about what it 
’ Nozick, .4narchj*, State, ai2d Utopia (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975 ), 26-53: Dworkin, Taking Rights 
Seriouslj, (London: Duckworth, 1977). 8 1 - 130: Raz, The Moi-alih. o f  Freedom (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press. 1986), 165- 192; Griffin, ‘Towards a Substantive Theory of hghts’ in Citiliti. and Rights. ed. 
R.G. Frey (Oxford: Blackwell. 1983,  137- 160. 
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says. Feinberg understands rights to be closel~ connected with claims. We sometimes find 
ourselves in situations in which we feel it is appropriate to make claims to goods or titles, 
such as when we are owed something or when we feel we have been wronged. He thinks we 
have a claim just when we are in a position to make a claim. This account of having a claim 
ma\7 sound odd, but it serves the useful purpose of allowing us to say of persons that they 
have rights of which they may not be aware, as one can be in a position to claim without 
realising one is in such a position. Upon further examination some of our claims will be valid 
and some will not, validitv being determined bv the moral principles under which we are 
deliberating4 Only those claims that are valid are rights. Feinberg th inks it is onlv * *  bv making 
claims (and thus by having rights) that individuals can have respect for others and self- 
respect. Thus it seems he is committed to drawing necessary empirical connections between 
rights and respect for others, and rights and self-respect, and a necessarv analvtic connection 
between rights and claiming. These are strong claims, and the argumentative burden on 
Feinberg is clearlv lugh. 
Despite the ambitious nature of Feinberg’s argument, manv have found it appealing. 
The main reason for its appeal, I think, has been its intuitive plausibilitv. It is easv to imagine 
that in a world devoid of rights individuals mav well ha1.e their interests repeatedlv 
encroached and graduallv lose their sense of themselves and others as special. In our own 
world in which rights-claims are wildlv proliferating, it seems all the more natural to thmk 
that rights must be our onh7 resource to preserve respect in the w a ~ s  Feinberg indicates. 
When we wish to help or save someone who is oppressed, we immediatelv appeal to their 
rights. Other moral concepts like goals or even duties are not so integral a part of the current 
moral lexicon of the wider world. 
The promise of Feinberg’s argument is boosted bv the success he has had in rebutting 
some criticisms made against it, of which I will mention three. The first is an objection that 
was originally advanced by Marx, and a version of wluch has more recently found favour 
The scope of the moral principles in question is left ambiguous in Feinberg. Perhaps he envisions 
moral principles which apply to el’eryone, but it is also possible he is thinking of different groups of 
4 
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with some communitarians. Marx suggests that rights are both an expression and a 
redorcement of individual selfishness, presumablv because thev concern individual desires.5 
Similarly, some communitarians have suggested that since rights are claims we have against 
one another, their exercise tends to drive people apart rather than bring them together. 
Feinberg counters, though, that there is nothing necessarilv selfish about individuals acting on 
their own desires, because there is no reason to think that all our desires are selfish. A 
psvchological egoist might be convinced by Marx’s objection, but almost no one else would 
be. Against communitarians Feinberg has two points. First, it is mysterious how acting on 
our rights could drive us apart from each other, since we assert our rights onlv when a wrong 
has already occurred. Second, it seems that a morality that features rights actuallv 
encourages us to behave with more civili? toward each other, because we know that cases of 
conflict have a good chance of being resolved clearlv and fairlv. We are therefore less likeh 
to resort to violence or some other desperate means of resolution.” 
While Feinberg’s replies to the communitarian position seem well-taken, it could be 
argued that he nonetheless underestimates the cornunitarian position. It seems likelv that 
what is important to the communitarians is not just the danger that we might drive ourselves 
apart by acting on our rights, but that our verv knowledge that persons have rights that they 
can assert against each other puts us all in a somewhat confrontational position. Indeed, it 
seems there is a small price to be paid bv rights advocates in this regard. To understand 
morality in terms of rights is implicitly to admit of fractures in the moral communi&, and to 
admit that the communitarian ideal is probablv unreachable. It is to admit that different 
individuals inevitably have such different aims that some friction in the moral community is 
ineT7itable. Reminding ourselves of the existence of this friction might make some people 
more suspicious of others and thus create more friction, but in the end I think the advantages 
of rights clearly outweigh this disadvantage. 
persons deliberating under different sets of moral principles. It seems clear that he would want to say 
that the moral impoverishment thesis holds in either case. 
Karl Marx, ‘On the Jewish Question.’ in Kurl h4ur~:  End). T.l.i-irings, trans. Rodney Livingstone and 
Gregor Benton (London: Penguin, 1975), 2 1 1-24 1. 
5 
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Another challenge Feinberg meets is one adx7anced by R.M. Frey, who argues that 
rights add nothing to moraliv not already captured bv duties.: The argument seems to have 
Some initial plausibiliq, because the connection between rights and duties is universallv 
acknowledged to be a very close one, and we might consequently wonder about the value of 
rights in the way that Frey does. But, as Feinberg replies, rights clearly add a measure of 
control bv the right-holder over the duties in question. He can either hold the dutv-holder to 
his dutv or release him from it. I will argue shortly that this element of control pla17~ an 
important role in explaining why rights are essential in morality. 
A third objection to which Feinberg successfully responds is that if his theory of rights 
were put into practice we would have a world full of uncaring moral automatons. Evervone 
would do their duties and nothing more, and evervone would claim their rights and never 
show mercv. A similar kind of objection wrapped in feminist clothing has been made by 
Carol Gilligan, who suggests that a justice perspective (such as that exhibited by Feinberg and 
other rights thinkers) is an inherent117 masculine one that neglects the feminine care 
perspective, which emphasises connection and concern for relationships.8 Feinberg answers 
these objections by pointing out that he has said only that rights are necessary in morality, not 
that they are sufficient. Rights plav a vital role in moralitv, but the17 must be complemented 
by other moral considerations, such as compassion, whose content is decided bv our values 
and principles. There is no reason we cannot emphasise both justice and caring in moraliv. 
In the context of rights, the element of caring should manifest itself in our willingness to 
sometimes do more than dutv requires, and to sometimes release others from their duties 
toward us. 
The point that moral rights, even if necessary, are not sufficient in morality, is an 
extrernelJ7 important one. Not only does it help Feinberg to explain how a rights view can be 
h Joel Feinberg, 'In Defense of Moral fights: Their Social Importance' in Freedom aim' F~ilfillnzei?t 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992), 243. 
R.M. Frey, hierests a i d  Rights: The Case .4gaiizst .4ni~7zaIs (Oxford: Clarendon, 1980), 12. For 
Feinberg's reply see Feinberg. 'In Defense of Moral fights: Their Bare Existence' in Freedom and 
Flr~fillllzelzr, 204. 
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integrated with a caring perspective, but it also explains whv we need legal rights in addition 
to moral rights. It seems that for each moral right that requires mechanisms of enforcement, 
there will need to be a legal right which corresponds to it, for onlv legal rights enjoy 
connections with such mechanisms. Legal rights have the distinct advantage of being backed 
b~7 the power of the law, including police enforcement of that  la^. This verv fact, though, has 
worried some thinkers about moral rights: if legal rights can do all the work, then are moral 
rights not redundant? But the worry is misplaced, because legal rights would be arbitrary 
without the backing of moral rights. It is moral rights, after all, that are derived from our 
moral principles. This helps us to answer another objection regarding moral rights and legal 
rights, namelv that moral rights are an incoherent concept mistakenlv based on a model of 
legal rights. The objection states that legal rights are coherent because they enjov the backing 
of law, but moral rights are incoherent because the17 fail to enjov an analogous backing.‘) As 
Feinberg points out, though, there seems n o t h g  incoherent about the claim that moral rights 
are backed up by moral principles. So far we have been given no reason to think the analogy 
between legal rights and moral rights cannot hold in the wav that Feinberg suggests. We will 
see more clearlv over the course of the thesis how7 it is that moralitx can serve as a foundation 
analogous to law. 
At ths  point I will summarise the respects in whch I consider Feinberg’s argument to 
be promising. First, I find plausible the claim that we must have rights in order to enjoy 
respect from others and self-respect, and I will offer an argument to support the claim shortlv. 
Secondly, h i s  account of the nature of rights is promising. I endorse h i s  thoughts on the wav 
that rights relate to claims, on what claims are, and on how the 17alidity of claims is 
determined. MY endorsement of the Feinberg position, then, is extensive. But with that said, 
Carol Gilligan, I12 a Diffreiit Jbice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 1982), 28-35. There h 
i s  a useful discussion of Gilligan in Evan Simpson, ‘Rlghts Thinlung,’ Philosophj, 72 ( 1997), 29-59. 
For Feinberg’s response to this criticism see ‘The Nature and Value of Rlghts,’ postscript, 156. 
Sumner. Bentham, Thc Wbrks ofJereiq3 Bciithanz, Vol. I. ed. John Bowring (Edinburgh: William Tate, 
1843), 2 18; Nelson, ‘On the Alleged Importance of Moral Rights,’ Ratio 18 ( 1976), 145- 155; Sumner, 
The Moral Foirizdatio~zs of Rights (Oxford: Clarendon. 1987). 1 19. For Feinberg’s response see ‘Bare 
Existence,’ 2 12-2 19. 
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This sort of objection has been raised in various forms by Bentham, William Nelson, and L.W. 
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let US now turn to a discussion of the limitations of h is  argument. This will give us a clear 
idea of what needs to be done in order to make the argument work. 
1.2 Feinberg’s argument: limitations 
The first limitation concerns Feinberg’s mention of the goods of respect for others and 
self-respect. Though he does not say so, I think the onljr reasonable conclusion we can draw 
about Feinberg’s treatment of these goods is that he considers them to be in some sense 
essential.10 This of course leads us to wonder both whv thev are essential, and in what sense 
the\. are so. To be fair, Feinberg does offer us a reason for whv self-respect is essential, 
namely that we need to have self-respect in order to be worthv of the respect of others. 
IntuitiLTelv this seems right. Not only do we have difficultv respecting someone who fails to 
respect herself, but we feel justified in having this difficulh.. llus is the case because we 
operate on the (quite reasonable) assumption that people know themselves better than they 
know others. If I perceive about someone (especially someone I do not know intimatelv) that 
she has no respect for herself, then I am inclined as a default position to think she is probably 
not worthy of mv respect. This default position is defeasible, because the person could be 
mistaken in her self-perception, but it is a reasonable default position nonetheless. 
Feinberg’s justification of self-respect as an essential good, of course, merely shifts the 
burden all the more onto justifving respect from others as an essential good. Unfortunatelv 
Feinberg fails to offer such a justification. We might be tempted to say that the justification 
could proceed in the reverse direction of the pre\Tious one - that we need to have respect from 
others in order to have self-respect -but ths  is unsatisfactory for two reasons. First, since 
each justification would be made in terms of the other the two justifications would be guilty of 
10 I will speak of ‘essential goods’ instead of the more commonly-used terni ‘intrinsic goods.‘ It seems 
that what is important about the concepts in question is that they cannot exist without being good. My 
conception of essential goods is more similar to John Rawls’s conception of primary goods than it is to 
conceptions of intrinsic goods. See John Rawls, -4 Theoi?’ q f  Jiisticc (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1972). 62. Recent discussions of intrinsic goods include John O’Neill, ‘The Varieties of Intrinsic 
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an unhelpful circularity. Secondly, the latter justification s e e m  dubious on empirical 
mounds. It seems possible to respect oneself even in the face of widespread disrespect from 
others, and indeed there is something heroic about this. Stoics are an example of persons who 
valued this kind of self-reliance and were able to practise it. 
0 
A more promising way to justify the second claim is to argue that respect for others is 
an intrinsic good because every individual is essentiallv valuable. This  method of connecting 
the value of respecting a person x with the value of that person x should be uncontroversial, 
because if x is valuable then she merits respect by definition. The controversy, then, 
surrounds whether we can indeed establish that every individual is essentiallv valuable. I 
thmk the case can be made by combining three different but compatible arguments. Gregory 
Vlastos has suggested that when we consider the \due of human beings we make a 
distinction between human merit and human worth.]’ He conceives of human merit as 
consisting of all the features in respect of which agents can be evaluated. Human worth, by 
contrast, is the value evervone has simply < -  bv virtue of being human. l h s  distinction is a 
useful one insofar as it allows us to acknowledge the obvious fact that indi14duals may vary 
greatly from each other in terms of attracrive qualities, vet it allows us nonetheless to preserve 
the idea that each human being possesses an essential value which cannot be taken awav. 
The problem comes, though, when we trv to justifv the claim about worth. Some 
have suggested that all indi1Tiduals have equal worth because of a particular quality they 
possess, such as rationalit\. or the ability to feel pain. But this strategy has not been very 
successful, because whateiTer qualitv we choose is in danger of seeming rather arbitrarv, and 
will invariably exclude some humans we would intuiti~ely wish to include. For a different 
approach to the problem we can turn to an argument Feinberg makes in a work, Social 
PMosoply, that followed ’The Nature and Value of Rights’ bv a couple years. There he savs 
that, when we think of human worth, it is better to see it not in terms of a quality possessed bv 
persons, but in terms of what is attributed to persons bv others through an attitude of 
Value‘ in Molzist 75:2 ( 1992); also Ken O’Dav, ‘Intrinsic Value and Investment’ in Utilitas 1 1 :2 
( 1999), 194-2 14. 
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respect.” This attitude of respect is groundless in the sense that it is not justifiable in more 
ultimate terms. However, it comes about when we regard others as centres of experience, or 
foci of subjectivity. Feinberg saw 
It may well be, however, that most normal people are 
disposed to fall into this attitude whenever their attention is 
drawn to certain traits of a;: humans, or when thev acquire 
the habit of looking at (or conceiving) their fellows in a 
certain wav. The traits thus attended to mav not constitute 
logicallv coercive reasons in support of the attitude of 
Kantian respect (that may be too much to hope for), but a 
thorough awareness of them can make the attitude seem less 
mlrsterious and actually lead people to acquire it - a result 
almost as good!l3 
I quote t h s  passage directly because it is both intriguing and somewhat obscure. It is unclear 
what sort of claim Feinberg is trving to make when he sa~rs we are ’disposed to fall into this 
attitude.’ Is this an empirical claim or a normati\re claim? If it is a normative one, is it an 
appeal to moral intuition, to self-evidence, or to moral deliberation? It is unclear what 
Feinberg is saying, but whch one should ue  choose? 
I think that a promising wav forw-ard on this issue has been pointed to by Ronald 
Dworkin in h is  account of the sacred.14 Dworkin argues that each life is sacred in the sense 
that it is inviolable, and that this is so because the complex processes that create and shape 
each life are themselves wonderful and valuable. It is not entirelv clear what Dworkin 
himself understands inviolabilihr to entail, but Vinit Haksar offers the promising suggestion 
that inrriolabilitv should amount to irreplaceabilitv, e.g. we cannot rectifV the loss of one life 
by creating another life, or el’en multiple new lives.15 This suggestion fits well with the 
h o r k i n  account, which holds that the complex combination of processes which composes 
~~ ~~ ~ 
Gregory Vlastos, ‘Justice and Equality’ in Social Justice, ed. &chard B. Brandt (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962). 3 1-72. 
Joel Feinberg, Social Plzilosophi, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 88-94. 
I’ Ibid.. 93. 
Ronald Dworlun, ‘What is Sacred?’ in Life ’s Domiizioi? (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 68-1 0 1. 
Dworlun’s argument is made in the context-of the moral permissibility of abortion. but need not be 
confined to that context. There is an irony in the usage to which I put Dworlun’s argument, insofar as 
he presents his discussion of the sacred as an alternative to rights-talk, while I am suggesting that it can 
be part of the basis for universal rights. But this is no more than an irony: Dworlun’s account is not 
incompatible with rights. 




each individual life is unique, and once lost cannot be replicated. What are these processes? 
Dw0rku-t lists three kinds that compose human lives: the evolutionarv natural processes that 
produce new lives; the complex cultural processes in which human beings participate; and the 
process by which individuals evolve through the decisions they make.16 Dworkin believes 
that these processes apply to goups as well as individuals, so that, e.g., species too can be 
regarded as sacred. While I believe this claim to be promising, I will mvself focus on the 
implications of h i s  account for individuals. Because each life exhibits the features he lists 
above, each life is valuable; and because each life realises these features in a unique wav, each 
life is sacred. We know that the processes and their various complex permutations are 
lyaluable because we wonder at them. Thus the processes are, in the most literal sense, 
wonderful. 
I find this account promising largelv because of its phenomenological plausibility. It 
seems that we do wonder at the processes, both natural and human, that compose each life. 
This is whv it is possible even for persons of a secular outlook to regard a birth as a sort of 
miracle: the natural processes involved are so awesome as to inspire a sort of mystical 
reverence. It also explains whv, upon the death of a person who has lived long and achieved 
much, their life can seem to take on a sort of mvthology of its own. The full weight of the 
processes (especially the human processes) that made up the individual’s life can seem 
oTrerwhelming, and can seem to give that person a towering stature whose dimensions seem 
greater than human. An ad\?antage of Dworkin’s account is that it helps to explain these 
quasi-religious feelings of wonder to the satisfaction of those who find overtly religious 
commitments philosophicallv unacceptable. A more obvious advantage is that it helps to 
explain the common intuition that each life is of some value. 
Dworkin’s account of the sacred has been criticised in several ways, most of which I 
will not address here, but I would like to defend h s  view against two criticisms which are 
perhaps among the most fundamental. The first is that it is not immediately clear why the 
15 Kni t  Haksar, ‘Collective fights and the Value of Groups‘ in Inqzrii;~. 4 1 (1998), 22. 
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processes Dworkin speaks of can be said to be valuable. At one point Dworkin suggests they 
are valuable because the products they yield are valuable, but it seems this cannot be correct, 
because elsewhere he claims the products are valuable in virtue of the processes that comprise 
them. To claim both is to be guilty of an unedifving circularih.. Elsewhere in Dworkin’s 
discussion it seems that it is the complexity of the processes that gives them their value. Yet if 
complexity is a necessary condition for a process being valuable, it seems unlikelv to be 
sufficient. AIDS is complex but we do not consider it valuable as a result. The Third Reich 
was an enormously complex political entity, but to ask whether it was valuable just seems an 
entire117 separate question. 
We might make progress on tlus issue if we consider more closely the wonder we feel 
at the natural and human processes in question. Part of what we marvel at does seem to be 
the complexity of the processes. To participate in such intricate and powerful processes is to 
feel we are becoming part of something greater than ourselves, and ths  inspires our awe. But 
it is also true that we can, to some extent, wonder at the sheer complexitv of the Third Reich, 
abstracting its structural complexihr from its moral horrors. The important point, though, is 
that our wonder at the complexity of the Third Reich seems importantlv different from our 
wonder at the processes Dworkin mentions, and that tlus reveals something important about 
why Dworlun’s processes are valuable and the Third Reich is not. Any wonder we might feel 
at the complexity of the Nazi regime is surely only an intellectualised appreciation for its 
structure and order, recoopising that such strict order might, fasluoned in the right way, be a 
laudable feature of other human pursuits. But our wonder at the processes Dworkin 
mentions seems sometlung more than this. It mal7 well contain the sort of intellectualised 
appreciation alreadv mentioned, but it also seems to contain a normative endorsement that is 
missing from the previous example. We admire Dworkin’s natural and human processes 
because they are not onlj7 complex but good for us: like the two forms of respect, they make a 
I leave open the possibility that there could be other sacred processes as well, but t h u g h o u t  the 1 h 
thesis I  ill be content to endorse these three. 
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special contribution to our well-being? This is whv the wonder we feel for them feels different 
from the wonder we might feel at the complexity of the Third Reich. It is the positive 
+:ontribution these processes make that sets them apart from the Third Reich example, that 
explains the normative element of our wonder at them, and ultimatelv that makes them 
1-aluable in a way that the Third Reich is not. But if this is the case, then whv do we not 
similarlv wonder at the two forms of respect? It is true that the two forms of respect 
contribute to our well-being, but they seem to be less complex than evolutionary processes or 
human participation in culture. It seems to be the case that we wonder at x when x is 
sufficientlv complex, and that we wonder at it in a full and complete way when (and onl17 
ivhen) it is both complex and contributes to our well-being. It is in this way that an 
examination of wonder helps to explain why Dworkin’s processes are valuable. 
This discussion leads to a second, related concern, that of limiting the scope of beings 
whose li\.es are sacred. So far we have discussed Dworkin’s processes onlv as thev apply to 
humans, but the scope of applicabilib might be extended further. It is unclear how wide a 
scope Dworkin himself has in mind; he ma\- envision only human beings as sacred, or he ma~7 
wish to include at least some higher animals as well. Depending on how we read him, the 
scope could possiblv be much wider, for if a given entih. needs only to participate in one of 
the three kmds of processes he mentions, then even non-lil-ing things will qualifv as sacred. 
Not only do humans and animals participate in e1Folutionary processes, but so do trees, 
plants, mountains, rocks, and just about evervthing else. I s  evervthmg sacred? This is 
perhaps going too far. The obvious wav in which to limit the scope of sacred entities is to 
raise the bar of qualification by demanding that sacred entities participate in more of 
Dworkin’s processes than just evolutionary ones. If we require that beings participate in all 
three kinds of processes, it seems that onl17 human beings will be sacred, and even then 
perhaps not all humans, for we would need to find wan to include infants and disabled 
humans. Altemati\relv we could require that participation in two out of the three processes is 
1- A similar explanation for the value of Dworlun’s processes is offered by Linda Barclay, though my 
argument in support of this conclusion is my own. See Linda Barclay, ‘Rights, Intrinsic Value. and the 
20 
sufficient. I will not attempt to place the threshold here, or to deal with the inevitable tricky 
borderline cases that would arise. My own inclination, for what it is worth, is that all humans 
and at least some animals are sacred in the Dworkin sense. Until it is tailored bv further 
argument, Dworkin’s view is compatible with this conclusion but does not entail it. 
My endorsement of Dworkin’s account of the sacred has wide-reaching implications 
for the argument of the thesis as a whole. It will serve as our fundamental account of the 
origin of value, and it will play a crucial role in the rights liew I advance in later chapters. 
We will see in Chapter 4 that it helps to justify the moral theory I eventuallv adopt, and that it 
indicates the shared reasons we have. The implications for ths  in Chapter 5 are that it 
ultimatehr indicates the content of our universal rights. But this is all in the future. The 
argument for now is that Dworkin’s account justifies the claim that each individual life has 
essential value. 
If Dworkm’s account is successful in doing this, then I think we are sirnilarlv 
successful in establishing the essential value of both respect from others and of self respect. 
To review our argument, if each indilTidua1 life is valuable, it follows simply that we should 
respect each individual. This does not mean we need to respect everyone equally, for 
different indixriduals will have different degrees of riicrif (see Vlastos). The equal zuorth of 
each individual does mean, however, that it is an essential good that we show some (at least 
minimal) respect for others. One implication of the essential good of respect for others is that 
it is essentiallv good for others to respect me -but thev will not be able to do this very 
completely if I do not show mvself respect. So the establishment of the essential good of 
respect for others vields the essential good of self-respect. Interestingly, in our attempt to 
justify Feinberg’s claims about two essential goods, we have found a thrd that underpins 
them, namely the essential good of each individual life. 
We still need to clarifv, though, what is meant by ’essential good’ in these cases. The 
term is ambiguous, and different thinkers ha1.e meant different things by it (and the same is 
true of the term ’intrinsic good’). When I sa\’ that indiridual lives, respect from others, and 
Politics of Abortion’ in Utilitas 1 1 :2 ( 1999). 2 15-29. 
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self-respect are essential goods, 1 mean that they are goods whose absence would cause life to 
be seriously deficient, and which cannot be compensated for by an\’ other goods or 
combination thereof. I have tried to argue above whv this is so for each essential good of 
Whch I have spoken. It is important to note that m~7 concept of essential value is weaker than 
that of some others. I am not suggesting that these goods have value independentlv of the 
lyaluation of agents, but merely that we can justifiablv agree that these goods are good for 
agents generally. I hope I have said enough to make this convincing in the case of the three 
0 ooods I have discussed: our recognition of their essential goodness is underpinned bv the 
sense of wonder we feel at the processes constitutilre of each human life, and the relations we 
reco,onise that the value of each human life has to the value of respect from others, and that 
the value of respect from others has to the value of self-respect. I will have more to say about 
the nature of essential goods in Chapter 4, but I think that the account I have provided 
already is sufficient for our present purposes. 
We have seen that one problem Feinberg encountered was an inadequate explanation 
of the essential goods of respect from others and self-respect. Feinberg also runs into trouble, 
though, in h i s  attempt to make the very strong connections he needs between rights and 
claiming, rights and respect from others, and rights and self-respect. As we have seen, he 
appears to envision the first connection as a necessarv analvtic one, and the latter two as 
necessarv empirical connections. The problems Feinberg encounters in trying to establish 
these connections are brought out well in a recent paper bv Derrick Darby, so I will discuss 
Darby’s criticisms at some length.18 However, in my discussion of Darby I will argue that 
Feinberg’s account at least hints at the resources needed to overcome these criticisms. After 
establishg this I will then trv to add the required missing pieces to a defence of the moral 
impoverishment thesis. 
A s  I have said, Darbv questions the links Feinberg tries to forge between rights and 
three entities: claims, respect from others, and self-respect. Let us consider each connection in 
Derrick Darby, ‘Are Worlds Without k g h t s  Morally Impoverished?’ in Southem JownuI of IS 
pjdosoplq* 37 (1999), 397-417. 
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turn, beginning with the one said to exist between rights and claims. As we have seen, 
Feinberg thinks that to have a claim is to be in a position to claim, and to have a right is to 
have a justified claim, justification being determined bi7 the moral principles under which we 
are working. AS Darby notes, this leaves us wondering just how to delineate the necessary 
and sufficient conditions for being in a position to make a claim. Darby himself offers two 
suggestions for how to do  this, the first of which he calls the ’sanction proposal’ and the 
second the ’moral proposal.’ His sanction proposal savs that we have a basis to make a claim 
- or to complain, which amounts to the same t h g  - when and onlv when others cannot 
ipore  us without risking external sanctions. Darbv notes a few unsatisfactorir consequences 
of tlus proposal, and I think it is also unsatisfactorv in the sense that it fits with Feinberg’s 
own thought rather uneasilv. There is little indication that Feinberg would wish to explain 
being able to make a claim in terms of sanctions, external or internal. 
More promising is Darbv’s moral proposal, which states that we are in a position to 
complain when and onlv when the recogrution of our claim is called for bv moral principles. 
Recopsing that tlus proposal is still a bit vague, he bifurcates it into an MP1 and MP2. MP1 
suggests that we have a basis to complain when and onlv when others cannot ignore us 
without committing a moral wrong, while MP2 suggests we have such a basis when and onlv 
when we would be morallv justified in complaining. I think MP2 is the proposal closest to 
Feinberg’s own thought. It parallels Feinberg’s treatment of justification when he speaks of 
rights as justified claims, where justification has the ‘positive’ quality of MP2 and not the 
appeal to wrongness found in MP1. The fact that MP2 is closest to Feinberg’s own thought 
does not mean it is our only possibilih., but I think this consistency gives it priority of 
consideration. 
Darbv thinks the problem with MP2 is that it means Feinberg must show that 
indilriduals are morally justified in complaining onl\7 when their moral rights have been 
violated. Feinberg cannot simply assume this is the case, and rights sceptics will say that 
other moral concepts can be invoked to explain what will qualify as justification. But I think 
Darby is mistaken that Feinberg must appeal to rights in order to explain when we are 
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justified to complain. As I have said above, I think a plausible interpretation of Feinberg’s 
treatment of this issue is that it parallels his treatment of the necessary and sufficient 
conditions for a justified claim. If this is true, then Feinberg would sav that we are in a 
position to make a claim only when we are justified in doing so bv our wider moral principles 
(remaining neutral for the moment about what these principles are). It is not clear why Darby 
thinks Feinberg must frame these principles thmselzm in terms of rights. An alternative 
formulation of moral principles is offered by the Scanlonian account I will endorse in Chapter 
4. 
Let us now turn to the connection between rights and respect from others. It is 
Feinberg’s view that we must have rights if we are to enjov respect from other people. The 
first point to note here is that there could be stronger or weaker interpretations of this claim. 
He might mean that we must have rights if we are to enjov am/ respect from others (this 
~ o u l d  be the strong reading). Alternativelv, he might mean that we must have rights in order 
to enjov a sufficiently high degree of respect we are due (weak reading). He could also be 
interpreted as saving that rights confer on us a certain lund of respect, different from the 
respect we could otherwise enjoy. The main restriction on our choice will be that the sort of 
respect we are connecting with rights must be of 17erv great importance, such that moralitv 
would be clearly deficient if it did not allow each agent to enjoy it. 
Feinberg does not sav much about the concept of respect with which we are working. 
Darby suggests that we utilise the concept of reco,pition respect, whereby a being is worthy 
of respect by lrirtue of some valuable fact or set of facts about it. For example, we might say 
that beings are worthv of respect bv 14rtue of their rationality, their sentience, etc. Darby 
tlunks that if we accept the validity of recognition respect it follows that there CaMot be a 
necessary connection between rights and respect. Recognition respect, depending on the 
criteria we use for respectabilitv, allows for the possibility that non-persons could be objects 
of respect. But if there is a necessar\r connection between rights and respect (via claiming), 
only persons could be objects of respect, because onlv persons are able to make claims. Since 
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the consequences of the two are incompatible, our acceptance of recooanition respect leads to 
our rejection of Feinberg’s claim about the necessarv connection between rights and respect. 
It is unclear whether we should accept recognition respect as the concept of respect 
with which we should work. As I have mentioned, Feinberg has argued in a later work that if 
we are concerned to speak of respect for all persons, then this respect might have to be seen as 
groundless in the sense that it does not make reference to anv propertv individuals possess. 
But even if we do accept recognition respect I do not think Darbv’s argument accomplishes 
what he wishes. This is because it both implies and depends on the idea that recooanition 
respect allows us to assign importance to anv fact or set of facts we wish. Darbv seems to 
conceilre of the choice as arbitrary, but I doubt Feinberg would agree, and more importantly, 
il1e should not agree. Of course it is empirically true that people might respect each other for 
any number of reasons. One person might be respected bv others because of his social status 
(Darbv actuallv uses this example). Another might be respected because she is beautiful. The 
legendary Kim I1 Sung of North Korea is respected in his homeland for allegedlv being able to 
lull entire battalions of Chinese nationalists bv snapping lus fingers. But there is no reason to 
think that all of these reasons to respect others are morally equal. Just as Feinberg invokes 
moral principles in his explication of justified claims, so it seems appropriate for us to invoke 
them in the present context. It seems entirely possible, and also intuitively plausible, that the 
only reasons for respecting others that will be endorsed b17 our moral principles will be 
reasons that refer to those individuals as right-holders. In fact I think we have more than just 
intuition to appeal to here, but I will delav that argument for the moment so that we can 
consider Darbv’s other criticisms. 
Before proceeding, though, I must admit that I do have some sympathy for a 
consideration that ma~7 be driving Darby’s objection about respect for others. Darby seems to 
be concerned that Feinberg’s treatment of respect is prone to a problem Kant also encounters, 
which is that it cannot extend to beings we intuitively wish to endow with respect. Here I am 
t&hg of animals as well as infants and mentally impaired humans. It is true that these 
beings are not claim-makers, and I share the unease that many people feel about denying 
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them respect. I think that for these beings the solution lies in appealing to the third essential 
value we discovered, the value of each individual life. The same features that Dworkin has 
suggested that cause us to feel wonder or awe at the life of each individual mal’ apply not 
o d v  to infants and mentally impaired humans, but to many animals as well. We do wonder 
at the evolutionary processes that produce new humans, even if they suffer from mental 
impairment or have the limitations of an infant. We also wonder at the same processes by 
urhich many animals are produced. We wonder at the process of communitii and language 
that an infant will participate in, that (at least some) mentally impaired individuals do 
participate in, and also in the processes of communities in whch complex animals participate. 
Equally, we wonder at the process of internal personal creation that an infant is alreadv 
undergoing, that manv mentally impaired persons can forge, and that even intelligent 
animals can participate in. Admittedly, these beings might participate in these processes to a 
lesser degree than fully-functioning, adult humans. Nonetheless Dworkm’s account of the 
I-alue of individual lives does not seem to be closed off to infants, disabled humans, and 
(some) animals, and this suggests to us that these beings might correspondinglv enjov the 
protections offered by rights. 
Let us now return to Darbv’s criticisms and look at the connection between rights and 
self-respect. These criticisms proceed along lines largely parallel to those concerning respect 
from others, and mv response will be similarlir parallel. Darbv once again points out that it is 
empiricallv the case that persons might respect themselves for anv number of reasons, some 
of which might concern rights but manv of which do not. Again, I respond that there is no 
reason to think that all of these reasons will be endorsed equally by our moral principles. It is 
possible, and again i n t u i t i ~ e l ~  plausible, to think that our moral principles will endorse onlv 
those reasons related to our possession of rights. Intuitively, there seems something more 
noble about respecting oneself because one is a right-holder rather than at least most other 
reasons one could think of. 
Perhaps more importantlv, it is in the discussion of self-respect that the Feinberg 
argument does contain a strong empirical element. He claims that people who lack rights (or 
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at least lack consciousness of their rights) tend to develop characters that are servile and even 
duplicitous. It is having rights and being conscious of them, bv contrast, that allows us to 
’stand up like men’ and ’look others in the eye.’19 As a general descriptive observation about 
persons, I think the claim about senrility is quite plausible. Darbv offers counter-examples 
& i c h  are not particularly convincing: he claims that Frederick Douglass and Harriet Tubman 
are examples of persons who lacked consciousness of their rights, vet had self-respect. It is 
unclear, though, whether they or others like them were lacking in consciousness of their 
moral rights. To be sure they lacked legal rights, but it could well be thev sincerelv believed 
themselves to have moral rights which thev were fighting to get others to recognise. 
Still, it is important to r e c o p s e  the inherent limitations of the sort of empirical 
argument Feinberg has advanced here. Even if there is quite a bit of evidence to support the 
claim that lack of consciousness of one’s rights leads to servility and lack of self-respect, it is a 
veri- difficult claim to prove. As Darbv points out, it does not seem to be the sort of claim that 
can be proved by philosophical argument. Even if we established through extensive field 
research that each case of lack of consciousness of one’s rights is accompanied bv sewile 
behaviour and lack of self-respect, we still would not have not established a causal connection 
between the two, and it is mvsterious how we could establish such a connection. So proofof 
Feinberg’s claim mav be too much to hope for. Yet it seems even less acceptable to simply 
discard ths  verv plausible observation about human beings. One needs only to tra\Tel to 
countries suffering under regimes that denv indilridual rights in order to see the prevalence of 
the sort of behaviour and mindset of which Feinberg speaks. The point for now is just to 
establish an initial plausibilitv for Feinberg’s empirical claim - I will have more to sa~7 in its 
defence shortlF7. 
Let us take stock of what we have learned about Feinberg’s argument in order to 
better see how we should proceed. We have seen that kus understanding of the nature of 
rights is promising, and that his claim that we need rights in order to enjoy self-respect and 
respect from others is intuitively appealing. We have seen that his account implies that self- 
- 
I9 ‘The Nature and Value of Rlghts,’ 15 1. 
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respect and respect from others are essential goods, and that these goods can be justified, and 
are in fact based upon a third essential good, the value of each indi17idual human life. We 
have also seen that the coherence of Feinberg’s account can be defended against the criticisms 
of Darby by making appeals to foundational issues such as the moral principles that Feinberg 
hmself invokes in a different context. It seems both possible and intuitivelv plausible that the 
only justified reasons to respect oneself and have respect for others make reference to the 
status of individuals as right-holders. In addition, Feinberg makes an intriguing empirical 
claim which states that individuals who lack consciousness of their rights lack self-respect and 
deITelop characters that are senile. The promise of Feinberg’s account has so far weathered 
the storm, but more must be said if we are to connect rights and the two forms of respect in 
the wav his argument requires. 
1.3 Helping Feinberg 
In t h s  section I will try to address crucial questions that remain about the moral 
impo1Terishment thesis. First and foremost, we must wonder if there is an\‘ reason to believe 
that our moral principles nctualli/ udl endorse rights considerations in the wav I have 
suggested thev might. Secondly, more must be said about the empirical argument if we are to 
get it to do anv work in our larger defence. It is still mvsterious just how7 the empirical 
argument relates to the rest of our defence, and just how plausible it is. The two main 
questions I have raised are, I think, quite closelv related, and I will attempt to address the first 
by answering the second. 
Our revised version of the moral impo1Terishment thesis states that our moral 
principles endorse rights-related concerns as a privileged means of justified self-respect and 
justified respect from others. Now, for reasons we shall see, a full-blown proof that rights and 
the two forms of respect connect in this way may be too much to hope for. Instead I will 
argue that our revised moral impox7erishment thesis can be established as highly probable. I 
will further narrow the ambitions of the argument bv focusing mostly on self-respect rather 
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than respect for others. Since we have seen that self-respect is an essential good, establishing 
a highly probable connection between rights and justified self-respect will be sufficient for our 
present purposes. It will justify the continued emphasis on rights that the thesis displays, and 
will be sufficient until we are able to revisit the importance of rights in Chapter 5. 
The argument makes use of several different claims, and it is useful to lav these out at 
the outset. The claims are familiar from our previous discussion, with the addition of a 
bifurcation of both claims that make up the revised moral impoverishment thesis - the claims 
about self-respect and respect from others - into both weak and strong versions. 
Empirical Claim (EC): we need rights (and awareness of them) in order to have self-respect, 
because lack of awareness of one’s rights leads to servilit\i. 
Normative Claim 1 (NC1): rights enjov a privileged connection with justified self-respect. 
Weak version (Weak NC1): our moral principles endorse rights as the best wav to 
Strong version (Strong NC1): our moral principles endorse rights as the only wav to 
ackueve self-respect. 
achieve self-respect. 
Normative Claim 2 (NC2): rights enjoy a privileged connection with justified respect from 
Weak version (Weak NC2): our moral principles endorse rights as the best wav to 
achie1.e respect from others. 
Strong version (Strong NC2): our moral principles endorse rights as the onlv wav to 
others. 
achieve respect from others. 
My argument for the importance of rights is that we can establish Weak NC1 as highly 
probable by means of a conjunction of EC and a moral intuition. I will also argue that this in 
turn takes us some wav toward establishing Weak NC2, and perhaps also Strong NC1. But I 
think that establishing Weak NC1 as highlv probable is sufficient for our purposes, and that 
will be mv primary goal at present. 
Our argument concerning Weak NC1 will be made in two broad steps. The first step 
is to establish that it is highlv probable that our moral principles will endorse the fact that we 
are right-holders as CI reason (possibly one among many) to respect ourselves. The second 
step is then to argue that not onlv is there a rights-related reason to respect ourselves, but in 
fact rights-related reasons are the bcsf reasons to do so. Let us now consider the first move. 
This first step relies cruciall\r both on the plausibilit). of EC, and also on the plausibility of the 
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claim that intuitively there s e e m  something noble, or at the ver~7 least morally legitimate, 
about respecting oneself because one is a right-holder. I will say little about this moral 
intuition, only that I feel it strongly and I think that most people probablv feel the same way. 
Intuitively we do feel that being a right-holder is a legitimate reason to respect oneself, just as 
our intuitions tell us that being blonde is not a good reason. While our intuitions are not 
decisive on moral matters, it seems they should not be completelv discarded either, so the 
supporting role that our intuition is plaving here seems to be appropriate. 
If we accept both EC and the moral intuition of which I have spoken, this means that 
we believe that being a right-holder does in fact give one self-respect, and that intuition 
endorses the idea that this reason for having self-respect is legitimate. In such a case it does 
seem likelv that Weak NC1 will be true. Admittedly, an acceptance of Weak NC1 is not 
entailed bv an acceptance of the conjunction of EC and the moral intuition. It is possible that, 
although being right-holders does give us self-respect and our moral intuitions suggest this is 
legitimate, nonetheless a proper understanding of moral principles will suggest that they do 
not endorse our status as right-holders as a legitimate reason to respect ourselves. But such a 
scenario would require that we have sufficient117 powerful reasons to contravene our 
intuitions in this case, and I cannot see what those reasons would be. Certain opponents of 
rights, such as some communitarians and some feminists, might insist that there are such 
reasons, but against them I refer back to Feinberg’s responses to their criticisms of the moral 
impoverishment thesis. In the absence of such reasons, it seems we are justified in saving that 
it is hghlv probable that our moral principles will endorse our status as right-holders as a 
legitimate reason for respecting ourselves. 
I would like to pause before moving to the second step of the argument, because 
some might think I have been too quick to accept EC. Indeed, I have argued onl\7 that Darbv’s 
objections to EC were unconvincing; perhaps there are better objections to be found. I have 
said that I am inclined to accept EC, but also that it is not the sort of claim that can be pro\-ed 
by philosophical argument. HoM~, then, might we strengthen the case for it? I thmk it can be 
strengthened b17 offering further empirical claims that will serve as explanations for why EC 
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is true. If these further claims are as widely acceptable as I suspect they are, then they will 
make it difficult to doubt the truth of EC. Obviouslv this discussion will take us on a slight 
digression from the argument in which we have been engaged, but I thmk it will be 
worthwhile. It should be noted that my arguments in favour of EC appljr onlv to rights we 
are aware of having. As we have seen, it is possible to have rights we are not aware of, but 
generally it seems likely that under normal circumstances we will be aware of at least some of 
the rights we have. 
A crucial feature of rights to keep in mind when we discuss EC is the intimate 
relation they have to claiming. Rights are valid claims, and correspondinglv the wav that 
rights are exercised is through the activitv of making claims. I think that one crucial feature 
relating to self-respect comes from the activitv of making claims, and another comes from the 
knowledge that we have claims. Let us consider the activitv of claim-making first. This 
acti\Tity requires that we assert ourselves, and furthermore our belief in the validitv of our 
claims encourages us to do so in a self-confident manner. The consistent acts of self-assertion 
required by claims (and by extension rights) seem likelv to help the agents who make those 
claims (and have those rights) to acquire and maintain self-respect. Whv this connection 
between self-assertion and self-respect? I would speculate that self-assertion (especially that 
which we feel is worthwhile or justified) is a natural antidote to the insecurities and even 
despair that come from knowing we are a seemingly-insignificant, small part of a vast and 
confusing world. From the cosmic perspective that we all sometimes take’o, our individual 
lixTes can seem absurd and devoid of meaning. Bv asserting ourselves, and especially I -  bv 
believing oursel\Tes to be making assertions others will find important or interesting, we are 
standing up and demanding to be reco,anised as important entities. Doing so on a consistent 
basis, and also knowing that one can do so on a consistent basis, help to cultiIrate the sort of 
self-respect that we have identified as an essential good. In addition we also remind others of 
My discussion here is influenced by Sartre’s notion of  forlornness in his ‘Existentialism is a 2 0 
Humanism’ in E-x-isteiztialisni (New York: Phlosophical Library, Inc., 1937), reprinted as ‘Free Will, 
Self-Construction, and Anguish’ in Reason arid Responsibilih.. ed. Joel Feinberg (London: Wadsworth, 
1996). 456-463. 
31 
our value, which helps to explain the connection Feinberg has said exists between self-respect 
and respect from others. 
I have indicated a second way in which we can explain whv it is rights and self- 
respect seem to be connected, a way related to the knowledge that we have claims (and 
rights). The important consideration here is a point that we found Feinberg making in a 
different context: rights and claims give us an important element of control over those who 
have corresponding duties. We can either hold others to their duties or release them. I think 
it is likelv that our experience of this sort of control, especiallv on a consistent basis, helps us 
to see ourselves as significant individuals and to respect ourselves accordingly. Our 
experience of this sort of control provides an antidote, parallel to the one provided bv self- 
assertion, to the lost or neglected feeling we might sometimes have in the complex and 
bewildering realm of human relations. As in the prior case, others are reminded of our value 
just as we are: in this case thev are reminded of it ever\’ time thev have a dutv toward us, or 
see that someone else has such a dutv. Yet there is no danger of megalomania here, because 
the tables will sometimes be turned, and w7e will owe duties to others. What results from 
these interactions is a community in which each individual can feel that she is an important 
entity, - i  vet not more important (in terms of moral worth) than others. Together I think the 
two considerations I have advanced help to make EC more plausible, and help to explain why 
it is so often the case in our world that persons without rights lack self-respect, and persons 
with rights do not. 
Let us now return from our digression, perhaps more comfortable in our belief of the 
truth of EC than we were previouslv. So far I have argued that it is hghlv probable that our 
moral principles will endorse the claim that our status as right-holders gives us a reason to 
respect ourselves. But, as we have seen, eiren Weak NC1 demands more than this: we must 
show that our moral principles indicate that the bcsf reason to respect ourselves will make 
reference to our status as right-holders. Again, mv aim is not to prove this claim, but to 
demonstrate that it is probable enough to believe with reasonable certainty. It seems the best 
(and perhaps onljr) wav we can do this is simplv to compare rights-related reasons with other 
32 
likely reasons for legitimate self-respect. Darby suggests several reasons that he takes to be at 
least as legitimate as rights-related reasons for yielding self-respect: the fact that one has a 
certain social status, that one is a human being, that one is a person, that one can act for 
reasons, or that one lives in accordance with personal or moral standards of conduct.” I will 
take this to be a promising list of rivals to rights-related reasons regarding self-respect, and 
consider them one at a time. 
Darby suggests that the fact that we have a certain social status might be a good 
reason to respect ourselves, but this first suggestion seems his most dubious one. I think that 
intuitively most people are inclined to regard this basis of self-respect as superficial and 
ultimately invalid. It seems that in order to be a good reason to respect oneself, and in order 
not to seem arbitrarv, a reason must make reference to one or more of our essential character 
traits. P’s reason for having self-respect must make reference to P’s genuine self, and I have 
argued that rights-related reasons do this. But social status connects, if at all, only verv 
loosely with our essential selves. Neither Donald Trump nor the Sultan of Brunei are 
paradigms of human merit, nor are the poor oi the f i r d  World necessarilv deserving of their 
fate. Our social status depends largelv on chance, and thus seems an arbitrary basis for self- 
respect. 
It might be contended, though, that the preceding argument has presupposed a 
contemporarv Western 14ew of the way in which social status is achieved. It is true that Plato, 
in the Republic, offered a lrision of a societv in which an individual’s social status was directly 
determined by h i s  essential traits. Even in our own time, the Hindu caste svstem claims to 
achieve a similar connection between worth and social status bv claiming that our social 
status in the present life is determined bv the wav we lived in the previous life. But I do not 
tlunk either of these counter-examples is particularly convincing. Plato’s idea requires that an 
outside par& makes a determination of an agent’s essential traits and then places him 
accordingly in societv, but this seems too difficult to achieve reliably in practice. The Hindu 
view would be a promising wav to explain social status if onh the metaphvsical claims it 
-’I Darby, 408. 
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relied upon were true, but the mysteries regarding reincarnation are perhaps too great to be 
accepted.?? I conclude, then, that the gap between social status and our essential selves is too 
great to allow us to accept Darby’s first suggestion. 
Let us consider Darby’s next suggestion, that our status as human beings gives us a 
0 aood reason to respect ourselves. At first glance, it might seem that I am committed to 
endorsing this suggestion, because I have argued that each indilTidua1 human life has 
essential value. But this would be misleading, because I have not endorsed the claim that 
human lives are special bccnusc they arc hunrniz. Rather, I have endorsed Dworkin’s suggestion 
that our wonder at certain processes involved in the lives of humans causes us to think of 
each individual as valuable. As we have seen, though, none of the processes Dworkin 
mentions are necessarilv exclusive to human beings: they might applv also (though perhaps 
to a lesser degree) to some of the higher animals as well. Anvone who finds Darby’s second 
suggestion promising must give us a reason to think that human beings are special qun human 
beings. I do not know of a successful attempt to do this. It seems that the argument is likely 
to turn on allegedly important features of humans, in which case we are back to the problem 
of the apparent arbitrariness of an17 features we choose. 
Darbv’s thrd suggestion is that we might legitimately respect ourselves because we 
are persons. Here we encounter the problem of how personhood is defined. If we define it in 
terms of the possession of rights (wluch Feinberg suggests but I am not myself endorsing) 
then it will onlv confirm the primacv of rights considerations. If we define it in any other way 
then the reason of personhood has reallv turned into a reason about whatever it is we are 
defining personhood in terms of. This mav reduce the reason of personhood to one of 
Darby’s other reasons for respecting oneself, such as being a human being or acting for 
reasons. If it reduces to something else, then we need to know7 what that something is, and 
how it connects with personhood. So I conclude that Darby’s suggestion that we would do 
well to respect ourselves because we are persons is unhelpful as it stands. 
-,, -- My concern to avoid extravagant philosophical commitments has its roots both in Occam’s razor and 
also in arguments such as that of W.K. Clifford’s in ‘The Ethics of Belief.’ See W.K. Clifford, 
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Darby also suggests that as good a reason as any to respect ourselves is that we can 
act for reasons. I must admit I do not actually disagree with this suggestion, but at the same 
time I do not think our agreement here is a problem for the establishment of a highlv probable 
Weak NC1. At first glance this sounds like a contradiction, for Weak NC1 saw that the best 
reason - the single best reason - to respect ourselves is that we are right-holders. But, as we 
shall see in Chapter 5, the resolution of this apparent contradiction lies in the fact that I 
consider rights to be a subclass of reasons. To be a right-holder is to be able to act for (certain 
kinds of) reasons. So mv argument that our status as right-holders is the best reason to 
respect ourselves is not actuallv at odds with Darbv’s suggestion that we would do just as 
well to respect ourselves because we can act for reasons. In fact, the two claims can be seen 
to amount to much the same thing. This  will obviouslv become more clear when we discuss 
exactly whv it is that rights are best understood as a subclass of reasons. 
Darbfs final suggestion regarding legitimate reasons for self-respect concerns our 
ability to live in accordance with personal or moral standards of conduct. Interestingly, 
Darbv here seems to be speaking of the very sort of moral principles to which we have 
referred approlringly as part of the moral backdrop for rights. What makes ths  suggestion 
less than satisfactory, though, is that he does not indicate that the content of these ’moral 
standards of conduct’ is important. It seems that, for Darby, consistently following any set of 
principles is sufficient to legitimate117 respect oneself. While it is true that I have not said 
much about the nature and content of moral principles in this chapter, I have nonetheless 
implied that their content is of great importance. It is reasonable to assume, even at this early 
stage of our discussion, that some moral principles will be better than others. It could be 
argued that Hitler was true to a set of moral principles, but we would not want to sav that he 
would have been justified in respecting himself as a result. So I think Darbv’s suggestion here 
is a necessarv but not sufficient reason for respecting oneself. As for respecting oneself 
because one is true to a good set of moral principles, I will try to show in Chapter 5 that a 
Lectrirw arzd E s s c ~ s ,  I’ol. 2 (London: MacMillan and Co.. 1879), 177-2 1 1 .  This sort of concern arises 
again in the final alternative I consider, which also concerns religious belief. 
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proper understanding of moral principles and the possession of rights that follow from them 
are very closely connected. They are so closely connected, in fact, that respecting oneself 
because one follows a good set of moral principles is tantamount to respecting oneself 
because one is a right-holder. This  will become more clear later. 
In addition to Darby’s suggestions we might consider an alternative that involves 
religious belief. It seems true that some people respect themselves because they are religious 
believers, and that this reason might carry an intuitive weight that, e.g., social status does not. 
This reason for self-respect might well seem just as good or better than anv alternative to 
those who hold it. Nonetheless there is still an important respect in which it seems to be not 
as ’good’ a reason as being a right-holder, namely that it requires us to believe in 
metaphvsical doctrines from which there is inadequate justification. Religious beliefs require 
that a believer take a positive position on profound metaphysical mvsteries, and the 
increasing secularisation of the world shows that manv persons are unwilling to do this. 
Because the arguments concerning the importance of rights do not involve similar 
extravagances, thev seem superior in that thev will seem reasonable to a greater range of 
persons. 
I conclude that all of the alternatives we ha1.e examined to Weak NC1 are either 
problematic, or not si,gnificantlv different from Weak NC1. An examination of competitors to 
Weak NC1 has failed to move us away from endorsing it. At this point, then, I feel justified in 
claiming that Weak NC1 is highly probable, and that we therefore have sufficient reason to 
believe it to be true. As I have said previously, I think this is all we need in order to be 
justified in continuing to focus on rights in the following chapters. If rights are the best reason 
to respect oneself, and self-respect is an essential good, then rights are in some sense essential. 
Though the importance of rights has not, strictly speaking, been proved, it has been made 
hghly probable. At the very least this is enough to place a high burden on those who would 
argue against the moral impoverishment thesis. 
It is interesting to see brieflv how far we can go at present toward establishing the 
other claims I listed at the beginning of the section. By establishing a highly probable Weak 
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NC1, it seems we have gone some way toward establishing Weak NC2, because, as we have 
said, self-respect is a necessary condition for respect from others. But there would still be 
u7ork to be done, because self-respect seems unlikely to be a sufficient condition. It seems that 
we will respect others only when they both respect themselves and treat others with respect. I 
thmk Weak NC2 is as highly probable as Weak NC1, but its establishment would require a 
long digression that is not strictly necessary for our purposes given our establishment of 
Weak NC1. As for Strong NC1 and Strong NC2, I think these claims are probablv too 
ambitious. They seem to be the versions that Feinberg himself wishes to defend, but Feinberg 
falls well short of succeeding in this task, and even in our more extensive discussion I think 
we would be better off focusing on the weaker versions of the normative claims, which are 
sufficientlv challenging to establish in their own right. 
At this point I would like to consider two objections that might be made against the 
argument I have advanced. Both objections address the worry that some may still have about 
whether, even after all we ha1.e said, rights are ultimatelv redundant in moral theory. The 
first objection is that if we trulv have a persuasive account of essential goods, then rights 
might be unnecessary. If Dworkin’s account of the sacred is as appealing as I claim, then it 
might be the case that evervone can be persuaded to accept its implications, and respect each 
other and themselves accordingly. Here it seems we would secure the essential goods I have 
argued for, vet have no need to protect these goods against each other in the way that rights 
do. But while there is nothing wrong with this objection in theory, I think it simplv will not 
work in practice in our actual world. MY response, in other words, brings us back to EC. It 
seems true that in a world of angels no one would need to have rights, because things would 
proceed just as this objection suggests thev might. But in our world of flawed human beings 
rights are needed as distinctlv effective protections of the goods I have discussed. The 
protections thev offer can offset anv natural tendencies we have toward insecurity, 
selfishness, short-sightedness, suspicion of others, and so forth. This  is not to take an overly 
pessimistic view of human nature: human beings display manv admirable tendencies as well. 
But in our moral theory we must take into account the full spectrum of human nature, and I 
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thmk that it is the objection under consideration which fails to do this. By painting an overly 
rosv view of human nature the objection encounters the danger of naivete. 
There is another way the problem of redundancv can be seen, and it will make up our 
second objection. We still may wonder whv duties, goals, or some combination of the two 
cannot secure the essential goods we have talked about. If anv of these options could be 
shown to be sufficient, then it looks as if rights would indeed be redundant. I will consider 
each in turn. Regarding duties, it is of course true that thev p l ~  an important role in the 
framework I have suggested, for rights and duties are quite closely connected. I will have 
more to sav about the nature of their connection in Chapter 5. This objection, though, 
contends that we would not lose anythmg bv securing our essential goods through duties 
alone, and disregarding rights. But as I discussed previouslv, Feinberg counters this objection 
b\r pointing out the fact that rights give us control over the duties of others, and I have tried to 
supplement his argument bv describing the wav in which the exercise of this sort of control is 
important for the cultivation of self-respect. If these arguments are convincing, then it seems 
that duties alone will not secure the essential goods under consideration. 
Would goals alone be anv more successful at securing our essential goods? I think 
thev would probably be even less so. To see this we can consider a utilitarian theorv that 
excludes rights entirelv: act-utilitarianism as it was envisioned bv Bentham. According to ths  
theory, we must always act in such a wav as to achieve the greatest happiness for the greatest 
number. As Bentham clearlv saw, the consistent observance of this principle leaves no room 
for rights. My ’right’ to anvthing becomes meaningless whenever the Greatest Happiness 
Principle dictates that agents should act contrary to it, and this includes even something as 
apparentlv fundamental as a right to life I might be said to possess. Considerations such as 
this prompted Bentham to make h i s  famous declaration that moral rights are ’nonsense,’ and 
absolute moral rights ‘nonsense upon stilts.”3 Yet this simple act-utilitarianism might still 
’\ 
-- Jeremy Bentham, ‘A Critical Examination of the Declaration of hghts’ in Bentham’s Political 
Tlzoirght, ed. Bhikhu Parekh (London: Croom Helm. 1973), 269. Bentham would not hmself endorse 
the view of happiness I suggest in the next sentence, but I do not mean for anything to turn on this. The 
point is that the version of utilitarianism under present consideration is a simple aggregative one and 
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claim to secure the goods we are seeking, because it can consider respect for others, self- 
respect, and respect for the value of individual lives as goods constitutive of happiness, and 
thus goods worth maximising and aggregating across individuals. It seems possible that a 
defender of such a position could claim that our essential goods are being recognised and 
promoted in this instance without an\. use of rights. 
The heart of the difference between my own account and that of the act-utilitarian 
concerns the latter's emphasis on aggregating happiness across persons. It does not matter to 
our utilitarian how the happiness in question (or its constitutive elements, which we are still 
imagining to be identical to our 'essential goods') is distributed, so long as its total is 
maximised. There is a growing consensus in contemporarv moral philosophv that this 
element of act-utilitarianism is unacceptable. It has often been stated that act-utilitarianism 
does not take seriouslv the distinction between individuals. On the account I have suggested 
this claim is supported bv the essential, non-instrumental value of each individual human life 
originally advanced bi- Dworkin. Our recognition of others as essentiallv valuable beings 
who undergo and participate in wondrous processes implies that we should respect them as 
the centres of experience, or foci of subjectivitv, which Feinberg claims thev are. I think this is 
what the 'distinction between indi1Tiduals' amounts to: each individual is a unique centre of 
experience, and deserves to be treated in a wav that recognises her as such. If our utilitarian 
is unmoved by t h s  argument, then he has two options. He can try to make a convincing case 
for why each individual life does not have the essential, non-instrumental value that I have 
argued it has, or he can argue that utilitv-without-rights can account for the relelrant 
distinction between indilriduals. I suggest that either option would prove extremely difficult. 
Our utilitarian may - 4  trv to improve the situation by adding duties to his moral theory, 
while still excluding rights. T h s  would allow him to say that we have duties to recognise that 
each indilTidua1 life is valuable, to respect others, and to respect ourselves, because acting on 
these duties leads to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. But there would be two 
does not involve any 'rules' other than the Greatest Happiness Principle. In this respect it is like 
Bentham's. 
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problems with trying to combine goals and duties in this wav. First, such a theory would 
encounter a problem of coherence similar to that brought out bv David Lvons in the context of 
combining rights and goals.14 Briefly, the problem is this: there mav be times when, in 
following such a moral theory, an agent would be better off (in the utilitarian sense of 
maximising happiness) violating a given duty, and there would be no adverse consequences 
of this one-time (or at least rare) violation. It seems that, in order to be a consistent utilitarian, 
our agent would have to violate the dutv. But this fact threatens the strength of the duties we 
are trving to include in utilitarianism, which we original117 envisioned to be exceptionless. 
With only a weak concept of duties we are in danger of encountering the problems mentioned 
above in the context of (duhi-less) act-utilitarianism. 
Even if a right-less combination of goals and duties could be shown to escape the 
worry about coherence,, it would still fail to address the problem encountered by duties alone. 
As we saw, a moralitv of duties without rights fails to account for the important element of 
control that rights give us over the duties which correspond to them. The addition of goals to 
our moralit\- of duties does nothmg to address this concern. Certainlv we cannot simph hope 
to substitute goals for rights in order to accomplish the task needed. So again, if the argument 
for the importance of having this element of control over duties has been effective,, then it 
looks as if the importance of rights has been defended. I move in the next section to a 
discussion of universal moral rights. 
1.4 Universal rights 
We are now readv to turn our attention to the importance of universal moral rights. 
In terms of our olrerall argument we must now move from ’evervone has (at least some) 
rights’ to ’everyone has (at least some of) the same rights.’ The first claim alone would not be 
sufficient for the establishment of universal rights, because it allows for the possibility that 
2-1 David Lyons. ‘Utility and fights’ in Theories of Rights, ed. Jereniy Waldron (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1984). 1 10- 152. 
40 
ever~7one has different sets of rights, and that no single right is held bv everyone. Now, if 
some rights are held by everyone, these rights will likelv concern the goods we have 
described as essential. As we have seen, essential goods make unique contributions to our 
well-being, and this applies not just to some agents but to all. Thus if it is also true that rights 
are essential in morality, it seems that some rights will be shared by all agents, and that these 
will be rights concerning the acquisition and/or preservation of essential goods, or goods 
derkrative of them. Although I have not attempted to give a full discussion of what essential 
b Ooods there are, I have indicated a few, such as self-respect, respect from others, and 
individual lives. I will offer a more complete discussion of essential goods in Chapter 4, but 
whatever this account turns out to be, it seems there will be universal rights relating to those 
b wods, both because essential goods applv to evervone, and because rights are essential in 
moralitv. 
My discussion of rights and essential goods, however, might seem to present us with 
a danger of redundancv regarding the goods of self-respect and respect from others. That is, 
if agents alreadv achieve self-respect and respect from others bv having rights geizcvnlli/ (as we 
saw in our defence of Feinberg), why must thev further secure these goods bv having specific 
rights to them? There are two points to note about this apparent redundancv. First, even if it 
is true, it does not invalidate our argument that there are universal rights which pertain to 
essential goods. As we have begun to see, there are other essential goods aside from the two 
forms of respect for which no danger of redundancv will arise. Furthermore, redundancies 
can be tolerated: it mav be conceptuallv untidv to secure the two forms of respect twice, as it 
were, but the problem need not be seen as deeper than this. 
Second, though, I am not certain the alleged redundancv exists, because specific 
rights to self-respect and respect from others often seem to do important work that is not done 
merelv * &  b~7 securing the two forms of respect bv means of having rights generally. The 
difference comes out clearlv in a case in which I am tortured (which we shall assume for the 
moment is a 1-iolation of my right to respect from others). If I have a specific right to receive 
respect from others, and especially if this right is enshrined in law, I may gain some sort of 
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justice for the agony I have endured. This recompense would serve as a reminder and 
reaffirmation that respecting others is important. Consider now the other case, in which I 
have some rights, but not specifically the right to receive respect from others. In this case I 
will similarly have self-respect (by virtue of our argument in the first section), but I will not 
have a similar recourse against my tormentors who fail to respect me. I can point out that 
they should not have done what they did, and that thev should have respected me because I 
am a right-holder, but I Cannot demand specific redress in the way I could in the previous 
case. The only sorts of recourse I have are those entailed bv the specific rights I possess. Put 
another way, particular rights are performative in a way that the possession of rights 
n aenerallv is not. Thus it seems that universal rights to self-respect and respect from others 
~ o u l d  o useful work that would not be done by the possession of rights generally, even 
though the possession of ani’ rights helps to increase our self-respect and respect from others. 
So the problem of redundancy that we identified seems onlv to have been apparent, and I 
take the importance of universal moral rights to ha1.e been established. 
Let us conclude the chapter by summarising where we have been and indicating 
where we are going. I have endorsed Feinberg’s understanding of the nature of rights, and 
argued that h i s  moral impoverishment thesis, in a relrised form that I feel is consistent with 
h s  original version, is highlir plausible. I have defended what I take to be an implication of 
Feinberg’s account that respect from others and self-respect are essential goods, and in m\r 
justification of them I have, borrowing from Dworkin, argued for the existence of a third 
essential good, the value of each individual life. I have tried to strengthen the moral 
impoverishment thesis by emphasising the connection that right-holding enjojrs with self- 
respect. Finallv I extended the argument to universal moral rights and suggested that, in the 
case of universal rights to the two forms of respect, the establishment of their importance 
evades the apparent problem of their redundancv. 
The following chapter will begin the project of justifiring universal rights. It will do 
so by arguing that a credible account of universal rights requires that those rights are 
grounded in an objective meta-ethics. The argument is general and highly theoretical, and 
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moves us a step closer to the establishment of our own rights view. I will go on to argue that 
this view aligns me at least broadly with the natural law tradition, and I will consider my 
place within that context. The chapter aims to narrow the range of views that will count as 
plausible universal rights views, in order to lend greater authorih. to the view at which I 
arri\Te in later chapters. 
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Chapter 2 
The Need For a New Natural Law Theory of Universal 
Rights 
In the previous chapter I tried to defend the idea that rights, and especiallv uni\Tersal 
rights, are essential in a proper understanding of moral theory. In this one I will begin an 
inllestigation of what sort of universal rights view is best. The present discussion is not a 
delineation of a particular rights liew in all its detail, but an argument about the general 
strategy our lriew should emplov and why. I will argue that, in order to be credible, an 
account of unilrersal rights must be grounded in an objective meta-ethics. Particularly, 
universal rights must follow from objecti1.e values. I then go on to argue that this view places 
me at least broadly within the natural law tradition of rights justification, whxh gives us a 
natural rights view. I then criticallv examine other natural rights views with the dual purpose 
of explaining why I feel a new view is needed, and also directing our future discussion 
through the lessons that such an examination \Gelds. 
As such this chapter begins a second phase of the thesis, a phase that will carrv on 
through the next chapter. In this phase I am interested in narrowing the scope of what will 
count as an acceptable, or plausible, or credible, account of uni\Tersal rights. If we succeed in 
doing this, then the view I present in Chapters 4 and 5 will enjoy an authoritv it would 
otherwise have lacked. The point of Chapters 2 and 3 is not to offer an eliminative argument 
which shows all other views of universal rights to be unacceptable - such a project would be 
too ambitious, and I am not elren sure it is possible. Rather, the point is to set up the ~7iew 
which emerges in the final two chapters as one which enjovs important advantages over 
manv alternati\re views, and thus might be said to be defeasiblv the best view available. If we 
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succeed in doing this, then our view will enjoy an authority greater than that of simply being 
one alternative among many, with nothing to choose between them. 
2.1 Universal rights and objective values 
I wish to defend the soundness of the following argument concerning universal rights 
and objective moral values: 
P1: Rights depend for their existence on conceptuallv 
prior moral values. 
P2: If certain rights exist universally, then the \dues 
on which thev depend must also be universal. 
P3: If these universal rights are to be credible, the moral 
values on which they are based must be universal 
in a strong sense, i.e. objecti\Tel\r valid. 
C: A proper theorv of universal rights must be grounded 
in a meta-ethics of moral objectivit1.. 
The argument is general and schematic. It does not purport to establish that there are in fact 
uniITersa1 rights, or that moralit\r is in fact objective. The connection it hopes to establish 
between universal rights and objectivity is a conditional one: that if a credible account of 
universal rights exists, it must have an objecti1.e grounding. I will also refrain from 
discussing in detail how it is that rights might be derived from objective moral values. The 
issues I am leaving aside for now, concerning the exact nature of moral objectivitv, the actual 
existence of universal rights, and the wav in which these rights are derived from moral 
Idues, are all difficult issues, and indeed thev will be the primary concerns of the chapters to 
come. 
Since I will be emphasising the importance of moral values it is important to explain 
what I understand them to be. I shall be content in this chapter to understand values in quite 
a simple way as those concepts whose objects we designate as having worth. Thus if we 
consider the continuation of life to be a value that we hold, we are saying that the 
continuation of life has worth. If we consider the d i c t i on  of pain to be a disldue, then we 
are claiming that it is something that has negati1.e worth. In Chapter 4 I will begin to explain 
45 
how values are best understood in terms of YCIISOIZS, but I think that in this discussion to talk of 
reasons would introduce peripheral issues that would onlv prove distracting. I will be 
concerned in this chapter with values that exist at the most fundamental level, which I have 
identified in the previous chapter as essential values. I will not discuss the content of these 
ITalues further, but I will try to ascertain why they are needed to underpin universal rights. 
Thus I acknowledge the existence of derivative instrumental values, but I will not emphasise 
them in what follows. 
I have indicated that later talk of values will be made in terms of reasons, but should 
be careful to specify that reasons-talk will not be intended to pre-empt values-talk. It will be, 
rather, a more specific way of understanding values. Similarlv, we might wonder how moral 
values relate to moral principles. We saw in the previous chapter that Feinberg thinks that an 
important connection exists between rights and moral principles. This  is that rights are valid 
claims, and that claims are valid just when their validitv is determined bv the moral principles 
with which we are worlung. Similarlv, the Scanlonian position I endorse in Chapter 4 will 
also emphasise the importance of moral principles. I see my present discussion as being 
closelv compatible with these concerns of Feinberg and Scanlon, because I envision a \'er\. 
close connection to hold between values and principles. I understand principles to be general 
normative statements whose content is informed by the values we recognise, and whch guide 
us in making moral decisions. principles are expressions of values, and it is impossible that 
we could have a valid principle that has no correspondence with a \Talue that we recognise 
and endorse. So to sav that universal rights must be based in objective moral values is also to 
say that thev must be based in objective moral principles. Since values are the more 
fundamental of the two concepts, though, it seems appropriate that we concentrate primarily 
on values.35 
With this discussion as our background let us trv to justify each of our premises, 
beginning with the first. As we have seen, this premise states that moral rights depend for 
'5 My concentration on values over principles might also make the argument in this chapter more 
appealing to certain moral particularists who accept the existence of values but find the concept of 
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their existence on conceptually prior moral values. This  statement is meant to apply not just 
to the moral rights we all share, but also to those moral rights possessed bv some agents but 
not others (such as those created by particular promises and contracts). One way to argue in 
favour of P1 is to try to envision whether anv plausible alternatives to it exist. Such a sunrev 
does not seem to yield very promising candidates. It is logically possible that rights could 
exist without reference to moral values, vet it is mvsterious how thev could plausiblv be 
shown to do so. It seems unsatisfactory to simplv declare that rights exist without anv 
0 orounding at all, and if moral values are as fundamental as I have suggested, thelr seem to be 
the most obvious and promising way to ground rights. For example, we have a right to life 
because we value the continuation of life. 
In order to strengthen our case for the first premise, however, let us brieflv revisit 
some alternative methods of grounding rights. Dworkin has suggested that there are three 
broad kinds of moral theories: those that are dutv-based, goal-based, and right-based.'" 
Allowing t h s  distinction to frame our discussion, I now wish to claim that any rights included 
in anv of these kmds of moral theories must be justified in terms of moral values in order to 
be believable. Let us first take a look at dutv-based theories. Here the term 'dutv-based' 
sounds like a threat to our first premise, because it seems to implv that duties would be the 
ultimate basis for rights. This problem, though, turns out to be illusorv, which can most easily 
be seen bv turning to the example of Kant's ethics.Z7 There we see that persons are said to 
have rights because others have duties to treat them in certain wavs. This  is the sense, then, in 
which the theorir is dutv-based. But can these duties be the ultimate basis for our rights? It 
seems that in such a case the duties themselves would be arbitrary, and Kant himself certainly 
does not envision such a situation. Even Kant's master duty, the categorical imperative, is a 
moral principle that is an expression of the value of universalisation. This value, 17ia the 
principle, is what gi\Tes the duties, and by extension the rights which are derived from them, 
principles to be unhelpful. Nothing that I go on to argue in this section dcpeizds on the claim that 
principles follow closely from values. 
Ronald Dworlun, Taking Rights Serious(\> (London: Duckworth, 1977). 26 
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their legtimacy. Thus it is true for Kant that rights (via duties) require for their existence a 
reference to a moral value. It seems that if the label 'dutv-based' is the correct one to applv to 
Kant, it is so only in the rather weak sense that duties are conceptually more fundamental 
than rights and goals, not that they are the ultimate basis for rights, or indeed for moralitv 
generally. 
It seems that the same point must hold for those who claim that our rights derive 
from duties to God. Some might think that we have a duty to God to lolre our neighbour, and 
that this duhi not onlv gives God a right against us, but also gives our neighbour a sort of 
right bv proxv. But even these duties to God cannot hang in the air unsupported. The77 too 
relv on conceptuallv prior moral values, such as the value we attach to obeving God's 
rexrealed teachings (on account of God's goodness, etc.). So again we see that a particular 
dutv-based conception of rights is not plausible without a basis in moral \dues. Since the 
Kantian transcendental approach and the theistic approach are the two main strains of duty- 
based theories and neither ha\Te offered us a counter-example to P1, I think we can sav of 
dutv-based theories generally that thev must rely on moral values. 
A similar conclusion can be drawn about goal-based rights, for similar reasons. 
Rights 'based' on goals are actuallv based more fundamentally on values that underpin those 
goals. If I have a right not to be killed on a utilitarian account, this can onlv be because 
refraining from killing persons leads to the greatest happiness of the greatest number. 
Utilitarian rights require a reference to a moral principle, namely the greatest happiness 
principle, and ultimately to the value of happiness generallv. It is a similar story for accounts 
that are consequentialist but not utilitarian, like the theorv of the early Scanlon in 'Rights, 
Goals, and Fairness."S In that piece Scanlon claims that rights are justified by reference to 
whether thev contribute to the basic goods of fairness and equality. Thus his view appeals to 
the consequences of rights, vet is not utilitarian because he does not understand fairness and 
equalitv to (necessarily) contribute to happiness. For our purposes this account is 
~~ ~ 
> -  
- There is a minority position among moral philosophers which claims that Kant's view is not duty- 
based but right-based. I endorse the position that he is duty-based, but to enter into this controversy 
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conceptually similar to the utilitarian account: rights are justified ultimately bv reference to 
the values of fairness and equality. 
With regard to right-based theories, an interesting challenge to P1 is presented bv 
John Mackie, who claims that morality must be right-based.29 He thinks that we cannot do 
without morality, that morality is either right-based, goal-based, or dutv-based, that dutv- 
based moralities are clearly unacceptable, and that goal-based moralities reduce to right- 
based ones. His style of argument, then, is eliminative: no other kind of moralit\. will do, so 
we must invent one based on rights. He seems to believe that h is  eliminative argument 
allows him to forgo anv further discussion of the grounding of rights. But Maclue’s argument 
is less than fullv successful. He dismisses duhi-based approaches almost without argument, 
which seems too quick. His arguments against goal-based theories are predicated on a doubt 
about the flexibilitv of the greatest happiness principle to explain the diverse and progressive 
0 ooals we have, but utilitarians may be able to counter this criticism. Worse, Mackie does not 
0 oive us much of an idea of which rights are valid, and whv thev are valid. Thus he does not 
provide us with a fullJT-formed alternative picture to the one indicated bv P1. It mav be true 
that there is not a necessary conceptual connection between rights and our basic values, but 
Mackie does not gi1.e us anv reason to prefer an alternative picture of how rights are 
c, orounded. 
Other ’right-based’ theorists ha1.e tried to ground rights in human dignity. They wish 
to claim both that rights are fundamental, and that persons possess rights on account of their 
inherent dignitv. But in order to hold onto both of these claims, such theorists must 
understand the word ’fundamental’ in a rather weak sense. Rights may well be more 
fundamental on this \.iew than duties or goals, but thev nonetheless rely crucially on the claim 
that persons possess dignity, and on the value of dignihr. The ’right-based’ view that relies on 
dignity is, in other words, not trulv right-based. I am not now criticising it on substantive 
mrould be to stray too far from our current concerns. 
2h 
29 
T.M. Scanlon. ‘Ibghts, Goals, and Fairness’ reprinted in Theories q f  Righrs, 137- 152. 
John Maclue, ‘Can There Be a bght-Based Moral Theory?’ ibid., 168-1 8 1. 
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grounds, but merely pointing out that it is conceptuallv unsuited to provide a counter- 
example to our first premise. 
There is a sense, then, in which the view I am presenting concerning the priority of 
values need not be seen as a rival view to right-based, dutv-based, and goal-based theories. 
We can understand these theories in a weak sense such that, e.g., a right-based view is one 
which holds that rights take priority over duties and goals, but which still bases rights 
ultimate117 on values. This reading requires that relativelv weak necessary conditions hold in 
order for a view to qualify as right-based. On this weak reading, mv argument does no harm 
to those who still wish to speak of their theories as right-based, goal-based, etc. However, 
there is a stronger reading whereby we understand these theories to indicate that the concepts 
in question are truly fundamental, e.g. that a right-based theory indicates that rights need not 
refer to anv underlving concepts such as principles or values. I have tried to make the case 
that there are serious questions about whether this stronger view is tenable regarding the 
presence of rights in an77 of the three kinds of moral theories Dworlun identifies. 
I take this analvsis of duhr-based, goal-based, and right-based views to provide a 
defence of the claim that rights depend for their existence on prior moral values. I hope the 
analvsis is at least sufficientlv convincing to place the burden of proof in the debate on those 
who would say that rights can exist without being based on values. Perhaps there is a theorv 
that can ground rights adequate117 without reference to values which falls under the broad 
categories I have examined. Alternati\relv perhaps there is a successful exotic species of rights 
theorv the likes of which I have not considered. But I cannot see what these would be, and 
until a counter-example to P1 can be found I will consider it to be justified. 
Our second premise moves us from a discussion of moral rights generallv to a 
discussion of universal moral rights. It states that if certain rights exist universall\~ then the 
d u e s  on which they depend must also be universal. At first glance this proposition might 
ha\Te the ring of Self-elTidence, but the fact that moral rights (generally) require moral values 
does not entail that universal moral rights require universal moral values. For one thing, 
there is no reason we must expect a one-to-one relation to hold between rights and values. 
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We can envision a scenario in which different rights might follow from the same value. For 
example, if (as our discussion in Chapter 1 suggests) we should value the preservation of 
individual lives, it might follow that each individual has a right not to be murdered, but it 
might also follow that individuals have rights to basic necessities for survival such as food, 
water, and shelter. Now, it also seems true that a particular right might be deri\Table 
independently from two different moral values. Let us take as an example the alleged right to 
an education. We might be said to have this right because it follows from the Iralue of 
personal autonomy, for it seems that being educated does indeed contribute to our sense of 
our own development as individuals. But alternativelv, we might be said to have a right to an 
education because we value that society as a whole has members that are well-informed 
about the world.30 This  seems to be a reason of roughly equal plausibilitv to the one 
concerning autonomv. Of course, it is certainlv possible that the best explanation of a right to 
an education might include both of these values, but the important point for our current 
discussion is that it does not seem necessarv that ths  is so. A right to an education might be 
explained adequatek - <  by either value independent of the other. 
While it is true that we cannot expect a one-to-one relation to hold between rights and 
1-alues, it is also true that such a relation is not needed in order for P2 to be true. The first 
lund of deviation from a one-to-one relation that we identified, namelv that more than one 
right might follow from a given value, is not a threat to P2. This  is easv enough to see by 
returning to our example above. Let us sav it is the case that the value of individual lives 
yields several rights, such as the right not to be murdered, the right to acquire food, the right 
to acquire shelter, etc. Furthermore let us say for the moment that these rights can be derived 
only from this principle. If these conditions hold, then the following statement must be true: 
if the rights in question are held universallv, then the moral principle must also be held 
universally. It would be false to say, for example, that everyone could have the right to 
3 0 
It seems that in such a case we would have not only a right to an education but a duty to be educated, 
but the addition of a duty here does not affect the argument. 
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adequate nourishment without the existence of the moral principle that each individual life is 
valuable. 
The story is different, however, for the second kind of deviation we mentioned. We 
saw that it appeared to be the case that, for at least some rights, a single right could plausiblv 
be derived independently from two different values. It is important to see that this sort of 
deviation is a threat to P2 in a way that the first kind was not. If a particular right can be 
derived independently from more than one moral value, then it is possible that that right 
might be held universally while the relevant values will not be. For example, it could be the 
case that evervone is understood to have a right to an education, but not evervone recognises 
the value of individual autonomv. This  is because some base their recognition of the right to 
an education only on a recooanition of the value that the good of society should be promoted 
(assuming of course that education does in fact promote the general good). The real danger 
for P2 is that all of our rights could turn out to exhibit the feature of being derivable 
independently from different values. If so, it could then be the case that we hold rights 
universalh. without holding m y  values universallv. Another example of a right that can be 
deril-ed from two different values might be found in the context of an alleged right not to be 
tortured. Some might think that such a right is based on a value which concerns the victim of 
torture, while some (e.g. Kant) might tlunk the right derives from a value concerning the 
rationalitv and dignih- of the torturer. 
Let us stay with the example of torture in our defence of P2. It is true that there seem 
to be at least two different values from which a right not to be tortured could be derived. One 
concerns the disvalue of the effects of torture on the victim, while another concerns the 
dislvalue of the activitv of torture as it pertains to the torturer. But we will recall that I was 
careful to specifv earlier in the section that the values I am concerned with in mv argument 
are values that exist on the most fundamental level. Is there a value (or disvalue) more 
fundamental than the two considered here, from which these two might be said to be 
derived? I think there might be, and it could take the form of the disvalue of causing others to 
suffer. It seems that any right not to be tortured would have to make reference to this more 
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ultimate value. The fact that a right not to be tortured can be derived from different 
derivative values, then, does not harm P2. This defence has plausibiliW so long as it is 
plausible that the disvalue of torture to both the victirn and the perpetrator follows from the 
general disvalue of inflicting suffering on others. The hope is that, for all of our universal 
rights, the right can be derived from one value onlv, even if it mal’ be true that some values 
vield more than one right. We will have to make do with a certain amount of hope at this 
stage, because a complete defence of P2 requires that we address e\Tery rele\Fant example, and 
there are examples of fundamental values wluch 1 will not address until Chapter 4. But I 
hope I have provided a model for how7 it can be that examples that seem to fit uneasilv with 
P2 can be reconciled with it. 
We have noted that P2 can be true without a one-to-one relation holding between 
unilrersal rights and universal values. It is possible that more than one right might be derived 
from one basic value. Additionally, nothing we have said precludes the possibility that there 
mav be basic moral values that exist vet do not vield rights. What seems not to be the case, 
however, is that more than one basic moral value vields the same right. It seems sometimes to 
be the case that more than one derivatilre value vields the same right, but the hope is that, in 
each case in which this is so, the lralues in question themselves derive from a common basic 
value. 
Our third premise states that in order for universal rights to be credible, the moral 
\dues on which the~7 are based must be universal in a strong sense, i.e. objectivelv valid. 
Immediately we notice that there are terms in tlus premise that need to be explained. We 
need to know why credibilihi is an important standard to apply to universal rights, and what 
it consists in. We need to know what is meant by moral objectivih., and whv I have identified 
it as a kind of strong universalitv. Let us first consider the standard of credibility. Broadly, 
moral judgements, rights, principles, etc. are credible if we have good reasons to believe in 
them. It is clear that a standard like this is needed if our rights (and other concepts) are not to 
appear arbitrary. It is a higher standard than mere possibility, intelligibility or coherence, for 
it requires not onl\r that the concept in question is possible and makes sense but that a strong 
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case can be made for its actual existence. In short, it indicates that the concept in question is 
justified, all  things considered. It is important to see the implications of this discussion for 
universal rights. If universal rights are to be credible, then it should be possible, at least in 
principle, that everyone can regard them as justified. This  is the case because universal rights 
b17 their nature apply to everyone; thus their credibiliw must range similarly over all agents. 
It need not be the case that everyone in fact thnks universal rights are valid, but it must be 
the case that everyone is, at least in principle, able to recognise their \ialiditv. 
Tlus leads us into a discussion of the term 'objective.' Bv objective moral values I 
mean those values which are in some sense valid independent of the beliefs and desires of 
agents. An objective moral value would have its status even if evervone in the world 
disbelieved it, or no one had even considered it. I will refer to these values as being universal 
in a strong sense, because their universal correctness has binding force. Objective values can 
be contrasted with subjective ones, which are values that do depend for their existence on the 
beliefs and/or desires of agents. The categories of objective and subjective do not exhaust the 
possibilities for moral values, however, for such values could also be intersubjective. 
Intersubjectivitv might be thought of as a status between those of objectivity and subjectiviv, 
one which is characterised bv a state of affairs of evervone adhering to certain values even 
though there is no binding reason they must. Intersubjective agreement can range over 
agents as expansi1Tely as objecti1.e agreement, but has a contingent nature that allies it with 
subjectivih.. This contingent nature is what leads me to refer to intersubjective values that are 
shared bv evervone as being universal in a weak sense. 
Having clarified our terms, we are now in a position to see how our defence of P3 
must proceed. We must show both that universal rights are credible in a meta-ethics of moral 
objectivity, and also that thev fail to reach a threshold of credibility in a meta-ethics of 
subjectivitv or intersubjectivitv. The first task is perhaps the easier one. If moral values are 
objective and universal rights are somehow derived from them, it follows straightforwardly 
that these rights would be credible. This is both because we are justified in favouring their 
existence over their non-existence, and because their justified status would be binding on 
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everyone. We would be justified in favouring the existence of universal rights precisel~ 
because we are justified in favouring the existence of the moral values in question, and 
because we are justified in favouring the validitv of the derivation of the universal rights in 
question from those values. Furthermore, the fact that the these rights deri1.e from objective 
values implies that they share the authorihi of those values: just as it is in principle 
demonstrable that evervone is justified in believing in the existence of objective values, so it is 
in principle demonstrable that evervone is justified in recognising and respecting the 
universal rights that follow from them. Even if someone denies the validih. of these universal 
rights through some sort of error, it is in principle possible to demonstrate to her that she is 
wrong. Thus a contingent fact of disagreement about universal rights need not be a threat to 
their credibilihr . 
It is similarlv not very difficult to show that universal rights will not be credible in a 
meta-ethcs of mere subjectivitv. Bv 'mere subjectivih.' I mean a subjective meta-ethics that 
features no widespread agreement about values or principles. It is clear that any attempt to 
institute universal rights in such a svstem would not o n l ~  lack credibilitv, but would in fact be 
wholly impracticable. Without a general agreement about values it is mysterious how there 
could be widespread agreement about the importance or the content of rights. This  fact of 
disagreement would be sufficient to defeat the notion of universal rights, because unlike what 
we saw was the case in an objective meta-ethics, there would be no explanation we could 
appeal to (even in principle) under mere subjectiviw to settle the disagreement. 
A somewhat more difficult claim to demonstrate is that universal rights will lack 
credibilitv in an intersubjective meta-ethics. It seems we can, after all, imagine a scenario in 
which the contrarv is intuitivelv plausible. We can imagine it might be true that all agents 
respect (at least some of) the same moral values - even though nothing about the nature of 
those values savs thejr must - and that thev furthermore think that rights are valuable moral 
concepts. Moral agents might then agree both on the existence of universal rights, and on the 
content of those rights. These universal rights would also seem, at first glance, to pass our test 
of credibilitv. In this world of harmonious intersubjectivity everyone would agree that we are 
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justified to agree about the validity of universal rights. Because agents agree about values 
and principles, it is likely they will agree about the moral concepts which follow from those 
values. Thus they can agree that everyone possesses certain rights, and they each be relied 
upon always to respect those rights. 
My response to this counter-argument to P3 is that although the state of affairs it 
depicts is theoretically possible, it will never come about in the actual world. In making this 
argument I am relving on some of the same empirical claims I made in defence of EC in 1.3. It 
seems evident that human beings are creatures who possess manv diverse aims, and the aims 
of some individuals will inevitably conflict with those of others. If this is the case, then it 
seems highly unlikel\. that czw+yyonc will reach intersubjective agreement about a n v t h g ,  even 
if the subject of the agreement is very basic, intuitivelv appealing rights, such as the right not 
to be tortured. Even if it is the case that a great many people agree that evervone has a right 
not to be tortured or murdered, it seems likelv there will alwavs be dissenters in the world, 
whether out of complex philosophical disagreement, malice, or sheer perversitv. We ha1.e all 
experienced hob7 difficult it is to get a large group to agree on anvthing; we can extrapolate 
from this experience to see how difficult it would be to have evervone in the world reach a 
consensus. 
At this point, though, a defender of the objection I have described to P3 might 
complain that we are asking too much of intersubjectivih.. She might sav that bv insisting on 
truly universal agreement we have placed the burden of the intersubjective argument too 
high, and are being unrealistic. What is wrong, such a person might ask, with an 
intersubjective agreement about universal rights that is widespread, though not universal? 
Surely this scenario is not unrealistic, and it seems that these rights could be upheld by the 
majority against anv dissenters. Here we would seem to have an example of intersubjective 
uni\Tersal rights that could be put into practice and operate quite well in the world. 
MY response to this argument is that, although it presents a scenario in which 
universal rights are, in a sense, practicable, it does not present them as credible. To see this 
we must remind ourselves about what is entailed b\7 credibilitv, and particularly by the 
56 
credibility of a moral concept that claims to be universal. In order for a concept to be credible 
it must be true that we are justified in accepting it. The scope of beings to whom the word 
’we’ applies in this formulation depends on the scope of beings to whom the moral concept in 
question applies; for a concept such as universal rights that purports to applv to everyone, the 
word ’we’ will similar117 applv to 
accept that universal rights are justified, all t h g s  considered. We have seen that in an 
objective meta-ethics this is not a problem, because the objectivitv of moral values implies that 
we are either correct or incorrect to believe in the existence of universal rights, and that the 
matter is discoverable bv us. But this is the point at which objectivih. and intersubjectivit). 
crucially come apart. Even in the face of widespread agreement about universal rights, it is 
mvsterious what could be said in an intersubjective meta-ethics to change the minds of the 
minorihr of rights sceptics. Coercion is presumably out of the question, because we would 
imagine that this is just the sort of behaviour that defenders of universal rights are interested 
in preventing. Our rights dissenters could be reasoned with, persuaded, cajoled, but in the 
end their would still be under no obligation to accept the validity of universal rights. Such 
rights are derived from particular moral values, and our rights dissenters are under no 
obligation to accept those moral values. Those \dues are not in anv sense correct, after all, 
but onlv widely shared. 
That is, evervone must in principle be able to 
To sav that rights dissenters are under no obligation to accept uni\-ersal rights in an 
intersubjective meta-ethcs is not necessarily to sav that there is 120 YC(ISOR at all that the 
majority support unilrersal rights. The majoritv may well have man\’ reasons for supporting 
universal rights: the\r might think that universal rights contribute to the overall happiness of 
the world, or that thev promote equalitv, or that they protect individual autonomy, or a 
combination thereof. Intersubjective rights-defenders mav passionately believe in these 
values and the principles connected with them, and be able to sing their praises articulately 
and at length. In doing so thev might win over an17 rights-dissenters who happen to share 
.? 1 We should keep in mind that I have not specified exactly who everyone is (e.g. persons, humans, 
animals. etc.). But this does not affect the present argument. 
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their values, but may have inadequately appreciated some of the moral facts present (such as 
the relation of rights to those values and principles) . The problem, though, is that rights- 
dissenters may not share the values of the rights-defenders, and if this is the case, then there 
will be nothing rights-defenders can do. The arguments of rights-defenders would have to 
presuppose the correctness of certain values and principles, and this is exactlv what they 
cannot do on an intersubjectivist moralitv. 
I conclude with regard to P3 that anv values that underlie universal moral rights must 
be universal in a strong sense. Thev must be objective values, values that are in some sense 
correct for everyone, and whose correctness is in principle discoverable bv anj'one. Though it 
is theoreticallv possible to have a credible concept of universal moral rights that are 
underpinned bv weak (intersubjective) moral values, this cannot happen in the actual world 
because of certain empirical facts about humans. Persistent rights-critics are bound to exist, 
and intersubjectivist rights-defenders will have nothing effective to sa17 to them. 
More broadlv, I consider each of our premises to have been defended satisfactorilv at 
ths  stage. I conclude, then, that a proper theorv of universal moral rights must be grounded 
in a meta-ethics of moral objecti1Tih.. On a credible account of universal moral rights, the 
rights must themselves be objective in the sense that they are both possessed bv, and held b\i 
others against, those who mistaken117 denv their existence. Rights can have this very strong 
status onl17 if it is conferred on them b17 values that halie the same sort of status. Now, there is 
some good news and bad news that follows from our conclusion. The good news is that our 
present inquir17 has clearlv pointed the wav forward for our future discussion. We know that 
an exploration of objectivity is needed, and we know that we will also need to explain how it 
is that rights follow from objective values. The bad news is that it seems that a credible 
account of universal rights must take on all the additional problems associated with moral 
objectilritv. Many rights theorists would think thev have enough worries without additionally 
importing those of moral objectivity, but if the argument I have presented is correct, we have 
no choice but to try. 
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2.2 Natural rights theories 
I believe the argument presented in the previous section places mv thought at least 
broadly in the natural law tradition of rights justification. Theories of this sort are commonl17 
referred to as natural rights theories. If the theory I have presented is a kind of natural rights 
theory then it is worthwhile to discuss how it fits into that tradition. I will do this with an 
awareness of the fact that the position I have argued for above is still a bare sketch, and will 
have to be filled out in subsequent chapters. Nonetheless I think that el'en r n \ T  embrvonic 
position can be usefullv compared to other natural rights accounts, and that such a 
comparison is useful as a wav of helping to direct our inquirv in chapters to come. 
Since natural rights theories depend crucially on claims about natural law, our first 
project is to determine what counts as a natural lam7 position, and this proves to be 
surprisingl!- difficult. Clearly the natural law is meant to be some lund of 0bjectiK.e basis for 
morality, though in twisting its way through almost the entire historv of Western philosophy 
it has undergone several permutations, performing various functions for theorists with varied 
aims. The natural law tradition ma\7 reach back as far as Plato, insofar as he believed that 
human behaviour is subject to an unchanging normative order that is part of the natural 
world. Natural law may be more commonly identified with Aristotle, who believed that the 
inner principle of change in beings - which for humans is reason - naturally led them to do 
certain things, and that goodness can be ascribed to those actions. Conversely, then, whatever 
we do contrary to our inner principle of change is morally bad. The Stoics thought that 
reason in humans is part of the logos, the force which governs the universe. So although they 
had different metaphysical ~riews from Aristotle, theFT agreed with him that the natural law 
for humans is goL7erned by reason. Aquinas followed Aristotle closely on natural law, as on 
many other philosophical matters, though for him the legitimacy of natural law depends at 
least partly on the teachings God has revealed to us. An important shift occurs in the early 
modern period with the thought of Grotius. Though he was himself a theist, Grotius thought 
that natural law was valid and comprehensible without God. Just as radically, he was the 
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first to see natural law as itself a theory of human rights. Grotius is in some ways the key 
figure for us in the history of natural law, and I will examine him in more depth shortlv. I 
will also discuss Locke, who followed Grotius in many important respects. After Locke 
natural law lav mostly dormant for the next several centuries, though in recent times it has 
been revived bv several figures including John Finnis, who grounds natural law in basic 
0 ooods whose goodness is self-evident. Though Finnis is perhaps the best-known of recent 
natural law theorists, I will not examine his thought in detail because he is not much 
concerned with derixring rights from natural law.3’ 
This survev of natural rights theories, cursorv though it may be, helps us to 
understand what is meant bv natural law. As I have mentioned, for all theorists natural law 
is a kind of objective basis for moralihr. A more specific characteristic of natural law that 
emerges from this survev is that it is often understood to be in some respect a part of nature, 
and discoverable by the natural faculties of humans. It is debatable whether a theory must 
have both elements (objectivit-v and naturalism) in order to qualify as a natural law theory; 
some feel comfortable calling anv objectivist meta-ethics a sort of natural law. My lriew is a 
natural law view in the weaker sense of the two: it emplo~s an objective meta-ethics, but the 
kind of objectiviw I endorse is not naturalistic. We might sav that the sense in whch mv view 
can be labelled natural law emphasises the word ’law’ over the word ’natural.’ Though some 
might for this reason den17 that mv view qualifies as a natural law view, this is not a verv 
fruitful controversy in which to become enmeshed. The most important point is that my view 
has similarities to certain natural law Lriews, and can benefit from an examination of them. 
Manv natural law theorists through history have not been particularly interested in 
natural rights. Thev have instead connected natural law, at least implicitlv, with duties 
and/or goals instead of rights. However, if our argument in Chapter 1 is correct and rights 
(particularly universal rights) are essential to a proper understanding of morality, then the 
possibilitv of connecting natural law and universal rights should be explored fully. I would 
My very brief discussion of the history of natural law is essentially a summary of a slightly less brief 32 
one offered by Stephen Buckle. See hs ‘Natural Law’ in A Conzpai~ion to Ethics, ed. Peter Singer 
60 
like to b e p  this exploration by addressing what is perhaps the best-known recent criticism of 
natural rights, that levelled by L.W. S ~ m n e r . ~ ~  Sumner’s argument against natural rights is 
complex, and a complete presentation of it would take us on a long diversion, but it is 
important to emphasise where the differences between us lie and how thev might be resolved 
in favour of the view I have presented. Sumner thinks that a natural rights theorv must treat 
onlv rights as morally basic, yet he also recognises the need for moral principles, so he claims 
that for the natural rights theorist there must exist ’rights principles’ that are more 
fundamental than other principles. For example, the principle that all human beings have a 
right to life would be a rights principle. He thmks that natural rights, if they existed, would 
ha\ie to be derived from such fundamental rights principles, and that anv attempt to sa\’ that 
these principles are fundamental is highlv problematic. 
The most important difference between mv view and Sumner’s is that I thmk rights 
can be derived from values and principles that are not, in Sumner’s terms, specific all^ rights 
principles. As we have seen in my discussion of P2, I hold that rights can be derived 
ultimately from verv general moral values, values that can be understood in terms of 
principles whose fundamental status Sumner would find unobjectionable. Thus I tlunk that a 
right to life can be derived ultimatelv from the value we attach to each life, and 
correspondinglv from anv principle that expresses ths  value. Such a principle would not be a 
’rights principle’ (according to Sumner), because its content makes no reference to rights.34 
Thus in order to overcome Sumner’s criticism I will need to show exactlv how it is that rights 
can be derived from \dues and principles in the way I have suggested. The details of this 
derivation will be our project in Chapter 5, so we must delay a full response until then, but I 
think it is useful nonetheless to acknowledge Sumner’s argument in this context and to 
identify what sort of response will be needed. 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 199 1 ). 16 1 - 174. 
‘Natural hghts‘  in The Moral Fo~inda t io~  q fRights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 92- 128. This 
piece is an elaboration of his earlier ‘kghts  Denaturalized’ in Frey, 20-40. 
fights theorists whose sympathies lie with right-based moralities might contend that such a principle 
makes at least an implicit reference to rights. But if P 1 in the previous section is correct then this need 




At this point I would like to analyse a few important attempts that have already been 
made to derive rights from natural law. The point of this analvsis, and the criticisms it 
contains, will be twofold: mv criticisms will suggest whv d i  mV own theorv will diverge in 
important respects from the ones discussed, and thev will also point out some of the most 
important problems that will need to be addressed in future chapters if we are to have an 
optimum natural rights theorv. With this in mind I will discuss the natural rights theories of 
two older thinkers, Grotius and Locke, and a contemporary theorist, Anthonv Lisska. The 
two questions for which we wish to find answers from these thinkers are 1.) what is their 
concept of natural law?; and 2.) how are rights derived from natural law? 
Grotius’s views on natural law and natural rights develop over the course of several 
works, and there are some respects in which he clearlv changes his mind from one work to 
another, makmg it difficult to identify a single Grotian theorv.35 His earlv view of natural 
law, found in Dc I u w  Pracdac (’Commentary on the Law of Prize and Bootv’), is that it is an 
expression of God’s will, which is in turn explained in terms of man’s innate sociability. At 
tlus stage he beliel~es it to be conceptuallv possible to divorce discussion of natural law from 
that of natural rights; natural rights are not, strictlv speakmg, a part of natural law. 
Nonetheless natural rights do follow from the natural law, so it is true to sav that individuals 
have rights in a state of nature. This is because nature is patterned in a particular way which 
implies the validiw of certain human practices. Grotius suggests that natural goods are 
apportioned like seats in a theatre, such that thev must be claimed by physical occupancy, but 
once claimed can be regarded as private property. Our basic right to use the material world 
extends naturallv to the development of private proper&, and it does so through the labour 
that we exert on xrarious natural goods. Thus there is a natural right to private propertv, and 
there is a further right to protect our property against threats.36 Grotius also thinks there is a 
natural right to punishment, though his argument for this is perhaps less convincing. He 
? -  
’’ H u g ~  Grotius, Dc Jiir-e Praedue Commenta~ius (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950); The Jiir-isprudence 
of Holland (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1 926); De Irrr-e Belli (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925 ). My 
discussion of Grotius is influenced by that of &chard Tuck in ,Vatiir-al Rights Theories (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1979), 58-8 1 .  
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argues that because the state has a right to punish, and because anv rights the state possesses 
must be held in virtue of their transference from the state’s members, then there is a natural 
right to punishment possessed by each individual. This argument, however, simply 
presupposes that the state has a right to punish, and is thus unconvincing. Nonetheless, the 
picture Grotius presents of deriving rights from natural law was original, and is still regarded 
bv manv to have considerable merit. 
Before analvsing Grotius’s thought it is best to see how it changed in important 
respects as his career unfolded. In his lntvoducfioii to the Juvispuderzcc of  Holland he retained 
the idea that natural law was intimately connected with the social nature of humans: the 
things that are intrinsicallv good are those that are associated with our sociabilitv. The 
important shift in this work, though, is that instead of seeing rights as derived from natural 
lau-, he now sees them as part of the natural law. The natural law is the list of universal 
natural rights plus the general injunction to respect the rights of others. Grotius thus shifts 
ths  work to a more right-based approach. He sees rights as a conceptual necessitv in the 
realm of justice, e.g. in order for there to be a categorv of distributive justice there must be 
n 
’distributi1.e rights’, or rights of desert. He claims that we have two kinds of rights, those that 
concern propertx and those that concern merit. Though he is not entirelv clear on this point, 
Grotius apparently thinks that the content of our natural rights is governed by the fact that 
human sociabilitv is of paramount importance. That is, because concerns about property and 
merit are closelv connected with concerns about our sociabilitv, thev enjoy the protection that 
rights provide. 
Grotius’s most famous work is his later De lirvc Belli (’On the Right of War’),37 which 
presents some new thoughts on the nature of natural law. Grotius now sees the natural law 
as the obligation humans are under to preserve social peace. Although t h ~  is a change from 
his previous claims about natural law, one can see how it follows from Grotius’s continuing 
concern with the importance of sociabilitv. Rights are conceptuallv necessary for the 
~ ~ _____ _ _ _ _ ~  ~ 
All natural rights mentioned in our discussions of Grotius, Locke, and Lisska should be understood as 3 0 
featuring a universal scope, unless otherwise indicated. 
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preservation of peace, and are thus again a part of natural law. A more important break with 
Grotius’s previous writings is found in h i s  claim that the natural law is a logical necessity that 
does not depend on God. Indeed, not only does God not create the natural law, but he could 
not change it if he wanted to. God cannot act contrary to what is logicallv necessary: just as 
he cannot make 2+2=5, so he cannot make good what is intrinsicallv evil. The importance of 
this shift for the historv of natural law thinking cannot be overemphasised. From Aquinas to 
Grotius God was alwavs the source of natural law, and it seems likely that most theorists did 
not even entertain the possibility that there could be a natural law that exists independent of 
God. At the same time, this is not to suggest that all natural law theorists from Grotius 
onward were atheists; on the contrary, Grotius was himself a theist, and we shall see that 
Locke was a theist as well. But @Ten the metaphvsical uncertainties of God’s existence 
combined with the increasing secularisation of centuries that followed Grotius, the separation 
of natural law from theism was an important step for natural law’s continued plausibilik. 
Now that we have surveved the evolution of Grotius’s thought we are in a position to 
analvse his kev ideas. I will first point out what I regard as its promising elements, and then 
its problems, both with an eve toward directing our own inquirv. Perhaps most importantlv 
for our purposes, the earlv Grotius can be understood as offering an account of the derivation 
of universal rights from moral values. I am referring here to h i s  treatment in De lure  Pvlzcdne 
of the rights of properh. and punishment. Though he is not explicit in saying that these rights 
derive from fundamental moral values, it is difficult to see how his understanding of the 
matter could be otherwise. Particularly with regard to his treatment of the right to property, 
he seems to enlrision this right as being derived from the value of human sociabilih., and 
perhaps more fundamentallv from a value concerning God’s will. Admittedlv, the derivation 
is not as clear in the case of the right to punishment, because his  discussion of this right is less 
satisfactory. But a case could surelv be made that this right derives from the same values as 
> -  
-’ It may seem odd that ‘iure’ is translated to ‘law’ in the title of Grotius’s earlier work but to ’right‘ 
here. T h s  reflects the subtleties and ambiguities of ‘iure,’ whch are brought out well throughout Tuck. 
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the right to property. So although the early Grotian account is far from unproblematic, it is 
one that fits into the strategy I have suggested in the first section. 
Another promising element, as I have alreadv indicated, is Grotius’s important 
separation of natural law from theism, which takes place explicitlv in De Iurr Belli. To be sure, 
the concept of God is doing some work even in this piece: it is God who purposivelv makes 
humans sociable, which is what makes it conceptualh impossible that there be a rational 
being to whom the natural law fails to apply. But throughout Grotius’s writings it is easv to 
imagine ’God’s’ work being taken over by other concepts. In the earlv Grotius it is God’s will 
that @res us the natural law, but this will is expressed in terms of human sociabilihr, which 
alternativelv could receive a non-theistic grounding. The same point can be made about 
Grotius’s later claim (abo~~e)  that humans are sociable because God makes them so. 
The problems Grotius faces are instructive for us. First, although he does attempt to 
ground natural l aw in different wavs throughout his writings (e.g. God’s will, man’s 
sociabilitv, nature’s pattern, logical necessity), none of these groundings seem satisfactory as 
thev stand. We ha\re alreadv noted the problems with relying on a concept of God, so I will 
leave aside the consideration of God’s will. As for man’s sociabiliw, or anv alleged pattern to 
nature, we need to know whv either of these claims are true, and whv they are of paramount 
importance, if thev do not relv on God’s will. Here Grotius’s account is incomplete, though 
not necessarilv mistaken: manv have thought that the claim that humans are naturally 
sociable and the claim that nature exhibits a pattern discoverable to humans enjoy some 
intuitive plausibiliw. The burden is on a natural rights theorist like Grotius, however, to 
provide as complete an account as possible of the wav in which morality is objective. If 
objectilritv appeals to human sociabilifi7, t h s  might for example be because there is s o m e t h g  
natural about sociabiliw, and because there is a connection between what is natural and what 
is good. But neither of these claims are easv to establish. Similarlv, if objectiviw appeals to a 
pattern in nature, we must first establish that the pattern exists, and then establish that it 
somehow tells us what is good. The most prominent problem that arises for these suggestions 
about grounding objectivitv, then, is the classic Humean one of how7 we can derive ‘ought’ 
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from ’is.’ It is difficult to see how there could be a natural law theorv which avoids the need 
to provide a solution to this problem. But this is not to sav that the problem is insoluble, and I 
will suggest in Chapter 4 that Dworkin’s account of the sacred appears to contain the 
necessary resources to overcome it. 
I think the later Grotian claim that natural law is a logical necessiw, though, is 
probably too ambitious. This view is similar in manv wavs to Kant’s meta-ethics, but though 
Kant’s account is not unproblematic, he at least provides us with an explanation of 
considerable complexitv for whv it is that everv rational being is bound to respect the 
categorical imperative.38 If anvone is to succeed in the later Grotian project of seeing natural 
law as a logical necessihi, a similarlv complex (and more successful) explanation for how this 
is so must be provided. It is far from intuitivel7: clear, for example, that even if there is a 
natural law for humans, it would applv with equal strictness to Martians3‘], as would be the 
case if it is a logical necessitv. I will myself suggest a weaker version of natural law in 
Chapter 4. 
Finally, given my pre1Tious discussion of right-based moralities it will perhaps come 
as no surprise that I think Grotius’s mo17e in his later work to a more right-based approach is 
not an improvement on lus earlier approach. I have some svmpathv for Grotius’s claims that 
rights are preconditions for justice Uurisprudeizce) and social peace (De lure Belli), though t h s  
point might be better stated in a weaker form (i.e. ’rights are the bcsf wav to aclueve these 
b Goods’). As I have alreadv argued in Chapter 1, I think rights enjov a privileged connection 
with respect from others, self-respect, and the value of each individual life, and it is quite 
plausible to say that these goods will be needed if we are to enjov the full flourishing of justice 
and peace. But I do not think Grotius improves matters bv suggesting in these works that 
rights are a ynrt of the natural law, implving that they are as conceptually basic as values or 
principles. If m\T argument for P1 is correct, then even in these works Grotius is committed to 
saving that rights are derived from values, such as those concerning justice and peace. If 
lmmanuel Kant, The Moral Latr.: Groundiifork For the Metaplij~sic o f  Morals. ed. H.J. Paton (New 3 h  
York: Routledge, 1948). 
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rights are appealed to as important because they are preconditions of certain goods, I cannot 
see how they could be considered to be as conceptually fundamental as those goods. 
We learn several lessons about a successful natural rights account, then, from an 
examination of Grotius. One of the most important of these is that natural law can and should 
be divorced from theistic considerations. Another important lesson is that we will have to be 
as specific as possible about how the natural law (or moral objectivity) is grounded, so as to 
avoid the incompleteness found in the Grotian account. It seems that one problem we will 
have to overcome in order to do this is to explain how the Humean is/ought hurdle can be 
cleared. It also seems likely that, whatever our concept of natural law, it will have to be 
weaker than the concept involving logical necessio7 advanced bv the later Grotius. These 
lessons will influence my discussion in the chapters to come. 
The second natural rights thmker I would like to discuss is Locke.40 As we shall see, 
many of Locke’s ideas about natural rights, including some for which he is famous, are 
actuallv derivative of Grotius. Nonetheless Locke does adlrance important new ideas about 
natural law and natural rights which w7ill help to direct our own inquiry. His explanation of 
natural law is unfortunate117 less extensive, and perhaps less consistent, than that of Grotius. 
Locke savs both that natural l a w  is reason, and also that it can be knoi(7lz b\r reason. Now, it is 
a bit unclear how both claims could be true, but we can perhaps interpret t h s  cursor\7 
discussion charitably and draw a few conclusions from it.41 Whatever else Locke may have in 
mind, he clearly thinks that reason is closely connected with natural law, and that natural law 
is discoverable to humans though their natural faculties. Similar to Grotius, he also imagines 
God to pla\r a role as the giver of natural law -but it is easy to imagine Lockean natural law 
as existing independent of God. For even if reason does not come from God, it still might be 
-3 9 
40 
Assuming, of course, that Martians exist and are significantly different from humans. 
John Locke, ‘Second Treatise’ in T i r ~  Treatises o f  Go\wwnent, ed. Peter Laslett (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1960), 265-428. My discussion of Locke is influenced by that of A. John 
Simmons in The Lockem Theon. . .  o f  Rights (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 68- 120. 
Locke is aware that some may find his discussion of natural law too cursory: ‘it would be beside my 
present purpose, to enter here into the particulars of the Law of Nature.. ..’ ‘Second Treatise,’ 275. I t  is 
a bit difficult to see. though, how he could think that the details of such a basic part of his political 
thought were anterior to his purposes. 
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said to have an authoritative status that justifies the fact that its dictates enjov normative 
force. 
Locke’s ori,oinal contributions are found more in what he claims the natural law tells 
us, for example that our natural state is one of perfect freedom and equalih.. It is easv enough 
to see why he might think that we are perfect117 free in a state of nature, though perhaps less 
clear whv he claims we are perfectly equal. H i s  claim about equalitv depends on the claim 
that it is obvious that creatures who are biologicallv similar (e.g. members of the same 
species) should be considered equal in a moral sense. This has not been so obvious to manv 
other philosophers, though I have tried to offer my own defence of equal human worth in 
Chapter 1. Crucially, Locke claims that the natural law also tells us that we have a duty to 
preser1.e our own lives. His explanation for tlus does depend on God: we are God’s creatures 
put on the earth for h is  purposes, so only God can end our lilres. He then combines tlus with 
h is  claim about equality of persons to reach the conclusion that we all have duties to preserve 
each other’s lilres. 
It is Locke’s belief that a great proliferation of universal rights follows from his 
understanding of natural law. He thinks we enjov rights to life, health, liberh., private 
propertv, punishment (if others have transgressed the natural law), and reparation (if our 
own rights have been violated). The justifications he offers for these rights hold some 
promise. He thinks there is a right to health for the same reason (aboLre) that there is a right to 
life. Our right to liberh. follows from the fact that we are free in a state of nature. Our right to 
private properw is essentially an elaboration of the Grotian account: we have propertv in our 
own person and transfer that ’natural’ propertv to individual objects through our labour. His 
account of our right to punishment, though, is an improlrement on the Grotian explanation. 
He savs that since natural law is worthv of obedience, each transgression of it should be 
punished to a high enough degree that its future violation is hindered. In addition to tlus 
reason of restraining further \.iolations, we can punish for reasons of reparation, so long as 
our reparation is proportionate to the original transgression. This is superior to the Grotian 
68 
account, which, as we have seen, relies cruciallv on an assumption that states have a right to 
punish their citizens. 
The promise of Locke’s account lies more in the intuitive plausibility of some of its 
claims than in the arguments Locke offers in support of those claims. Manv have found his 
claim that human beings enjoy rights to goods such as life, health, and liberhr (as well as the 
Grotian rights of propertv and punishment) to be intuitivelv persuasive. I mvself endorse 
these rights in Chapter 5, but in so doing I trv to give a fuller justification (found in Chapter 4) 
of why the goods in question are essential. Locke’s discussion of the right to punishment is 
more successful: it seems that if there really is a valid natural law, then fairness considerations 
would indicate that we would be allowed to punish its transgressors for reasons of reparation 
and restraint. We will see the influence of Locke’s theory of punishment in my own account 
of a right to a fair trial. 
I have already mentioned some of the problems the Lockean account faces. Since I 
ha -e  noted that h i s  treatment of both natural law and equalitv of persons seems too cursory, I 
will not dwell further on these points. A problem that is at least as important, though, is that 
it is unclear how Locke’s rights are grounded. Some have understood h i s  account to be a 
right-based one. Alternatively it might be understood to fit the model I have suggested in the 
first section b\7 claiming that universal rights are derived from values concerning liberty and 
equality. Either wav, though, h i s  account requires further explanation. If Locke is presenting 
a right-based moralitv, he must sa\’ more about why morality is right-based. He might opt for 
the sort of argument that Mackie makes when Mackie claims that morality simply cannot be 
dutv-based or goal-based, so it must be right-based.4’ Alternativelv he might adopt the (later) 
Grotian strategv of claiming that rights are preconditions of the enjoyment of certain goods (in 
ths  case liberty and equalitv). Regarding Mackie’s strategy, few endorse the idea that all 
duty-based and goal-based theories reduce to right-based ones. Even if they did reduce in 
ths  wa\7, I will later work with another kind of moral theory, a reason-based one, which does 
not seem to reduce to rights in this way. If Locke has the Grotian strategy in mind then the 
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burden is on him to show why liberty and equality cannot be enjoved without rights. The 
burden of argument would be high, because he would be committed to making the stronger 
claim that rights are necessary for liberty and equalitv, not just that they are the best way to 
achieve these goods. In Chapter 1 I settled for a weaker sort of claim that rights are the best 
wav (but not necessarily the only way) to achieve the essential goods I identified, and even 
this weaker claim required extensive argument. I think there is reason to doubt that Lockeans 
can be successful in showing that rights are necessary preconditions for libertv and equalitv. 
Alternativelv Locke might be suggesting a deriL7ation of rights not dissimilar to MV 
own. He might be claiming that universal rights are derived from moral values, in this case 
values concerning libertv and equalitv. But if tlus is the case he is neglecting to offer a crucial 
discussion of exactlv how it is that rights follow from these values. Rights are certamly not 
entailed by moral values. And if rights are not understood to be preconditions for libertv and 
equalih., Locke will hare to explain why it is that rights are so important. I will discuss the 
details of mv own derivation of rights from values (via reasons) in Chapter 5. But, if Locke is 
suggesting ths  tvpe of rights derivahon, it is tlus sort of discussion that his account needs in 
order to be more convincing and complete. 
The lessons we learn from Locke do overlap somewhat with those from Grotius, 
which is indicative of lus account being partlv derivative of Grotius. Again, we find ourselves 
in need of a more extensive explanation both of what natural law is, and of how universal 
rights are derived from it. Nonetheless, as with Grotius, the continued importance and 
mfluence of Locke’s account of rights gives us hope that the natural rights strategv holds 
promise, and mav be made more promising vet if we can provide a more complete account of 
natural law and natural rights. fin all^, in h s  discussion of rights to life, health and libert)., 
Locke presents us with ideas for the content of rights that have considerable intuitive power. 
As I have mentioned, I will agree with Locke that these are universal rights, though I believe 
that their justification needs to be filled out. I have already gone some way toward doing t h s  
Maclue, 013 cit. -17 
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for the right to life (and arguably also of health) in mv discussion in Chapter 1 of the value of 
each individual life. A further treatment of the issue will take place in Chapters 4 and 5. 
The last natural rights theorist we will examine is Anthonv Lisska.43 Though perhaps 
not as renowned a figure as some of the other rights theorists I have discussed so far, Lisska is 
a contemporary thinker who has advanced a natural rights theory of some subtlety that is in 
some respects quite close to the kind of theory I have suggested we need. As such it will be 
useful to examine his thought and see what lessons we can learn. As with Grotius and Locke, 
we will examine both the promise and the problems of his theorv with a view toward aiding 
our own progress. 
Lisska follows the natural law thought of Aquinas (and ultimately of Aristotle) more 
explicitly than do Grotius and Locke. His account of natural law is an attempt to expand on a 
Thomist view by bringing into plav recent work in metaphvsics that he thinks is consistent 
with the thought of Aquinas. He suggests that six principles are needed for such an account 
to work: 1.) a theory of natural kinds; 2.) a theorv of essence composed of dispositional 
properties; 3.) a metaphvsics of finalitv determining obligatory ends; 4.) ethics as a second- 
order actilritv based upon the development of the dispositional properties in the individual 
that make up an essence; 5.) a conjunction of ’good’ with ’end’ as a terminal point of the 
natural process; and 6.) a consistent theory of practical reason. It is not mv project to analvse 
each of these principles in detail, but together thev clearly represent an attempt to discuss 
natural law in the sort of detail that I noted was absent in Grotius and Locke. Put 17ery briefly, 
Lisska’s view of natural law is that humans have an essence which indicates for them an 
’obligatorv teleologv’, wherebv thev have duties to do the things which lead to flourishing. 
According117 he realises the importance of overcoming the naturalistic fallacv, which he tries 
to do bv criticising ontological assumptions on which it rests? As in Aquinas and Aristotle, 
43 Anthony J. Lisska, ,.lquiiias ‘s Tlieoi?. o f  lVatural Laii-: ‘4ii ilnalj‘tic Rccoiistmctioii (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1996), especially Chapters 8 and 9. 
Lisska speaks of overcoming Moore’s naturalistic fallacy, while I have suggested natural law 
theorists need to overcome Hume’s isiought problem. Though the two points are not equivalent, they 
are nearly so. The problem for natural law theorists is that they must advance a theory of moral 




claims about human essence are of paramount importance in Lisska’s theorv. He thinks that a 
grounding of human essence can be aided by an appeal to recent work in metaphvsics, such 
as the work of Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam on natural kinds, and of Everett J. Nelson on 
nomic universals. His treatment of these complex subjects is rather schematic, but it indicates 
that there is hope in the strategy of using recent metaphvsics to support claims that are 
centuries old. 
Lisska’s attempt to derive rights from natural law is similar to hs treatment of natural 
law7 itself in the sense that it is more detailed and less mvsterious than the attempts made bv 
Grotius and Locke. His position is that the human essence consists of various dispositions, 
that these dispositions vield duties, and that these duties in turn vield rights. Let us look 
briefly at each of these steps. He thinks that his claim about human essence is clearlv 
supported bv empirical evidence, e.g. we can see it is true that humans have dispositions to 
continue in existence, to seek nutrition and growth, to have sensations and perceptions, to 
care for offspring, to be curious rationallv, and to li1.e in social units. He claims that the 
Aristotelian/Thornist obligatory teleologv he endorses gives us duties to act on these 
dispositions, because we have a dutv to flourish. That same obligatory teleologv also gives us 
rights whch protect these duties from interference bv others. For example, it is not enough 
just that I have a dutv to care for mV offspring - it must also be true that I have a right to non- 
interference from others to such an extent that my dutv can be carried out. The duhr is 
necessarv but not sufficient for the fulfilment of our obligatorv teleology. Thus the class of 
rights will be restricted in certain ways by the class of duties to which it corresponds. The 
number and content of our rights will correspond exactly to the number and content of our 
duties. It also seems likelv that the onlv rights we will have will be those relating to non- 
interference.45 
Lisska’s treatment of natural law, and of the rights that follow from it, offers hope 
that a natural rights account can provide the sort of detail needed for it to be fully convincing. 
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Furthermore his strategy is not as far away from my own as it might initiallv appear. 
Although he does not often speak explicitly about values, I think his account does fit the 
model I have proposed in the first section. Moral values, such as the value of life and the 
value of rational curiosity, are morally fundamental in Lisska’s theory. It is true that these 
values are derived from claims about our dispositions, but dispositional claims are 
descriptive, not normative. As long as values are the most fundamental nonmtiue elements of 
Lisska’s theory, and universal rights are derived from these values, then it fits the model I 
have suggested. 
As I have noted, Lisska’s appeal to recent philosophical work, such as the work of 
Kripke and Putnam, is a welcome feature of h s  theory. I am not as interested in a specific 
discussion of natural kinds or nomic universals as I am in the viabilih. of the general strategy 
of supporting a natural law view with an appeal to recent philosophical work. Refreshingly, 
this strategy runs contrarv to the view that some might hold that natural law is an antiquated 
kmd of theory. We should feel free not only to look to recent work, but to work that has been 
done in contexts different from (though related to) natural law or natural rights. We will do 
this in the next chapter when we examine the modem discussion of moral objectivitv. 
Another important similaritv between Lisska’s thought and mv own lies in his 
method of deriving rights from natural law. While he thmks that the derivation proceeds 
from dispositions to duties to rights, I will suggest a derivation that proceeds from a certain 
class of reasons to rights. There will be important similarities as well between the Aristotelian 
concept of dispositions and mv treatment of shared reasons. But it is also important to note 
that there is a significant difference between Lisska and I in the last step of the derivation. 
Lisska belielres that we have rights as a way of protecting our own duties, while I take the 
iriew that x’s reason to reject a given set of v’s principles simultaneouslv gives x a right and v 
a duh.. It is not our own duties that give us rights, though it is our own reasons. This will 
become more clear in Chapter 5. 
1 5  Though this last point is less clear. If. for example, we have a duty to nourish ourselves, and we 
cannot do this without help from others, do we then have a right against others that they help us? It is 
7 3  
I believe it is too early to judge the success of Lisska’s project. His discussion of 
natural law and natural rights is sometimes not as full as it could be, and often merelv 
0 oestures at projects that need to be taken up in earnest, but it does not give us any reason to 
think that his project cannot be successful. But while I believe Lisska’s thought has enough 
merit to deserve further attention, there are significant differences between our theories. His 
approach is more overtly metaphvsical than the one I will suggest. As we shall see in the 
following chapter, I am sceptical of the success of metaphvsical attempts to justifv moral 
objectivih., whch makes me inclined to justifv natural law (and consequentlv natural rights) 
in a somewhat different wa\r from Lisska. But it is possible that, contrarv to what is suggested 
about the lriews surveved in the next chapter, a metaphvsical sort of moral realism mav -~ vet be 
viable, in which case Lisska’s view would merit serious attention. 
What I hope this chapter has established is a map for the way forward that will help 
to guide the rest of our project. Most generally, I have argued that our project of justifving 
uni\Tersal rights must ground those rights in objective moral values (and principles) in order 
to be credible. I have also suggested that ths  sketch of a rights view can be understood to 
place us in the natural l aw tradition. I then suggested that an examination of natural rights 
theories broadlv - -  sympathetic to the one I have sketched teaches us valuable lessons that we 
can incorporate in chapters to come. Taking our lessons from Grotius, Locke, and Lisska as a 






We would do well to have a secular, rather than a religious, concept of natural law. 
Despite the tendencv to think of natural law as a historical theorv we should look to recent 
work in philosophy for support. This is true both of our search for a convincing account of 
natural law or moral objectilrity, and also of our attempt to derive rights from objective 
moral values. 
We must have a full and convincing account of what natural law is and how we come to 
know it. 
If natural law is in some sense to be based on a concept of human essence or nature, we 
must come up with an account of human nature that is extensive and does not seem 
arbitrary or dogmatic. 
possible Lisska could say this. 
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5. In our account of objectivity we must find a way to evade Hume’s is/ought problem and 
Moore’s naturalistic fallacy. 
6. We must devise a sound argument for how it is that universal rights follow from moral 
values and principles, and this will involve offering a convincing account of how rights 
and duties relate. 
7. The content of universal rights must be explored in a more comprehensive wav than we 
have found so far, and is likelv to include (though perhaps not be limited to) intuitively 
plausible rights candidates such as the right to life, to health, and to liberhi. 
While these lessons will not comprise the onlv points that we will explore in the remaining 
chapters, thev will nonetheless be among the most important issues explored. Issues one 
through three will be addressed in Chapter 3 (though the second point applies to all 
remaining chapters). Issues four and five have alreadv been touched upon in our account of 
Dworkin’s view of the sacred in the previous chapter, and they will be addressed in more 
detail when we revive that discussion in Chapter 4. Issues six and seven will be taken up in 
Chapter 5. The project which nom7 clearly takes conceptual prioritv, though, is to explore 
what sort of natural law there might be and how we come to know it. This is the project of 
the next chapter, and will take the form of a survey of theories of moral objectivity, to see if 
there i s  at least a broad sketch of this sort of meta-ethics that is defensible. Chapter 4 will then 
describe and defend this theorv of objectivitv in detail, while Chapter 5 will show how rights, 




The aim of this chapter is to explore different versions of moral objectivism with the 
aim of finding one on which to base universal moral rights. We have seen in the previous 
chapter that an objective meta-ethics is needed if we are to ground universal rights in a 
sufficiently secure way, i.e. if these rights are to be able to exist in the face of the dissent that 
will inevitablv arise about their existence. When we find a promising lrersion of objectivih.4" 
we will be able to explain and defend it in greater detail in the following chapter, and then 
show7 how universal rights follow from it in the final chapter. Our interest in the foundations 
of rights, then, demands that this chapter and the next depart from any explicit discussion of 
rights themselves in favour of a discussion of the concepts from which rights are derived. The 
issue of objectilrism is a tree that has sprouted manv branches, and I will be able to cover only 
some of them here (and those with varving degrees of completeness). The shape of my 
discussion can be taken to implv a substantive position concerning where the most important 
issues lie. 
In the context of the thesis this discussion carries on the second phase that I discussed 
at the beginning of the prelious chapter. That is, it continues the project of setting up the 
universal rights xriew at which I later arrive as one that enjovs significant advantages over 
alternative views. In the previous chapter this discussion took the form of arguing that we 
need to ground universal rights in objective \dues, thereby implicitlv calling into question 
any universal rights view which fails to do this. In this chapter the argument is that objective 
values are best understood via the strategy of irrealist co,anitivism. The chapter implicitlv 
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aims to call into question anv view of universal rights which is derived from alternative 
objective bases, such as those I will group under the general heading of moral realism. Now, 
even if the argument of this chapter succeeds, it will fall short of establishing that the view I 
suggest in subsequent chapters is the best possible view of unitTersa1 rights. But it will go 
some wav toward putting that view in a privileged position that is likely to lend it more 
authority and thus more interest. 
Now to the argument of the chapter. I will argue that cogrutivism is the crucial 
element of objectivism that needs to be established, and that the most promising wav to 
establish it is through an irrealist objectivism based on the universality of reasons, such as that 
suggested bv T.M. Scanlon, Thomas Nagel, Derek Parfit, Jonathan Dancy, and Michael Smith. 
Although versions of moral realism can in principle establish cogrutivism, thev encounter 
serious problems overcoming objections that have been put forward by subjectivists. The 
argument in this chapter does not defend a specific version of irrealist cognitivism in detail, 
but only attempts to show how this kmd of objectivism evades some important subjectivist 
objections, and has at least a ,winzn facie plausibilitv that accrues from its avoidance of 
ontological difficulties. If we can accomplish this, we will be in position to explain and 
defend our lrersion of objectivism at greater length in the following chapter. 
BY moral objectivism I mean 
the view that the objects of the most basic concepts of ethics 
(which mav be supposed to be values, obligations, duties, 
oughts, rights, or what not) exist, or that facts about them 
hold, objectivel~ and that similarlv worded statements by 
different persons make the same factual claims (and thus do 
not concern merelv the speaker’s feelings).-‘: 
The disjunctive character of this definition suggests that objecti1Tism is actuallv many debates 
rolled into one: we might establish that objectivism is true either by showing that the objects 
of the most basic concepts of ethics exist objectivelT7, or by showing that facts about them hold 
I will henceforth drop the description ‘moral’ from terms such as rights. objectivism, realism, 
cognitivism, etc. Unless otherwise noted, when I speak of any of these concepts or theories, the 
description ‘moral’ is implied. 
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objectively. I will explore the implications of this in more detail below. B\r subjectivism I 
mean the opposing meta-ethical view, namely that the objects of the most basic ethical 
concepts do not exist independentlv of what we feel or believe about them, nor do facts about 
them hold in a similarly independent way. We have some familiarih. with the difference 
between objectivism and subjectivism from our discussion in the previous chapter. 
There are at least three major sub-debates contained w i t h  the debate about moral 
objectivity, each of which indicate a different wav of seeing the problem.ls We look at the 
issue in an ontological manner if we are aslung whether moral properties exist independent of 
people’s beliefs about them; this is the debate between realism and anti-realism.-19 We pose 
the question in an epistemological manner if we are askmg whether moral knowledge is 
possible; the debate here is between cognitivism and non-cognitiiFism. The question can also 
be asked in a logical/conceptual manner, as when we ask whether moral judgements should 
be construed as assertions about moral properties or facts, or whether thev are best 
understood as expressions of an appraiser’s attitudes; ths is the debate between descriptilrism 
and non-descriptivism. Though it is likelv that a given theorist will come down on the same 
side of the objectivist question in each respect (such that a realist is likelv also to be a 
cognitivist and a descriptivist), there are some combinations of views which could ’cross the 
lines’ without incoherence. For example, it is possible to believe that moral properties exist in 
the world but that we cannot know them, whereby we would have realism and non- 
cognitivism. As we shall see, one could also be a cognitivist without being a realist. Similarly 
it is not incoherent to believe that moral properties exist but that moral judgements are best 
understood as expressions of an appraiser’s attitudes, in which case we would have realism 
and non-descripti1Tism. The important issue to examine now, though, is what set of views one 
‘Ethical objectivism’ in The Cambridge Dictionai?, o f  Philosophj., ed. Robert Audi (Cambridge: 
My classification here is influenced by the discussion of R.M. Hare in ‘Ontology in Ethics‘ in 
1- 
Cambridge University Press, 1995), 244. 
ildoraliti. and Objectivicl,, ed. Ted Honderich (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1983, 39-53. Peter 
Railton lists as many as thirteen different issues involved. though many of these can be subsumed under 
the categories 1 suggest. See his ‘Moral Realism’ in Philosophical Reiiert> 95 ( 1986), 163-207, esp. 
1s 
164-165. 
1 9  I thus take moral realism to be an essentially ontological thesis. In doing so I am using the term more 
narrowly than do some contemporary theorists. such as Railton and Geoffrey Sayre-McCord. 
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must hold in order to consider oneself to be an objectivist. Is it the case that an objectivist 
must hold to all three 'objectivist' positions (realism, cognitivism, and descriptivism), or is the 
requirement for objectivism weaker than this? 
3.1 The priority of cognitivism 
It is central to the rest of mv discussion in this chapter that cognitivism is the crucial 
issue for objectivists.50 The establishment of co,anitivism is necessary and may be sufficient 
for the establishment of objectivism. To see why, we need to remind ourselves wh7' we do 
ethics in the first place. Different people may well have different reasons for studving ethics, 
and different moral theories emphasise different overarching questions, but it seems that one 
question that all students of ethics are concerned with is the one which asks 'How should I 
act?' or 'What should I do?' This may not be the onlv question we wonder about, and it may 
not even be the most important, but it is a question that we can agree to be of at least soiizc 
importance.51 Furthermore, we wish not onlv to find an answer to this question intellectuallv, 
but to put our answer into practice. In order to do this we must have some belief about how 
we should act, and we must have some motivation to act on this belief. Now, if this is true, 
then the epistemological issue seems to be a crucial one in ethcs, and this is preciselv the 
issue addressed bv cognitivism. If co,anitivism can be established, then there are moral facts 
that can be known, i.e. we have an answer to the question 'What should I do?' Furthermore, 
depending on whether we adhere to internalism about motivation (whch, following Parfit, I 
will later identifv as moral belief internalism), knowledge of what we should do might give us 
adequate motivation to do that thing. I will lea1.e aside the issue of motivation until the next 
chapter, but the important point for now is that, even if we cannot be motivated by belief 
Sayre-McCord niakes a similar point in his 'Introduction: The Many Moral Realisms' in Essaw on 
kforal Realism. ed. Geoffrey Sayre-McCord (Ithaca, NeM- York: Cornell University Press, 1988), 1-23. 
His broader usage of the term 'moral realism,' though. leads him to say that cognitivism is the central 
issue for moral realists. 
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alone, the priority of cognitivism over both realism and descriptivism in the objectivist debate 
is not threatened by this problem, because realism and descriptivism simply are not in the 
business of addressing moral motivation. If cognitivism is in need of supplementation, that 
supplementation will come from a story about reasons, desires, or both -but again, I will 
leave that discussion for the following chapter. 
We can see that realism and descriptivism, even if true, are not as well-suited to help 
us answer the question ’How should I act?’ We will recall that realism concerns the issue of 
whether moral properties exist in the world. T h s  is an interesting metaphvsical question, but 
it is not one of practical \due  in moralitx unless these facts can be discovered, and are 
motilrating in the right wav. In other words, consideration of realism in light of practical 
moral concerns leads us back to the epistemological question of cognitivism. Now, it could be 
that the establishment of some form of realism is a particularlv effective (or even the onlv 
effecti1.e) wav to establish cognitivism. As I will argue in 3.7, I do not mvself believe that 
realism is the onlv waj7 to establish cogrutivism. But there seems no reason to believe at this 
point that it is not a wav - even a verv effective wav - of establishing cognitivism, and as such 
it is worthy of further examination. 
Descriptivism is perhaps the least promising of the three routes for the objectiList to 
take. This  is not to sav that it is of no importance at all whether moral claims should be 
construed as assertions about moral facts: if we find that moral language is best understood in 
this wav, it is highlv suggestive that moralihr may be objective. It seems unlikely, after all, 
that the w a ~ s  language is used arise by pure happenstance. But descriptivism’s persuasive 
force seems not to rise above the level of suggestion. However moral language is best 
understood to be used, it might nonetheless be in error, even quite fundamentally so. Perhaps 
moralitx seems objectixre to man\’ people, and t h s  has caused moral terms in our language to 
be used descriptively, but these people are in error. The possibility thus arises that 
For example, much is often made of the fact that virtue theorists consider the question ‘What lund of 
person should I be?’ to take priority over the question ‘How should I act?‘ But this does not mean they 
think the latter question to be wholly unimportant. 
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descriptivism could be true, yet morality could be subjective.52 In this respect descriptivism is 
no different from realism. What makes descriptivism a somewhat less promising avenue to 
pursue, though, is that its establishment seems to lack even the potciztinl for leading us to 
cognitivism in the wav that realism might. As I have suggested, the establishment of realism 
might well lead us to conclude that cognitivism is true - e.g. this will be the case if the moral 
properties in question can be known and are intrinsicallv action-guiding. But there is no 
particular understanding of descriptivism that would similarly i ,  vield co,gnitivism. It could 
alwaw be the case that language is best understood as containing moral descriptions, vet 
these descriptions do not refer to anvthing real. As I have said, descriptivism is suggestive of 
objectivism, but I cannot see that it can be anvthing more than this. 
This discussion has revealed a strategv for us to pursue in the rest of the chapter. We 
need to examine whether a defensible version of moral cognitivism exists. Our pursuit of 
cognitivism will take in a consideration of different versions of moral realism, because realism 
is a possible means to the end of cognitivism. If realism cannot be made to work we shall 
hale to see if there exists an irrealist cognitivism that is defensible. However, because 
descriptivism is inadequate for the establishment of cogrutilGsm, I will leave it aside for the 
remainder of the discussion. 
3.2 On the burden of proof 
Before I examine the substantive arguments at stake between subjectivists and 
objectivists I would like to discuss the merits of an opening move that is often employed by 
both sides, which is the use of a burden-of-proof claim. The general strateg~ is to claim that 
one’s own position in the objectivism debate is the more plausible, and thus that the burden of 
proof lies with one’s opponent to offer convincing positive arguments for whv we should 
5’ - -  In fact, as we shall see, Maclue suggests this is the case. See John Mackie, ‘The Subjectivity of 
Values’ in Ethics: Iiwenting Right and Wrong (London: Pelican, 1977). 15-49. 
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believe the ~ontrary.~3 There are two curious features about this move. First, it is interesting 
that both objectivists and subjectivists seem equallv comfortable making this claim, for they 
cannot both be correct! We might wonder how their disagreement arises: do they disagree 
about a single relevant issue (such as what our moral intuitions tell us), or do they disagree 
even about which issue ’fixes’ the burden of proof (such as intuitions versus a certain 
philosophical argument)? Secondly, it is curious that the burden-of-proof strategv is deemed 
necessary at all. It seems to indicate that both sides in the debate lack confidence in their own 
positive arguments, and are more comfortable defeating the arguments of their opponents. 
We might wonder whether this lack of confidence is appropriate (from either side), given that 
both sides do have positive arguments for their positions. I will examine these two curiosities 
in turn. 
First, why the widespread disagreement about where the burden of proof lies? An 
answer to this question requires that we investigate what consideration or considerations are 
used to fix the burden of proof. Since the burden-of-proof claim occurs at the beginning of an 
argument about the issue of objectivism, the candidates for issues that motivate its placement 
are somewhat limited. We might justify a placement of the burden of proof bv claiming that 
moral intuitions are in our favour. This  would of course require that intuitions be sufficientlv 
similar among different individuals. Alternatively, we might claim that the moral 
phenomenologv favours our position. We might say that moralitv ’feels’ either objective or 
subjectilTe, and claim that this is a good reason to place the burden of proof with the 
opposition. Clearly, it is possible that the issues of intuition and phenomenology might come 
to the same thing, because we might thmk that our intuitions are themselves determined by 
the phenomenology. It is otherwise mvsterious how intuitions acquire their alleged 
normative force, and it is far from clear that we share intuitions in the wav needed by an 
advocate of this intuitionist position, so I will focus on the claim about moral phenomenologv. 
The claim is made by Maclue, McNaughton, Nagel, David Brink. and others. Brink’s discussion is 
unusual in that it provides a philosophical argument in support of his placement of the burden of proof. 
For a critical analysis of this see Ken Yasenchuk, ‘Moral Realism and the Burden of Argument’ in The 
So~tthei-ii Joui-nul o f  Philosophj. 35 ( 1997), 237-264. 
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The claim under consideration, then, is that the burden of proof lies with one’s 
opponent because the moral phenomenology favours one’s own position. Since moral 
phenomenologv refers to the way morality feels to us in our immediate experience, claims 
about whether it favours objectivity or subjectivi@ cannot be settled by philosophical 
argument. They must, rather, be settled by an empirical consensus about what morality feels 
like. But since both objectivists and subjectivists trv to claim that the moral phenomenologv 
favours their own side, it is clear that such a consensus is lacking among philosophers. 
Furthermore, we seem no wiser about the matter if we appeal to the opinions of non- 
philosophers, because the same lack of consensus appears to be present. It fairlv clear that, 
among people who are unfamiliar with philosophv, some (even non-religious people) seems 
to regard moral demands as objectivelv binding, while others regard them with a flexibility 
we might associate with a subjectivist outlook. So, although it is alwavs riskv to assume that a 
sur1iev of the opinions of plulosophers will indicate anything other than a survev of the 
opinions of philosophers, in this case their disagreement about how moralitv feels seems 
indicati1.e of a disagreement among people generallv. Since tlus is the case, I do not think that 
claims about moral phenomenology can be used to settle the question about where the burden 
of proof is located. 
This brings us to the second curiositv about the burden-of-proof style of argument, 
namelv that we might wonder whv it is deemed necessary at all. As I have said, the very 
employment of the burden-of-proof claim implies a lack of confidence in the adequacv of 
one’s own positive arguments. But why this particular lack of confidence in the debate about 
objectivism? As we shall see, the debate features positive as well as negative arguments made 
by both sides, arguments that can be compared and tested against each other. In this respect 
the objectii7ist debate is no different from other philosophical debates. But most contestants in 
most other debates refrain from trving to ‘stack the deck’ ahead of time by slufting a burden 
of proof onto their opponents. There seems no reason why a burden of proof in the objectivist 
debate cannot lie squarelv in the middle, in between the subjectivist and the objectivist. This  
solution acknowledges the problematic nature of anv effort to determine whether the moral 
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phenomenology favours one side over another, and it eliminates the unfairness that would 
result from attempting to coercivelv place the burden of proof on one side or the other 
regardless. I conclude that the entire burden-of-proof issue has been an unhelpful one in the 
objectivist debate. The arguments made bv both sides are best examined without an~7 prior 
bias concerning who has the higher burden to meet. 
3.3 The subjectivist challenge 
Now that we have cleared away preliminarv issues we are read17 to take a look at the 
substantive arguments involved in the objectivist debate. I w7ill begin bv examining important 
subjectivist arguments, then in later sections turn to \-arious objectivist attempts to overcome 
them. One of the most daunting subjectivist arguments is an old one: the argument made bv 
Hume that we cannot derive a normative conclusion from merelv descriptive premises, i.e. 
that it is not possible to derive an ’ought’ from an ’is’. The force of this argument in the 
present context i s  that objectivists need to find a way to fix some normative propositions as 
correct and some as incorrect, and the way this is often done is to say that (at least some) 
normative propositions follow from descriptive ones. Objectivists must either show how the 
(apparent) fact-value gap can be bridged, such that values really can be shown to follow from 
facts, or else show that the distinction is unimportant. We will examine attempts to do both. 
Other subjectivist arguments are all to a greater or lesser extent derivative of, or relv 
upon, Hume’s fact-value distinction. Thev can be divided into two camps: those which are 
non-cognitivist, and those which are part of an error theory. Non-cognitivists (or 
instrumentalists) claim that moral ’beliefs’ describe only the attitudes of the speaker, not any 
facts about the world.54 Gilbert Harman and Simon Blackburn are two prominent theorists 
Non-cognitivists come in different stripes. Prescriptivists (such as Hare) believe that moral language 
recommends a course of action (e.g. ‘X is good’ means ‘Do X’). EmotiLists (such as C.L. Stevenson) 




who subscribe to versions of non-cognitivism.55 Harman argues that we can see that the 
world contains no moral facts by comparing the case of moral observation to that of scientific 
observation. He thinks that scientific observation is cruciall\7 different from moral 
observation, and that this difference can explain whv it is reasonable to be a cognitivist in 
science, vet a non-cogrutivist in ethical matters. A valid test of scientific facts is that they p l a ~  
an explanatory role in the world: e.g. a scientist who sees a vapour trail going through a cloud 
chamber in a given experiment is justified in surmising that a proton was present, because the 
fact of the proton's presence best explains the vapour trail. But moralitv is importantlv 
different. If I see a group of hoodlums lighting a cat on fire, I am not justified in saving that 
there is a moral fact of wrongness present. This is because mv reaction can be explained 
entirely in terms of my psvchologv or moral sensibility; e.g. I see the cat being burned and 
experience a certain psvchological reaction. Any moral 'facts' are explanatorilv superfluous 
in a way that scientific facts are not. 
Objectivists have responded to this argument in at least two different wavs. 
Cobpitive irrealists such as Nagel have denied that explanatory necessity is the right test of 
the existence of moral facts. I will examine this line of argument in a later section. Taking a 
realist line, Nicholas Sturgeon has argued that even if we accept explanatorv necessity as a 
valid test, there is no reason to believe that moral facts do not play such an explanatory r0le.5" 
It seems the simplest explanation of Hitler's (at least apparent) moral depravity is that there is 
a moral fact of the matter, i.e. that Hitler i(jas morallv depraved. Harman thinks this sort of 
explanation cannot be correct, because we would have exactlv the same reaction to Hitler if 
we imagined all  the non-moral facts of Hitler's actions as fixed, vet that there is no moral fact 
of Hitler's depralrity. Even if moral facts offer what is in some sense a direct explanation of 
moral phenomena, he argues, thev are not needed to explain those phenomena. In response, 
Sturgeon points out that Harman's test of factual superfluitv could apply equally well to 
scientific 'facts.' If, in his experiment, the phvsicist saw a vapour trail and believed there was 
~~ ~~ ~ 
- -  >>  
- .  Gilbert Harman, 'Ethics and Observation' in Sayre-McCord, I 19- 124: Simon Blackburn, 'Errors and 
the Phenomenology of Value' in Honderich, 1-2 1. 
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a proton present, even if there was none, he would still be justified in his belief, because he 
has no reason to think h i s  general theory to be mistaken. Correspondingl~7, we have no 
reason to think an objectivist moral theory mistaken. Sturgeon concludes that Harman has 
shown no special problem to exist about ethics as opposed to science, and that if Harman 
wishes to persist in his ethical scepticism, he is committed to being a sceptic about non-moral 
facts as well. 
The debate between Harman and Sturgeon is in one important respect a stalemate.s7 
We cannot conclude from the debate that moral facts exist, nor can we conclude that thev do 
not exist. What we can conclude is that an alternative to the objectivist picture of the moral 
phenomenology exists and has some plausibilitv: it mav be that our revulsion at seeing a cat 
being tortured feels objective, but an alternative subjectivist account of some plausibilitv 
exists. The subjectivist alternative is strengthened by the quasi-realist account of Blackburn. 
Much of Blackburn’s contribution to the objectivist debate has been to show various wavs in 
which a moral phenomenology which apparently points to objectivism can be captured on a 
subjectivist account. Following Hume, he claims that moralitv seems objective onlv insofar as 
we project our feelings onto the external world. A virtue of Blackburn’s theorv is that he is 
able to offer an account of how quasi-realism accords with the moral phenomenologv in even 
apparently problematic cases, such as the strong pull of obligation we can sometimes feel to 
perform a certain action. We feel the pull of duty in such cases not because the duty is 
objectivel\r valid, but because we have been brought up in a certain way, and as a 
consequence we look with great distaste (or even horror) at the possibilitv of disregarding our 
duh.. I take Blackburn, along with Harman, to succeed in offering a plausible alternative 
picture to an objectivist account of the moral phenomenologv. Together their arguments 
serve as a challenge to any objectivist who relies sigruficantlv on claims about this 
phenomenology. We will examine one such theorist in the next section. 
Nicholas Sturgeon, ‘Moral Explanations’ in Sayre-McCord, 229-255. 




The main subjectivist alternative to non-cognitivism is an error theorv, and this 
strategv was suggested most famouslv I ,  bv Mackie.58 Mackie claims that moral statements are 
indeed the sort of claims that can be true or false, but that thev are in fact all false. Moralih. 
feels objective to us, but this feeling is radicallv in error; consequently we make moral 
judgements to which we attribute a categorical force, judgements that are meaningful but 
erroneous. Mackie makes three arguments to support hs error theorv. He first suggests that 
the prevalence of moral disagreement throughout the world points to the fact that moralitv 
cannot be objecti1.e. I think any objectivist would acknowledge that it does seem to be a 
feature of the world that there is widespread disagreement about moral matters, and that at 
the verv least this casts some doubt on the notion of moral truth. But Mackie’s first argument 
cannot bv itself do more than this. It could be that, el’en though people disagree about 
moraliw, some are right (in an objective sense) in their substantive views and some are 
wrong. It could be that the discoverv of moral truth is possible but verv difficult. David 
McNaughton offers an interesting account of how moralit\r might be objective vet widelv 
disagreed-upon with his comparison of the process of learning moralitv to the process of 
appreciating jazz.‘‘) In both cases, McNaughton claims, the subject experiences a change in 
perception, and sees the given situation in a new light. McNaughton does not sa\’ enough 
about the comparison to give the argument tremendous force, but the fact that ths  sort of 
explanation seems minimally plausible suggests that Mackie’s first argument does not 
accomplish much. As Thomas Benningson points out, an argument such as Mackie’s gains 
maximal force onl\7 if we can demonstrate that disagreement about moral matters is not only 
prelTalent, but that it is irresolvable.60 The error theorist would do well to supplement an 
empirical claim about disagreement in the world with an epistemological one about moral 
beliefs (i.e. that the17 are irresolvable). Mackie’s second two arguments attempt to m o ~ e  us in 
See Maclue, ‘The Subjectivity of Values.’ 5S 
$9 
- David McNaughton. ‘Moral Realism - An Outline’ in Moral T i’sion: .4n Introduction to Ethics 
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1988). 39-65. 
Thomas Benningson, ‘lrresolvable Disagreement and the Case Against Moral Realism’ in The 
Sorrthem Joui-nul o f  Philosoply. 34 ( 1996). 4 1 1-437. 
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this direction, for though they both directly concern the issue of moral realism, they have 
implications for cognitivism. 
Mackie’s second argument is the one he labels the ’argument from queerness.’ Here 
he claims that, if moral properties or values exist in the wav a realist suggests, they would 
have to be an utterly different kind of entitv from anvthing else in the universe. This is 
because moral properties would have to be necessarilv action-guiding in order to account for 
the motivational force and practical relevance of moral judgements. No other entities in the 
universe appear to ha\Te this sort of action-guiding qualitv. This puts a high burden on the 
moral realist, who must explain the unique ontologv of values, as well as the apparent117 
unique epistemological facultv we would have to use to discover them. Mackie suggests that 
these metaphvsical and epistemological extravagances be rejected in favour of subjectivism. 
The third argument from Mackie is an extension of his concern about queerness. It is 
that a moral realist is committed to explaining how the moral features of an action are linked 
to that action’s natural features. In doing so moral realists are apparently committed to giving 
an account of how moral properties supervene on natural properties, and Mackie doubts the 
success of such a project. Like Mackie’s second argument, this seems a legitimate question to 
ask of a would-be moral realist. Since moral realists claim that moral properties exist, thev 
are committed to telling a metaphvsical storv about these properties as complete and coherent 
as any storv that can be told about non-moral properties. At the risk of complicating the 
matter, then, it might be useful to see Mackie’s second two arguments as combining to create 
a four-part challenge to moral realists. A moral realist must demonstrate that 1.) There do 
exist the sort of queer, action-guiding entities in question; 2.) We have an epistemological 
facultv which perceives these entities; 3.) Objective values are intrinsicallv motivating; and 4.) 
The moral qualitv of an action can be plausiblv lmked to the natural features of that action. 
We have seen that several promising subjectivist arguments have been advanced, 
which indicates that objectivists will have several daunting hurdles to overcome. I will 
conclude the section bv summarising the subjectivist arguments I take to be the most 
promising. 
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1. Bridging the fact-value gap is a problem any objectivist 
must face. It is in many wavs the overarching problem of 
objectivism, in the sense that other problems are 
derivative of it. 
2. Any objectivist who relies si,pificantlv on claims about 
moral phenomenologv faces the burden of explaining 
why alternative explanations (e.g. quasi-realism) are 
unsuccessful. 
3. Objectivists who attempt to achie1.e cognitivism via 
realism must deal with Mackie’s four-part queerness 
challenge. 
In the next several sections I will examine objectivist attempts to overcome these problems. 
The next three sections will look at attempts to establish co,anitivism Iria realism. I will begin 
with McNaughton’s attempt to r e l ~  on claims about moral phenomenologv. 
3.4 McNaughton and moral phenomenology 
A curiositv of McNaughton’s account of moral realism is that he begins with a 
warning of sorts about the dangers of over-relying on moral phenomenology. He says ’the 
appeal to the nature of our moral experience, to what we might call the nzord phenomenology, 
represents the starting point for an argument, not a conclusion. Onlv a presumption in favour 
of realism would have been established and presumptions can be defeated.’hi This does in 
fact seem to be a plausible account of the role moral phenomenologv should plav in a realist 
argument. But the reason it is so curious in this context is that McNaughton then proceeds to 
relv heavilv on phenomenological claims to ground his account of realism and argue against 
the sort of subjectivist worries we encountered in the last section. I will argue that t h s  
strategv of grounding realism is unsuccessful. 
The crux of McNaughton’s argument lies in his discussion of moral observation. He 
claims that we can observe moral properties using our ordinarv faculties, and that we do so 
regularly. For example, when we see children throwing rocks at a wounded animal, we can 
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simply observe that what they are doing is cruel. This  sort of observation has parallels in the 
aesthetic domain, such as when we perceive the beautv of a sunset. For McNaughton, non- 
cognitivist accounts cannot be correct because thev fail to account for the immediacv and 
authority of moral demands that are made on us in particular situations. To advocate non- 
cognitivism, then, is to seriouslv distort the picture of what it is like to be a moral agent in the 
world. Similarlv, McNaughton also tries to address the third part of the argument from 
queerness by appealing to the moral phenomenology. He suggests that moral facts must be 
intrinsicallv motivating, because this is the only wav we can make sense of the immediacy of 
moral demands. More broadlv, the motivational picture McNaughton presents is one 
whereby an agent perceives a moral fact, which causes him to have a belief about what 
should be done, which in turn motivates him to act. McNaughton thus advocates a lrersion of 
internalism about motilTation, or moral belief internalism, which is the view that an agent can 
(at least sometimes) be motivated b\7 a cognitive state a1one.Q 
It is clear from this discussion that McNaughton relies on phenomenological claims 
more than he initially implies he will. As we have seen in the previous section, the burden 
that this sort of argument must meet is that it must give us a clear reason to favour a realist 
phenomenologjr over the sort of quasi-realist alternative offered bv Blackburn. I do not think 
McNaughton succeeds in doing this. First, it should be noted that the phenomenologv of 
moral decisions will usuallv not be felt as dramaticallv as it is in McNaughton’s example of 
the children and the wounded animal. Most moral ’demands’ that we feel will be 
correspondingly less strong, which calls into question how widely applicable McNaughton’s 
argument could be even if it worked. Second, I cannot see that McNaughton gives us any 
reason to favour his account of the phenomenologv over Blackburn’s. It appears Blackburn 
would not be bothered by this example, and would explain it in the following way: the 
natural facts which encompass the scenario of the children torturing the animal cause the 
natural facts which encompass our psvchological reaction. This psychological reaction might 
McNaughton, 40. 61 
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well be very strong, might be felt immediately and might well motivate us to act in certain 
ways, but this is still entirely explicable in terms of natural facts. As we have seen, Harman 
would give a similar account of the scene. It appears that the factors which McNaughton 
thinks swing the phenomenologp in the realist’s favour are the immediacy and felt authority 
of (at least some) moral demands, but if this is so, he needs to offer a more convincing 
argument concerning whv a non-cognitivist cannot account for these features. I harbour 
doubts about whether this strategy of argument can be successful, but perhaps I will yet be 
proven wrong. 
Regardless, it must be admitted that not all of McNaughton’s arguments r e l ~  on 
claims about phenomenologv. He tries to meet the concerns expressed in the first, second, 
and fourth parts of the argument for queerness by offering a sketch of how \dues can find a 
place in a physicalist account of the world. Phvsicalism is the \iew that all objects in the 
world are phvsical objects. McNaughton advocates a ’modest phvsicalism’ wherebv not all 
properties of objects are physical properties: he allows for the existence of emergent non- 
Ph) &a1 properties, properties which arise from the interrelations of phvsical objects but are 
not reducible to phvsical properties. He claims that moral properties are these sorts of 
emergent properties, and arise from complex interrelationslups between human beings. 
This  is the beginning of a metaphysical picture whch could turn out to be quite 
promising. Unfortunatelv, McNaughton provides only this bare sketch, perhaps because he 
tlunks he has already made the case for moral realism via his arguments concerning 
phenomenologv. The sort of modest phvsicalism McNaughton advocates would need to be 
defended on its own merits, not just on whether it can allow for the existence of moral 
properties. Just as clearly, we would need a more detailed explanation of how moral 
properties emerge from interactions among agents, how they are known, and how thev 
moti\Tate us, and these explanations are likelv to be lengthv and complex. There is no reason 
to think that the metaphysical picture McNaughton offers cannot work, and as such it merits 
This view can be contrasted with moral belief externalism, which holds that desire must always have 6’ 
a role to play in motivation. I will discuss this internalist-externalist debate about motivation in more 
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elaboration. But there is also not enough reason presentlv to think that it can work, so it 
cannot convince us of the truth of moral realism as it stands. I conclude that McNaughton’s 
argument is unsuccessful in its attempt to surmount the kind of subjectivist hurdles we saw in 
the previous section. In the next two sections we will take a look at more complex 
metaphvsical explanations of moral realism to see if we can vet find a wav to establish 
cognitivism. 
3.5 The analogy with secondary qualities 
We have seen that McNaughton’s metaphTTsica1 picture was not sufficientlv complete 
to provide a com7incing solution to the argument from queerness. We will now turn our 
attention to a different wa17 to argue for the existence of moral properties, which is to claim 
that thev resemble secondarv qualities in important respects, and that, since we allow for the 
existence of secondarjr qualities, we should also admit the existence of values. I will focus on 
an argument of John McDowell’s, for although McDowell is not the only theorist to suggest 
this strategv, he is perhaps the best-kn0wn.h’ I will follow McDowell in taking colour to be 
the operative example of a secondarv qualih., though the analogv between colours and values 
is meant to work equallv well for other secondar). qualities such as tastes and sounds. If the 
analogv can be made to work, it mav well present us with the sort of plausible metaphvsical 
picture of moral properties that can overcome the queerness hurdle. More generally, it might 
succeed in showing how values can emerge from certain kinds of facts, therebv bridging the 
fact-value gap. I will argue, howe\rer, that McDowell does not succeed in h s  attempt to show 
that the analogy works, and that it is unclear how7 the attempt could be made more 
successfullv. 
Considered against the subjectivist arguments we have already examined, the 
strategy of claiming that values are analogous to secondary qualities appears to require a 
detail in the next chapter. 
John McDowell, ‘Values and Secondary Qualities’ in Honderich, 1 10- 129. 63 
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certain argumentative structure. First, it requires that there is available to us a coherent and 
plausible story about what secondary qualities are and how thejr exist. If a comparison with 
secondary qualities is to make values less mwterious, then secondarv qualities must 
themselves be sufficiently unmvsterious. Second, it requires that the metaphvsical storv told 
about values is sufficientlv similar to that told about secondarv qualities. This  step is in many 
wavs the crux of the argument, and unsurprisinglv it is the issue to which McDowell devotes 
the most space. Third, it requires that we have a reason to prefer the realist picture that 
emerges to an anti- or quasi-realist one such as those suggested bv Harman and Mackie. This  
third step is important, because it is possible that we could have a coherent picture of the wav 
in which values are importantly slmilar to secondarv qualities without actual117 having any 
reason to favour that picture over subjectivist alternatives. 
I thmk the first step in the argument can, despite some lingering controversies over 
secondary qualities, be accomplished. McDowell defines a secondarv qualihr as 
a property the ascription of which to an object is not 
adequately understood except as true, if it is true, in virtue of 
the object’s disposition to present a certain sort of perceptual 
appearance: specifically, an appearance characterizable bv 
using a word for the property itself to sa\’ how the object 
perceptually appears.M 
Thus when we sav x is yellow, we mean simplv that x appears vellow to a normal observer 
under normal conditions. A distinctive feature of secondarv qualities is that they are neither 
whol l~  objective nor wholl\r subjective: like the emergent properties discussed bv 
McNaughton, thev are the products of properties that exist independent of obsenrers, vet 
secondary qualities are themselves different from the properties from which they are derived, 
and are not reducible to them. Secondary qualities are dispositions, like fragility and 
solubilih., because thev display a tendencv to react in characteristic wavs in certain 
situations.05 As such, a secondarv qualih. is a potential for the object to which it belongs to 
~ ~ ~~ 
Ibid.. 1 1 1.  
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enter into a particular causal interaction. For example, if something is red, its property of 
redness exists independent of human perception; yet it would make no sense to say that the 
redness itself exists unless the propertv is perceived by (normal) human perceptual 
mechanisms. This  is because, as we have seen, the identihr of redness is tied essentiallv to the 
experience of it. 
The second step of the argument is more problematic. To begin, there seems to be a 
phenomenological implausibilitv about hring the experience of value closely to the experience 
of colour. Colour experience seems more immediate, direct, and certain than value 
experience. Jonathan Dancv, despite being himself a moral realist, claims that we are at a 
greater phenomenological remove from value than we are from colour, and that this gives us 
a reason to doubt the success of the analogv as McDowell has framed it.hh Dancv notes that 
although value might be seen as a sort of disposition, there is a ‘raw’ n-ature to experienced 
colour which makes colour unlikelv to be a disposition, even a verv t h  one. Though I have 
criticised McNaughton for an over-reliance on (contentious) phenomenological claims, 
Dancv’s claim here is useful as a priiizlz facie reason to doubt the success of McDowell’s 
analogy. 
Although Dancfs phenomenological worrv is not decisive in itself, it points to a 
deeper problem with the analogv between values and secondary qualities that is expressed by 
Bernard Williams.”’ The problem is that ethcal reactions, unlike colour perceptions, include 
psychological and social elements, which indicates that if we sav that values are a part of the 
world, this ’world’ needs to be construed in a richer sense than the ‘world’ of secondary 
qualities. Another wav of expressing the problem is to sav that colour experience, unlike 
value experience, seems to be a merelv causal one. When we look at a red rose, the property 
of redness causallv interacts with our perceptual mechanisms, which causes us to think that 
the rose is in fact red. But there seems to be an extra complication invol~ed in the perception 
of values. To borrow McDowell’s example, let us say we see a steep cliff and assess it as 
qualities and dispositions is not one of dependence, but of identity. See Jonathan Dancy, ‘Objectivity’ 
in Moral Reasorzs (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993), 144- 165, esp. 160. 
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dangerous. In making this evaluative assessment we seem to be suggesting that the cliff 
nzcvifs a fearful reaction in a way that colours cannot be said to merit a certain perception in 
us. Upon perceiving the relevant details of the cliff we are led to believe that we should 
perceive it as dangerous, and that others mav be blameworthv if thev fail to do so. We do not, 
b77 contrast, tend to blame someone for failing to perceive the redness of a rose. 
McDowell’s response to this objection is that the alleged difference between causing 
and meriting simply does not amount to anvthing significant. He claims that for an object 
such as a cliff to merit fear is simply for it to be fearful, i.e. to contain the property of 
fearfulness when perceived, in an analogous wav that a given object might contain the 
propertv of redness. The fearfulness of the cliff, according to McDowell, interacts with our 
perceptual mechanisms in the same direct wav that the redness of a rose does. But this 
position leads McDowell into a difficultv that relates to Mackie’s argument from moral 
disagreement. As we saw in section 3.2, it seems that even objectivists must concede that 
there is widespread disagreement about moral matters throughout the world. There is a 
tremendous discrepancv between the amount of disagreement about moral matters on the 
one hand, and the amount of disagreement about secondarv qualities such as colours on the 
other. This discrepancy should not exist if there is no significant difference (as McDowell 
claims) between the ’meriting’ involved in value perception and the ’causing’ involved in 
colour perception. 
McDowell does address this discrepancy of levels of disagreement, but does so in a 
way I find puzzling. He first points out the merits of widespread moral disagreement: he 
claims that the pre1Talence of moral disagreement keeps us on our toes and prevents us from 
being lulled into a false and unreflective contentment. This comment seems odd because 
what is at issue is the fact that the quaizfifv of moral disagreement is so high - the alleged 
value or disvalue of the disagreement seems to be beside the point. McDowell then claims 
that, despite the existence of widespread moral disagreement, we are still justified in 
~ ~ ~ ~ 
Ibid., 162. 




supposing his form of moral realism to be correct, because we will be able to back up this 
supposition with explanations that show how our moral responses are well-placed. But 
although this second claim succeeds in addressing the correct issue, I cannot see that it does 
so in a satisfactory way. Particularly, we are left wondering what will count as a successful 
explanation in this context. If the validitv of an explanation is governed by arguments 
McDowell has alreadv made (e.g. that for a cliff to merit fear just is for it to be fearful) then 
explanations are not playing any additional (and helpful) role at this stage. In this case thev 
would not help to explain the discrepanc~~ between disagreement about secondarv qualitv 
perception and disagreement about moral perception. If the validity of an explanation is 
0 UolTerned by some new criteria, we need to know what those criteria are, and how7 thev help 
us to explain the discrepancv that is puzzling us. Either wav, McDowell has not succeeded in 
explaining the existence of the discrepancv, and because of ths  I do not think he has 
succeeded in drawing a sufficientlv tight parallel between values and secondary qualities. 
I have tried to argue that the second part of McDowell's argument fails, and if this is 
so, his overall argument cannot succeed. Nonetheless I will add a few comments about whv I 
think the third part of his argument is also problematic. We will recall that what I have called 
the third part of the argument (but which McDowell actually addresses first) is the claim that 
even if coherent and plausible, the realism based on an analogy between values and 
secondarv qualities must pass an additional test of being superior in some way to non- 
co,o;nitivist alternatives, such as those offered bv Harman and Blackburn. McDowell argues 
that it is superior on the grounds that a realist account accords with the moral 
phenomenology better than non-cognitivist accounts do. Since we have already seen the 
problems associated with this sort of argument in our discussion of McNaughton, I will not 
dwell on them here. I will only note that McDowell relies on the claim that non-cognitivists, 
instead of describing the moral phenomenology, are committed to 'correcting' it. McDowell 
mav , ,  vet be right about this, but he is not clearly right, and he (or McNaughton, or other moral 
realists) will have to show more preciselv whv quasi-realism cannot account for the moral 
phenomenology. 
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I conclude that McDowell’s argument is unsuccessful. It may be too early to pass 
judgement on the larger question of whether an analog17 between values and secondarv 
qualities can be made to work, but I myself doubt this strategv’s chances of success. There 
does seem to be a fundamental difference between the simpler, causal experience of colour 
and the more complex, psychologically-rich experience of value, a difference which poses a 
serious threat to the analogy’s ability to overcome Mache’s queerness objection. For if the 
experience of value is unique, t h s  would seem to accord with Mackie’s claim that in order for 
values to exist they would have to be an ontologically unique kind of entitv. In the next 
section we will examine yet another strategy of accounting for moral realism, that of claiming 
that moral facts are a special kind of natural fact. 
3.6 Naturalistic realism 
The kind of realism we might call ’naturalistic’ has become a movement of sorts in 
contemporaw moral philosophv, haring been advocated in one form or another by Peter 
Railton, Sturgeon, and Richard Bovd, among others.@ Naturalistic versions of realism claim 
that natural facts are, broadly speaking, the onl17 kind of facts in the world, yet moral facts are 
a special kind of natural fact. The upshot of this strategv is that moral facts are shown to be 
much less queer than Mackie supposes, and are shown to plav an explanatorv role in the 
world in a wav that Harman denies. T h s  explanatorv role is said to be confirmed bv 
predictions made bv the theories in question, predictions that accord with various features of 
morality as it is actually practised in the world. This  kind of realism has been particularly 
attractive to theorists who possess a deep respect for scientific method and scientific progress, 
because its ambition is to show how moral realism fits into the best current understanding we 
have of a scientific framework. And as with the other versions of realism we have examined, 
naturalistic realism purports to explain not only how moral facts exist in the world, but also 
Railton, ‘Moral Realism’; Sturgeon, ‘Moral Explanations’; &chard N. Boyd, ‘How to Be a Moral 66 
Realist’ in Sayre-McCord. 18 1-228. 
97 
how we can know them. It thus addresses the issue of cognitivism we saw to be crucial in 
section 3.1. 
My analysis of naturalistic realism will focus on the thought of Railton, whose essav 
’Moral Realism’ is acknowledged to be a classic, and to have greatlv influenced subsequent 
naturalistic accounts. I will first attempt to summarise Railton’s argument, showing in the 
process how he attempts to overcome the subjectivist hurdles we examined in section 3.2. I 
will then point out what I believe to be problems with Railton’s account, and perhaps with the 
naturalistic strategv generallv. Specificallv, I will argue that Railton allows for no conceptual 
space for freedom of the will, and also that his account of flourishing fails to escape concerns 
about the naturalistic fallacy which are closelv related to the problem of the fact-value gap. 
Giving a brief account of Railton’s long and complex argument is no easv task. He 
thinks that the moral story begins with subjective interests, which he suggests are secondarv 
qualities. The mention of secondarv qualities reminds us of McDowell’s argument, but 
Railton’s claim is different in two respects. First, it is subjective interests, not values, that he is 
connecting with secondarv qualities. Second, the nature of the connection is different: instead 
of claiming that subjective interests are analogous to secondarj? qualities, he is claiming that 
subjective interests arc secondarv qualities. As such, secondarv qualities supervene upon 
primary qualities of the perceiver, the object perceived, and the surrounding context. Railton 
calls this set of qualities the ’reduction basis’ of the secondary quality (i.e. the subjective 
interest). 
We have so far a naturalistic account of how we have subjective interests, but Railton 
realises this can only be the beginning of his storv. It seems that an\’ theory of moral realism 
must account for the fact that our subjective interests are sometimes mistaken and can be 
corrected, and Railton tries to account for this in his next step by introducing the notion of an 
’objectified subjecti1.e interest.’ He claims that an agent has such an interest in x in a certain 
situation just when his idealised self would want him to want x in that situation. Bv 
extension, x is (morallv or non-morall\7) good for the agent just when x is in the agent’s 
objective interest. The immediate question this account raises concerns the operative criteria 
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for an idealised self. For Railton these criteria are complete and vivid knowledge of oneself 
and one’s environment, and the possession of a non-defective instrumental rationalitv. But 
even if these criteria are adequate for idealising our interests, are they attainable? It would 
seem at first that even if the second criterion is attainable, the first one must surelv be out of 
reach, for it entails that an agent have ’unqualified cognitive and imaginative powers, and full 
factual and nomological information about h s  phvsical and ps\7chological constitution, 
capacities, circumstances, hstorv, and so on.’h9 It might be objected that it is impossible for 
anvone ever to be able to achieve such a state, or at least impossible for moral agents to 
achieve it on the consistent basis Railton requires. HowelTer, Railton does have a replv to such 
an objection. He suggests that we align our subjective interests with our objective ones bv a 
method of trial and error, and sometimes without even consciouslv realising we are doing so. 
To take a non-moral example, when we are dehvdrated we might learn what is best for us bv 
first drinking milk and having a negative reaction, then later happening across a bottle of 
soda and feeling better upon drinlung it. Admittedly the moral realm adds an extra 
complication, because the rele\rant idealised view will be not just a personal one, but a social 
one. It requires us to determine what would be rationally approved of were the interests of 
all potentiallv affected individuals counted equallv under circumstances of full information. 
Tlus gives us a standard of social rationalih., and the discontent produced by departures from 
ths  standard ma\. produce a feedback that, analogous to the negative impact of the milk, 
promotes the development of norms that better approximate the ideal of social rationalitv. 
At ths  stage, though, we might feel we have lost the metaphysical story in favour of 
pursuing a practical one. We know that as a naturalist Railton is committed to providing a 
natural ontologv of the processes described above, and so far we have seen only hs ontology 
of subjective interests. His ontologv of objectified subjective interests is broadly similar to that 
of (mere) subjective interests: objectified subjecti1.e interests have a reduction basis, and this 
basis is the truth-maker for the claim that a given interest is an objective interest of ours. 
Objective interests superl’ene upon natural and social facts, e.g. in the dehydration example 
(’9 Railton. 173-1 74. 
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these would include facts about the agent’s circumstances and constitution. Now, it is true 
that this account of supervenience is not as complete as it could be - it is schematic and does 
not pretend otherwise. Nonetheless, it seems promising in its schematic wa~7. Railton points 
out that it is not fundamentallv different from the sort of supervenience relation usually 
accepted to hold between chemistrv and physics. 
We have not examined Railton’s entire argument, but I think we have seen enough to 
reco,dse the argument’s promise in rebutting Mackie’s queerness objection. We will recall 
that we summarised Mackie’s queerness objection as consisting of four parts (see section 3.3), 
and it seems that Railton’s account has an answer of some plausibilitv for each of the parts. 
Regarding the first part, Railton can claim that moral facts are not ontologicallv queer because 
thev are, in essence, natural facts. He can argue that we do not need a special facultv in order 
to observe moral facts, as opposed to natural facts, for the same reason. As for the connection 
between moral facts and motivation, it is our interest in minimising social disharmony that 
motivates us to continuallv refine our moral judgements, bringing our subjective interests 
more in line with our objective ones.70 Finally, as we have seen, objective interests supervene 
upon natural facts to create moral facts, and there seems no reason whv this supervenience 
relation need be considered more mysterious than others that are commonl\7 acknowledged in 
the natural world. This  is but a sketch of how Railton would handle Mackie’s argument, but 
the important point for now7 is that there is no reason at this level to think that Railton would 
be defeated bv the queerness objection. 
How would Railton fare against other subjectivist arguments we have examined? We 
will recall that the crux of the arguments of both Harman and Blackburn is that there is no 
reason to favour a realist view over an anti-realist one, because an anti-realist view can be 
coherent, fullv explanatory, and in accordance with the moral phenomenology. The reason 
Railton thinks we should favour his realism o17er these views is one that scientists use to 
favour one theorv over another: he thinks that his naturalistic realism has superior predictive 
I t  seems that this motivational picture might be amenable to either moral belief internalism or 70 
extemalism. 
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power. Indeed, he does show that his theory predicts some historical moral trends that have 
been borne out in the world. H i s  theory predicts that the scope of who is considered morally 
important in the world to a given group of people will graduallv expand through historv (e.g. 
from family to tribe to nation, etc.), and it does seem to be the case that moral discourse has 
evolved to consider at least the whole of the human race as morallv significant. H i s  theory 
also predicts that moral principles will increasinglv enjoy an intrinsic connection with their 
effects on human interests, which has increasinglv been the case as we have moved from a 
sacred basis of moralihr involving God’s commandments to a secular one.71 His theorv also 
predicts that some areas of moralitv will vield greater agreement than others, e.g. prohibitions 
of aggression or theft will be wide117 agreed-upon, while matters of social hierarchy and social 
responsibilitv will be less so. Since all of these moral trends are commonly acknowledged to 
be a part of our world, and are not predicted by any sort of subjectivist moralitv, the fact that 
the\. are predicted bv Railton’s realism gives us a reason to favour it o\rer subjectivist 
alternatives, such as Blackburn’s quasi-realism. 
Nonetheless there is a problem with Railton’s account that makes me disinclined to 
f a w n  it. The problem concerns his abilih. to close, or bridge, the fact-value gap. It appears 
that on Railton’s account there must be some reason whv it is good to objectify subjective 
interests, why it is good to avoid social disharmony, etc. Railton has surprisinglv little to sal7 
about this. It cannot be the case that reason alone directs us to do these things, for Railton is 
clear in endorsing a limited, instrumental account of rationalitv. He addresses the issue bv 
claiming that, even though rationaliw goes relative when it goes instrumental, epistemology 
(including moral epistemologv) need not follow, because epistemic warrant mav be tied to an 
external criterion. For example, we are warranted in saving that we know we should avoid 
social disharmony because of the relation of the moral fact (i.e. that we should avoid social 
disharmonv) to an external criterion. But what is this criterion? Though it is barelv 
mentioned, the relevant criterion appears to be a concept of flourishing, understood as 
Though of  course ‘progress’ (if this is indeed progress) has been uneven: Kant’s morality serves as a ’ I  
counter-example to this trend. The source of  the categorical imperative is just as external to human 
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reproductive fitness.” But why should flourishing be understood in this way? Railton does 
not tell us, but we are left to infer that it is because moral facts just we determined bv 
evolutionary considerations. Evolution encourages and rewards reproductive fitness, 
therefore the relevant concept of flourishing is reproductive fitness. 
If this is what Railton is arguing, then it seems that he has just failed to bridge the 
fact-value gap in any convincing way. He is asserting that a fact (evolution encourages 
reproductive fitness) vields a value (we should avoid social disharmony) without giving any 
account of how this extraordinarv derivation is achieved. As we saw in section 3.3, this is 
exactly the sort of move that Hume has claimed we cannot make. As such it appears that 
Railton’s account, though it is much more subtle and complex, mav not ultimatelv differ 
much from various accounts of evolutionar\7 ethics recentlv criticised bv John Lemos.Y? 
Lemos considers a number of recent attempts that have been made to move from facts about 
evolution to values, and shows that none of the attempts builds the sort of bridge between 
facts and values that is required. It seems clear that Railton’s argument would suffer from the 
same problem. It is an open question whether the interests and acts that evolution rewards 
are good or not, a question that cannot be settled bv facts about evolution alone. As Lemos 
notes, it is possible that evolution could encourage torture and murder, but this does not give 
us an obligation to accept these acts as good. 
There is another reading of Railton that mav render his traversal of the fact-value gap 
less mvsterious, but onlv at a price. We may read his project as a purelv descriptive one of 
reporting what we do do rather than what we oughf to do. It could be that clusters of natural 
facts interact in such a wav as to lead us to have subjective interests, to objectifv our subjective 
interests, to graduallv bring our subjective interests more closelv in line with our objective 
ones, and so forth, and that there is nothing more to the story. If this series of interactions 
does fill out the moral world, then it is not clear there is room for a meaningful ’ought’ at all. 
interests as God’s commandments are held to be. 
- Railton. 179 (footnote). 
-’ John Lemos, ‘Bridging the Idought Gap with Evolutionary Biology: Is This a Bridge Too Far?’ in 
The Souther-n Jour-nul of Philosophj. 37 ( 1999), 559-578. Lemos criticises the accounts of Larry 
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This  might remind us of our discussion of McDoweIl in section 3.5. There we saw that 
McDowell had trouble accounting for the apparent fact that values merit a certain response, 
while colours only cause a response. On the present reading of Railton this is not a problem, 
because moral facts are said to cause a response in just the same way that secondar~ qualities 
do. But of course this raises a new problem, a problem of free will. It is not clear on this 
reading of Railton how agents could possiblv have anv freedom, moral or otherwise. 
Evervthing we think and do is the result of interactions of natural facts, and it is mvsterious 
how we could be said to have any control olrer these interactions. Now, it is true that the 
problem of free will is hardlv exclusive to (a particular reading of) Railton - it lurks behind all 
of moral philosophy, indeed all of philosophv. It is mvsterious even on a less naturalistic 
picture how we could have freedom of the will, and in what sense we might have it. 
Furthermore, some moral philosophers (most famously Spinoza) have been happy to embrace 
determinism, insisting that ethics is still a meaningful project within such a picture. But at the 
l’erv least, ethics seems less than full-blooded when considered within determinism. We 
usually assume that to say that we ought to do x implies not onlv that we can do x but that we 
could choose not to do x. On t h s  reading of Railton, though, to say that we should act in a 
way that maximises our reproductive fitness means onl17 that we do act in such a wav. Thus 
if the fact-Kralue gap has been bridged, it has been bridged onlv in a revisionist sense that 
greatly weakens the notion of what it is for a given x to be valuable. In the next section, when 
I defend irrealist co,dtivism, I will of course fall far short of demonstrating conclusively that 
it allows for free will, and in fact I will not even trv to demonstrate this. Nonetheless I think 
the picture of irrealist cognitivism has the virtue of not being incompatible with free will, 
which makes it significantly different from Railton’s account on our present reading. 
I conclude that although Railton’s account manages to provide promising answers to 
several subjectivist challenges, it encounters serious problems with regard to the most general 
subjectivist challenge, that of the fact-value gap. I am not making the stronger argument that 
Arnhart; kchmond Campbell; Robert &chards; Williani Rottschaefer; and John Collier and Michael 
S tingl. 
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Railton’s account cannot succeed in some revised form, nor am I suggesting that the entire 
project of naturalistic realism is necessarilv a failure. I am suggesting onlv that I cannot see 
how it can be made to work, and that this makes me disinclined to favour it as the objective 
basis for rights I am searching for. More generallv, this discussion will conclude our surlrev 
of attempts to establish cognitivism via realism. This strategv of establishing cognitivism 
seems too problematic in its current forms to endorse. I will now turn mr7 attention to the 
other general strategv for establishmg cognitivism, which is to claim it can be grounded 
without a resort to ontologicallv-loaded claims about the existence of moral facts. 
3.7 lrrealist cognitivism 
Irrealist cognitivism is the kind of objectivism I wish to defend. The best-known 
recent advocates of this position have been Scanlon, Nagel, Parfit, Dancv, and Smith, though 
the tradition extends as far back as Kant.74 Generallv speakmg, the position states that we can 
know moral truths even though those truths do not correspond to any facts that comprise the 
fabric of the world. It allows us to speak of moral facts, so long as we understand those facts 
to be something other than the ontologically-loaded entities we have been considering in our 
discussions of realism. Instead of a correspondence to such entities, irrealist moral facts re117 
cruciallv on claims about reasons, and particularly on claims about the universality of 
reasons. I will give a fuller account of reasons, and particularlv of what I will call shared 
reasons, in the following chapter. What I hope to accomplish in this section is to explain what 
irrealist cognitivism is in a broad sense, and show how the strategy has the potential to 
T.M. Scanlon, Fllhat J4’e olt’e to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998); 
Thomas Nagel, The T k i t .  From Noithere (Neur York: Oxford University Press, 1986), especially 
Chapters 8 and 9; Derek Parfit. ‘Reasons and Motivation’ in Proceedii?gs o f  the Aristotelian Socich. 
Supplementary Volume 7 1 ( 1997), and ‘Rationality and Reasons’ (forthcoming); Jonathan Dancy, 
Practical Realihj (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000); Michael Smith, Tt2e Moral Problem; 
Immanuel Kant, The Moral Lait’: Groiuzdit~ork For the Metaphjsic qf Morals. All subsequent mentions 
of these authors will refer to these respective works unless otherwise noted. It should be noted that, 
regarding Nagel. there is a terminological confusion with regard to his position, because I call it 
irrealism while he prefers to call it ‘normative realism.’ But on the way I ani using the term ‘realism’ 
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overcome the subjectivist arguments we have examined. This should serve as a useful 
transition to the discussion of Chapter 4, and a helpful introduction to it. 
Most comprehensively, we might want to explore these issues regarding all of the 
authors above. Certainlv all of them are sufficientlv significant and influential to merit such 
treatment. But to do so would stifle the flow of our overall project, so I will consider only the 
accounts of Scanlon and Nagel, and treat them as paradigmatic examples of irrealist 
cognitivism. Now the central question an irrealist cogniti17ist must answer is, naturallv 
enough, how cognitivism can be achieved without realism. In order to gain some perspective 
on this problem it might be helpful to remind ourselves of h o ~ 7  cognitivism was purported to 
be achieved i i d h i i z  realism. The idea there was that moral facts have some sort of existence in 
the world, and that we know them bv perceiving them. Though moral facts are not said to 
exist phvsicallv like trees, the wa17 that we know about moral facts is said not to be 
fundamentallv different from the vm\7 that we kno~7 about trees. In both cases we are 
considering entities which exist in the world, whch we perceive with our faculties, and whch 
we come to know about through our perception of them. It should also be noted that t h s  
kmd of epistemologv would broadly hold even for the sort of non-naturalism suggested by 
G.E. Moore. While Moore thmks that the good is not a part of the natural world, he 
nonetheless thinks it is a propertv that helps to comprise the fabric of the world, and a 
propertv to be known through perception.75 Thus with regard to scientific realism, naturalist 
moral realism, and non-naturalist moral realism, it is true that we know facts of the relevant 
kind because thev exist and we can perceive them. 
The alternatilre metaphvsics of irrealist cognitivism, though, leads us to embrace a 
different moral epistemologv. Obviousl~~, if moral facts are not entities in the world, then 
moral truth cannot be a matter of correspondence to such entities. As I have mentioned, the 
alternatiL7e offered by irrealist cognitiL7ism relies crucially on claims about the nature of 
reasons. The crux of the position is that we can have a moral reason to do or not do x, and 
his position is clearly an irrealist one. This sort of point is brought out by Stephen Damall in his 'Hon. 
Nowhere Can You Get (and Do Ethics)?' in Etllics 98 (1987), 137-157. esp. 143. 
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that the presence of this reason indicates that there is a moral fact of the matter about x (e.g. 
that doing x is good or bad, or perhaps right or wrong, respectivelv). The notion of a reason 
is thus seen as normatively loaded: to have a reason is to have a good reason. But at the same 
time it is not ontologicallv loaded, for reasons do not take up anv 'space' in the world. 
Scanlon tries to dispel metaphysical worries about reasons bv comparing moral reasoning 
with mathematical reasoning. He claims that just as my judgements about arithmetic are 
judgements about a subject matter independent of me (i.e. that I can be mistaken about), so 
m\- judgements about what there is reason to do are about a similarlv independent subject. 
But just as we need not accept arithmetical Platonism to make the former case true, so we 
need not accept realism about values to make the latter case hold.7" The analog7 is useful in 
showing in a general wav how irrealist cognitivism is meant to work, though of course it begs 
the question of why disagreement is so much more prevalent in ethcs than it is in 
mathematics. But I think Scanlon addresses the problem of moral disagreement in a 
satisfactorv wav, and we will touch on ths  in the next chapter. 
Since the subjectivist arguments examined in section 3.3 have defined the parameters 
of our examination of objectivism to this point, a useful way to defend irrealist cognitivism for 
the purposes of ths  discussion will be to show how it can handle those subjectivist arguments 
better than its competitors. In some cases this is not difficult to do. 
concern about how values fit into an explanation of the world does 
For example, Harman's 
not have an\' force in the 
present case, because irrealist cogrutivism just is not in the business of claiming that values 
must play such a role in the world. As Nagel saw of the sort of picture envisioned bv both 
Harman and realists such as Sturgeon and Railton, 'an epistemological criterion of realitv is 
being assumed which pretends to be comprehensi1.e but whch in fact excludes large domains 
in advance without argument.''; For the same reason, the cognitive irrealist need not be 
concerned about alternative metaphvsical explanations of moral phenomena, such as 
Blackburn's quasi-realism. Likewise for Maclue's queerness argument: again, the cognitive 
~ ~~ ~ - _  
' G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, I97 1 ). 
Scanlon. 62-63. 76 
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irrealist is not in the business of explaining how action-guiding entities can exist in the world, 
how we can know them, how they can motivate us, or how their moral features and natural 
features relate. Admittedly, the third part of Mackie's queerness challenge will still applv in a 
modified form, as the cognitive irrealist is still committed to explaining how we are motivated 
to act on reasons we have. This appears to raise the difficult internalism/externalism 
question about motivation that has been so prevalent in recent discussions of objectivism.71 
As I have said, I will treat this issue at some length in the next chapter. 
All of the subjectivist arguments mentioned so far are clearlv arguments against a 
realist position, so it is hardlv surprising they can be easily side-stepped by irrealism. But it is 
not clear that a cognitive irrealist can avoid the problem of the fact-value gap with similar 
ease. To be sure, the gap may manifest itself in a different wav than it does for the realist. We 
saw that for Railton it is mvsterious how natural facts about evolution can vield normative 
facts about what we should do. The question in Railton's case thus seems to be an ontological 
one of how one kind of fact in the world (natural) can yield another kind (moral). But the 
irrealist's avoidance of moral ontologv may not exempt h m  from fact-value concerns, because 
he must give an account of how reasons are justified, and it is possible that this justification 
may have to rest on claims about non-normative facts. Nagel thinks that our reasons are 
justified by wav of acceptance from an objecti1.e standpoint, a standpoint which excludes the 
personal idios\mcrasies of individuals and is instead composed only of what thev share in 
common. Assuming that such a standpoint can actually be reached, we might wonder what 
makes the acceptance of reasons from this standpoint the proper test of their validity. It 
apparent117 rests on the more general epistemological principle, which Nagel also holds, that 
the more we abstract from our subjective perspective on the world, the closer we come to 
knowing the world as it reall~r is.7') This is whv Nagel greatlv admires physics, a discipline he 
7 -  
Nagel, 141. 
It has been so prevalent largely because of the work of Michael Smith in his The Moral Prohlcni 7 s  
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). Smith will figure into our discussion in the next chapter, but only 
tangentially. 
individuals' respective subjective standpoints will yield more truth than the objective one. Nonetheless 
Actually the story is more complicated than this, because Nagel goes on to say that sometimes 79 
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believes to have accomplished this sort of abstraction from the subjective self better than 
others. 
I s  there a leap in Nagel from fact to value? In a sense there is, but I am not certain it is 
one that falls within the range of Hume’s objection. Nagel’s ’leap’, if it is one, seems to 
involve the surreptitious justification of a normative principle by way of a non-normative one. 
The normative principle in question is that subjecting moral reasons to scrutinv from the 
objective standpoint will yield a conception of reasons that is more fair than the alternatives. 
There are such t h g s  as moral facts about x, because there are such things as moral reasons to 
favour, do, or promote x. But whether we have these sorts of reasons regarding x depends 
cruciallv on whether the favouring of x is fair to others (e.g. one benefit of this objective ’test’ 
is that it screens out egoists). Now, apparentlv this concern with fairness is itself justified 
because it is the ethical equivalent of the scientific model of finding the truth about the world 
bv abstracting from the subjective self. To be sure, the analogv between science and ethics 
here does seem problematic, because the truth about scientific facts is golrerned b\r a 
correspondence of our beliefs to the world, while the truth about moral facts is governed at 
least in part bv considerations of fairness to others. Nagel’s problem of moving from the 
scientific model to the ethical one reminds us of the problems McDowell faced in moving 
from claims about secondarv qualities to claims about values. But whether there is actuallv a 
fact-value leap going on here is less clear, because it is generallv accepted todav that scientific 
reasoning itself contains a normative component. If it does, then the move from a scientific 
model to a moral one seems to be a m0~7e from value to value, not from fact to value. So 
although Nagel’s basis of the validity of moral reasons mav be problematic, its problems seem 
not to be captured bv the fact-value objection. 
Scanlon’s account mav also escape the fact-value trap that Hume has set. His .rTiew is 
a contractualist one wherebv the validity of our reasons is governed by what we can 
reasonablv justify to each other. This account has similarities to Nagel’s, but it also has 
1 think the epistemological principle I have cited is what lies behnd Nagel’s account of ‘objective 
tolerance.’ See Nagel, 130-1 34. 
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important differences. One of the most important of these differences is that reasonable 
grounds for rejecting a principle come from the points of view of distinct individuals, and not 
from an objective standpoint. We cannot, for example, justify harming one person greatly for 
the moderate benefit of a great number of others, because we could not in such a case justify 
ourselves to that one person.*O Scanlon proposes several reasons whv this account of the 
justification of reasons is to be preferred over rivals. He thinks that h i s  account helps to 
explain certain important elements of moral phenomenology, such as whv it is that the values 
of right and wrong have prioritv over all others, and whv it seems to be a particularlv serious 
failing to not care about right and wrong, as opposed to not caring about other things. He 
also thmks it can account for the complexities of moral motivation, e.g. we (at least 
sometimes) a1Toid a wrong action not just because it is wrong, but because other people are 
counting on us or need our help. 
If Scanlon is guiltv of making a leap from facts to values in h s  justification of reasons, 
h i s  leap is perhaps not a \’er\’ harmhl or implausible one. He does rel~7 ultimatelv on facts 
about moral phenomenology in order to explain why we have normative reasons to justify 
ourselves to each other, and it is true that in section 3.4 we saw the danger of an over-reliance 
on phenomenological claims. But it is arguable that Scanlon’s reliance on phenomenology is 
not an over-reliance in the same way that McNaughton’s is. First, it is not clear that a 
subjectivist such as Blackburn could account for the prioritv of right and wrong over other 
values in the same way that he might account for the negative reaction of an observer to, e.g., 
seeing children throwing rocks at a wounded animal. Second, phenomenological 
considerations are not the only ones Scanlon appeals to in h i s  justification of his 
contractualism. He argues that another adirantage of his account is that it addresses an 
important ethical dilemma, Pritchard’s dilemma, in a satisfactory way. Pritchard’s dilemma 
states that we need an account of wrongness that is neither trivial (e.g. ‘we have a reason not 
to do x because it is wrong’) nor too far removed from the moral realm (e.g. ’we have a reason 
Nagel does wish to account for the validity of these ‘deontological reasons,’ but his explanation of  8 0 
them seems less successful. See Nagel, 175- 180. 
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not to do x because we might be caught if we do’). Scanlon’s account of wrongness, that we 
have a reason not to do x because we could not justify our action to others, steers a middle 
path through the dilemma. This is a reason to favour his account that makes no jump at all 
from fact to value. So I think the least we can conclude is that the fact-value gap need not be 
seen to plague irrealist cogrutivism in the same wav, or to the same extent, as it does accounts 
of moral realism. 
There is an additional problem for at least some conceptions of irrealist cognitivism, 
which is that it seems to demand a fuller role for rationalihr to play than is required bv 
realism. We briefly saw in section 3.7 that Railton relies on an instrumental conception of 
rationalitv, wherebv reason’s job, to put it roughlv, is to manipulate facts that are already 
present. Railton claims that in moralitv we require reason to tell us not what our good is (this 
is alreadv present in a concept of flourishing) but how best to achieve it. This  moderate 
version of rationalitv is more easilv defended than a robust one (though we have seen that 
Railton’s reliance on flourishing creates problems of its own). BY contrast, Nagel needs a 
robust concept of rationality, because he has nothing like a concept of flourishing to which 
moral reasoning can refer. He saw that we can see from the objective standpoint (and 
sometimes the subjective one) what is good, but what determines the content of the good? 
Standpoints alone cannot tell us what we see from them. It appears that, like Kant, Nagel 
requires reason to tell us both what is good, and also how to achieve that good. This raises 
the obvious and difficult problem of whether reason can actuallv take on this extra 
An important advantage of Scanlon’s account over Nagel’s is that it is able to combine 
irrealism with a modest, instrumental account of reason.S? We reason about the principles we 
need in order to justifv ourselves to each other, but the claim that we do need to justif77 
ourselves to each other in this wav is a substantive claim, not a rational one. Scanlon 
emphasises, for example, that someone who believes herself to be exempt from justifving 
herself to others is not (necessaril~) irrational, but she does fail to appreciate the reasons she 
For another attempt to explain this sort of irrealist cognitivism featuring a robust concept of reason, s1 
see John Skorupslu, ‘Irrealist Cognitivisni’ in Ratio 12 ( 1999). 436-459. 
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has. We feel obligated to justifv ourselves to each other partly because this kind of 
justification fits the moral phenomenology, and partlv because it accords with substantive 
arguments, such as the one concerning the value of each individual life I offered in Chapter 1. 
I will say more in the next chapter about how Dworkin’s account of the sacred can be used to 
help justify Scanlon’s contractualism. 
As I mentioned at the beginning of this section, I have not tried to offer anvthing like 
a full defence of irrealist cognitivism. I will be satisfied if this section has offered an 
introduction to some features of the general strategy, and has shown how two prominent 
examples of the strategy, the views of Scanlon and Nagel, fare against the subjectivist 
arguments examined in section 3.3. Because irrealist cogrutivism does seem able to meet 
those objections better than the versions of realism we examined, I believe it to be more 
promising than its realist competitors. But the more difficult task lies ahead, for it is one thing 
to show an objectivist strategy such as irrealist cogrutivism to h a ~ e  promise, and quite another 
to show in greater detail how it is a thoroughlv defensible position. 
I conclude that, given the subjectivist arguments we have examined, irrealist 
cognitivism is the most promising objectivist strategy, and one worthy of further pursuit. We 
have seen that cogrutivism is the crucial issue w i t h  objectivism, and that although it might 
vet be established I ia  realism, current lrersions of realism are unable to satisfactoril~7 meet one 
or several of the subjectiT5st objections we have considered. Keeping in mind the fact that 
realism does not seem to be the only wa\r to establish cognitivism, we have come to favour 
irrealist objectivist positions such as Scanlon’s and Nagel’s. More broadly, this concludes the 
second phase of the thesis, wherebv we have tried to pinpoint with some precision the kind of 
universal rights view that is needed in order to enjov credibility. This has been one which 
bases rights ultimatelr7 on objective values, and which understands objective values within a 
scheme of irrealist cognitivism. 
In the following chapter I will offer a detailed defence of a Scanlonian view of irrealist 
co,witivism. T ~ E  project will consist largely of defending Scanlon’s 1Tiew against criticisms 
82 As I note in the next chapter, this is also an important divide between Scanlon and Parfit. 
1 1 1  
that can be devised against it, though in the process of making this defence I will also suggest 
important revisions to Scanlon’s view. Foremost among these revisions will be an 
incorporation of Dworkin’s account of the sacred as an underpinning to contractualism, and a 
resultant account of reasons we all share. A fairly comprehensive moral view will emerge 




A Scanlonian View of Moral Reasons 
We saw in the previous chapter that the most promising sort of moral objectivitv 
generally, and thus the most promising one on which to base uni~~ersal moral rights, is the 
kind I labelled irrealist cognitivism. This objectivist strateg~ emphasises the universalitv of 
moral reasons while de-emphasising the sort of complex metaphvsical commitments made by 
some other forms of objectilism. This chapter is an attempt to defend a particular theorv of 
moral reasons, namely that of Scanlon. The first section will discuss Scanlon’s moral 
psychology and epistemologv, defending h i s  anti-Humean \4ew of motivation and his view 
that moral reasons exist external to moral agents. The second section will defend Scanlon’s 
contractualism, and b77 extension his account of right and wrong. The thrd section will then 
extend Scanlon’s theory to suggest that there are certain goods which we all have reason to 
pursue (and perhaps promote), and it will suggest what some of those goods are. This  will set 
us up in the fifth and final chapter to show7 how universal rights follow from these essential 
goods. 
In the context of the thesis as a whole this chapter begins the third and final phase of 
the project, which is to explain in some detail what mv own rights view is. This statement of 
intent may sound a bit odd in light of the fact that I have said previously looking ahead to this 
chapter that it does not contain much of an explicit discussion of rights. Indeed this is true: 
the chapter is an account of what I will call reasons of autonomy and duties, but not rights. 
Nonetheless, I thmk it is legitimate to claim that this chapter begins a delineation of mv rights 
view, because the Scanlonian moral picture it defends is the framework into which I will 
insert rights in the next chapter. I will claim in the next chapter that rights are derived from 
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reasons that are discussed in this chapter, and it will be impossible to understand or 
appreciate that discussion without an understanding of the present one. 
An interesting interpretative issue will arise throughout this chapter regarding how 
closely the views I end up defending are representative of Scanlon’s own moral picture. One 
wav in which I almost surely do revise Scanlon’s contractualism is to make it more 
determinative, but perhaps correspondinglv less flexible in its abilitv to deal with particular 
cases.s3 Although questions of interpretation are interesting in their own right, I will not 
emphasise them in what is to follow. I shall confine my speculations about these matters to a 
few footnotes. Overall, ml’ primary concern is to emerge at the end of this chapter with a 
view of moral reasons that is persuasive and coherent, whether or not it adheres strictlv to an 
orthodox reading of Scanlon. 
4.1 Moral Reasons 
This section is a defence of a Scanlonian theorv of moral reasons. Mv discussion will 
focus particularly on two related issues that hare featured prominently in the recent literature 
on moral reasons, namely what role (if anv) desire plavs in our recognition of reasons and 
abilitv to act on them, and whether and how reasons exist external to moral agents. Scanlon’s 
1-iews are that desires play little if an\’ role in our abilitv to recognise and act upon moral 
reasons, and that reasons exist external to moral agents. I will defend both views, though I 
will suggest that the latter view requires a different defence than the one Scanlon offers in his 
first chapter, a defence that draws on resources from elsewhere in our project.s4 
Although I will focus on defending Scanlon’s account of moral reasons, I have 
already noted that he is not the onlv theorist workmg on a concept of external moral reasons. 
Scanlon acknowledges that some readers might be tempted in this direction, and he implies that there S3 
might be some merit to this approach. See U7mr k T e  Otlv to Each Orhcr (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 1998), 241 -247. All future references to Scanlon will be to this work. 
Scanlon seems to be offering a self-standing epistemology of moral reasons in his first chapter. See 




Dancy, Parfit, Smith, and Nagel are perhaps the other most influential figures working on 
theories of objective moral reasons. There are manv debates internal to these irrealist 
cognitivists that I will not touch upon. Mv focus on Scanlon over others is a result of mv 
belief that he currentlv has the most complete account of moral reasons, and that his account 
is in some wavs particularly agreeable to yielding rights, especially universal rights. 
Scanlon’s account has the advantage of being more coherent than Nagel’s, and of avoiding the 
perhaps implausible gvrations involved in Smith’s attempt to combine objectivism with 
Humean motivation.85 As for Parfit and Dancv, I think that much of what thev sa\’ serves to 
complement Scanlon’s account, and I will cite some of their points accordinglv. 
As I have said, I will focus on Scanlon’s concept of nio~al reasons, though he and 
others often discuss moral and non-moral reasons (sometimes called ’practical reasons’) 
interchangeably. It should be clear enough from mv pre1Tious chapters, and from what I have 
indicated will follow in my final chapter, whv I am particularly interested in moral reasons as 
opposed to non-moral ones. Some of what I sav about moral reasons will apply equallv well 
to non-moral reasons, though some may not. Since my concern is not primarilv with non- 
moral reasons, I will refrain from pointing out where overlaps occur and where they do not. 
Before we discuss Scanlon’s view it is best to be clear about our potentiallv confusing 
usage of the terms ’internalism’ and ’externalism.’ There is a sense in which these terms are 
used to talk about the motivation of agents, and a verv different sense in whch thev are used 
to talk about the source of reasons. Regarding motivation, a theorist is often considered an 
internalist if he thinks that agent A can act on h i s  reason to @ without a desire playing a causal 
role in this action. Converselv, an externalist on the issue of motivation would insist that a 
desire must be a part of the motilTationa1 stor\r. I will follow Parfit in labelling these positions 
’moral belief internalism’ and ’moral belief externalism’, respectivelv.8” Regarding the source 
of reasons, an internalist holds that reasons originate from an agent’s subjective motivational 
The lund of view to which Nagel is committed has been usefully criticised by Dancy in Pi-ucricul 
Parfit. ‘Reasons and Motivation’, 103- 105. It might be somewhat misleading to label Scanlon’s own 
85  
Realit?.. 50-5 1 .  Smith’s view has been criticised by many commentators. 
position ‘moral belief internalism.’ because he thinks beliefs are only one of several lands of 
8 h 
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set, while an externalist holds that (at least some) reasons applv to an agent whether or not 
they correlate with his subjective motivational set. Following Parfit again I will call these 
positions ’moral internalism’ and ’moral externalism’. Clearlv, it is possible for a theorist to 
be an internalist in one sense and an externalist in the other - for example, Scanlon is himself 
a moral belief internalist but a moral externalist. 
The briefest overview of Scanlon’s treatment of moral reasons might summarise it in 
the following points: 
1. Reasons are primitive. Thev are not derived from desires, or from beliefs, 
or from a n v t h g  else. 
2. Reasons necessarilv have a normative element: a reason is a good reason. 
3. It is possible for an agent to be rational, vet fail to appreciate the reasons 
that apply to her. 
4. Reasons present us with no special metaphvsical mvsteries. 
5. Desire plavs almost no role in an agent’s recooanition of most reasons, nor 
in h i s  motivation to act on them. Attitudes of the agent do p l a ~  an
important role in these processes, but these attitudes are judgement- 
sensitive. 
6. Reasons exist external to the agent. Thev may applv to an agent even 
though she does not (perhaps even cannot) recognise or appreciate them. 
7. We find out what reasons we have bv thinlung about them. Our 
judgement-sensitive attitudes give us operative reasons, which then must 
survive two steps of critical scrutinv. Operative reasons that survive the 
first step are pro tanto reasons; pro tanto reasons that survive the second 
step are genuine reasons. 
As I have already indicated, the bulk of mv discussion will focus on the last three points. I 
have alreadv tried to defend the fourth point in 3.7. It would perhaps be useful, though, to 
sav a bit more about the first three points, if onl\7 to explain why I have chosen not to examine 
them at greater length. The claim that reasons are primitive is one of the most distinctive, and 
perhaps surprising, claims that Scanlon makes. Reasons have been traditionally seen to be 
reducible to beliefs, or perhaps a combination of beliefs and desires. Scanlon thinks we must 
make do with the (admittedlv circular) definition that a reason is a consideration that counts 
judgement-sensitive attitudes that can motivate us. This label does, though, imply the crucial point that 
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in favour of something, and counts in favour of that thing by providing a reason for it. But 
this circularity is hardlv surprising, because if a concept is primitive it is analvticallv true that 
that concept cannot be explained in terms of anvthing else. Whv can reasons not be 
primitive? The most likelv source of scepticism will probably take the form of metaphvsical 
doubts about reasons, and I have tried to defend Scanlon on this point in the previous 
chapter. But since it is difficult to offer positive arguments in fa\Tour of reasons being 
primitives7, the best way to proceed is probablv to admit the possibilitv that they are 
primitive, and then see if ths  claim can be part of an overall account of reasons that is 
coherent and plausible. I hope mv discussion in this section will show that it can be. 
When Scanlon claims that reasons are good reasons, he is distancing himself from a 
distinction that is often made between two kinds of reasons. f i s  distinction, which we will 
see from Smith later, differentiates between motivating (or explanatorv) reasons on the one 
hand, and normative (or justifving) reasons on the other. Motivating reasons are claimed to 
be those that move us to act, while normative reasons are those that moralitv indicates we 
have. But it is a substantive controversv whether such a distinction need be made. The 
Scanlon view is that reasons are normative, and that a person of non-defective faculties88 can 
recognise the reasons that apply to him, and will exhibit the rationality to act on the reasons 
he recognises. There is no need on this picture to distinguish between motivating reasons and 
normative reasons. If Scanlon’s view of motivation is correct (or at least not clearly incorrect), 
then it seems there is probably no need to distinguish between motivating and normative 
reasons, and there is no obstacle to claiming that all reasons are normative. On the other 
hand, if a Humean view of motivation like Smith’s is true, then it might be helpful to make a 
distinction between different kinds of reasons, so I will delay further comment until we 
examine that issue. 
desire need not be one of those attitudes. so I will retain it despite its slight imprecision. 
nor on desires. One might infer from these arguments that reasons must be primitive. See Practical 
Rcalih., Chapters 2-3. 
Scanlon is not entirely clear on what will count as a defect in this context. He does say that one kmd 
of defect occurs when our desires mislead us: we may have desires that arise unbidden and run contrary 
to the attitudes that would help us to recognise our reasons. See p. 40. 
Though Dancy offers helpful negative arguments. He argues that reasons cannot be based on beliefs. S7 
Sh 
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Scanlon’s view of rationality is wide in the sense that he thinks it is possible for an 
agent to be rational, yet fail to appreciate the reasons that applv to her. Agents are irrational 
only when their attitudes fail to correspond to their judgements about reasons. Thus 
(applying Scanlon’s view to an example from Parfit) I am being irrational if I think I have a 
reason to care about mv well-being on future Tuesdavs but fail to care about it on those 
occasions anvwav; but I am not being irrational if I (mistakenlv) believe that I do not have any 
reasons to care about mv welfare on future Tuesda~s.s‘~ Scanlon’s wide view thus conceives 
of rationality as instrumental, not substantive. If I have a reason to keep mv promise, t h s  
does not entail that I am irrational if I fail to keep it - rather, I am merelv failing to appreciate 
a reason that applies to me. This discussion is worth mentioning for two reasons. First, it 
explains the view of rationalit\. I will mvself adopt. Second, we can note that Scanlon’s 
instrumental view of rationaliW sets up a challenge for him (and for us): to give objective 
moral reasons a determinate content without appealing to what it is rational to value. I will 
begin to show how he proposes to do this in the discussion that follows. 
Before I offer a defence of Scanlon’s moral psvchology and epistemologv, it seems 
worthwhile to provide an overview of what the process of moral reasoning entails. I will trv 
to describe, first in general terms and then in examples, how we come to recognise and act 
upon moral reasons, according to Scanlon’s discussion in his first chapter. In doing so I am 
offering a fuller explanation of points five through seven, discussing them together to show 
how7 thev are linked. The present discussion, though, is an attempt onlv to clarifv Scanlon’s 
position, not vet to defend it. Reasons first arise in a provisional sense from an agent’s 
judgement-sensitive attitudes, possiblv combined with a state of affairs.90 Our judgement- 
sensitive attitudes include beliefs, intentions, hopes, fears, and attitudes such as admiration, 
respect, contempt, and indignation. Sigxuficantly, they do not, or at least do not usually, 
Parfit disagrees, preferring a relatively narrow view of rationality (X’s failure to appreciate she has a x9 
reason to @ can allow us to call X irrational) with corresponding substantive implications (X‘s 
appreciation of the fact that she has a reason to 4 makes her substantively rational). I will not pursue 
this controversy further, other than to suggest that Scanlon has convincing examples to support his 
view. See Scanlon. 25-30. 
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include desires. P may have an attitude A that suggests he has a reason to @, a reason that in 
turn supports A. In such a case P has an o;7emti~te reason to $. This operative reason must then 
undergo two steps of critical scrutiny in order to become a genuine reason. In the first step, 
we determine whether P’s operative reason can sunive questioning along the lines of ‘Am I 
overlooking something? Am I considering the object or facts in question in the right wav? 
What reasons do particular cases seem to present?’ and so on. The content of judgement- 
sensitive attitude A will help to give more specific content to this line of questioning. If after 
our questioning we still think that P has a reason to $, then this reason becomes a pro f m f o  
rcas011~1, and we gain confidence in the legitimacy of attitude A. We then engage in a second 
step of critical scrutinv in order to compare our pro tanto reason to $ to am7 other pro tanto 
reasons that might count against $-ing. Sometimes there will be different pro tanto reasons 
that clash in this wav, and sometimes there will not be. When there are, we must weigh them 
against each other to see whether we do actually hare a reason to $.92 If it still seems at this 
point that we have a reason to $, then at last we have a genuine reason. Our realisation that 
we have a genuine reason to $ gi\Tes us an intention to act on our reason (i.e. an intention to $). 
X s  intention is normally sufficient to cause us to $ when we judge that circumstances are 
amenable to doing so. 
It may be difficult to fullv picture what is going on in the Scanlon account when we 
discuss it in such general terms, so let us see how it works in a couple of examples. The first 
example, that of a parent’s alleged reason to strike an unruly child, comes from Scanlon 
himself. Let us sav a parent has a judgement-sensitive attitude in favour of striking h i s  child 
because the child has been terriblv incorrigible, and thus considers himself to have an 
operative reason to strike the child. How might he determine whether this operative reason is 
For example, my attitude in favour of eating ice cream may by itself make me think I have a reason to 90 
eat ice cream. Or this attitude may be ‘latent’: I may need to see an ice cream truck go by before I pay 
attention to my attitude in favour of eating ice cream. 
Scanlon does not himself emphasise the terminology of operative reasons and pro tanto reasons, but 
on two separate occasions he does use this terminology in the way I am using it. See 19, 65. 
O 2  What will be the weighing criteria? Scanlon does not have much to say about this. I presume he 




a pro tanto reason? Bv asking himself questions such as whv he thinks violence is 
appropriate, why he thinks the answer to that question is something desirable, and what 
alternative courses of action there might be. B v  engaging in this sort of scrutiny, it seems 
likelv that the parent will decide he does not have the reason in question (i.e. it is not even a 
pro tanto reason), and will accordingly revise the judgement-sensitive attitude on which it is 
based (this is an example of the way in which our attitudes are ’judgement-sensitive’). He 
will not form an intention to strike his child. 
We can easily devise a second example which brings the second level of scrutinv into 
plav. Let us say I have a judgement-sensitive attitude in favour of helping those in need, and 
I hear of a charik program which is helping families in rural Kenva to obtain clean drinking 
water which they would otherwise lack. I can spare some monev to give to this cause without 
causing hardship to mvself. I thus consider mvself to have an operative reason to contribute 
monev to the charity. Tlus operative reason seems to survilre the first level of scrutinv, as the 
monev does help the poor Kenvms, it is no great sacrifice to me, etc. But let us say I also 
know that although some of the charitv monev goes toward helping the poor people, some of 
it ends up in the pockets of the autocratic and corrupt leaders of the country, helping them to 
perpetuate their rule. Since the policies of these leaders are largely what is keeping the rural 
population poor and unhealthy, it seems I have pro tanto reasons both to give the money and 
not to give the money. If I weigh these reasons and decide I do not have a reason to give the 
monev, I need not change the judgement-sensitive attitude on which my original operative 
reason was based, for that reason survived the first level of scrutiny. If a comparison of pro 
tanto reasons reveals that I do have a reason to give the money, I will then form an intention to 
give the money, which will be sufficient to motivate me to do so when circumstances permit. 
I should issue a reminder at this point that I have so far only been trving to explain 
Scanlon’s view of moral reasons, not defend it. I trust that the basic tenets of h is  position have 
been made clear, and that we can now examine how the position holds up against counter- 
arguments and rival theories that some ha\?e found persuasive. I will first offer a defence of 
Scanlon’s view that desire plavs little or no role in the recognition of reasons and our ability to 
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act on them, comparing the Scanlon view to Humean ones such as Smith’s. Then I will offer a 
defence of Scanlon’s externalist view of the source of moral reasons against the influential 
internalist arguments of Bernard W i l l i a m ~ . ~ ~  To put the matter in Parfit’s terms, I am first 
defending Scanlon’s moral belief internalism, and then h is  moral externalism. 
The debate between moral belief internalists and externalists is considered to be of 
6 o-reat importance in discussions of moral reasons, because it is often thought that if we are to 
be cxtcnznlists about the source of moral reasons (and thus objectivists) we must establish the 
truth of moral belief intcrmlisnz. For example, it strikes man17 people as mysterious how 
reasons could exist external to an agent, Vet depend on that agent’s particular desires.‘)‘ The 
two poles in the debate are traditional117 seen to have been defined bv the positions of Hume 
and Kant. Hume is often associated with the view that we cannot @ without being motivated 
bv a desire to @, while Kant is associated with the view that it is (at least sometimes) possible 
to @ when motivated by moral belief alone. It is important to note, then, that the candidates 
for motivational elements halie traditionally been seen to be either belief, desire, or a 
combination of the two. Th is  belief-desire paradigm has been accepted b17 most moral belief 
intemalists (e.g. Nagel, McDowell, Parfit) and moral belief externalists (e.g. Williams, 
Blackburn, Smith) to the present dav. I will argue that although Scanlon’s transcendence of 
the belief-desire paradigm makes him immune from important criticisms of moral belief 
internalism, we nonetheless lack very effective arguments at present against moral belief 
externalism. The result is a sort of draw between the two sides, but ths  result is far from 
useless for our purposes. It allows us present Scanlon’s view as defeasibly sound, and to call 
into question the assumption currently held bv some thinkers that one must be either a moral 
internalist, or else accomplish moral externalism via moral belief externalism in the way that 
Bernard Williams, ‘Internal and External Reasons’ in Moral Lzrck (Cambridge: Cambridge University 93 
Press, 198 1 ), 10 1 - 1 13; ‘Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame’ in Making Sense of HLmaizi[\* 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 1995). 35-45. All references will be to the first essay unless 
otherwise noted. 
discussion I will be considering only Smith’s Humeanism, not his attempt to reconcile Humeanisni with 
objectivism. 
T h s  is not mysterious to Smith, of course, but it remains mysterious to many others. In this 94 
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Michael Smith attempts. The argument is encouraging to anyone who, like Scanlon, wishes to 
combine moral belief internalism with moral externalism. 
Let us see how Scanlon’s account handles a recent argument for Humean motivation, 
namelv that of Smith. Smith’s argument can be summarised as follows: 
Pl: Having a motivating reason is, intrr alia, having a goal. 
P2: Having a goal is being in a state with which the world must fit. 
P3: Being in a state with which the world must fit is desiring. 
C: Desires are constitutive elements of motivating reasons. 
Now, as I have mentioned, Smith distinguishes between motivating and normative reasons, 
while Scanlon does not. But this difference need not detain us long, for it seems that Smith’s 
motivating reasons are for present purposes akm to Scanlon’s operative reasons. Thus we 
might put P1 in these more Scanlonian terms: 
P1: Having an operative reason is, iiztcr dilz, having a goal. 
With this clarification in mind, what do we think of the argument? I doubt Scanlon would 
object to either of the first two premises. If I have an operative reason to give money to rural 
Kenvans, this seems rather straightforuwdlv to be a goal (though of course one which has vet 
to be ’approved’). Furthermore, to have this goal is to be in a state with which the world must 
fit, in the sense that mv goal will not be realised until states of affairs are arranged in a certain 
fashion. But if Scanlon would allow the first two premises, he would certainlv object to the 
third. Smith realises the third premise is the most controlTersia1, and he tries to defend it 
against various attacks made within the belief-desire paradigm. What Smith does not protect 
himself against, though, is the possibilitv of an alternative picture of motivation that takes 
leave of the strict belief-desire paradigm, which is what Scanlon offers. As we have seen, 
Scanlon belie1Tes that judgement-sensitive attitudes include not only beliefs but hopes, fears, 
intentions, etc. The kev point about these attitudes in the present context is that thev are not 
all reducible to talk about beliefs and desires, e.g. it is not the case that a hope is not mere117 a 
certain combination of beliefs and desires, while a fear is a different one. Hopes and fears are 
99  1 -- 
fundamentally different kinds of attitudes than beliefs and desires (though they are similar to 
beliefs in the respect that they are judgement-sensitive). If this claim is difficult to 
demonstrate conclusivelv, it is also difficult to refute. The mere fact that hoping maj’ seem to 
be similar in some respects to desiring does not mean it is necessarily conzposcd of desires. The 
same can be said for the other candidates for judgement-sensitive attitudes. As a result, it 
seems that Scanlon does not face anv conceptual impediment to denving P3 and claiming that 
attitudes other than desire can put us in a state with whch the world must fit. 
But is Scanlon’s conceptual alternative to the Humean picture phenomenologicallv 
plausible? The burden is on h m  to present a theory of motivation that is not onlv coherent 
but which seems to accuratelv describe our experiences. Let us test its phenomenological 
plausibilih. * I  bv comparing it to the Humean account with regard to an example that manv 
would take to be one that lends itself to the Humean view. Let us sav that on a hot dav I pass 
bv a water fountain and take mvself to have a reason to drink. On the Humean \riew it is of 
course m17 desire to drink (along with a belief that drinking will satisfy this desire) that 
motivates me to drink. On the Scanlon account, I am motivated bv a judgement-sensitive 
attitude, namelv the belief that drinlung the water will lead to the pleasant state of having mv 
thirst satisfied. Which account is more phenomenologicallv accurate? This  seems hard to sav. 
In the case of giving to charitv, Smith would claim that I do so because I have a desire to help 
the rural Kenyans (along with a relevant means-end belief), while Scanlon might sa\’ that I am 
motivated bv my hope that the lives of these people will improve as a result. Which account 
does the phenomenologv favour? Again this seems difficult to determine. But if the 
phenomenology does not count decisivelv in favour of Scanlon, it seems not to form the basis 
of a convincing argument against him either. 
So far our moves against the Humean have been defensive in nature. I have tried to 
argue that Scanlon is not harmed bv appeals to direction of fit or by appeals to 
phenomenology. But if we shift from defence to attack, what can be said to discredit the 
Humean picture? Manv different lunds of arguments have of course been attempted. It is 
sometimes thought that one of the more successful of these has been that of the earlv Nagel, 
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who made the quite plausible claim that manv of our desires result from our deliberations 
about the reasons we have (and are in this sense 'motivated').95 Some have taken this to 
imply that desires generally are unlikely to be motivationallv efficacious. While Nagel 
himself thought (or at least hoped) this conclusion to be true, he realised it did not follow 
simply from his claim about motivated reasons, for that claim bv itself allows for the 
possibility that (unmotivated) desires motivate our reasoning. Nagel's account, then, shows 
the anti-Humean a clear wav to attack Humeanism, if onl17 the gap he leaves can be bridged. 
How can we get from the claim that manv of our desires result from reasons we take 
oursehTes to have, to the claim that our reasons are (at least sometimes) not motivated b\7 
desires? A recent attempt to bridge this gap has been made bv D a n c ~ . ' ) ~  His argument goes 
like this: 
P1: Manv and 17arious desires are immediatelv grounded not in other desires 
P2: The only desires not grounded in reasons are pathologcal urges. 
P3: These urges cannot themselves count as reasons for doing what they 
P4: For all reason-based desires to @, the desires do not themselves add to 
but in reasons. 
move us to do. 
those reasons, nor do they add to reasons to do what would subserve @- 
No desires are reasons, and no desires add anvthing significant to our 
stock of reasons. 
ing. 
C: 
We can see that Dancy's strategv is to marginalise unmotivated desires to the greatest extent 
possible, then argue that motivated desires contribute nothing important to the reasons on 
which the\r are based. The structure of the argument seems promising, but I think Dancy is 
less than fullv successful in justifving either one of these two steps. Since the argument 
becomes suspect if just one of the two steps is not successful, I will confine my discussion to 
Dancv's attempt to marginalise unmotivated desires. How does he manage to reduce 
unmotivated desires to pathological urges? P2 depends on the claim that, if we can rationally 
explain whv we desire to @, our desire must be had for the reason that our explanation 
reveals, i.e. it must be motivated. From there, Dancv needs only to show that blind urges are 
95 Thomas Nagel, The Possibili~. qf  Alii-rrisni (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), Chapter 5. 
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the only desires that do not fit this descriptiong7, which he arguablv does. But the mere fact 
that a reason can be found for a desire does not make that desire motivated. It simplv begs 
the question to assume that everv desire for which we can devise a reason must be based on 
that reason. We can see this if we return to an example we used previouslv. We have seen 
that at least two coherent and plausible, though irreconcilable, explanations exist for what 
happens when I pass a water fountain on a hot day, have an attitude in favour of drinking, 
and drink the water. The Humean one is that I have a desire to drmk the water, and this is 
what motivates me to do so. Scanlon’s alternative is that I drink the water because I believe 
that doing so will give me a pleasurable sensation of having my thirst quenched, and that this 
belief gives me a reason (at least an operative one) to drink the water. To this we might add 
another anti-Humean account, that of Nagel, who thinks that mv belief that the water will be 
pleasurable gives me a desire to drmk the water, but that this desire is not motivationallv 
efficacious. The question we must ask ourselves at this point is how Dancy’s argument can 
give us anv reason to prefer either anti-Humean view to the Humean one. I cannot see that 
anvthing Dancy has said excludes the possibilitv that in this instance I have an unmotivated 
desire to drink the water, and that this is what moves me to drink it. It could be the 
satisfaction of just such an unmotivated desire that makes our drinking pleasurable. 
Though we have not bv anv means examined all the arguments against Humeanism, I 
am pessimistic about our chances, at least w i t h  the current terms of the debate about 
motivation, of finding a decisive reason to favour either Humeanism or anti-Humeanism. 
The problem, stated in general terms, is that Humeans and anti-Humeans carve up the same 
phenomenological material in w a ~ s  that are coherent and of roughly equal plausibilitv, and 
that anv argument one side makes against the other depends on a particular wav of can7ing 
the material the other would simply reject. We have seen examples of this phenomenon 
already; another can be seen in the different wavs that desires and dispositions are or are not 
carved apart. Scanlon’s task of excluding desires from judgement-sensitive attitudes is made 
Practical Realih,, 35-39. 




easier by the fact that he whittles desires down to the sort of urges discussed bjr Danc\r above. 
This allows him to say that judgement-sensitive attitudes do not normall~7 include desires, 
and instead are composed of various dispositions. Smith, on the other hand, takes a much 
wider view of desires as states that have a certain functional role. To desire to @ is, for Smith, 
to have a certain set of dispositions regarding @-ing. Must dispositions be considered desires? 
I cannot see how this question can be resolved bv philosophical argument. 
Fortunately, though, this impasse concerning Humean motivation affects Scanlon’s 
account less than we might have imagined. First, it allows Scanlon’s moral reasons to be at 
worst defeasiblv legitimate. There seems no reason concerning moral motivation to doubt 
their legitimacv at present, even though we must admit we have not beaten back the Humean 
challenge as much as we might like. Second, even if new and convincing arguments for 
Humeanism are devised, it is possible that Scanlon’s account would not be harmed. To see 
this, let us take Scanlon’s motivational picture and insert desire in everv place a Humean 
might want it. We might end up with the following picture: we have judgement-sensitive 
desires which @Ire us operative reasons. We then subject these reasons to our two levels of 
critical scrutinv. When a reason passes both leirels, we form a dcsire to act on it, which is 
normallv sufficient for us to so act. I cannot see that the moral externalism of Scardon’s 
account is threatened bv this interjection of desires into the picture, which would st i l l  include 
elements such as the judgement-sensitiviw of desires, and the critical scrutinv of reasons. But 
if these are indeed important elements, thev indicate how the Scanlon account might be 
harmed. One wav would be to sav that not onlv are we motivated by desires, but that these 
desires are not judgement-sensitive. But it is not clear, at least prima fizcic, why desires, or at 
least a large class of them, could not be judgement-sensitive. The other way is to claim that 
Scanlon’s account of the critical scrutinv of reasons does not accomplish what it needs to, 
failing to give us a determinate account of the reasons we have. As I will argue in the pages 
to come, I think there might be something in this criticism. But the important point at present 
is that it is a separate issue from the problems presented bv Humean motivation. 
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I have argued that, although I cannot see how7 the Humean account of motivation can 
be refuted, Scanlon is nonetheless unharmed by it. His motivational account seems to me to 
be just as plausible as the Humean one, which confers on his moral reasons a defeasible 
legitimacy. Furthermore, even if Humeanism is true it is not clearlv a threat to the crucial 
elements of Scanlon’s external reasons. Despite the impasse we have reached, the discussion 
of moral motivation has been important to our defence of Scanlon. Humeanism has become a 
sort of dogma in modern philosophy, suggesting to manv that we must choose between either 
a subjectivist ethics that admits the arbitrariness of individual desires, or an objectivism that 
proceeds along Smithian lines. I hope I have shown that there is no reason in the current state 
of the debate to feel we are forced into malung such a choice. 
The second main line of defence of Scanlon’s account I wish to pursue involves h i s  
moral externalism. As we will recall, this is the view that an agent can have moral reasons 
that are not suggested by his subjective motivational set - moral reasons are in this sense 
external to the agent. The opposing view is of course moral internalism. Williams, the most 
influential of the moral internalists, is happv to speak of moral reasons, but is puzzled by the 
idea that such reasons could be somehow external to moral agents. How can an agent, he 
wonders, have a reason to @ that she cannot reco,gnise? If she has a reason to @, this must be 
because she has in some sense a motivation to @.qs Accordinglv he decides that external 
reasons are incoherent, false, or somethmg else badlv expressed. I will t r ~ 7  to defend Scanlon’s 
concept of external reasons against Williams’s arguments. 
One reason the Williams account has been influential is that it avoids the charge of 
over-simplicih. which could easily plague accounts of moral internalism. It is not the case, for 
example, that P has a reason to @ whenever P desires to @. Williams does think that we have a 
reason to @ whenever we truly have a motivation to @, but that w7e are often mistaken about 
how best to fulfil our true, fundamental motivations. Thus it is possible for us to think we 
have a reason to @ when we actually do not, and it is possible that in particular cases we may 
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not realise it when we actually have a reason to @. To see if we really have such a reason we 
must deliberate about the relationship between our immediate inclinations and our 
fundamental motivations, and the deliberative process Williams envisions seems surprisinglv 
similar to the one Scanlon suggests at his first level of critical scrutinv.9’) In this wav Williams 
tries to account for all the complexih. of a moral externalist account while avoiding what he 
regards as the mvsterv. At the very least, h s  account has a plausibility which makes it worth 
taking serious117 as an alternative to moral externalism. 
I can discern two distinct but related arguments that Williams makes against external 
reasons. I will call the first the argument concerning explanation, and it can be summarised 
as follows: 
P1: If something can be a reason for action, then it could be someone’s reason 
for acting on a particular occasion, and it would then figure in an 
explanation of that action. 
P2: No external reason statement could bv itself offer an explanation of 
anvone’s action. 
C: External reason statements cannot be reasons for action. 
Scanlon would object to the first premise only in the sense that he thinks it applies only to 
agents who are relevantly non-defective. He thmks it is possible an agent might have a 
reason that applies to her that she cannot reco,anise, but only if that agent is deficient in her 
ability to scrutinise her reasons. While this is an important difference between Williams and 
Scanlon, it is not the basis for a telling objection to the argument. Scanlon’s more serious 
objection would be to P2. Strictlv speaking, Scanlon could admit that P2 is true, but that in 
the sense that it is true, Williams’s conclusion would not follow from it. For if we are to be 
precise, it is certainly true that no external reason statement could ‘bv itself’ offer an 
explanation of anyone’s action. A full explanation of an agent’s action involves reference to 
judgement-sensitive attitudes, deliberation about the external reason statement, and the 
forming of an intention. But to be fair, Williams seems to have a more substantive point in 
Note that for moral internalists this motivation need not include desire. Williams does hold to a 
Humean l iew of motivation, but his arguments concerning moral internalism do not depend on his 
doing so. 
So much so, in fact. that Scanlon is content to call them identical. See ‘Appendix: Williams on 




mind in P2. He is concerned to emphasise that a psvchological link is needed for an agent on 
an external reason statement, and that it is mvsterious where this link is going to come from. 
But I think this is a problem that Scanlon has transcended bv rethinking the old belief-desire 
paradigm. Perhaps if Scanlon were stuck with a picture that claimed we are alwa17s 
motivated in moralitv I d  bv belief alone, the Williams claim about the need for a psvchological 
link would have more bite (e.g. for reasons brought out b~7 Smith’s argument above). But 
clearlv the psychological link in question is provided on Scanlon’s account bv the notion of an 
intention. Following Michael Bratman, Scanlon conceives of an intention as a sort of 
defeasible plan, a plan whose motivating power derives from the judgement and reasons an 
agent recognises, not from a desire.lOO As we have seen, Scanlon claims that P’s recognition 
that she has a genuine reason to 4, n0mall~7 gives her an intention to 4,, which is normallv 
sufficient to lead her to 9. 
If there is anv reason to doubt Scanlon’s account of the sort of psvchological link 
Williams seeks, it probablv concerns whether the Scanlon picture can account for the 
phenomenon of akrasia. It seems empiricallv true that we sometimes recognise that we have 
a reason to 9, vet fail to be moved to act on this reason. We might wonder if Scanlon’s 
attempt at explaining a psvchological link between our recognition of a reason and our acting 
on it has drawn the connection too closelv, and cannot account for akrasia. But Scanlon does 
include conditionals in his account of intentions: P’s recooonition that she has a genuine reason 
to 4, iznrnzrzlly gives her an intention to 4,, which is izoriiznlly sufficient to cause her to 4,. 
Abnormal cases will sometimes arise in which we recognise we have a reason to @ but fail to 
focus on it properlv. To take an example from Scanlon, I may realise I have a reason to ignore 
what a certain group of people thnk of me, vet find mvself anxious to please them aqway.  
In such a case m~7 anxiousness to please this group stems from a failure to focus on the reason 
I have, and this failure is a result of the malfunction of my rational capacities. Humeans 
would of course suggest that what is happening instead is that my belief that I should ignore 
Michael Bratman, Iiitci~tio~i, Plai~s, atid Practical Reasori (Cambridge. MA: Han-ard University 100 
Press, 1987). 
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the opinion of this group is being overmastered bv a desire to please them. But as with other 
motivational phenomena we have examined, it seems to me that Scanlon’s account is 
phenomenologicallv at least as plausible as the Humean one. So I think Williams’s first 
argument gives Scanlon little to worrv about. 
I will call Williams’s second argument the argument concerning coming to believe. It 








Upon believing an external reason statement, an agent will be motivated 
to act. 
If external reasons are to be distinguished from internal ones, the 
motivation (from P1) will ha7e to be a new one that we come to have 
upon believing the truth of an external reason statement. 
The process bv which we acquire ths  new motivation involves correct 
deliberation. 
In order to deliberate we must do so from an original motivation. 
The external reasons statement will have to be taken as roughlv 
equivalent to, or at least as entailing, the claim that if the agent rationallv 
deliberated, then, whatever motivations she originallv had, she would 
come to be motivated to @. 
Regarding the external reasons statement, there will be no original 
motivation far the agent to deliberate from, in order to reach the new 
motivation. 
All external reasons statements are false. 
Whereas Williams’s first argument focused on an issue addressed bv Scanlon’s concept of 
intention, this argument concentrates on an issue that Scanlon tries to address with h is  
account of the critical scrutiny of reasons. It is Williams’s lriew that, in order to be justified in 
calling something a reason, an agent must, at least in principle, be able to reach it from her 
subjective motivational set. To call anv other reason-statement a genuine reason is simply to 
lapse into falsehood or incoherence. 
Williams’s second argument is a formidable challenge for the moral externalist, and 
we must see if a successful replv to it can be found within a Scanlonian context. In order to 
better see whv an externalist replv is important, though, I shall offer some suggestions for 
whv we should consider Wihams’s moral internalism to be unattractive at best. Williams 
seems on his own 1Tiew to be committed to an unhappv dilemma, one horn of which is less 
than coherent, and the other of which is just u g l ~ .  He claims that, although we cannot say 
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that others have reasons to do things that are alien to their subjective motivational sets, we 
can nonetheless legtimatelv employ words of normative censure against them, calling them 
selfish, brutal, cruel, etc. Surprisingly, Williams seems to think that our usage of these words 
can describe the agent or the act in question, not just our personal feelings about the agent or 
the act.lol But, given other claims Williams makes about reasons and motivational alienation, 
it is mVsterious how this could be. How could it be the case that Hitler had no reason to put 
an end to the Holocaust, vet was cruel to let it continue? How is it that a Taliban member has 
no reason to allow women to be educated, 77et is sexist and perhaps even brutal to repress 
them in this way? This  curious juxtaposition of claims about reasons and normative terms 
points to two curiosities about the Williams account. First, it leads us to wonder how words 
like 'brutal' and 'selfish' (and for that matter 'kind' and 'generous') are to be explained if not 
in terms of reasons. If thev are to be explained differentlv, then how is this other realm of 
moralih. related to h s  discussion of reasons? Second, it makes us wonder whv he expends so 
much effort trving to make plausible and coherent an account of internal reasons that he 
considers not onlv psvchologically realistic but also fulh normative, if it turns out that so 
much of normativiw must be explained outside the realm of reasons. On this first horn of the 
dilemma, then, the coherence of Williams's account is threatened. 
There is a way that Williams might salvage coherence, but perhaps only at the price 
of further reducing the appeal of h is  account. This would be to admit that his usage of 
normative terms like 'cruel' or 'generous' is non-descriptive, and to accept the relativist 
consequences. Thus I might call Hitler cruel because hs actions were contrary to those that 
would be suggested bv mv own motilTationa1 set, while admitting that he himself had no 
reason to act differentlv. Now, as I have mentioned, ths  tepid usage of moral terms seems 
not to be what Williams envisions, but even if it were, there would be a serious problem with 
this m0~7e. It seems that mV usage of 'cruel' to describe Hitler in this context would simply 
reflect a misunderstanding of the moral theory I am purporting to respect. If 1 truly believe 
"' I take Williams to be saying this because he presents these normative terms as an alternative to an 
externalist view of reasons, claiming that externalism would add nothing that is not already captured in 
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that each person has a reason to do only what his motivational set suggests, then whv do I 
think Hitler cruel at all? Surely it is irrelevant that Hitler did something that I mvself would 
not do. I am making a mistake by expressing moral disapproval of anv sort, even if I 
understand that disapproval to be of a non-descriptive varietx. Williams might want to sav 
that my own belief that Hitler was cruel suggests that I think that Hitler should have the same 
belief, but what he has not accounted for is anv reason that Hitler would have to care about 
my opinion of the matter. The second horn of the Williams dilemma, then, presents us with a 
picture wherebv we could criticise others onl~7 for failing to fulfil their motivational sets (and 
the same would applv to our criticism of ourselves). While ths  is more coherent than the 
view of the first horn, I hope I have said enough in my discussion of Dworkin’s account of the 
sacred in Chapter 1 to call this sort of view into question. Any view which suggests Hitler 
might have been on a moral par with Mother Teresa (because thev both fulfilled their 
motivational sets to a roughlv equal degree) is surelv so counter-intuitive as to be a last resort. 
But if Williams’s 1Tiew is unappealing, how do we address his second argument 
against moral externalism? Given the content of the argument concerning coming to believe, I 
thmk Scanlon could effectivelv defend h s  account bv demonstrating one of the following: 1 .) 
The existence of a given moral reason does not depend on the necessity of a (non-defective) 
agent to whom the reason applies being able, even in principle, to recognise that she has that 
moral reason; 2.) It is possible, at least in principle, that every (non-defective) agent can 
recognise all the moral reasons that a p p l ~  to him, even if some of these reasons are not in an17 
way suggested b\7 that agent’s subjective motivational set. I will argue that (1) is not a 
plausible option, and that although Scanlon tries to demonstrate (2), his attempt seems less 
than fullv satisfactorv. I will then suggest that other resources exist in What Wc OZW fo Elzclz 
Other whch make a defence of (2) more promising. 
I think (and Scanlon seems to agree) that there is a danger for moral externalists in 
talking of reasons that are too external. For example, what would be the use of talking of the 
our usage of these words. This would surely be an implausible claim if he took these terms to be used 
only in a non-descriptive way. See ‘Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame,’ 39-40. 
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existence of a moral reason that no one can ever recognise? But if this would be pointless, 
then it would also seem useless to speak of a genuine reason had by P that P could not, even 
in principle, recognise. Morality features an essential practicalitv that distinguishes it from, 
e.g., scientific inquiry, and this practicalitv suggests that moral reasons possessed bv P must 
in principle be able to be recognised by P. Scanlon’s discussion of his first l e ~ l  of critical 
scrutiny suggests that he agrees. The implication of that discussion is that anvone of non- 
defective rational capacities can engage in the sort of questioning that reveals what reasons he 
has. And although Scanlon’s discussion of the second level of scrutiny is more brief, I think 
that we can again assume that he feels that anvone of adequate rational capacities is capable 
of weighing competing pro tanto reasons and corning to a conclusion about them. So 1 think 
that option (1) is not very promising. 
Option (2) is the one Scanlon favours. He thinks that, whatever subjective 
motivational set (i.e. set of judgement-sensitive attitudes) agents begin with, thev can realise 
they ha1.e a reason to @ by engaging in the critical scrutinv of reasons. For example, P ma\’ 
initially have a set of judgement-sensitive attitudes that does not lead h m  to think about Qt-ing 
at all. Instead he has a judgement-sensitive attitude in favour of v-ing and so considers 
whether he has a reason to do that. It is Scanlon’s hope that, if P does have a reason to Qt, he 
will realise it in the course of h s  deliberations about v-ing (or about other reasons), aided bv 
the refinement of his judgement-sensitive attitudes that corresponds with those deliberations. 
Thus Hitler ma17 have began in a state of motintional alienation (in the full Williams sense) 
from the act of ending the Holocaust, but could (if he was rele\.antly non-defective) have 
come to have the right motilration through a series of deliberations about other reasons he 
took himself to have, and through the corresponding adjustments of his judgement-sensitive 
attitudes. 
This is how the Scanlon account works in theory. But is it really true that an agent 
who is radicallv alienated in his present motivations from Qt-ing can be brought to reco,anise 
that he has a reason to Qt? I wish to suggest that there is reason to doubt that Scanlon has said 
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enough in his account of reasons to explain such radical conversions.10~ I will focus on h i s  
treatment of the first level of critical scrutiny, which he explains in greater detail than the 
second. I will see how this process of scrutinv works in the context of an example that is 
appropriate for my overall thesis topic of universal rights, namelv the treatment of women b\r 
the Taliban regime in Afghanistan.'O2 It is well-known that the Taliban systematically deny 
women in their countrv most of the advantages thev accord to men, one of them being the 
opportunih. for education. Furthermore it seems safe to assume that many Taliban members 
are motivationallv alienated (in a full sense) from allowing women to be educated. Can 
Scanlon's account of the first level of moral scrutinv explain how such a hardened (but 
rational) Taliban member (let's call him T) can come to realise he has a reason to allow women 
to be educated (which we will unimaginativelv call a reason to @)? 
At the first level of scrutinv T would ask hmself the following general questions: 
1. Am I overloolung something, perhaps because I am not considering the 
fact or objects in question in the right way? 
2. What kinds of reasons might there be for Q-ing apart from any I have 
alreadv considered? 
3. What reasons do particular cases seem to present? 
4. What are other cases on which @-ing would have a bearing if it were a 
good reason? Is it a reason in those cases? Are our reactions consistent in 
those cases? Might our reactions admit of alternative explanations?'04 
A more specific h e  of inquirv in this case that retains the spirit of those general questions 
might go something like this: Whv do I think education is valuable for men? w h ~  do I think 
women are relevantly different? I s  this a reason for thmking that thev should not be 
educated? Whv or whv not? And so on. Scanlon envisions T going through this sort of 
questioning not just about whether he has a reason to @, but also about the background 
judgements on which his initial answer depends. Scanlon's hope is that bv questioning lavers 
Scanlon seems to concede this fact in his appendix on Williams, implying that the moral internalist 
This chapter was written whle  the Taliban were still in power. It still works as a hypothetical 
For Scanlon's discussion of this process. see 64-68. 
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and externalist are at an impasse. 




of background judgements, T will eventually find common ground with those who think he 
has a reason to $, and will thus come to share their opinion that he has this reason. 
Now, it seems true that we can question our operative reasons, and the background 
assumptions we hold, in just this way. Less convincing, though, is the claim that a 
motivationallv-alienated agent like T will, bv this process, come to think he has a reason to $. 
It seems to be entirely possible that T could examine his background judgements all the wav 
down and still think he has no reason to respect women as he respects men.105 We must keep 
in mind that Scanlon’s view of rationalitv is an instrumental one, not a substantive one. As 
such, rationallv non-defective agents face a separate question (i.e. separate from issues 
concerning rationalitv) of what thev will reason about, i.e. what will compose the substance of 
their reasoning. The substance in the cases of moral reasons is clearlv the moral values an 
agent holds. It seems entirely possible that an agent could use a Scanlonian account of 
rationalitv to refine h is  lower-level values in order to make them accord better with his 
higher-level values (i.e. his deeper background judgements). For example, if T does hold a 
deeper value in favour of respecting women, it seems possible that he could use Scanlon’s 
method of critical scrutinv to get h i s  reasons in line with t h s  deeper value. What seems 
unlikelv, though, is that Scanlon’s method will get T to change h i s  deepest values. This strikes 
me as a debilitating problem, because it seems empiricallv true that the world contains 
different groups of peoples whose moral disagreement with each other is radical and 
profound. Different groups or individuals might simplv disagree about values all the way 
down, suffering from a gap that no concept of instrumental rationalitv C M  by itself bridge. 
There are at least two wavs this gap in Scanlon might be bridged. One wav is to drop 
the instrumental account of rationalih; favoured bv Scanlon and adopt a substantive account 
instead. As I have mentioned, this is the track Parfit is currentlv pursuing, and the success of 
It might be argued that we could make progress with T by convincing him that the Taliban I05 
interpretation of Islam is incorrect, a charge that is often levelled against the Taliban. But whether the 
Taliban interpretation is correct is controversial, and ultimately irrelevant to us if we are using this 
example to test the viability of Scanlon‘s first level of critical scrutiny. 
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his project is not yet clear.10h Another way is to concede that there is a realm of reasons in 
Scanlon, a realm that might be called reasons of autonomy, which does not obviouslv allow 
for moral externalism. These are the reasons we have to pursue our personal projects or 
commitments. Nonetheless, there is a different categorv of reasons, which we might call 
deontological reasons or duties, that clearly are external in the relevant sense.107 It is 
Scanlon’s contractualism which imposes duties upon us. The contractualist formula, which I 
will call ‘C’, claims that ’an act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would be 
disallowed bv an77 set of principles for the general regulation of behavior that no one could 
reasonably reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.’los Since such acts are 
wrong, we have a duty not to perform them, and tlus duty applies to all of us whether or not 
it accords with our subjective motivational sets. Implicit in Scanlon’s account is the claim that 
all reasonable beings are able to realise that thev have this dutv, and that thev have the duties 
which follow from it and a p p l ~  to particular situations. 
A crucial question for C, then, is what will count as legitimate criteria for the 
reasonable rejection of a principle. Scanlon offers a subtle and complex discussion of this 
issue wluch emphasises the importance of adequate flexibility in handling the verv different 
kinds of moral problems that can arise. As a result he holds that no general, comprehensive 
list of criteria can be drawn up in advance, and that we ultimately must rely (at least partly) 
on intuition and judgement in our attempts to decide particular cases of reasonable 
rejectabilitv. I endorse this view, but I would like to suggest that some general guidelines to 
govern reasonable rejectabilitv can be found in the v e r ~  values which underpin 
contractualism itself. Contractualism seems to presuppose the importance both of respect for 
others and of self-respect, the verv goods whch we saw to be essential back in Chapter 1. Its 
connection with respect for others is clear enough, as it is difficult to see why we should 
Ths  is not to suggest that Parfit otherwise endorses Scanlon’s entire programme, but their concepts 
of moral reasons do have much in common. 
My labels of ‘reasons of autonomy’ and ‘deontological reasons‘ come from Nagel. Nagel also 
speaks of a third category of agent-relative reasons, reasons of special obligations to those close to us, 
but I think this category can be subsumed within the previous two. T i’cir, Fi*om Notr*hcl-e, 165. 
I00 
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Scanlon. 153. 1 os 
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consider it important to justify ourselves to others unless we alreadv respect them.’@ Less 
obvious perhaps is the connection of C to self-respect, but we may recall our claim from our 
first chapter that in order to be fully worthy of the respect of others, we must respect 
ourselves. If this claim is convincing, then it seems that C presupposes both forms of respect. 
And if C presupposes these goods, then it is difficult to see why they could not serve at least 
as general guidelines in the governing of the reasonable rejectabilitv of moral principles. 
If t h s  is so, then we have a promising explanation for whj7 our Taliban member T will 
have a reason to allow women to be educated. It is true that this reason does not accord well 
with T’s personal projects or commitments, but it is nonetheless a duty he has. He has this 
duty because the women in question could reasonablv reject a principle which forbids them to 
be educated - they could reject it on the grounds that it fails rather grievousl\r to show 
adequate respect for others. This  assumes that women should be respected on a lel7el equal to 
that of men, which is justified by our establishment of equal human worth in Chapter 1 .  I will 
elaborate in the next section on the role that equal worth plavs in our moral picture. This  
example also brings out the implication of C that our duties constrain our reasons of 
autonomy. T’s operati1.e reason to disallow the education of women does not become even a 
pro tanto moral reason (much less a genuine one), because it conflicts with a duty he has. 
Duties, then, compose at least part of the class of external reasons which had 
previouslv proven elusive. But these duties depend crucially on the legitimacv of C, so to 
make them more credible we must engage in a defence of C. C must be established as well- 
grounded, and as not suffering any serious phdosophcal defects. A defence of C will be our 
project in the next section. 
An exception might arise from a pragmatic need to justify ourselves to those who we do not respect, 
but who hold power over us, such as a buffoonish boss. Thus the above claim depends on the existence 
of an egalitarian power relationshp in the moral realm. I will discuss in 4.2 how this egalitarianism 




As we have seen, the concepts of right and wrong are captured in Scanlon’s account 
by the contractualist formula C, and, as a result, C indicates the duties we have to each other. 
The central role that C plays in Scanlon’s morality makes anv attacks on it particularly 
serious, and it can be challenged in at least two wavs. First, whv should we favour C at all? 
What sort of considerations count in its favour, and whv should these considerations be 
considered sufficient? Second, how convincing is Scanlon’s claim that justifiabilih7 to others is 
co-extensive with rightness, and that justifiabilitv is in fact a more basic notion than rightness? 
An adequate defence of C will set us up for our discussion of shared reasons in the following 
section, and has important implications for our next chapter, when we will trv to show how 
rights follow from reasons. 
Our discussion will focus on what Scanlon identifies as morality in the narrow 
sense.lIO This is the realm covered by contractualism, the realm of ‘what we owe to each 
other’. It includes duties we have to others to do things such as keeping our promises, and 
refraining from killing, harming, or decei1Ting. As Scanlon notes, the term ’moralihf is 
commonlv used to cover a broader area of conduct, such as prohibitions against certain forms 
of sexual conduct, or certain harms to the environment, to name just two examples. There is 
no reason to think this usage illegitimate, but it points to a class of duties that are created bv 
considerations apart from the contractualist machinery. If we have a reason not to flood the 
Grand Canvon, for example, this reason does not stem from what we owe to each other, but 
rather from the value of the Grand Canvon itself. There are many interesting issues that arise 
from this distinction, but it will not be my task to pursue them. I wish only to note the 
distinction, and to note that I will focus on the central part of morality which is covered bv 
contractualism. 
With this in mind let us turn to the first question, which asks why we think that 
Scanlon’s contractualism describes a central part of morality, or indeed any part at all. 
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Scanlon is wary of making grandiose claims on behalf of C, such as that its existence is a 
requirement of rationality. He instead lists three more modest considerations that count in its 
favour.ll* First he claims that contractualism is a phenomenologicallv accurate account of 
right and wrong. It seems that an important element of what makes an action wrong is that it 
wrongs sunzeunc, that it puts me into the wrong sort of relation to that someone. Second, he 
claims that contractualism offers the right sort of response to a dilemma pointed out by H.A. 
Prichard. The dilemma states that an adequate account of wrongness must be neither 
tautological nor too far removed from the sort of considerations we would suppose a moral 
person first and foremost to be moved by.112 Scanlon thinks that contractualism avoids this 
dilemma by connecting wrongness with what we owe to others, though he is not making the 
stronger claim that contractualism is the onh/ wav to avoid Prichard’s dilemma. Third, he 
claims that contractualism accounts for the complexities of moral motivation. By this he 
means that it accounts for the fact that we refrain from performing a wrong action not just (or 
even primarilv) because it is wrong, but rather because of considerations like ’she’s counting 
on me’ or ’he needs m\7 help.’ Scanlon realises that these three considerations do not amount 
to a cornprehensiLre argument in favour of contractualism, but since he does not believe such 
an argument to be possible, he hopes that these considerations are sufficient. 
Scanlon is probablv correct that a comprehensive argument that counts in favour of 
contractualism is unavailable, and he is wise to avoid o1Terly ambitious Kantian claims about 
moralitv’s basis. But it is worth noting that the reasons he proiTides, even if they are all 
correct, essentiallv reduce to the first claim, that contractualism accords well with the moral 
phenomenology. His second claim, for example, depends on the idea that justification to 
others is the sort of thmg that a moral person would be moved by, but the only defence of this 
claim available to Scanlon is to fall back on the phenomenological argument. His third claim, 
concerning the complexihr of moral motivation, seems tantamount to a restatement of the first 
claim. It amounts to a claim that contractualism accounts for the different wavs in which 





right and wrong actions are felt to be right and wrong. Now, this appeal to phenomenology 
is far from worthless. As we saw in 3.4, in our discussion of McNaughton’s moral realism, 
appeals to the moral phenomenology are of some value, but the17 also should not be regarded 
as decisive if at all possible. Scanlon mav himself think that no other considerations can be 
brought to bear on the matter, which would make it reasonable for him to settle on 
p henomenological arguments. 
In my view there is a more substantial underpinning available for contractualism 
which has already been hinted at in the first section, namelv Dworkin’s account of the 
sacred.*13 We will recall that in the process of defending this account in Chapter 1 I argued 
that each individual life (as well as the existence of certain groups, though again I will 
concentrate on indi1Gduals) is valuable because of the processes that compose or create it, and 
that we know the processes are valuable because we wonder at them. If it is true that each life 
is sacred in ths  war’ - meaning that each life is inviolable and irreplaceable - then Scanlon’s 
contractualism seems a particularly perspicuous way of drawing out the implications of this 
fact in the realm of moral theory. His contractualism requires us to think of the personal, or 
agent-relative, reasons of each individual involved in, or affected by, a given action. If a 
given agent has a reason to oppose a certain action, and we deem it unreasonable to reject a 
set of principles supporting that reason, then we have a reason to oppose the action in 
question. Tlus holds true even if the action maximises expected neutral value in the wav that 
so many utilitarians would favour. It is a distinctive feature of Scanlon’s contractualism that 
aggregating value across individuals is forbidden.114 It is in this way that contractualism 
reco,dses the inviolability of each individual. So it seems true not only that Dworlun’s 
account of the sacred and Scanlon’s contractualism are compatible, but that Dworkin’s 
account serves as a helpful basis for Scanlon’s moral theorv. It is conceptually prior to 
‘ I 2  As stated, this is not really a dilemma. But since Scanlon calls it ‘Prichard’s dilemma’ I will retain 
this label. 
I reiterate here that the uses to which I put Dworkm’s account are quite different from the use he 
himself envisions for it. But I cannot see that his account is incompatible with my usage, and it is my 
intention to retain the substantive claims of his account without revision. 
intuitions. For t h s  discussion see Scanlon, 229-24 1 .  
113 
He does, however, think that contractualism can nonetheless accommodate some consequentialist 114 
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contractualism, and helps to explain why contractualism is a moral theorjr we should favour. 
Put another way, it helps to explain why we have a most basic reason to live with others on 
terms they could not reasonably reject. I have not tried to make the stronger arguments that 
Scanlon’s contractualism is either entailed bv Dworkin’s account, or that it is the only moral 
theory for which Dworkin’s account could serve as a basis. But Scanlon’s contractualism is 
perhaps the most natural and fluid extension of Dworlun’s account of the sacred into the 
realm of moral theorv. If this is correct, it would help to explain why Scanlon’s account 
accords with the moral phenomenologv in the wavs that Scanlon suggests, because that 
phenomenology mav be a result of our (at least implicit) recognition of the sacred as Dworkin 
describes it. Thus a more substantive basis seems to exist for contractualism than Scanlon 
himself acknowledges. 
There is an important implication of this usage of Dworkir.’s account for a well- 
known controversv about contractualism. One of the most prominent debates about 
contractualist theories generally is whether they can establish egalitarianism, or whether they 
must presuppose it.115 While I am not presuming to take the stronger position that 
contractualism generallv must presuppose egalitarianism, I am suggesting that Scanlon’s 
account does seem to presuppose it. While this would seem to be a problem for orthodox 
Scanlonianism, I hope to have suggested a wav out of the problem bv appealing to Dworkin’s 
account of the sacred. I argued in Chapter 1 that Dworkin’s account establishes that each 
indi\.idual life is lduable, thereby establishng an equalitv of human zm~fh (in Vlastos’s 
sense). Understanding Dworkin’s account as an underpinning of contractualism, then, would 
appear to solve the mvsterv of how the egalitarianism of Scanlon’s theory (seen most clearly 
in the demand that we justify ourselves distribufiwli/ to others) is justified. The demand of 
distributilre justifiabilitv to others arises from the equal worth possessed by each individual. 
We can turn our attention now to the second problem of the section, which is 
defending Scanlon’s claim that justifiabiliw to others is co-extensilre with rightness. Even if 
we are confident that contractualism has a secure basis, there is a further question of whether 
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it captures rightness and wrongness in the comprehensive way it intends. This problem is 
one which has already received a good deal of attention in the literature, with doubts about 
the Scanlon position being expressed bv Blackburn, Colin McGinn, and Philip Pettit. I will trv 
to defend Scanlon’s position against two kinds of arguments that have been made in this 
context. 
The first charge, made by all three critics abolre, is that Scanlon’s contractualist 
machinery does not actually do anv useful work in helping us to determine the reasons we 
have.ll6 It goes as follows: there must be reasons why some principles are rejected under 
contractualism and why some are such that no one could reasonablv reject them. These 
reasons seem to be moral reasons, thev seem to be antecedent to contractualism, and thev 
seem to do the important work within contractualism. The question arises, then, wh\r we 
need contractualism at all. If, for example, we reject a principle because it is unfair, whv not 
just sav that its unfairness makes it wrong? Whv go through the contractualist process of 
talking about what people could reasonablv reject? 
A promising answer to this worrv has, I think, been provided bv Michael Ridge.117 
Ridge notes that Scanlon makes use of a distinction between personal and impersonal 
reasons, and he suggests that this distinction maps onto Nagel’s famous distinction between 
agent-relati1.e and agent-neutral reasons, respectively. l l S  According to Nagel, an agent- 
relative reason is one whose general form includes an essential reference to the person who 
has it, while an agent-neutral reason is one whose general form does not. Ridge notes that 
Scanlon’s critics appear to regard the reasons (e.g. unfairness) for whch a given principle is 
said to be rejectable as agent-neutral reasons, but that ths  is clearly a mistake. On Scanlon’s 
account, I can reject a principle because it is unfair fo  me, but I cannot reject it on the basis that 
it is unfair p7r 9 . 1 1 9  But if this is case, then it is mvsterious how7 (without contractualism) my 
This debate has, for example, been conducted in the context of Rawls‘s theory ofjustice. 
Simon Blackbum, ‘Am I Right?’ Neit. York Times, February 2 1 ,  1999. Colin McGinn, ‘Reasons and 
Unreasons.’ The Neii. Republic, May 24, 1999, p. 35. Philip Pettit, ‘Doing Unto Others,’ Times 
Literal?. Supplemciir, June 25,  1999. 
Michael h d g e ,  ‘Saving Scanlon: Contractualism and Agent-Relativity’ (forthcoming). 







reason to reject a given principle would give you a reason to react appropriately. For 
example, how does my reason to reject a principle which would advocate dishonesty give you 
any reason to be honest with me? It would not appear to give vou anv such reason if not for 
contractualism. So it seems that C serves as a necessarv bridge between mv agent-relative 
reason to reject a principle and your agent-relative reason to react appropriatelv. 
It might be objected, though, that an endorsement of Ridge’s argument is not open to 
me, for reasons related to mv previous comments about the underpinnings of contractualism. 
If it is true, for example, that the good of respect for others serves as a basis for 
contractualism, then perhaps there is a new danger that contractualism is otiose. If P should 
not steal from Q, then whv not simplv i ,  sav that this follows from a recognition of the good of 
respect for others? Whv must P go through the contractualist process of justifving himself to 
Q? The answer, I think, is that contractualism specifies the exact wav in which the good of 
respect for others (and, b\7 extension, self-respect) is worked out in moral theorv. By virtue of 
its appeal to justification to others and of the reasonable rejection of principles it is more 
precise than would be am7 vague appeal to respecting others. To put the matter more 
0 oenerally, I see the role of Scanlon’s contractualism as one of working out the implications of 
Dworkin’s account of the sacred in the realm of moral theory. Its role on mv view is not to 
add neu7 substantive moral claims, but to serve as a tool which explains how the substantive 
implications of Dworlun’s account can be carried out bv agents in their evervdav I *  interactions. 
We saw this previously in the context of egalitarianism, and, in a related matter, it is also true 
of the two forms of respect. 
Ridge’s discussion allows us to gain a more sophisticated view of the conceptual story 
invol\~ed when one person owes a dutv to another. We can illustrate this bv returning to our 
example of the Taliban from the previous section. An Afghan woman W has a reason (a 
reason of autonomv) to pursue her education, but ths  is denied by our Taliban member T 
who has an operative reason R to deny her the opportunity to be educated. T’s reason reflects 
a principle P, whose content we might state as ’no woman should be allowed to be educated.’ 
W considers the principle by which T acts and determines it is reasonably rejectable on the 
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ground that it fails to show respect for others. As a result, W has a second reason, namely a 
reason to reject P. W’s reason to reject P, when combined with the contractualist formula, 
gives T a reason to also reject P, and to recognise R as a less than a genuine moral reason. 
Whv does contractualism demand that T do this? Because P has been determined to be 
unacceptable, while the alternative principle, name117 allowing women to be educated, cannot 
be reasonably rejected. Thus W’s reason to reject P entails T’s reason to reject P, to embrace 
the alternative principle, to act differentlv (to allow W and other women to be educated), and 
to adjust his judgement-sensitive attitudes accordinglv. This  sophisticated picture of duties 
we have to others is not only important as a defence of C, but it will be important to 
understanding our derivation of rights in the following chapter as well. 
The second charge I wish to examine is one made in a subsequent paper bv Pettit.120 
At first it mav sound like a verv similar charge to the one dealt with bv Ridge, but closer 
examination shows it to be importantlv different. Briefly, the charge is that Scanlon’s 
contractualism can be read in two wavs, one of which is unstable and the other of whch is 
hghlv implausible. Pettit distinguishes two readings we might make of C, whch he calls 
semantic and semantic-cum-substanti\Te, respectivelv. On the semantic reading, we take C to 
show us how the normative kind answering to the predicate ’right’ is unified in our 
experience and thought, i.e. by understanding rightness as distributive justifiabilitv. But this 
will not be the deepest account of rightness available, for we can presumably engage in a 
further project of investigating the normative kind which answers to the predicate ’right’, as 
that kind exists in itself. Thus if Scanlon considers contractualism to offer a radical account of 
right and wrong, i.e. the deepest account available, his ambition will be thwarted if we must 
adhere to the semantic reading. The fact that the semantic reading leads us to a further 
project is what makes it unstable. 
The semantic-cum-substantive reading of contractualism holds that the u n i h r  of 
’right’ that is described by contractualism just is what it is to be right. There is no separate 
Philip Pettit, ‘Two Construals of Scanlon’s Contractualism’ in The Joulwul Of’Philosophj, 97, 2000. 
148-164. 
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normative kind which answers to the predicate ‘right.’ Clearlv, this will exempt the semantic- 
cum-substantive reading from the accusation of instabiliw, but Pettit contends that it suffers 
from the new problem of a double implausibilitv: it gives an implausible explanation of wh~7 
right options are distributively justifiable, and it is phenomenologicallv implausible. I wish to 
focus for now on the first of these, the alleged implausible explanation. The argument goes as 
follows: Scanlon’s contractualism requires that some options prove to be complaint immune, 
i.e. thev pass through the filter of justifiabilihr. The complaint immunitv of these options thus 
arises from something other than their justifiabilitv -but it cannot arise from the nature of the 
options, because if it did we would be driven back to the semantic reading. In such a case, the 
complaint immunitv of the options would suggest that there is somethmg intrinsic to these 
options (i.e. to right options) that unifies them independentlv of their being distributively 
justifiable. Since it is impossible to see how Scanlon can hope to explain the complaint 
immunih. of right options without inlroking their common nature, the semantic-cum- 
substantive reading is highlv implausible. 
Pettit notes that it is unclear which reading Scanlon would himself prefer, but he 
implies (I thmk rightly) that Scanlon would be unhappv with the unambitious nature of the 
semantic reading as Pettit has described it. Scanlon does seem to consider himself to be 
offering an account of right and wrong that is deep, perhaps the deepest available. He never 
gives anv indication that contractualism leaves us with further work to do in the investigation 
of right and wrong. Furthermore, the semantic reading as Pettit has described it would be 
less than full\? satisfactorv for mv project on the whole, insofar as I am seeking to go as deep 
as I can in an iniTestigation of the foundations of morality, and particularlv of universal rights. 
But the objection we have examined to the semantic-cum-substantive reading seems 
formidable. How could rightness be divorced from the common nature of right options? As 
Pettit suggests, this does seem highlv implausible. So, as Pettit has framed the dilemma, it 
appears that Scanlon is in considerable difficulty. 
I suggest, though, that there is a possibility Pettit has overlooked in the wav he has set 
up the problem, and this possibilitv allows for a way to adhere to the semantic reading of 
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contractualism without the adverse consequence Pettit suggests. We will recall that the 
adverse consequence is that the semantic reading points us to a deeper project to be 
undertaken: an investigation of the normative kind answering to the predicate ’right.’ But 
while this consequence is a possible result of the semantic reading, it is not entailed by this 
reading. Its existence depends on a crucial epistemological assumption: that we can know the 
nature of the normative kind in question. Perhaps we can infer that the normative kind 
answering to ’right’ exists, yet we can also determine that its nature cannot be known in 
detail. If this is the case, then the problem Pettit has pointed to for the semantic account is not 
a problem at all, and the semantic account provides a ’radical’ account of right and wrong 
insofar as it is the deepest account available. 
It seems to me that Scanlon’s account lends itself well to just this reading. The 
options which prove to be complaint immune (and therefore right) do have some element in 
common be\Tond their complaint immunihr. But further exploration of the normati1.e kind 
that the\- point to looks likely to be unpromising. We have seen that Scanlon denies that there 
is an\’ general formula for determining when a principle is reasonablv rejectable. Different 
criteria will count in different situations, and the method bv which we determine which 
criteria count at which times has an ineradicably intuitive element. It is the criteria for 
reasonable rejectabilitv which determine the shape and boundaries of the normative kind 
which answers to the predicate ’wrong,’ and this in turn defines the shape and boundaries of 
the predicate ’right’ (because right, on Scanlon’s account, is whatever is not-wrong). If this is 
correct, then our inabilih. to articulate a general formula for reasonable rejectabilih. points to 
an inability to define the shape and boundaries of the normative kinds referred to by ‘right’ 
and ’wrong’. We have no reason to think it mistaken that the normative kmds referred to b\7 
these words exist, and indeed their existence is supported b\7 the moral phenomenology and 
our intuitions. Yet because the content of the normative kind referred to by ’wrong’ relies 
inescapablv on intuitions concerning the specific situation in which we find ourselves, so the 
content of the normative lund answering to ’right’ also relies on those intuitions. The 
inescapabl~~ intuiti1.e nature of reasonable rejectabilihr thus shows that the normative lunds 
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answering to ‘right’ and ’wrong’ are not knowable beyond what Scanlon’s account already 
tells us about them. Scanlon’s account of right and wrong is - though not as radical as Pettit 
would like it to be - as radical as it can be. 
It might be objected at this point, though, that the foregoing move is not available to 
me, because I have suggested wavs in which reasonable rejectabilibr is more determinate. It is 
true that in 4.1 I suggested that the essential goods of self-respect and respect for others, 
0 ooods that underpin contractualism itself, serve as general guidelines that help to shape the 
notion of reasonable rejectability. But this is not currentlv a problem, for two reasons. First, I 
suggested that these essential goods were only general guidelines in governing reasonable 
rejectability, not absolute rules. We should take them into account in combination with our 
intuition and judgement when determining the reasonable rejectabilitv of a given principle in 
a given situation. They do not serve as the equildent of a strict and determinate list of 
criteria for reasonable rejection known ahead of time. Second, to the extent that the two forms 
of respect are an important part of helping us to determine right and wrong, we already have 
engaged in the sort of deeper investigation of them that Pettit encourages. T h i s  deeper 
investigation took place in Chapter 1, when we showed how the two forms of respect follow 
from our more basic reason to regard each individual as having worth, which itself is 
ultimately rooted in the fact that the processes Dworkin describes are wonderful. To the 
extent that Scanlon’s own account (on our more determinate interpretation) is not as radical 
as it could be, I have tried to provide the deepest investigation of rightness available. 
Th is  section has tried to accomplish two t h g s .  First, I have tried to defend the 
rationale for Scanlon’s contractualism as a moral theorv , <  bv pointing out how it follows 
naturally from Dworlun’s account of the sacred, which I defended in Chapter 1. Second, I 
have tried to defend C against criticisms that have been advanced against it. I have argued 
that C is not useless and that it does not beg questions about right and wrong, nor point to 
an17 further project concerning an investigation of the concepts of right and wrong. At this 
stage it is rnV hope that we finally ha1.e a full picture of how it is that Scanlon’s account allows 
for reasons that are external. In the next section I will tr\~ to show that some of these external 
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reasons are reasons that we all have. This will set us up for a derivation of universal rights 
from those shared reasons in the following chapter. 
4.3 Shared reasons 
In the previous two sections I have tried to present a reasonabljr full picture of how a 
concept of external moral reasons can be defended, and in the process of doing so I provided 
a defence of C. In this section I wish to explore the implications our picture of moral reasons 
for a particular class of reasons, namelv reasons we all share. I will claim that there are some 
reasons of autonomy and some duties that are possessed b\7 evervone - reasons had bv each 
indiiTidua1 personally, but whose first-personal content is identical. In fact I think we have 
alreadv seen what some of these reasons are in previous sections, and in this section I wish 
merelv to explain them better, and to suggest some candidates for other reasons that we all 
share. These shared reasons will determine the content of the universal rights I will attempt 
to derive in the following chapter. 
We have seen previouslv that the realm of contractualism covers only part of 
moralitv, albeit the central part. In the present discussion we are further narrowing the scope 
of our discussion, because we are talking about only a part of the ’central part’ of moralitv. 
On m\7 view, reasons we all share are an important part of the realm covered bv 
contractualism - in fact thev mav be the most important part. But of course contractualism 
covers a broad range of reasons, many of which will be shared with some agents and not all, 
and some of which mav not be shared with ani’ other agents. These more idiosyncratic 
reasons are no less lralid than ones that are shared b~7 evervone, but I will not emphasise them 
in the discussion that follows. As I have already implied, my interests in this section are 
shaped b77 my more general interest in universal rights, and my concentration on universally 
shared reasons (which I will hereafter refer to as ’shared reasons’) reflects that interest in 
wavs that will become even more clear in the next chapter. 
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In order to understand shared reasons as fully as possible, and in order to make our 
current discussion compatible with discussions of previous chapters, we must be clear about 
what we mean when we say a given good or value is ’essential.’ We will recall that I offered a 
definition of essential goods in Chapter 1, which stated that a good is an essential good just if 
it is good for evervone, and its beneficial effects cannot be replicated bv other goods. I now 
wish to retain the basic elements of this account, but to draw on Scanlon to achieve a more 
detailed picture of essential value. First, we must be clear about what is meant when we say 
some x is valuable. Scanlon rejects the idea that value is either a natural or a non-natural 
propertv, I *  vet he does not wish to deny that things can be valuable, i.e. that value in some 
sense exists. His solution to this problem is to propose a ’buck-passing’ account of value, 
whereby ’x has value for p’ means ’p has a reason under the circumstances to behave 
favourably toward x.’121 Th is  favourable behaviour toward x might include trving to pursue 
it, secure it, protect it, or possibl\r (though not necessarilv) to promote it. It is natural features 
of x which give P ths reason. Thus if I am enjoving a scoop of strawberrv ice cream (i.e. if I 
can be said to value it or consider it good), this is because of natural features of the ice cream: 
perhaps its smooth creamv texture, its coldness, and its sweet tangv flavour. These natural 
features give me a reason to eat the ice cream. But this reason is best understood to exist (at 
least initiallv) at the pro tanto le\Tel, because there might be overriding reasons against eating 
the ice cream (e.g. perhaps I am dieting). It is in this way that value or goodness can be said to 
exist in the world even though it is not itself either a natural or a non-natural property. 
I think we can achieve a deeper understanding of essential value if we applv the 
buck-passing account to reasons we all share. On this view, x has essential value just if 
even~one has a pro tanto reason to behave favourably toward it. The pro tanto reasons we all 
have to behave favourably toward x are conferred by natural features of x. Thus, if we all 
have a pro tanto reason to pursue pleasure (and I am not here saying that we do), this is a 
result of facts about the natural features of pleasure. Conversely, I will argue later that pain 
has essential disvalue, which means that we all have a pro tanto reason to avoid it on account 
’” Scanlon, 96- 100. 
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of facts about its natural features. Note that the second condition of our previous definition of 
an essential good, that the good be non-replicable, has dropped out. This  condition was 
present previouslv in order to ensure that the good in question was not onlv had by all but 
was sufficientlv weightv. I think the issue of weightiness, though, is captured sufficientlv - 4  bv 
demanding that we all have a pro tanto reason (not just an operative one) to behave 
favourably toward x. So we now have a view of essential value which seems more 
streamlined, but includes the same elements as our original view. We might also note that to 
sav that ’x has essential value’ adds nothing to the conceptual stor\T which is not alreadv 
captured bv considerations of natural features and reasons, but it need not be seen as 
misleading either. Labels such as ’essential value’ and ’essential good’ are not, on the buck- 
passing view, strictly necessarv (just as ’good’ itself is not), but thev are convenient, and I will 
continue to use them on this ground. 
For some essential value @, then, we all have a reason to behaL7e favourablv toward @. 
But is this reason a reason of autonomy or a duh.? I thmk that essential value is best 
understood to range over both lunds of reasons. If there is some Q whose natural features 
g v e  us each a reason to favour it, then it seems that we will all have a reason of autonomv to 
pursue @-ing, even though some mav not realise their have this reason. In order to see this, 
let us go back to our most recent example of the Taliban member T, who found he had a dutv 
to the Afghan woman W to a l l o ~  her to be educated. He had this dutv because the principle 
bv which he previously acted (’women should not be allowed to be educated’) was shown to 
xriolate the good of respect for others. It seems that, if T can (in principle) accept the fact that 
his previous principle was reasonably rejectable on these grounds, then he should also be able 
to infer that he should embrace these grounds as legitimate, and incorporate them into his 
own personal projects. That is, he should recogruse that he has a reason (of autonomy) to 
pursue respect for others as a personal project, and to change his judgement-sensitive 
attitudes accordingly. After all, the grounds by which W rejected T’s previous principle 
(namelv, that it violated the good of respect for others) was general in character. There is 
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nothing about the content of this ground which suggests it should be appreciated only by W 
and not also by T. 
This example also shows how an essential good can give us certain duties. The fact 
that we all have a reason to respect others carries weight in W’s (and others’) assessment of 
T’s first principle (’women should not be allowed to be educated’). In keeping with the spirit 
of the Scanlon account of reasonable rejection, we might say that a consideration of respect for 
others mixes with a degree of judgement and intuition about a given particular case. It seems 
likely that in this particular case, the importance of respect for others will carrir considerable 
weight in determining the reasonable rejection of T’s principle, and is unlike117 to be 
outweighed bv anv competing considerations. As we have seen, a consequence of this 
process is that T ends up with a dutv to allow women to be educated, a dutv which subserves 
the good of respect for others. So a reason we all have to behave favourablv toward @-ing 
should be understood as a reason of autonomv that, through the process of contractualism, 
can give ourselves and others duties regarding both @-ing and actions which subserve @-ing. 
I mentioned at the beginning of the section that the shared reasons I am discussing 
are agent-relative (or personal) in character, yet they are had by everyone. Some might think 
that this sounds like a contradiction. After all, as we have noted, a reason is agent-relative if 
its general form includes an essential reference to the person to whom the reason applies. 
Thus, if there is an agent-relative reason to avoid pain, the general form of the reason will 
note who the reason applies to, e.g. ’Jim has a reason to @.’ But if it is onlv Jim who has the 
reason, then how can evervone have it? The answer is that, for a ’shared’ reason to @, every 
agent has a different reason to @, insofar as the general form of everyone’s reason will be 
different (’Jim has a reason to @’, ’Marv has a reason to @’, ‘Tom has a reason to @’, etc.). But 
evervone’s reason to @ has identical content when stated from a first-personal perspective, i.e. 
evervone can truly sa\’ of himself that ’I have a reason to @.’ Because the general form of 
evervone’s reason is different, the reasons in question are agent-relative. Because the first- 
personal content of the reasons is identical, the reasons are in some sense shared. 
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Some may wonder why we do not simplv say that there are agent-neutral reasons to 
pursue certain goods. After all, are not agent-neutral reasons shared by their very nature? If 
it is true that agent-neutral reasons are shared, thev are shared in a different wail than the 
agent-relative reasons I discussed above. The general form of an agent-neutral reason makes 
no essential reference to anyone to whom the reason applies. The general form of an agent- 
neutral reason to $ would be ’anyone has a reason to $’, or simplv ’there is a reason to $.’ 
There are at least two reasons whv I prefer the agent-relative concept of shared reasons to an 
agent-neutral one. First, the storv we have adopted of how reasons come about seems to 
indicate that all reasons will be agent-relative. It is individuals who have reasons, and who 
view their reasons from a personal point of view. There is no equivalent in Scanlon’s picture 
of moral reasons of the objective standpoint, or the view from nowhere, found in Nagel.122 
Thus it is mvsterious how impersonal or agent-neutral reasons could be said to exist. Second, 
even if agent-neutral reasons could exist on our account, thev face a serious problem of being 
adequately motivated. It is unclear whether anyone has succeeded in showing how reasons 
that are essentiallv impersonal can be ’personal’ enough to move us to act on them.1’3 
At this stage we should have a reasonablv clear picture of the more abstract, 
conceptual issues relating to our concept of shared reasons (and, by extension, of essential 
lralue). I would like now to turn to a more detailed discussion of the content of our shared 
reasons. What personal, pro tanto reasons do we all have? My discussion will be an attempt 
to suggest what some of these reasons are, but I make no guarantees that its range is 
comprehensive. There mav , I  vet be other reasons we can all be shown to possess. Still, even a 
list that may well be partial will put us in a promising position to show in the next chapter 
how universal rights can follow from shared reasons. 
Our new understanding of essential value allows us to see that we have already 
encountered suggestions and justifications for a few different shared reasons. For example, as 
12’ See L7ieli, From Noiihere. Nagel himself makes this point in his review of Scanlon, ‘One-to-one,’ 
London ReIGeiii q f  Books, February 4. 1999. ”’ For problems see Stephen L. Danvall, ‘How Nowhere Can You Get (and Do Ethics)?‘; Christine M. 
Korsgaard. Creating the Kingdom qf  Ends (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996). Chapter 
10; Robert M. Stewart, ’ Agent-Relativity. Reason, and Value’ in Mo~is t  76 ( 1993). 66-80. 
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I have already hinted, we can now explain in terms of reasons the essential goods that arose in 
the context of Dworkin’s account of the sacred. We each have a reason to wonder at the 
processes described in that account. We will recall that these processes include the 
evolutionarv processes which compose our biologv, the cultural processes in which we 
participate, and the process bv which we shape and reshape our lives through the decisions 
we make. Our reason to wonder at these processes is conferred bv the natural features of 
their manifestations, and it is the most basic of our shared reasons. Following closelv on its 
heels, we each have a reason to regard each life as being of worth131, and this reason is 
conferred bv the natural features of each life, which are themselves manifestations of the 
wonderful processes Dworkin describes. 
As we have also seen, the essential goods of respect for others and self-respect both 
follow from the essential worth possessed bv ever\- indiITidua1. In terms of reasons, we each 
have a reason to respect others, and we each have a reason to respect ourselves. These 
reasons follow from the same natural features of ourselves and others we saw7 in the previous 
example. In fact, they are so closely related to our reason to regard all individuals as having 
worth that I will usuallv be content to speak of the essential values of respect for others and 
self-respect, leaving the essential worth of each individual life to be implied bv the value of 
these two forms of respect. The two forms of respect serve as the basis for the most basic 
reason Scanlon suggests, the reason we all have to live with others on terms they could not 
reasonablv reject insofar as thev are also motivated bv this ideal. 
I think the two forms of respect also serve as a basis for other reasons we all  share, 
such as reasons relating to health, freedom or personal autonomy, honesty or fidelity, and 
access to certain opportunities and resources. We have for each of these derivative goods a 
reason to pursue them ourselves, as well as (via contractualism) a duty to respect (i.e. at least 
not to violate) others’ pursuit of them. MY general strategv of argument in support of these 
derivative goods is that a failure to realise their importance indicates a failure to appreciate at 
Again, I am leaving open the question of exactly what counts as ‘each life.’ In Chapter 1 I suggested 124 
that my own preference is that worth ranges over al l  humans and some animals. It will at least range 
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least one of the three kinds of processes mentioned by Dworkin, processes that themselves 
underpin the two forms of respect. The goods of health, freedom, and honesty, (as with the 
two forms of respect themselves) require that we determine an appropriate level of the good 
to be maintained (e.g. how high a level of health is enough?). I will not address this issue in 
detail, though it deserves a fuller treatment. 1 will ha1.e to be content to reljr on an intuitive 
notion of how much of these goods is enough. 
First consider the good of health. A failure to realise that I have a reason to look after 
my health, and generally to refrain from dama,oing the health of others, indicates a failure to 
appreciate the first of Dworkin’s processes, namelv the evolutionary processes that are 
manifested in our biology (as well as in the world around us). These processes are awe- 
inspiring, and the fact that we are manifestations of them is a significant part of the 
explanation for whv we have worth. But to have no interest in health (one’s own and others’) 
is to fail to appreciate the manifestations of ths  kind of process, and bv extension to fail to 
appreciate the process itself. 
The essential value of freedom, or personal autonomv,125 follows in a similar manner 
from the last two kinds of processes in Dworkin’s account. Both the process by which we 
participate in culture, and the process bv which we shape our lives through our decisions, 
require that individuals enjoy a substantial sphere of autonomv. Participation in the cultural 
processes of humanity requires not onlv that we not be prohibited from doing so, but also that 
we not be forced to do so, because it is difficult to see how forced participation can produce 
genuine cultural expression. This claim depends on the idea that genuine cultural expression 
must represent the perspectives of the various individuals that comprise that culture. An 
example of ’cultural’ expression whereb)? a group is forced by a dictator to participate is not 
cultural expression, but merelv the expression of an individual’s will carried out by a group. 
It is even more clear that we could not possiblv succeed in shaping and reshaping our lives 
through our decisions if our freedom was curtailed too sharplv. Talk of ’decisions’ in the 
over a l l  persons. 
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context of Dworkin’s third kind of process is clearly of decisions freely made; otherwise the 
decisions in question would not be ones by which iuc could shape our lives at all. So to denv 
that we have a reason to seek and secure a sphere of personal freedom, as well as a general 
reason not to violate that sphere of others, is implicitlv to den17 the importance of Dworkin’s 
second two processes. 
Our reasons to be honest with ourselves and generallv with others follow from our 
appreciation of Dworkin’s third 
to respect the process by which we and others shape our lives through our decisions. We saw 
above that this process requires that the decisions in question are freelv made. We might now 
add that it appears to require that the decisions are honestlv made. The wonderful qualitv of 
the process of shaping our lives through our decisions concerns the fact that our situation in 
life becomes b\7 tlus process a reflection of our deep personalih. traits. To shape our own lives 
under the influence of self-deception is to shape them in a wav which fails to express who we 
trulv are. In addition, to be dishonest with others is often to lead them to make life decisions 
(large or small) which are inaccurate reflections of how thev would express themselves if thev 
benefited from full and accurate information. To be dishonest with others, then, is to impede 
them from carrving out the tlurd of Dworkin’s processes. 
To be dishonest with oneself and others is to fail 
The argument in favour of access to certain opportunities and resources is closely 
related to our argument in defence of personal freedom. It is nearlv impossible to engage in 
either of the second two of Dworkin’s processes unless one has access to some basic resources 
and opportunities. Persons who live in poverty and isolation might, for example, be able to 
participate in human culture to some small degree, but their opportunity for participation will 
be extremelv limited. Likewise, thev mav be able to make decisions about their lives, and 
thus shape their lives in some small degree, but the range of options about which they can 
make decisions is likely to be extremelv limited. But if it is true that u7e all have a reason to 
seek certain opportunities and obtain certain resources, what are these to be? I will not t r \ 7  to 
The notions of freedom and personal autonomy may come apart in some contexts. but in the way I I25 
am using them I think they can be used interchangeably. 
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draw a comprehensive list, but a reasonable place to begin seems to be with goods and 
opportunities that relate to the other essential goods we have already described. Thus some 
likely candidates are an adequate level of subsistence (following from the goods of survival, 
respect for self and others, health and personal freedom), health care (following from the 
good of adequate health), and education (following from concerns about respect and personal 
autonomy). As with previous goods, these goods applv to ourselves as well as others. For 
example, I have a reason to pursue an adequate level of education for mvself, and a reason 
not to impede others from doing the same. 
So far we have established a sort of hierarchy of shared reasons, with the reason to 
regard everyone as having worth being at the top. But might there be shared reasons which 
are legitimate, but do not derive from a claim about human worth (and its closely-related 
claims about respect for oneself and others)? Might there be some other way (or wavs) to 
establish the existence of a legitimate shared reason? 1 think there is at least one other way, 
whch is to appeal to the essential value or disvalue of certain experiential states. The two 
obvious candidates to come in for such a treatment are the essential value of pleasure, and the 
essential disvalue of pain. I find the essential disvalue of pain to be the more promising of the 
two, because I am persuaded by the view that pleasure is not a sensation, but an activitv of 
appreciation. We might hope to establish that pain’s natural features give us all a reason to 
al~oid it, but this sort of treatment is not open to pleasure if it is understood as an activitv. I 
prefer the view that pursuing pleasure may well be something many wish to undertake 
within their realm of personal autonomv, but it does not itself indicate a reason we all have. 
I think that the project of trving to show that pain is essentially disvaluable is more 
promising. It is a view that seems to be held by Scanlon, and is also held by Nagel, but 
neither offers anything like a complete argument for the position.127 They neglect to do this 
probablv because the wide-ranging and complex issues involved in a discussion of the 
disvalue of pain entail an extended discussion that mal7 seem like an awkward diversion from 
Scanlon has a somewhat different discussion of the importance of honesty, but he reaches the same 
conclusion that we all have a reason to be honest with each other. Scanlon, 3 1 7 - 3 2 .  
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moral issues. We are not immune from this possibility ourselves, because unlike the other 
goods we advocated above, the disvalue of pain does not follow simply from considerations 
of human worth. It seems we must choose between simplv assuming that pain is disvaluable, 
or else engaging in a treatment of the issue that is much longer than our treatments of other 
shared reasons. But the first choice is unacceptable, because it is from our shared reason to 
avoid pain that we will, in the next chapter, derive the right not to be tortured, which is 
among our most basic and important rights. It is therefore critical that we offer a full 
explanation for why pain is disvaluable, even if that explanation mav seem at times like a 
digression.1’8 
I will begin the discussion of pain with two points of clarification. First, in speaking 
of pain’s phenomenological disvalue I will speak of it as being ’unpleasant,’ ’awful,’ and 
words to this effect. I am not entirelv happv with the abilih. of ani,’ single word to capture 
what we might call the ’ouch!’ qualit\r of pains. It is an interesting fact about language, and 
perhaps about pain as well, that we seem to lack the means to speak articulately of pain’s felt 
disvalue. Nonetheless I will try to speak of it, and we will keep in mind the limitations of the 
words involved. Second, I will assume there is a very close connection between pain’s 
disvalue and our inclination to avoid it. While I am not dcfiiziizg pain’s disvalue in terms of its 
behal4oural manifestations, it nonetheless seems true that, if pain is trul)~ awful, the 
reasonable behavioural response to it is to seek its avoidance or relief. David Lewis suggests 
that a madman might respond to a pain sensation not by seelung its avoidance but bv 
concentrating on mathematics, crossing his legs and snapping his fingers.12‘) I do not know 
whether there could be such a man or not, but as long as we can safelv call him mad he does 
not pose a problem for us, because I halre suggested that attempting to avoid pain is a 
reasonable response to feeling pain, and madmen are not reasonable. 
Scanlon, 18 1 ; Nagel, 156-1 62. 
The discussion that follows is a modification of my ‘The Disvalue of Pain and Pain-Infliction‘ in 
12- 
Earth ’s ‘4 bonziizations: Philosophical EssaiJs on Evil, ed. Daniel N. Haybron (Rodopi. forthcoming). 
See Appendix B. 
Block (Cambridge, MA: Haward University Press. 1980), 2 16-222. 
David Lewis, ‘Mad Pain and Martian Pain’ in Readings in Plzilosoplzj- o f  Psj*clzolog\*, T 01. I, ed. Ned 129 
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If we are to succeed in showing that pain has essential disvalue in the relevant sense, 
we will have to find a way to counter the sort of view advanced bv Hare.130 Hare believes 
that badness is not only a contingent proper& of pain, but it is a property not always 
manifested. That is, he t M s  it is perfectly possible to conceive of a pain which is not 
unpleasant, and cites examples we experience of this sort of ’pain.’ He thinks that if I lightly 
drag the point of a pin across mv skin, I will feel pain, yet not consider that pain unpleasant. 
He calls this pain-without-unpleasantness ’pain1 ’ and pain-with-unpleasantness ’pain?.’ He 
thnks that pain? pains are composed of both a ’bare sensation’ (which I will simplv call a 
sensation) and a qualifi of unpleasantness, while pain1 pains are composed of the sensation 
alone. The constitutive feature of pain for Hare is not unpleasantness but the sensation or 
limited range of sensations which all pains share. 
The first point to note in response is that an equallv coherent story can be told in 
Hare’s terms about pain being a phenomenon that is bad for everyone. There seems little 
doubt that manv people could perform Hare’s needle experiment and not find the experience 
unpleasant, but the example does not demonstrate what Hare wishes. The bare facts of the 
matter can be described in this way: when I drag the tip of a pin across mv skin, I feel a 
certain sensation but no unpleasantness, and the sensation I feel resembles the sensation I 
would feel if I pressed hard enough to draw blood. The only phenomenological difference 
seems to be that while the light dragging of the pin is not unpleasant, the deeper cut is. But 
these facts alone do not give us anv reason at all to call the first scenario an instance of pain. 
We could sa\’ with equal coherence that onl~7 Hare’s pain? is actualltl a case of pain, and that 
painl is something other than pain. Hare admits that in psvchological case studies there is no 
consensus to be found on what people call instances of his painl. Some call it pain and some 
do not. Hare thinks he can fall back on another argument: that as long as we can imagine an 
instance of pain without unpleasantness then such a thmg must be possible, and disvalue 
cannot be a constitutive feature of pain. But Hare’s strategv here of appealing to whether we 
R.M. Hare, ‘Pain and Evil’ in .4ristoteIian Sucictj. Srrpplemeiztur;i* I blirnzc 38 ( 1964). 9 1 - 106. It 
may seem odd that I focus on this piece when so much has been written on the subject of pain since its 
130 
158 
can imagine x to demonstrate possibilitv of X I S  existence has since fallen out of favour, as it 
s e e m  that we sometimes think we can imagine things we reallv cannot. 
At this point we have two equallv plausible stories about pain with no clear wav to 
choose between them. Some thinkers, including Daniel Dennettl3l, have despaired that we 
are stuck here, and that there is no way to resolve the matter. But I think that even if we may 
not be able to decide the matter with absolute certain*, there is some reason to favour the 
view that pain is, by its nature, unpleasant for evervone. As we have seen, Hare thinks that a 
pain consists essentiallv of onlv a sensation. There are two waVs we might interpret ths  
thought. It might mean that all pains share the same sensation, or it might mean that pains 
are characterised bv a specific range of sensations. Since it is easv to devise examples of 
different pains which have different sensations (for example, a dull toothache versus 
frostbite), the onlv plausible interpretation is the second one. But i s  it true even that the 
sensations of pains fall within an identifiable range? It is difficult to see what the sensations 
of getting jabbed with needle, having a dull ache in mv back, and getting scalded by boiling 
water have in common. But these experiences do have one thing in common: thev all hurt! 
I suggest it is more plausible that we think of pains as being composed of both a 
sensation and a feature (or combination of features) which, when perceived by us, causes us 
to regard our pain as awful. But obviouslv we must speak of sensation in a different wav 
than Hare does if we are to avoid the problem he faces. The wa~7 we can do so is to sav that 
the necessarv conditions for pain to be pain are that it be composed of anv sensation 
accompanied bv a feeling of dislike. There is not a pressing need for our class of pains to be 
held together by a limited range of sensations, because our class is alreadv limited by the fact 
that pains must invoke a feeling of aversion. So although we have allowed that pains can 
have anv sensation, it by no means follows that an\‘ feeling we ha1.e will qualify as a pain. 
I should emphasise at this point that I am to sketch the necessary 
conditions for pain; the sufficient conditions are a different matter. It remains to be worked 
publication. But I think it still stands as a paradigmatic treatment of the disvalue of pain, particularly of 
the sort of position I wish to oppose. 
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out, for example, why we are inclined to differentiate bad itches, or feelings of nausea, from 
pains. Both meet my necessary criteria for pain, 17et mv intuitions accord with those of most 
other persons in telling me that these feelings are somehow different from pains. The way in 
which they are different remains to be worked out, but I will be content with trying to defend 
my claim about pain’s necessary conditions. Admittedly, it could be that itches and feelings 
of nausea turn out to be differentiated from pains bv a consideration of sensation alone, but it 
is far from clear this will be the case. Another possibilitv is that these phenomena are 
distinguished at least in part by a distinct qualitv of awfulness each possesses. It may well 
turn out to be that a correct account of pain’s sufficient conditions will not present any 
problem for m~7 account of pain’s necessarv conditions. 
I think, then, that we have some reason to prefer the view that pain is essentially 
disvaluable in the wav we have specified. But ths  claim mav vet be too strong. It seems 
possible that, although pain has always given us a reason to avoid or relieve it, there mav d <  ~7et 
be pains which we enjov or at least do not mind. Perhaps in some possible world, or perhaps 
in our om7n world at some future time, there may be pains which are not unpleasant. I do not 
know how to prove that such a possibilitv could not exist. But it seems safe to sav that if the 
most coherent explanation of pain involves the claim that all pains are unpleasant, then the 
connection between pain and unpleasantness is more likelv than not to be an essential one. So 
with this proviso in mind, I will continue to speak of the connection as essential. 
One feature of this account of pain that some may find curious is that it clearly makes 
room onlv for phi/sicnf pain. This  mav seem troubling, because we do often speak of 
emotional pains: the pains of grief, betrayal, longing, embarrassment, etc. In fact, many 
people would undoubtedlv sav that these emotional distresses are the most profound and 
extreme pains of all. I do not, of course, deny that negative emotional experiences are a part, 
indeed a central part, of human experience - but the problem then arises of how7 to justify my 
claim that the onl17 real pains are phvsical pains. One wav out of the problem would be to 
Daniel C. Dennett, ‘Why You Can’t Make a Computer that Feels Pain’ in BI-ainstoms: 131 
Philosophical E s s q s  OM Mind arid Psycholog\* (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press, 1978), 190-229. 
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take a materialist stance, and claim that emotional experiences are merely physical events 
anyway. But there is a less ambitious alternative we might prefer. It s e e m  we can st i l l  speak 
of emotional pains on my account, provided that when we do so we understand ourselves to 
be speaking of pain in a metaphorical sense. When we sav we feel the ’pain of despair’ we are 
saying that our despair causes us to feel something verv much like the physical sort of pain 
detailed above. Of course, it is possible that certain strongl\r negative emotional experiences 
will be so bad that they cause us to have real phvsical pains, and any reference to these 
manifested feelings as pains would be literal, not metaphorical. But negative emotional 
experiences which fail to vield feelings which have both sensations and a feature (or 
combination thereof) which is perceived as unpleasant are not (literally) pains, nor do they 
(literally) produce pains. To say this, though, is not to discount their importance or belittle 
their awfulness. 
I will now consider five objections to mv claim that a feeling of unpleasantness is 
essential to any pain experience. The first is that a defender of the essential badness of pain 
cannot explain the existence of the masochst. I have suggested that if pain is trulv bad then 
ever17 reasonable person will try to avoid it. Yet it is a fact about the world that some people 
do (in at least some circumstances) seem to pursue pain and find it pleasurable, and it is not 
exactly self-evident that all of these people are unreasonable Ths seems to point us back to a 
view of pain more like the one expressed bv Hare. But although it ma~7 seem obvious that 
masochists pursue pain for its own sake and find it pleasurable, a story of at least equal 
plausibility can be devised which gives the masochist’s motivations more complexity. It 
seems possible that the masochist is not reallv pursuing pain as an ultimate end, but is 
pursuing pleasure onlv. It is possible the masochist can achieve certain pleasures only < -  bv 
experiencing pain, because pain experiences are essential means to certain psychological 
states such a person finds enjoyable.l3? In a response to Hare’s paper, P.L. Gardiner suggests 
l x  For what it is worth, this view of masochism is confirmed by Kenneth Tynan in his account of his 
own experiences in hs recently published diaries. Kenneth Tynan. Tlic Diaries q f  Kenneth T ~ w a n ,  ed. 
John Lahr (London: Bloomsbury, 200 1 ). It is also encouraging that the general picture of the masochist 
I have advanced is reported by Virginia L. Warren to have become the mainstream view among 
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what two of these states might be: perhaps feelings of guilt are assuaged by the pain 
experience, or perhaps the seeking of pain is an attempt to transfer responsibility to the 
punisher.l33 Undoubtedly other possibilities exist along these lines. The crucial point is that 
the existence of such a psychological state, though pleasurable and brought about bv pain, 
does not entail that the pain which is a means to it is pleasurable. It makes sense to sav that 
the pain is bad because it is unpleasant, but that the experience as a whole (which we will for 
now call the pain plus the resultant psychological state) is one the masochist finds valuable, 
because the \due of the resultant psvchological state outweighs the disvalue of the pain. 
Perhaps someone might think this last point shows that the masochist’s pain is actuallv 
valuable after all, because its instrumental value outweighs its essential phenomenological 
dislralue. This brings us to an issue I will take up in my responses to later objections, so I will 
delay comment until then. 
I think this picture of the masochist is to be preferred to one which might emerge 
from an account like Hare’s. If Hare delved more deeplv into the implications of his view of 
pain for masochism, he would find hmself faced with two equallv unattractilre alternatives. 
He might say that the pains the masochist pursues are all instances of painl. That would 
allow him to say that there are at least some cases in which the masochist finds the mere 
sensation of pain pleasurable. Perhaps the masochist even feels some pains as pain, which 
other people would feel as pain.. But although this is possible, it seems to take all the sting 
out of masochism (so to speak). Do we reallv wish to sav that it is only the scizsntio~ of being 
hit with the crack of a whip that the masochist craves? Or is it perhaps necessary that such a 
person feels pain in the sense of pain? in order to satisfv certain desires? We ordinarilv think 
of the masochist as seeking an experience of pain?, and indeed I think this is the only plausible 
wa~7 of seeing the issue. If sensations alone were being pursued, then the masochist would 
most likelv seek out many which are not ordinarilv thought of as unpleasant, and pursue 
psychiatrists by the mid- 1980’s. See Virginia L. Warren, ‘Explaining Masochism’ in Joimal.for the 
Theor?? o f  Social Belzaviour 15 ( 1985). 103- 130. 
P.L. Gardiner, ‘Pain and Evil’ in Aristotelian Socieh- Siipplenzerztai:ij T o/rnne 38 ( 1964), 107- 124. 
Gardiner’s paper is a reply to Hare’s. 
I33 
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them for the same reasons that sensations ordinarily conceived as unpleasant are pursued. 
But there is no evidence the masochist does this. 
Alternativelv, Hare could say that the masochist does indeed pursue experiences of 
pain2, and finds such experiences pleasurable. But this seems just incoherent. It is mysterious 
(to me, anvwav) how anvone could find pleasurable an experience which is genuinelv 
dislikable. This would mean the same experience is found to be simultaneously pleasurable 
and unpleasurable, which seems impossible. There may be some hope of salvaging this line 
of argument bv appealing to second-order considerations. We might be able to sav that the 
masochist’s pain experience involves simultaneouslv a first order displeasure and a second- 
order pleasure. But I do not h o w  if we can make sense of the concept of second-order 
pleasures. 
I will now turn to the second objection, whch is that the testimonv of some patients 
who have undergone lobotomies suggests that there are such things as pains which we do not 
find unpleasant. When a patient receii~es a lobotomy, all (or at least most) subsequent ‘pains’ 
are felt by that patient onlv in the sense of what Hare would call pain]. That is, a lobotomv 
patient feels the sensations of pain in their full intensity, but without the dislike which would 
normallv accompanv them. Interestingly, manv of these patients are inclined to speak of such 
experiences in terms of feeling pains but not minding them, which seems to support Hare’s 
lriew. But while I admit that this fact about lobotomy patients does not favour my view, I do 
not think it favours Hare’s verv stronglv either. Not all lobotomy patients speak of feeling 
pains which are not unpleasant: many? do, but not an overwhelming majority. Of those who 
do speak of feeling such pains, there might be some reason to doubt their word. Although I 
am otherwise happv to support the thesis that people are incorrigible about their own pains, 
there might be some reason to doubt incorrigibilit~ in the case of patients who have 
undergone such a traumatic experience as a lobotomy. Also, as I have argued, I think the 
conceptual storv which supports mv own view is independently stronger than the one behind 
Hare’s, and if I am right about this then the burden of proof is rather high in the lobotomv 
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case. That is, I think the testimony of lobotomv patients would have to support Hare’s view 
overwhelmingly in order to cause undue concern. 
The third objection is that the fact that some people pursue pain as a means to a 
worthy end shows that at least those pains can be valuable. An example might be someone 
who goes on a hunger strike to protest oppressive government policies. Such a person suffers 
the pains of hunger, yet these pains are valuable as a political instrument. In fact, it maV well 
be that the instrumental value of these pains far outweighs their essential disvalue, so can we 
not sav that the pains are good in an overall sense? I think that if we were to do so we would 
betray a confusion about what in this picture is valuable and what is not. The hunger striker 
has a reason to bring about a change of government policv (because the policv really is 
oppressive), and his (perceived) hunger helps him to achieve this end. What is valuable is the 
relation of the (perceived) hunger to the state of affairs at which the striker aims (i.e. anvone 
in the hunger striker’s position would have a reason to engage in this activity), and it is this 
value we are referring to when we talk of the hunger’s instrumental value. But the p i n  itsclf 
is no more valuable than anv other pain. To sa\., then, that the pain of the striker’s hunger has 
instrumental value is to sav that it enjovs a certain valuable relation with a state of affairs 
which is itself valuable (indeed, it seems the value of the relation is derived from the value of 
the state of affairs). The only wav the value of the relation could sav anything interesting 
about the value of the pain itself is if the relation is a necessary one, and obviouslv this is not 
the case - we can think of examples of anv of these means-to-an-end pains which are clearlv 
bad. In fact, the very instrumental effectiveness of pains like the hunger striker’s depends on 
the fact that the pains will be perceived as having disvalue. If no one thought the pains of 
starvation were bad, no one would likelv be moved bv ths  sort of protest. 
A fourth objection is that some people who are not clearlv masochists pursue pain for 
deeply considered reasons, and that their pains can be said to be valuable. For example, some 
ascetics choose to lead a life of hardship, deprivation and pain. They seem to be different 
from both the masochist, whose reasons for pursuing pain are usuallv sexual, and the hunger 
striker, who would choose a less painful form of protest if it was likelv to succeed. The 
164 
reasons of the ascetic for choosing pain seem to be tied quite closely to a considered 
judgement about the human condition. Conceptually speaking, though, I think the ascetic 
inevitably falls into the camp of either the hunger striker or the masochist. Manv ascetics (e.g. 
monks) live as thev do because thev believe themselves to be following strict guidelines set 
down by religious authorities, and as such they believe that their life of pain will vield 
rewards in another life. Of course, a cvnical view of their activities suggests that they are 
lixring a life of pain onlv to receive a reward, and that if their religion allowed them to live in 
an easier wav thev would gratefullv accept. Obviouslv in this case their pain experiences 
would have the means-to-an-end quality of the pains of the hunger striker. But even if we 
take a less cvnical view and claim that (at least some) monks believe in their hearts that a life 
of pain is a holv one, this may not change the fundamental point. It seems their positive 
valuation of pain would still be informed by a religious context which promises them 
salvation. Many would not value pain if thev did not also believe in other elements of their 
religious framework (such as salvation). 
Now, it is possible that there are monks who would live a life of pain and hardship 
even if they were convinced of the untruth of salvation. Similarly there may be ascetics who 
seek out some forms of pain and who choose asceticism for non-religious reasons. Many 
would be uncomfortable calling such people masochsts, because, as I have mentioned, the 
term masochist is usually used to refer to someone who pursues pain as a means to sexual 
pleasure. The ascetic may seem radically different from the masochist, because the ascetic 
pursues pain for deeply-considered, perhaps mvstical, reasons. Yet I think that, for our 
purposes, these non-religious ascetics (and hardened monks) fall conceptuallv into the 
masochist’s camp. Thev pursue pain for the sake of something else, such as a moral ideal or 
psvchological state, thev cannot obtain bv an~7 other means. The fact that the masochist is 
after sexual pleasure while ascetics are pursuing some other end is not relevant to the 
argument, so our initial inclination to call the masochist and the ascetic strange bedfellows 
proves to be unfounded. 
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I have saved what is perhaps the most common objection for last. It is that pain 
cannot be a bad thing, because it serves as a useful warning about serious dangers to one’s 
health. The pain of cutting my skin, for example, is said to be a good thing because it keeps 
me from cutting myself too often or too deeplv and losing too much blood (or perhaps 
exposing myself to infection). The pain I have in a certain muscle when I overexert mvself is 
said to be good because it calls my attention to the fact that if I strain the muscle further, I 
might do serious damage to it. The pain of a headache at the onset of influenza is good 
because it causes me to be more restful, which helps to prevent me from becoming more ill. 
I do not tlunk anvone would dispute the fact that pains do often have this sort of 
instrumental value, and we might further think there is something about this general 
instrumental value of pains which makes this case different from the ones we examined in the 
third and fourth objections. The connection between pain and usefulness here seems so close 
that we might wonder if it is a necessarv one. If pains are necessarily useful, then it seems 
unlikely we can call pain essentiallv disvaluable. But the connection between pain and 
usefulness cannot be a necessary one, because it is clear that not all pains have instrumental 
\due.  For example, sometimes we have rather ordinary aches or cramps which do not serve 
as anv particular warning to us. The case can be more extreme: think of the intense pain 
which might be suffered bv someone who has acute arthritis. This  pain does not seem to 
serve an\’ purpose which helps to guide the sufferer’s behaviour. Even pains that have some 
connection with instrumental value, such as the pains of a burn victim, might present us with 
a case in which the phenomenological disvalue of the pain is far more intense and prolonged 
than it needs to be to have instrumental use. 
It is clear, then, that the supposed instrumental value of pain turns out to be a value 
which applies contingently, and to only some pains. So, as in the case of the religious ascetics 
of the fourth objection, the useful pains of the fifth objection ultimately cannot escape the 
argument we advanced in the context of the third objection. Pains that have ‘instrumental 
value’ are not themselves valuable (when we consider only the felt pain itself), but enjoy a 
valuable vclntioiz to a particular fact or set of facts. It is this valuable relation which makes it 
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permissible to say that the pain experience on the whole has instrumental value. For 
example, the instrumental value of my pain when I cut mvself arises from the relation of the 
pain to various facts: the fact that the cut causes me to bleed; the fact that a deeper cut would 
cause me to bleed more; the fact that if I bleed too much I will die, and so on. There is an 
interesting way, though, in which this conceptual story differs from the one we told in the 
case of the hunger striker. In that example, the value of the relation between the pain and the 
fact or set of facts with which it was connected (the bringing about of a change of government 
policy) depended on the positive value of the fact or set of facts itself. But in our present 
example, the value of the relation depends on the diszvduc of the facts with whch it is 
connected: bleeding excessivelv, getting infected, dying and the like are all bad t h g s .  This  
difference follows from the different roles that pain is playing in the two examples - in the 
first instance of b r i n p g  about something good, in the second one of warning us about 
something bad. But the important point is that, in both cases, the value that some might think 
to attach to the pain itself is actually found in the relation the pain has to a fact or set of facts. 
The way I have defended my position, though, may lead to yet another objection, one 
which combines a representationalist theory of pain with evolutionary considerations.13 It 
might be argued that humans (and other animals) have evolved in such a wav that pains are 
essentially useful as representations of disturbances in the body. Pain cannot be bad, because 
the 1’ex-y purpose of pain is to alert us to bodily disturbances or damage. The objection 
contends that I have made too much of the exceptional cases in which certain pains are not 
useful. Representational theorv entails the possibility of misrepresentation, and thus the 
possibilitv of pains which are not useful. Furthermore, biologically our pain system is a 
natural svstem, and natural s\?s,tems are imperfect, so not only are useless pains conceptually 
possible - they will in fact sometimes occur. The objection’s point, though, is that pains are 
good because they are essential to playing the helpful role that they play. That is, the job 
For a representationalist theory of pain see Michael Tye, Tell Problems of Consciousness: -4 134 
Representational Theor?. o f  the Ph€r70??1eliN/ Mind (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995), 1 1 1 - 1 16. 
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pains perform is vitally important, and the17 must have phenomenological disvalue to do this 
job. 
But it is not clear, to me anyway, that we need something unpleasant like pain in 
order to carry out the function pain does. Do warnings about bodily damage need to be 
awful (and sometimes even unbearable)? There would certainlv be a problem if such 
warnings were pleasurable, insofar as such a scenario might lead us to seek out experiences 
which are actually detrimental to our well-being and sunrival. But perhaps warnings about 
bodilv damage could be sensations which are neither pleasant nor unpleasant. Admittedly, 
there is a danger that such sensations would be less noticeable than disvaluable ones, but we 
could solve this problem bv saving that our warning sensations could be neutral regarding 
their pleasantness or unpleasantness, yet phenomenologicallv unique. Even if this point is 
granted, some might insist that we still need the unpleasantness of pain as a sort of 
paternalistic feature of our biology, to guard against a natural carelessness or even self- 
destructiveness in our behalriour. I am not sure there is actuallv such a carelessness in our 
nature, but even if there is, the argument is not clearlv successful. A world in which we cause 
ourselves more bodilv damage but feel no pain is not clearlv worse than one in which we 
cause ourselves less damage but suffer quite a bit of pain. In fact, it might well be better. The 
comparison would undoubtedlv turn on just how much bodily damage, versus how much 
pain, we are talking about, and devising the weighting might be a complicated task. But I, 
for one, would be willing to accept some increase in bodilv damage if it meant living a life 
free of the unpleasantness of pain. And, as I have said, this choice mav well be irrelevant 
anjwav. I think that it is quite possible that a phenomenologicallv distinctive neutral 
sensation could perform the job of warning us about bodily danger as well as pain does. 
I have tried to show that pain is essentiallv disvaluable in the buck-passing sense, i.e. 
that the natural features of pain give evervone a reason to behave aversely to pain, for 
example by avoiding it, preventing it, minimising it, etc. This means that we all have a reason 
of autonomii to avoid pain, and that any principle which advocates or allows the causing of 
pain to another will have at least a p i i n n  facie rejectability. But neither the reason of 
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autonomy nor our duties to others will be absolute in character, as is accounted for by their 
pro tanto status. Even though the masochist or the ascetic has a reason of autonomy to be 
averse to pain due to pain’s phenomenological disvalue, the reasons which stem from their 
personal projects (which involve some suffering of pain) mav outweigh the reason to be 
averse to pain. A marathon runner, for example, might reasonablv accept that her project of 
running marathons will entail the suffering of a great deal of pain. There are, after all, such 
people in the world, and we do not consider them to be obviouslv unreasonable. Regarding 
our duties, we will generally have a dutv not to cause pain to others, because principles whch 
allow the causing of pain will generallv be rejectable. But it is easv to conceive of principles 
which are likelv to serve as exceptions. A doctor, for example, will sometimes be expected to 
act by a principle which allows him to cause some pain to his patients in order to prevent a 
worse scenario, as when he administers a vaccination for a debilitating disease. The fact that 
pain has essential disvalue, though, is an important factor in considerations of whether a 
given principle inLTolving the inflicting or allowing of pain is reasonablv rejectable, and we 
can assume that such principles will be acceptable only in exceptional cases. 
This last discussion indicates a more general point to be made about shared reasons. 
We should recognise that the issues of universality and absoluteness are separate issues, 
issues that are conflated at our peril. Th is  point applies equally well to our discussion of 
rights in the next chapter. Universalitv refers to the range of beings to which a given reason 
applies, while absoluteness refers to the strength that reason has when it is competing against 
other reasons. Universal reasons need not be absolute, and reasons of absolute force need not 
be universal. I ha\Te suggested several different reasons which are shared by everyone, but, as 
I have said, these reasons are (at least initially) pro tanto in character. Even regarding a 
reason as basic as our reason to live, there may be extraordinary circumstances that suggest 
that killing ourselves is acceptable. Similarly, there may be extraordinary circumstances 
which suggest that a principle which allows us to kill others is acceptable. To say that there 
could not be such circumstances would be to abandon the spirit of Scanlon’s account of 
reasonable rejection, which (as we saw preliously) emphasises the importance of judgement 
169 
and intuition about individual cases, and resists attempts to draw up inflexible general sets of 
rules. I should emphasise, though, that our shared reasons will nonetheless plav an important 
role in considerations of reasonable rejection, and can be understood to set the bar high for 
exceptional cases. This is because, stemming ultimately from Dworkin’s account of the 
sacred, our shared reasons are reasons that concern some of the most fundamental aspects of 
our existence. 
A general question about the specific content of our duties has been lurking in the 
background of this section. If it is true that we have a dutv to beha1.e ’favourablv’ toward, 
e.g., the freedom or health of others, and to behave ’aversely’ toward the pain of others, what 
does this behaviour entail? Does it involve onlv relevant kinds of non-interference, so that, 
e.g., I have a dutv not to worsen vour health, not to unduly infringe on vour personal 
freedom, not to inflict pain upon vou, etc.? Or, more stronglv, does it invol~e the provision of 
goods to others, or even the saving of others? If you are in pain, do I (at least sometimes) 
ha\-e a dutv to rescue vou? I thmk that what we have said so far about duties and about 
reasonable rejection could be compatible with a range of views along these lines. If it is true 
that having access to certain opportunities and resources is essentiallv valuable, then it seems 
we will at least be required to support a state that prorrides those opportunities and resources, 
and this goes bevond mere non-interference with others. On the other hand, it seems that 
duties to rescue are likeljr to be constrained to some extent by the essential value of personal 
autonomy. Unfortunatelv I lack space to give a more detailed account of this important issue, 
but at least we have indicated some general guidelines to follow. 
In this section I ha1.e presented a view of how we might come to have certain shared 
reasons on a Scanlonian account, and of what at least some of these reasons are likely to be. I 
suggested that understanding our previous account of essential value in Scanlonian buck- 
passing terms helps to square our current picture of shared reasons with our previous one of 
essential value. As for the content of our shared reasons, it includes and derives from the 
values whch underpin Scanlon’s contractualism, values ultimately explained by Dworkin’s 
account of the sacred. I suggested, though, that there is at least one shared reason which does 
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not derive simply from these fundamental values, and that is the essential disvalue of pain. 
Thus the picture of shared reasons we have presented would seem to look something like this: 
reason to regard each individual as having worth 
reasons to respect ourselves and others 
reasons to behave favourably (regarding ourselves and others) toward: 




living wage, health care, education 
To the side of this hierarchy is our reason to behave unfa1Tourablv toward pain, a reason 
whch does not derive from any of the above reasons, but whose moral implications are 
ZY Guided by those reasons. As I have said, the content of these shared reasons will help us to 
identify the content of our universal rights in the next chapter, if indeed we can succeed in 
our project there of deriving rights from reasons. 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter I have tried to present a full explanation and a defence of a certain 
picture of moral reasons. That picture has been largelv faithful to the one presented bv 
Scanlon in W h n f  We O w  to Endz Other. My view differs from Scanlon’s in the respect that it is 
somewhat more determinative, particularly regarding the reasonable rejection of principles, 
and regarding my claim that the underpinnings of Scanlon’s contractualism suggest the 
existence of a class of reasons we all have. I will close by briefly summarising the view of 
moral reasons that has emerged in the chapter. 
We identified two broad categories of reasons, namely reasons of autonomv on the 
one hand, and duties on the other. Reasons of autonomv are the reasons we have to fulfil our 
personal projects and commitments. Duties are reasons we have to treat others in a specified 
manner. These two kinds of reasons are not mutuallv exclusive: it is possible to incorporate 
duties to others into our personal projects, and indeed Scanlon’s discussion of judgement- 
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sensitive attitudes suggests that this will happen as our attitudes become more refined. All of 
the reasons we have discussed have been agent-relative in character, meaning that their 
general form includes a reference to the person who has the reason. 
Reasons of autonomy and duties (or, at least, those duties that have not been 
incorporated into our reasons of autonomv) arise in different ways. Let us first review the 
formation of reasons of autonomy. A given moral agent P begins with a set of judgement- 
sensitive attitudes, which include beliefs, intentions, hopes, fears, and attitudes such as 
admiration, respect, contempt, and indignation. Some of these attitudes arise unbidden. If an 
unbidden attitude in favour of +ing presents itself, I will normallv consider mvself to have an 
operative reason to @. Th is  operative reason must then undergo a two-step deliberative 
process. In the first step, I ask questions about mv operative reason such as 'Am I 
overloolung something? What kinds of reasons might there be for +ing apart from the ones I 
halie alreadv considered? What reasons do particular cases seem to present, and what can I 
learn from those cases?' If mv answers to tlus line of questioning do not suggest the rejection 
of mv operative reason to 6, then it becomes a pro tanto reason. This brings us to the second 
step of our scrutiny, where we compare this pro tanto reason with other pro tanto reasons 
that mav be present, to see if it outweighs competitors. If it does, then it is a genuine reason. 
We all have a basic reason (of autonomy) to live with others on terms thev could not 
reasonably reject insofar as thev are also motivated bv this ideal. This reason is itself 
underpinned by our reasons to respect ourselves and others, and ultimatelv to regard each 
individual life as having worth. We have these general reasons because we are capable of 
realising that each indi\Tidual is a unique product of wonderful processes, processes such as 
the evolutionary ones that result in our bodies, our minds, and the world around us; cultural 
ones that link us to persons and civilisations past and present; and processes of decision- 
making bv which each individual shapes her life in such a way that her life is a testament to 
her identiw. From our reason to live with others on terms they could not reject we derive the 
contractualist formula C, which determines the concepts of right and wrong. It states that an 
act is wrong if it would be disallowed b~7 anTT set of principles for the general regulation of 
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behaviour that no one could reasonablv reject as a basis for informed, unforced general 
agreement. 
It is C which gives us our duties to others, which we can see in the following example. 
Let us say that a mother loans the fami l~  car to her teenage son on the condition that he bring 
it back before midnight. He agrees, but does not come home until two in the morning. The 
mother considers the principle by which her son has h is  alleged reason to be late and 
concludes (correctly) that it is reasonablv rejectable. Since contractualism suggests that the 
son is wrong to pursue a course of action which follows from principles that can be rejected, 
he has a d u b  to reject the principles by which he acted, and to adopt principles incompatible 
with the first set. 
A realisation of the fact that the \dues of self-respect and respect for others underpin 
contractualism suggests that we have shared reasons other than just one to live with others on 
terms thev could not reasonablv reject. Most ob\viouslv, we all have reasons to respect 
ourselves and others. It seems likelv that we also share deri\rati\re reasons to pursue, attain or 
protect a certain level of health, personal freedom, honestv, and access to opportunities and 
resources such as a living wage, health care, and education. We also all have a reason to 
avoid pain, and not to inflict it upon others. With regard to favouring these goods for 
ourselves, the status of our reasons is (initially) pro tanto, because these reasons could 
sometimes be overridden b\r competing pro tanto reasons. With regard to our duties, the 
17alue of the above goods figures into the criteria bv whch we determine the reasonable 
rejectabiliw of principles (e.g. if a principle favours &ringing upon someone’s personal 
autonomv it is likelv to be rejectable). But none of these criteria have absolute force, and anv 
one of them might be overridden by other considerations in particular cases. However, just as 
we should think of the above goods as general117 pointing to genuine reasons of autonomv, so 
we should think of them as generallv pointing to decisive criteria of reasonable rejectabiliw. 
Exceptions will exist, but thev will be relatively rare. 
I have strived to make the picture I have presented in this chapter of moral reasons 
clear and comprehensilre. Yet we must hope it has not been entirely comprehensive, because 
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our project in the final chapter will be to show that it has been missing something. 
Specifically, I will try to show that this framework of moral reasons benefits from the 
introduction of rights, and that it vields rights in a w7av that seems natural and unforced. This 
project will conclude the thesis proper, and aspires to fulfil our long-standing aim of devising 
a potent and original account of universal rights that is grounded in moral objectivism. 
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Chapter 5 
The Derivation of Rights 
It is the project of tlus chapter to argue that a concept of rights, including universal 
rights, can and should be derived from the Scanlonian account of moral reasons we defended 
in the previous chapter. As such, the chapter serves as a culmination of sorts for the thesis. It 
fulfils the promise of our first chapter that rights, and especiallv universal rights, must be 
included in a proper understanding of moral theorv. It is a product of our argument that a 
credible account of universal rights must be grounded in an objective meta-ethics, and that 
the most promising meta-ethical grounding appears to be the strategv of irrealist cognitivism, 
of which Scanlon’s account is an example. The derivation of rights will r e l ~  on and utilise the 
entire discussion of the previous chapter. 
I have said that the project here is to demonstrate that rights can and should be 
derived from Scanlonian moral reasons. We should be careful, however, not to state our aims 
too ambitiously. I have been careful to point out previously that I have not tried to show that 
Scanlonian reasons are the onlv valid grounding of universal rights, or especiallv of non- 
universal rights. Similarly, I will not attempt to claim in this chapter that rights must be 
deri\.ed from Scanlonian reasons in order to give Scanlon’s account anv merit or credibilitv. 
As I argued in the previous chapter, I think that orthodox Scalonianism has much to be said in 
its favour. I will, howeirer, argue in tlus chapter the inclusion of rights in Scanlon’s 
contractualism makes it a superior theorv by its own lights than it is without rights. This 
claim seems more than sufficientlv ambitious, and should be of considerable interest to 
scholars of Scanlon if it can be shown to be plausible. 
175 
The rights I will be discussing are of the kind identified by Wesley Hohfeld in h is  
classic taxonomy as claim-right~.l~~ This is consistent with our discussion in Chapter 1, which 
also emphasised claim-rights. We will recall from that discussion that the fact that some 
agent (or group) A has a claim-right to some good x implies that another agent (or group) B 
has a corresponding duh7 with regard to x. This  corresponding duw will usually be to not 
interfere with x, and possiblv to provide A with x. Claim-rights are sometimes contrasted 
with liberw rights, which are a weaker kind of right. Mv liberty right to @ implies that I am 
permitted to +, i.e. I have no duti. not to @. Though it is not clear p ~ i ~ z l z  fncic how we might 
derive liberty rights from Scanlonian reasons, there also seems no reason to t M  it would be 
impossible to do so. Liberty rights might somehow be shown to correspond to reasons of 
autonomy, so that, e.g., mv reason to climb Mount Kilimanjaro corresponds with a liberty 
right to do so. Libertv rights might even be identified with reasons of autonom~. ’~(~ But while 
this sort of inclusion of libertv rights may well be possible, I do not see an\; advantage to 
introducing them into our picture. I cannot see that the\. would add anvthing conceptuallv 
sigruficant to reasons of autonomy, for, if I have a (genuine) reason of autonomv to @, this 
alreadv implies that I have no dutv not to @. E\~erv reason of autonomy to + can thus be 
thought to be (or perhaps entail) a liberty right to @, so while there is no harm in speaking of 
these reasons as being (or entailing) libertv rights, at least in a metaphorical sense, neither 
does there seem to be much advantage. So I shall leave liberty rights aside. 
With this in mind I will now proceed with the discussion in several parts. I will first 
discuss how it is conceptuallv possible to derive rights from Scanlonian reasons. This account 
will turn out to depend on, and thereby lead us into, a discussion of why it is useful to derive 
rights from these reasons. These first two sections will concern the larger class of rights, 
which includes both universal and non-universal rights. In the third section I will narrow the 
~ 
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what we have reasons of autonomy to do. but also things that we have no reasons of autonomy to do. 




focus and discuss the derivation of universal rights from shared reasons. I will then identify 
the content of at least some of our universal moral rights. In the final section I will consider 
two objections that might be made against the argument in this chapter. My rights view can 
be summarised in the following four points, to which I will repeatedly make reference 
throughout the chapter: 
1. Rights are a distinct subclass of reasons. Thev exist just when certain facts 
hold about our reasons to reject given sets of principles. I have a right to 
some good x just when it is true that I would have a pro tanto reason to 
reject anv set of principles held b~7 another agent that would prevent me 
from attaining, preserving, or exercising x. 
2. The criteria which govern the reasonable rejection of principles also 
account for the defeasibilihr of rights. 
3. The justification for the introduction of rights into a Scanlonian account 
ultimatelv lies in the cumulative weight of arguments in favour of the 
need for rights, both in a Scanlonian framework particularly and in 
moralit\r generally. 
4. Universal rights correspond to facts about shared reasons in the same way 
that non-universal rights correspond to facts about unshared reasons. The 
deri1Tation of universal rights does not present any special problems not 
encountered bv the derivation of non-universal rights. 
I will attempt to explain (1) and (2) in the first section. I will also touch on (3) in 5.1, though 
the arguments to which that point refers will be presented in the second section. Point (4) will 
be covered in the third section of the chapter. 
5.1 The conceptual story of rights 
In this section I will discuss the conceptual story behind the derilyation of rights from 
Scanlonian reasons. As I have mentioned, ths  entails the explanation of (1) and (2) above, 
and a brief discussion of (3) that will lead us into the following section. With this in mind we 
can turn our attention to (1). (1) first identifies rights as a distinct subclass of reasons, b\T 
which I mean they are a subclass distinct from the others we have already identified, namely 
even on this picture I cannot see that liberty rights are adding much that is conceptually useful to our 
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reasons of autonomy and duties. The reasons of this subclass can be characterised as reasons 
to expect a certain kind of treatment with regard to a certain good, and to complain if this 
treatment is not given. If we wanted to identifv the subclass explicitly in terms of reasons we 
could call it the class of ’reasons to complain,’ though I will identifv it simplv as ’rights.’ 
Rights are distinct from reasons of autonomv in the sense that, like duties, thev are 
deontological in character. The content of our rights does not depend on our personal goals 
or aspirations, but depends rather on a consideration of what sets of moral principles are 
reasonably rejectable. A s  we saw in 4.2, the content of our duties similarlv depends on this 
sort of reasonable rejectabilitv. But rights are different from duties in the respect that we can 
legitimatelv choose not to uphold our rights, but we cannot choose not to fulfil our duties. To 
put the matter another wav, we can opt out of rights, but not out of duties. I will consider an 
objection to this point later, but for now I hope to have suggested a foundation for 
differentiating rights from reasons of autonomv and duties. 
We no~7  have some idea of how to answer the question of what rights are in the 
Scanlonian framework. Now I wish to address the question of the conditions under which we 
have rights. (1)  attempts to address t h s  issue bv suggesting that rights are connected to facts 
that hold about the reasons to reject given sets of principles (which I will call R-reasons) we 
would have under certain conditions. This sounds confusing, but a step-bv-step treatment of 
it reveals the idea behmd it to be rather simple. First, it is helpful to review what R-reasons 
are, and to remind ourselves of the crucial role thev plav in contractualism. We saw in the 
previous chapter that when someone treats us in a wav that we find ,winzn fncic objectionable, 
we have an operative reason to reject the principles bv which they have acted. This  operative 
reason becomes a pro tanto reason if it meets a threshold of plausibility by surviving a line of 
questioning along the lines of ’Am I overlooking sometlung?’ and ’What kinds of reasons 
might there be apart from the ones I alreadv recognise?’ Our pro tanto reason then becomes a 
genuine reason just when it is not overridden by competing pro tanto reasons. The fact that 
we have a genuine reason to reject a given set of principles is what makes the objectionable 
moral picture. 
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action wrong, and that gives the perpetrator a duty to reject his own principles and to act 
according to a new set. R-reasons, then, are what give others their duties, and this is one 
reason it is appropriate to call the role they plav crucial. 
What (1) adds to the account of R-reasons is the claim that there is a somewhat less 
direct sense in which they also give us our rights. Specificallv, I have a right to some good x 
just when it is true that I would have a pro tanto reason to reject anv set of principles held bv 
another agent that would prevent me from attaining, preserving, or exercising x. There are 
two important features to note about this formulation. The first is that it speaks of pro tanto 
reasons to reject principles (or pro tanto R-reasons), rather than genuine ones. This is an 
important difference from the account of duties above, because we saw there that it is onlv a 
'3 a~iiuiize R-reason of agent I? that gives agent Q a dutv to reject the principles he held. I think it 
is best to briefly delav the discussion of ths  point, because it lies at the heart of what is 
discussed in (2), and we hare not yet finished discussing (l), so I shall return to this point. 
The second important feature to note, though, is one that should receive a full treatment now. 
It is the fact that the conditions for right-holding are explained in a conditional form. 
Whether or not I have a right depends on whether it is true that I would have a certain pro 
tanto reason in a given circumstance. By contrast, whether I have a dutv to reject the 
principles by which I acted depends on whether someone else does have a genuine R-reason 
regarding mv principles. 
The formulation of rights depends cruciallv on the fact that we can determine in 
advance what sets of moral principles (and, b~7 extension, which actions) would be reasonablv 
rejectable. Though Scanlon does not sav much about determining this matter in advance, 
there seems no reason why it would be impossible to do so at least some of the time. This 
seems true for some genuine reasons, as we could imagine a certain act being performed, 
imagine the reasons behind it, and imagine whether we could reasonably reject the principles 
behind it. To take an extreme example, I might imagine a case of someone torturing me for 
fun. It seems I would straightforwardly hare a pro tanto reason to reject the principles 
behind such an act, and it also seems that there would be no overriding pro tanto reasons 
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counting against mv reason. Thus I can determine in advance that the principles behind such 
an action are reasonablv rejectable. Now, there may be times when we can determine in 
advance that we would have a pro tanto reason to reject a given set of principles, but not that 
we would have a genuine reason to do so, because of an inabilihr to imagine all of the relevant 
possibilities relating to competing pro tanto reasons. For example, I might ima,aine a child 
stealing bread from me, and think that in such a case I would have a pro tanto reason to reject 
the child’s principles. This  follows from the fact that the bread is mv propertv, and to 
understand the notion of propertv is to understand that we normallv should not steal the 
proper& of others. But it is less clear whether I would have a genuine reason to reject the 
child’s principles. Perhaps there are o1Terriding pro tanto reasons not to reject the child’s 
principles, such as the fact that she is homeless and starving. So while there are limitations to 
what we can imagine in advance about reasonable rejectabilitv, it seems nonetheless possible 
to predict the wrongness (especiallv on a pro tanto level) of manv different acts and sets of 
principles. If this is true, then there seems no si,onificant impediment to determining what our 
rights are on the formulation I have provided. 
The principal advantage of formulating rights in this conditional form is that it 
explains how we can have rights antecedent to being wronged. If we tried to simplifv the 
view bv saving that rights just clye R-reasons, we would encounter the unattractive 
consequence that we would need to be wronged before we had the relevant right. R-reasons, 
after all, exist onlv after a wrong has occurred - or, in the case of operative or pro tanto R- 
reasons, thejr exist only once we suspect we have been wronged. By making rights a distinct 
subclass of reasons and connecting them with facts about the R-reasons we would have under 
certain circumstances, we circumvent this problem. This  move not only7 brings our rights 
view into line with a commonlv-held rights tenet (i.e. that it is possible to have rights 
antecedent to being wronged), but it also preserves some of our most important arguments 
from Chapter 1 in favour of the need for rights. We saw then that rights contribute to our 
self-respect not just through their exercise, but also (and perhaps even primarilv) because we 
know in advance that we have them, and think of ourselves differently as a result. 
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Let us move on now to an explanation of (2), which focuses on the normative force of 
rights. The idea behind this point is verv simple: our rights are overridden just when the pro 
tanto R-reasons with which they correspond fail to become genuine. As we have seen, this 
happens when competing pro tanto reasons outweigh a given pro tanto R-reason. The easiest 
wav to explain this is bv seeing how it works in an example, and for this I will return to our 
child bread thief. We can say in this example that I have a right to the loaf of bread in 
question, because it is possible to determine in advance that I would have a pro tanto reason 
to reject the principles of anvone who tries to prevent me from securing it. A child takes it 
from me and runs away. Here is the important point for our present discussion: whether my 
right to the loaf of bread is overridden depends on whether mv pro tanto reason to reject the 
child’s principles (i.e. mv pro tanto R-reason) becomes genuine. Let us say I catch up with the 
child and find that she is trving to feed her stawing family, and can tell that I am not similar117 
destitute. Ths might well present a pro tanto reason that overrides mv pro tanto R-reason. If 
it does, then it is still true that I had a right to the loaf of bread, because it was true that I 
would have had a pro tanto reason (and in this case did have such a reason) to reject the 
principles of anvone w7ho took it from me. But it is also true that the child did not wrong me, 
because she had an overriding pro tanto reason to steal the bread. The most natural 
explanation for this combination of facts, and perhaps the onlv satisfactorv wav to account for 
them, is that I had a right to the bread, but m\? right was overridden bv the child’s reasons. If 
the chld’s reasons had been defeated by * i  my pro tanto R-reason, then my R-reason would 
have become genuine, and my right would not be overridden. 
We can now summarise in general terms what the preceding example has 
demonstrated. We have seen that our rights are overridden just when the pro tanto R-reasons 
with which thev correspond fail to become genuine. Such reasons fail to become genuine 
when thev are defeated bv competing pro tanto reasons. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, the circumstances under which thev are so defeated cannot be completely delineated 
in advance, and rely on judgement and intuition about individual cases. Since it is onlv when 
our pro tanto R-reasons become genuine that we can say we have been wronged, my account 
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has clear implications for the relation between the defeasibilitv of rights and wrongness. Mv 
right is overriding just when, and every time, I have a right and am wronged with respect to it. 
On the other hand, my right is ozmvidden just when, and every time, I have a right to some 
good x, I am prevented from attaining, preserving, or exercising x, vet I am not wronged with 
respect to x. The fact that rights and wrongness line up in this wav is, I think, an encouraging 
sign for our view of defeasibilitv. 
Some may object to the implication in mv account that it is possible for a right to be 
overridden without a wrong having been done. This m a ~  strike some as a weak account of 
rights, or others as simply counter-intuitive, or vet others as both. To this objection I offer two 
quick replies. First, this sort of account does not seem too weak or counter-intuitive for many 
other rights theorists, as we can see in the use to which manv have put the distinction 
between infvi~genzcnfs of rights and idat ions  of them. Manv rights theorists claim that 
infringements of rights occur when rights are justifiablv encroached upon, while violations 
occur when thev are unjustifiablv encroached upon. The distinction would not be a useful 
one if it were never permissible to override rights. Second, we might appease those who 
charge us with counter-intuitiveness by making room for a notion of wrongness in a weak 
sense. We might claim that even if the child justifiably stole the bread from me, there was still 
a weak sense in which she wronged me. The bread was mine, after all, and someone did take 
it without permission. This  weak sense of wrongness would be different from the one 
discussed in 4.2. We might sav that we are wronged in a weak sense whenever we have a pro 
tanto reason (not a genuine one) to reject the principles of another agent. But I introduce ths 
weaker sort of wrongness onlv as a cautious suggestion, and a much closer investigation of it 
would be required for a full endorsement of it. 
We might also emphasise a point that has been implied but not explicitl\r stated, 
which is that it is quite possible to be mistaken about the rights one has. This follows from the 
fact that rights correspond to pro tanto R-reasons, not operative ones. If rights corresponded 
onlj7 to operative R-reasons, which do not halre to meet any threshold of plausibility, then 
anything conceivable as a right could be a legitimate right. Thus I might think that I would 
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have a reason to reject the principles of anyone who deprives me of a hundred courtesans 
sitting at my feet and feeding me grapes, and therefore have a right to the courtesans in 
question. But (sadlv for me) it seems unlikely that the operative R-reason under consideration 
would ever have much of a chance of achieving pro tanto status. It is the fact that rights 
correspond to pro tanto R-reasons, and that pro tanto reasons must reach a threshold of 
plausibilitv governed by Scanlon’s first level of critical scrutinv, that limits the range of rights, 
and allows for the possibilitv that we could be mistaken about our rights. 
Staving with the topic of pro tanto reasons, we are now well-positioned to fulfil an 
earlier promise, which was to discuss whv it is that rights correspond to facts about pro tanto 
R-reasons rather than genuine ones. The answer, which should have become apparent by 
now, is that a correspondence with pro tanto R-reasons allows rights to be defeasible, because 
pro tanto reasons are themselves defeasible. Rights could not be similarlv defeasible if the\, 
corresponded with genuine R-reasons, because genuine reasons are not defeasible. A 
correspondence with genuine R-reasons would in t h s  respect have two distinct drawbacks. 
First, it would bring upon us all of the well-known problems with postulating absolute rights. 
To name just one of these, clashes between rights are almost inevitable, and it is mvsterious 
how7 clashes between (genuinelv) absolute rights can be handled. A second reason to be warv 
of connecting rights with genuine R-reasons is that it would simplv lead us to have fewer 
rights than we have if we connect rights with pro tanto R-reasons. This  follows 
straightforwardlv from the fact that not all pro tanto reasons become genuine, but all genuine 
reasons are pro tanto. Having relatively fewer rights, and knowing ourselves to have 
relativelv fewer rights, would mute somewhat the beneficial effects that rights have for our 
self-respect that we saw in the first chapter. We would not have as manv opportunities, for 
example, to assert ourselves through the exercise of rights, and we would not have as many 
opportunities to exercise control over the duties of others. Admittedly, it could be argued 
that it would be a rather hollow boost to our self-respect to think of ourselves as right-holders 
only to have those rights be frequentlv overridden. But, although Scanlon’s notion of 
reasonable rejectabilitv makes it difficult alwavs to know in advance which R-reasons will be 
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reasonably rejectable, we can cautiouslv i r  sav that the overriding of rights will generally be the 
exception rather than the rule. We will see that this is especiallv the case with regard to 
universal rights. 
It might be helpful at this stage to recap the discussion of (1) and (2) by showing how 
they work in another example. Let us see how our rights view works this time in the 
paradigmatic rights example of money-lending. I will demarcate various stages of the 
example with letters in order to make it easier to discuss in detail. Now imagine that Mary 
loans John a hundred pounds, which John promises to repay. (a) John’s promise gives Mary a 
right against him to repair the monev, because she would have a pro tanto reason to reject his 
principles if he did not repw it. (b) John does in fact violate h s  promise, and refuses to repav 
the monev. This gives Mar\. a pro tanto reason to reject his principles. (c) Whether her pro 
tanto reason to reject his principles becomes genuine depends on whether there are anv 
competing pro tanto reasons that override it. (d) If her pro tanto reason does not become 
genuine, then her right is overridden in this case. If her pro tanto reason does become 
genuine, then her right is not overridden and John has a duhi to reject the principles bv which 
he acted. 
An explanation of this example constitutes a review of what we have alreadv 
discussed, so I will take care that my explanation of each point is not overlv elaborate. (a) 
follows both from point (1) in the introduction of the chapter, and from facts about the nature 
of promising. It is the fact that John has made a promise to r e p a ~  the money that makes it 
true that Marv would have at least a pro tanto reason (not just an operative one) to reject his 
principles if he did not repay it. This is because an agent P’s promise to $, properl~ 
understood, creates a reasonable expectation that P will 
fact that Marv would have a pro tanto reason to reject John’s principles should he go back on 
his promise gives her a right against him to keep his promise. (b) follows simplv from the 
And from (1) we learn that the 
same facts about promising that we just described in our discussion of (a). In (a) we saw that 
This fact is entailed by Scanlon’s treatment of pronlising, but it is also entailed by many other 137 
treatments as well. See Scanlon, Chapter 7, 295-327. 
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Mary would have a pro tanto R-reason against John if he violated his promise, whi1e.h (b) we 
find that she does have this pro tanto R-reason, since he did in fact violate h i s  promise. (c) is 
simply a fact that follows from our discussion of contractualism in Chapter 4, and particularly 
from Scanlon’s notion of reasonable rejection. It does not raise anv new issues for us to 
discuss. Finally, (d) follows from (2) above. It notes the way in which the normative force of 
rights is tied to the reasonable rejectabilih. of R-reasons, a point that I have discussed prior to 
this example. 
Our discussion of (1)  and (2), and of how thev fit into the contractualist process, has 
provided a sketch of a new rights view. I think there are seireral reasons to thnk this is a 
strong view, particular117 in light of what we have tried to establish previouslv in the thesis. I 
will suggest three features of mv rights 1Tiew which I consider to be strengths. First, it enjovs 
a smooth compatibilitv with contractualism. It does not attempt to replace contractualism in 
any way, but rather ’piggy-backs’ onto contractualism in a wav that utilises the strengths of 
contractualism that we defended at length in the previous chapter. Bv seeking to amend and 
not replace contractualism, we avoid the worry that our arguments in the last chapter have 
been undercut bv the introduction of rights here. In fact, I believe that the introduction of 
rights into the contractualist picture helps contractualism bv Scanlon’s own lights. I will make 
that argument in the next section. 
The second strength of mv rights view, put in the context of what has come before in 
m17 thesis, is that it is consistent with elements of Feinberg’s view of rights that I endorsed in 
Chapter 1. We would be in some difficulty if this were not the case, because my arguments in 
support of the importance of rights relied on Feinberg’s view of the nature of rights. If we 
were to undercut the Feinberg view at this stage, then we would also call into question our 
arguments in favour of the importance of rights. But not only do I think that mv view is 
compatible with important elements of the Feinberg view I have endorsed, but I cautiously 
suggest that mv view might help to explain elements of Feinberg’s view that are otherwise 
explained in a less than complete manner. I think this may be true both with regard to 
Feinberg’s view of rights and his view of claims. 
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As we have seen, Feinberg understands rights to be valid claims. On my view it 
s e e m  possible to make sense of the idea both that rights are ’valid’ and that thev are ’claims.’ 
Rights are valid in the sense that to have a right is to have it be true that we would have an R- 
reason of some validitv (namely of pro tanto validit\?) in a given situation. The R-reason we 
would have must reach a threshold of validitv in order for us to consider ourselves to have a 
right. As I mentioned, if merelv an operative reason were required, then we could have a 
right to anvthing at all. Mv view also seems more specific than Feinberg’s, because Feinberg 
understands validih. rather vaguely, appealing to whatever our moral principles would 
endorse without discussing those principles further. Validity on my view depends on 
Scanlon’s first level of critical scrutinv, - <  bv wluch operative reasons become pro tanto reasons. 
Admittedlv, there is still an element of vagueness about this process of scrutiny, as the 
questions which comprise it are broad and general.138 But the fact that the questions have 
some content makes them more specific than Feinberg’s appeal to principles. 
I think MV view is also compatible with the idea that rights are a subclass of claims. 
As we have seen, rights correspond with facts about the pro tanto reasons to reject given sets 
of principles we would have in given situations. The fact that I know that I would have a pro 
tanto reason to reject your principles in a given situation, and that this lnformation is available 
to vou as well, gives me a sort of claim on vou. This  is easv to see if we return to the example 
of Marv and John. The fact that John has promised to repay the money gives Marv a right 
against him, because Marv would have a pro tanto reason to reject his principles if he failed to 
fulfil h i s  promise. Marv thus has a sort of claim over John, because she holds a sw7ay over his 
future actions. He can defv that swav onlv at the risk of acting wrongly. If John defies Marv 
and breaks his promise, then Mary has at least a pro tanto reason to reject his principles, or, to 
put the matter another way, to complain about h is  principles. But my account has the 
advantage of explaining what claiming or complaining entails in greater detail than 
Feinberg’s does. 
We will recall that examples of these questions include ‘Am 1 overloolung something?’, ‘What lunds 13s 
of reasons exist apart from the ones I already recognise?’, and ‘What reasons do particular cases seem 
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There is another element of the Feinberg view with which mine is compatible. We 
will recall that Feinberg’s understanding of claims is that we have a claim just when we are in 
a position to make a claim. One advantage of this positional view, as we saw, is that it allows 
us to speak of agents as possessing claims of which  the^ are unaware. On mv view it is also 
possible for agents to have claims (and rights) of which the~7 are unaware. Whether or not an 
agent has a right corresponds to the existence of a fact about a pro tanto reason he would 
have - it does not correspond to whether she kmws that she would have the pro tanto reason 
in question. Once John has made a promise to Marv, the fact that she has a right against him 
does not depend on her awareness of a pro tanto reason she would have. It depends rather 
on the fact that she would have that reason. To put the matter another wav, it depends on the 
fact that Marv is relevantly positioned to have a certain pro tanto reason should a certain 
circumstance occur. So although I have not explicitlv described rights and claims in terms of 
the ’position’ that agents are in, we can see that mv view is compatible with such talk. The 
difference between mv view and Feinberg’s is that while Feinberg neglects to tell us the 
conditions under which we are in a position to make a claim, I do provide those conditions bv 
connecting rights with the pro tanto R-reasons we would have when we feel we have been 
wronged in the relevant wavs. 
That concludes mv discussion of the compatibilitv of mv lriew of rights with 
Feinberg’s, which I proposed was the second strength of m~7 account. The third strength is 
that it offers a picture of rights that has some degree of novelty. There is a particular wav in 
whch I think mv rights view mav offer something new to rights theorists, and in order to 
understand it we must discuss the wav in which rights theories are commonlv categorised. 
As we ha1.e seen, Dworkin proposed that moral theories can be split into three categories: 
those that are right-based, duh7-based, and goal-based. Since then it has commonly been held 
that a corresponding trichotomv applies to rights theories: those that understand rights to be 
primitive, those that base rights on duties, and those that base rights on goals. Now, we noted 
in the previous chapter that Scanlon offers a moral theorv that is based on reasons, and as 
to present?‘ See Scanlon. 67-68. 
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such Scanlon’s theory seems to elude the categories of moral theories Dworkin proposed. 
Similarly, because my rights theory relies so heavilv on Scanlon’s reason-based approach, it 
seems to fall outside of the corresponding trichotomv of rights theories. lnstead of being 
primitive, or based on duties or goals, rights are on mv view based on reasons. Rights are 
both a subclass of reasons, as I indicated earlier, and are themselves based on reasons 
(specificallv R-reasons). As far as I know, mine is the onlv rights theorv which bases rights on 
reasons. Cefcris paribus, this would appear to give mv 1Tiew some value as an original rights 
theorv. 
There ma\7 . I -  vet be a concern, however, that my reason-based view onlv appears to be 
different from the other, more established, kinds of rights views, and in fact ultimatelv 
reduces to one of the others. But I do not think this is the case. It should be clear, for 
example, that rights are not primitive on mv account. fights are a subclass of reasons, a 
subclass that is derived from another group of reasons, nameljr R-reasons. It is similarlv 
implausible that rights are based on goals, because goals have had verv little role to p l a ~  in 
our Scanlonian picture. A more likelv scenario is that rights are on mv account covertlv based 
on duties, but this too turns out to be incorrect. It might seem to a casual observer that rights 
are based on duties, because rights are based on pro tanto R-reasons, and genuine R-reasons 
create duties. Thus there is some connection between rights and duties (as there is on other 
rights lriews). But on mv view, R-reasons serve as a sort of go-between with regard to rights 
and duties, and R-reasons are not themselves duties. I have alreadv offered a hint earlier in 
our discussion of whv R-reasons cannot be duties, which is that we can opt out of our rights. 
Because this is possible, and because rights are connected to the pro tanto R-reasons we 
would have in certain circumstances, then it must be possible to opt out of R-reasons, which 
differentiates them from duties. R-reasons are instead best seen as a subclass of reasons of 
autonomv. So I think that mv reason-based view of rights is genuinely reason-based, and 
does not reduce to a duty-based view. 
It maV help to clarifv the preceding discussion if we are more explicit about the 
relation that holds between rights and duties. This has been implied in different parts of our 
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account but never explicitly and comprehensivelv stated. Now, it is a standard view of rights 
theorists that rights and duties are both directly and necessarilv related. If P has a right 
against Q, then Q necessarily has a dutv toward P, and this relationship between rights and 
duties is unmediated by other concepts.’”) By contrast, one of the most surprising aspects of 
my view is that rights and duties are neither necessarilv nor directlv related. There are cases 
in which P map have a right even though Q does not have a d u e ,  such as the case in which 
John fails to repay Mary but does so for a justifiable reason. Here Marv has a right to be 
repaid but John does not have a duh. (in the full sense) to repay her. We might sav that John 
has a pro tanto duty to repav her, but that that pro tanto d u e  is overridden by h i s  other pro 
tanto reason(s). Even when there is some relation between rights and duties, as when John 
neglects to repav Marv on a whim, that relation is mediated bv R-reasons. The fact that Mary 
has a right is determined bv the fact that she would have a pro tanto R-reason to reject John’s 
principles should he fail to repay the monev. The fact that John has a dutv to repav the 
monev is determined bv the fact that Mar\. would have a genuine reason to reject his 
principles should he fail to repav it. If John fails to repay the money on a whim, then he has a 
further dutv to reject the principles by whch he acted, which is determined bv the fact that 
Marv has a genuine reason to reject h is  principles. Thus there is a sort of connection between 
rights and duties in the sense that thev both spring from R-reasons. But the connection is only 
a loose one, because P’s right follows from a ~ 7 ~ 0  tnizto reason she would have, while Q’s duties 
follow from gcizuiw reasons P would have or does have. 
It must be admitted, then, that mv view features a highly unusual account of the 
relation that holds between rights and duties, but is ths  a problem? Some may think that it is, 
but I am not convinced b77 arguments thev are likely to make. It might, for example, be 
thought that alternative accounts are preferable on account of their simplicity. But the most 
widely-considered alternatives, such as the benefit theory and choice theory, are deceptively 
~~ 
This is not to say that rights theorists agree on exactly how rights and duties are related. The benefit 
theory, choice theory, and complaint theory are three prominent views on the matter. I do not think my 
view falls neatly into any of these camps, though of the three it is most aluri to the complaint theory. 
For views of this sort see Joel Feinberg, ‘Duties, kghts ,  and Claims’ in Amet-ican Philosophical 
139 
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complicated, and arguably have vet to be articulated in a satisfactory way. Alternativelv it 
might be argued that by disassociating rights and duties to the extent that I do, I have devised 
such an odd view of rights that it does not deserve to be called a ‘rights’ theory at all. Mv 
response here is to refer the reader back to the important and fundamental wavs that mv view 
is compatible with Feinberg’s, and most notably that it seems to capture the central idea that 
rights are valid claims. I submit that enjoving a necessarv and direct connection with duties is 
not an essential feature of rights because their status as \did claims can be captured in a 
different win-. 
I will close the section by considering two more objections to mv view. The first 
concerns a specific claim that I made in two different parts of the section, which was that it is 
possible to opt out of rights. Certainly, there are manv reasons for wishing to have a view of 
rights that allows us to opt out of them. Feinberg, for example, claims that a world in which 
no one ever opted out of h i s  rights and forgave others of their duties would be a world of 
’bloodless moral automatons.”A” But there is a question about whether Scanlon’s view of 
irrationalitv, which I haire already endorsed, prei-ents us from allowing for this feature of 
rights. We will recall that Scanlon holds that the clearest case of irrationality occurs when an 
agent’s attitudes fail to conform to her judgements about reasons, i.e. when she recognises 
there is a reason to @ but is nonetheless not motiryated to @. It could be argued, though, that 
this is exactly what happens on mv view if we opt out of rights. This  is because opting out of 
rights would in\.ohTe realising that we have a pro tanto or even genuine R-reason against 
someone, but nonetheless not acting on it. For example, if Marv opts out of her right to be 
repaid by John, she is acknowledging that she has a reason to complain about the principles 
behind h is  refusal to repav, yet implving that she is not inclined to act on this reason. It 
would appear that, on Scanlon’s account, Marv is being irrational here. Must we make the 
unhappv choice between being bloodless moral automatons and being sometimes irrational? 
~~ 
Quartcrl~, 3 ( 1966). 137- 144; Vinit Haksar. ‘The Nature of fights‘  in Ai-clzii’.ftrr Rechts- L I M ~  
Sozialphilosoyhic 64 ( 1978), 183-202. 
Joel Feinberg, ‘A Postscript to the Nature and Value of  kghts , ’  156. 140 
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Mv replv is that there is some cause to doubt that Scanlon’s account of irrationality 
should hold for R-reasons in the same wa\7 that it holds for other reasons. We will recall from 
4.1 that Scanlon’s defence of his view of irrationalitv is primarilv that it accords better with 
intuition than do rival views. This defence seems to have some plausibility when it comes to 
personal projects such as the reason I take mvself to have to learn how to juggle. Intuitively it 
is difficult to see how I could consider mvself to have such a reason, vet not be at all inclined 
to pursue the project of juggling.141 It seems quite plausible to call such a person irrational. 
But Scanlon’s view of irrationality does not accord nearlv as well with intuition when applied 
to a failure to act on R-reasons (and, b17 extension, to uphold rights). Intuitivelv we maV not 
be inched to call Mar\. irrational if she forgives John of lus debt. The matter might seem to 
turn on the particular details of her personal circumstances, such as how badlv she needs the 
money back. But even if she is in dire circumstances and she is declining to uphold her right 
out of mercv, we mav not intuitively be inclined to call her irrational. Indeed, it seems to be 
the role that values such as forgiveness and m e r c ~  play in the failure to uphold R-reasons that 
makes this failure different from the one we saw in the example of juggling. It seems 
unlikely, then, that we are committed to saving that the refusal to uphold one’s rights is 
alzuays irrational, though I leave open the possibilitv that it might sometimes be so. This 
conclusion seems enough, though, to take the sting out of the objection to which we are 
replying. 
The second objection is more general, and poses a deeper threat to our overall liew. 
It is that the account of rights I have offered, whatever its other merits, is not a derivation of 
rights so much as an ad hoc introduction of them. Even if I have presented a plausible 1Tiew of 
rights, the argument goes, it is still ad hoc because I have not indicated anv necessitv for it. I 
thmk this objection is best answered in two parts. First, there is the issue of whether there is 
anv derivation of rights present in my view. I think there is one, in the sense that rights are a 
subclass of reasons that follow from other reasons. Specifically, rights follow from R-reasons, 
Let us assume that there is no great instrumental value to learning how to juggle. e.g. there is not a 1-21 
lucrative job waiting for me at the circus. 
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and they do so in the way indicated in our discussion of (1). This  seems to be in some sense a 
derivation of rights. But there is still the second part of the objection to answer, namely 
whether our derivation of rights is s i m p l ~  ad Izoc. Whv are rights needed in morality at all? It 
is in answering this part of the objection that we touch on (3). (3) holds that the justification 
for our introduction of rights into contractualism lies in the cumulati\re weight of arguments 
in favour of the need for rights. I am not aware of any definitive proof that (3) is correct; I 
simplv do not know of an\’ better wav to justifv the inclusion of rights. Just as there is no 
definitive proof that (3) is correct, it seems too ambitious to try to establish an17 definitive 
proof that rights are needed in support of contractualism, or even that thev are needed in 
moralitv generally. We must be content to weigh the arguments on both sides and see which 
side ultimatelv outweighs the other. 
I have of course already made a substantial beginning to such a project in Chapter 1. 
We will recall that I concluded then that rights, including but not limited to universal rights, 
are needed in a proper understanding of moral theorv. I think we would not do badlv if we 
simplv relied on those arguments to justify our present inclusion of rights in the Scanlonian 
framework. I stand bv the arguments of Chapter 1 and do not wish to suggest that they need 
to be changed. Nonetheless, it also seems to be the case that some new arguments are 
available to us when we consider the need for rights particularlv within the contractualist 
framework. This  raises the interesting possibilihr that the inclusion of rights into 
contractualism improves contractualism by its own lights. This is in fact what I will argue in 
the next section. So the arguments of the next section are intended to complement the 
arguments in Chapter 1,  and in doing so to add to the cumulative weight of arguments in 
support of the importance of rights. This  will in turn complete our replv to the objection that 
our rights view in this section has been ad hoc. 
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5.2 The importance of rights revisited 
I hold that there are three ways in which Scanlon’s account benefits from the 
introduction of rights. First, the goods that contractualism presupposes, self-respect and 
respect for others, are best secured only in a moralitv that includes rights. Second, 
contractualism tries to fulfil an ideal of interpersonalisation which is better achieved when 
rights are added to the picture. Third, contractualism has difficulh. explaining the 
disproportionate phenomenological force of (at least some) duties, which is arguablv made 
less mvsterious by the introduction of rights. The arguments apply to the re\rision of Scanlon 
I made in the previous chapter, but the17 also purport to applv equallv well to a fullv orthodox 
Scanlonianism. I hold out the hope, then, that thev mav be of interest to scholars of Scanlon, 
whether or not those scholars favour the revisions I made in the previous chapter. 
The first argument is not wholly new, but is really an application of some of our 
arguments from Chapter 1 to a Scanlonian context. In that chapter I defended Feinberg’s 
moral impolrerishment thesis by arguing that the possession of rights is the best wav to 
achieve self-respect and respect from (and for) others, focusing particularly on the connection 
between rights and self-respect. Now I wish to argue that because self-respect and respect 
from others are goods that underlie Scanlon’s contractualism, the fact that rights help us to 
best secure these goods makes contractualism-with-rights, cctcvis pnvibus, an improvement on 
contractualism-without-rights, and it does so by Scanlon’s own lights. Let us see how the 
argument works step by step. First, we must establish that self-respect and respect from 
others are goods that do in fact underlie contractualism. I tried to make this argument 
already in -2.3, but it is worthwhile to re1Gew it. The contractualist formula, or C, demands 
that we act in wavs that others could not reasonably reject, and in doing so it implicitlv 
demands that we be able to justify our actions to each other. This process of justification takes 
into account not the group as a whole, but each individual. It is impossible to see how we 
could regard C as valid if we considered respecting others (and receiving respect from others 
in turn) to be wholl~. unimportant. So the good of respect from others, at least, underlies C. 
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And, back in the first chapter, we also noted Feinberg’s point that to be fully worthy of the 
respect of others, it seems that we must respect ourselves. If this is true, then the foundation 
of C would be unstable without the good of self-respect to strengthen it. So it seems that both 
respect from others and self-respect underlie contractualism. 
The next step of the argument is to establish that self-respect and respect from others 
are best secured by the possession of rights. I trust that I have done that alreadv in the first 
chapter, particular117 with regard to self-respect. We will recall that that argument focused on 
the connection that the activitv of claiming enjoys with self-assertion, and the connection that 
rights-holding enjoys with a healthv degree of control over others. So we can m0\7e to the 
next step, which is to argue that an\’ goods which underlie contractualism are better secured 
at a higher level than a lower one. This step assumes that contractualism is itself valid, whch I 
have tried to argue alreadv in 4.2. To address the main concern of the step, then, we must ask 
if there is anv reason we would izof want to secure at the highest possible level the goods 
whch ser1.e as the twin bedrocks of contractualism. I cannot see that there is anv such reason, 
as it is difficult to see how there could be such a phenomenon as too much (legitimate) respect 
for others, or too much (legitimate) respect for oneself. Until a con\rincing counter-argument 
is made, then, I will consider it true that we have a reason to secure the two forms of respect 
at the hghest possible level. If our arguments from Chapter 1 are correct, then securing the 
two forms of respect in this wa\7 is predicated on the possession of rights. So it seems that 
contractualism-with-rights is an improvement on contractualism-without-rights in t h s  
respect. 
The second argument in favour of rights is that they succeed in carrying out the 
Scanlonian ideal of interpersonalisation more completely than does contractualism-without- 
rights. In order to make this argument we must first explain what is meant bv the ideal of 
interpersonalisation, and we must show7 that this ideal is indeed an important part of 
Scanlon’s project. By the ideal of interpersonalisation I mean the guiding conviction that 
morality, or at least the most significant part of it, should be understood as fundamentally a 
project of justifying ourselves to others on a one-to-one basis. Rather than look to external 
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criteria such as what reason demands of us (as would Kant), or to what an objective point of 
view would indicate (as would Nagel), a fullv interpersonal moralitv suggests that we should 
look to the fundamentally social criterion of what we can and cannot reasonably reject from 
others. Scanlon’s account thus emphasises the importance of the relations that our reasons 
put us in with other agents. I call this emphasis on the interpersonal an ’ideal’ because I take 
Scanlon’s account to imply that the more interpersonal a moral picture is, the more correct it 
is going to be.14’ Since there is no external viewpoint from which to see matters, we should 
strive to offer a moral picture that takes proper account of the moral si,anificance of all of the 
nuances of personal interactions. 
There is ample evidence that Scanlon holds to something like this ideal of 
interpersonalisation, and I will be content to point out onlv some of the more prominent 
examples of it. The contractualist formula C,  wluch underpins h s  entire view, demands that 
we act in a way that others cannot reasonably reject. It demands that we consider the lriews 
of others when we act - and not ’others’ understood as a monolithic group, but understood as 
each individual affected by our act. The interpersonal nature of Scanlon’s account can also be 
seen in l us  account of the nature of reasons. All Scanlonian reasons are agent-relative, or 
personal reasons. But, as we have seen, some personal reasons of an agent x can give rise to 
personal reasons of an agent v, which indicates Scanlon’s emphasis not just on the personal 
but on the interpersonal. Also, we find Scanlon eager to emphasise the interpersonal nature 
of morality in his account of moral motivation, as he does when he claims that we are 
motivated to act morallv not just because we are interested in following rules but because of 
considerations like ’she’s counting on me’ or ’he needs mv help.’l43 An important adITantage 
of lus view, he contends, is that it can account for interpersonal considerations like this. 
I wish to argue now that contractualism-without-rights goes some wav toward 
realising this ideal of interpersonalisation, but realises it incompletel~ in an important respect. 
The relevant shortcoming of contractualism-without-rights is found in its treatment of the 
For Scanlon, ‘correct’ in this context means according with the moral phenomenology, as we saw in 
4.2. For me it means not only according with the phenomenology but also carrying out the implications 
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central notion of wrongness. It might seem surprising that I focus on wrongness as a 
shortcoming of this sort, because I have argued in the previous chapter that wrongness is 
governed bv contractualism, and I have indicated above that C is itself evidence of the ideal of 
interpersonalisation. Should it not be the case that Scanlon’s notion of wrongness is, by 
extension, evidence of interpersonal concerns? But I think that although there is a wair in 
which Scanlon’s treatment of wrongness accounts for the interpersonal nature of morality, 
there is another way in which it does not. The way in which it does account for 
interpersonalisation is found in the fact that it demands that we distributivel~ justifv 
ourselves to others. Thus the list of acts that will qualifv as wrong is determined b77 a 
criterion that is essentially interpersonal. For example, if it is indeed wrong to lie, cheat and 
steal, the fact that these acts are wrong is ultimately determined bv considering what the 
interests of other indiITiduals are. But there is nonetheless something surprisingly and 
conspicuously irizpersoiznl about wrongness on the Scanlon lriew, which is that although it 
allows us to speak of committing a wrong, it does not seem to allow us to speak very 
meaningfully of wronging S ~ I ~ I C O I I C .  Let us sav that Q has acted in a wav that is wrong, and 
that grievousl\7 harms P (and onlv P). P has a reason to reject the principles by whch Q acted, 
but so does anyone else (such as an onlooker) who knows the facts of the matter. Q, in 
rejecting his own principles, does so on the grounds that thev are reasonably rejectable, i.e. 
that anvone sufficiently well-positioned could have reasonably rejected them. Oddly, even 
though it is P who has been specifically harmed bv Q’s actions, P is not in any sort of 
privileged position to point this fact out, or to demand redress.14 What is important on the 
Scanlon view is that Q has committed a wrong, not that Q has wronged P particularlv. The 
lack of emphasis on the fact that Q has specifically wronged P not only strikes a discordant 
note with Scanlon’s own ideal of interpersonalisation, but it even sits uneasily with our 
corrunon intuitions about morality. Intuitivelv we want to say that it is (at least sometimes) 
~ 
of Dworkm’s account of the sacred, which I also argued in 4.2. 
Scanlon, 155-156. 
Of course. P could be in a ‘privileged’ position if he happens to be the only agent situated to judge 
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competently on the reasonable rejectability of Q’s principles (e.g. perhaps no one else knows about the 
196 
morally important not only that someone has committed a wrong per SE, but that her wrong 
action has harmed that ~7avticuZav pevsoiz. 
It might help to illustrate the preceding argument bv returning to the example of John 
and Mary. Imagine for a moment the interaction between John and Mary in a picture of 
contractualism-without-rights. When John refuses to repay Marv’s monev, Marv has (at least) 
a pro tanto reason to reject the principles bv which John has acted. But, importantlv, so does 
anvone else who knows the facts of the matter. Although it is Marv alone who has been 
harmed bv John’s decision, there is nothing to suggest that ths  fact has anv moral importance. 
Similarly, John has (at least) a pro tanto reason to reject the principles by which he has acted, 
but not because he might ha1.e harmed Marv particularlv. Rather, he has this reason because 
there is a certain plausibilihr to the fact that he has committed a wrong pcr se. The fact that h s  
act wronged Mar17 particularlv, and would seem to have placed him in a particular relation to 
Marv as a result, turns out to be unimportant. 
I believe that the introduction of rights personalises wrongness in a way that better 
accords with Scanlon’s ideal of interpersonalisation. An implication of our rights view is that 
whenever P wrongs Q, he lriolates a right of Q’s not to be treated in the relevant wav. And, as 
we saw in the prelious discussion, Q’s rights are an essential source of Q’s respect for himself 
as well as from others. Each of Q’s rights contributes toward ths  self-respect and respect 
from others. It follows from these facts about rights on our view that P’s wronging of Q is 
tantamount to P declaring an important source of Q’s self-respect and respect from others to 
be unimportant. Bv w r o n p g  Q, P is implicitly saying to Q and to others that it is 
unimportant whether Q respects himself or is respected bv others. This is a very real sense, 
then, in which P is not onlv committing a wrong, but is wronging Q personallv. This is 
especiallv true when P realises in advance that Q has the relevant right. Let us sav, for 
example, that John realises that Mary has a right against him that he repav the monev, and 
realises that this right is a source of Marv’s self-respect and respect from others, vet on a 
transaction between P and Q). But this empirical contingency does not harm our general conceptual 
point. 
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whim still refuses to repay the monev. In this case John is implicitlv saying of Mary that her 
ability to respect herself and to gain respect from others is unimportant to him. This is a 
personal comment on Mary as an individual. Thus there is a clear sense in which John has 
not only committed a wrong, but has wronged Marv personallv. 
It is important to emphasise what this argument does and does not purport to state 
on behalf of rights. Rights are on m~7 view an amendment to contractualism, not in anv wav a 
replacement of it. Thus contractualism is still the mechanism bv which we determine which 
actions are wrong, and it is still the mechanism which gives agents their duties. One function 
that rights perform, however, is to help to personalise wrongness. They give a conceptual 
backing to the intuition that it is morallv important that we have wronged someone, not just 
that we have committed a wrong in the abstract. Furthermore, an accounting of this intuition 
seems to be necessary if we are to more closelv fulfil Scanlon’s ideal of interpersonalisation. A 
view of wrongness that takes into account who we have wronged is clearlv more personal 
than one which takes into account onlv whether we have committed a wrong. 
MY third argument in favour of rights is both more speculative than the previous two, 
and less rooted in Scanlon’s explicit concerns. I mention it as a possible explanation, but onlv 
a possible one, of a phenomenon that is otherwise mysterious. The claim is that rights could 
help to explain whv (at least some) duties have a phenomenological pull that is out of 
proportion to their actual moral weight. To borrow an example from Nagel and apply it to a 
slightly different context, it may strike us as mysterious whv it feels so wrong to twist the arm 
of a child, even if the pain would be short-lived and doing so might make the child give us 
life-saving information that he would not otherwise provide.145 It seems likely on this 
example that our pro tanto reason not to twist the child’s arm is outweighed bv a competing 
pro tanto reason, yet the realisation of this fact does not take awav the great 
phenomenological unease we feel at doing the arm-twisting. Note that our present concern is 
not to delineate the circumstances in which twisting the child’s arm is actuallv wrong, but to 
~~ ~ 
T’iew? From Nowhem, 176. Nagel uses the example in the context of wondering how we can have 1-45 
deontological reasons in the face o f  strong countenailing consequentialist concerns. 
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try to account for the mystery of why, regardless of the circumstances, twisting the arm 
always feels so wrong. 
Contractualism-without-rights does not seem to provide an answer to th is  mvstery . 
Scanlon does appeal to phenomenological concerns at various points to support 
contractualism, as we have seen, but he does not suggest that it helps to explain the great 
phenomenological pull of some duties, nor is it easv to see how it could do so. To the extent 
that contractualism-without-rights suggests anv substantive position on this matter, it would 
seem to indicate that the phenomenological force of our duties should alwavs be 
proportionate to their moral importance. We might infer this from the fact that Scanlon thinks 
that, as a general matter, contractualism is consistent with the moral phenomenologv. But, if 
there is any plausibilitv to the problem as I have described it, this substantive view cannot be 
correct. More prudentlv, it might be best if we simplv understand contractualism-without- 
rights to be silent about suggesting any view on this subject at all. But silence might itself 
seem to be a deficiency, because ideally we wish to be able to account for the 
phenomenological curiositv under consideration. 
One way that the disproportionate phenomenological pull of some duties might be 
understood is to consider it to be the result of a recognition (at least an implicit one) of the 
rights a given agent possesses. Tlus argument is aided bv our previous one, that the 
introduction of rights contributes to a personalisation of wrongness. If I understand the child 
to have a right not to have his arm twisted, with all of the facts about self-respect and respect 
from others this implies, then this could help to account for the unease I feel at the prospect of 
grabbing his arm and twisting it, even if I feel I would have a very good overriding pro tanto 
reason for doing so. The child, after all, has a right against iizc not to have his arm twisted.'lh 
To go ahead and twist his arm anvwav is feel myself swimming headlong against the stream 
of his self-respect and respect from others, because it is failing to respect an important source 
of those goods. It is to face the fact that there is no difference in the importance of his 
His right also applies to other people as well. But this does not change the fact that it applies to me 116 
as an individual. 
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enjoyment of the two forms of respect over mv own, vet to treat him in a way that I would 
myself not want to be treated. Justifiable or not, the arm-twisting affects my relationship with 
the child in a very personal way. It is hardlv surprising, then, that there should be a 
phenomenological fallout from the arm-twisting, a fallout indicative of the cost to the child, 
even in cases in which I have an overriding pro tanto reason to twist his arm. This also helps 
to explain why mv phenomenological unease would not be as great if someone else were 
doing the arm-twisting. In such a case, it is another person who is undergoing the personal 
experience I described above, and is altering his personal relationship with the child as a 
result. It is not surprising, then, that this other person should endure the brunt of the 
phenomenological impact in this case. 
As I have said, t h s  last argument is best taken as a speculative suggestion for a wav 
in wluch Scanlon’s account might be improved with the introduction of rights. It would be 
more than this if I could demonstrate that rights are the onh/ wav that the disproportionate 
phenomenological pull of duties could be accounted for, but I doubt this can be decisively 
shown. I shall be content to conclude that the fact that agents possess rights is one plausible 
wav in which this important phenomenological fact can be accounted for, and that it seems to 
be an improlrement on any resources that Scanlon has at h i s  disposal to do so. As such, the 
argument raises another possibilitv in favour of how contractualism-with-rights can be an 
improvement on Scanlon’s contractualism-without-rights. 
More broadly, tlus brings us to a conclusion of the section. The purpose of the three 
arguments I have presented has been to add to the case for the importance of rights, a case we 
started to make in Chapter 1. In this section I have been particularly interested to show how 
rights can be shown to improve Scanlon’s contractualist picture, and do so bv 
contractualism’s own lights. Bv contributing to the cumulative weight of the case in favour of 
the importance of rights, these arguments have helped us to wrap up the discussion of the 
previous section, which depends on that cumulative weight in order to justify the view of 
rights it presents. In the next section I will move from a discussion of rights generally to a 
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discussion of universal rights in particular. I will discuss the derivation of universal rights, 
and the content of at least some of these rights. 
5.3 Deriving universal rights 
This section may seem in some respects to be a sort of climax to the thesis. I have 
been concerned with the grounding of universal rights throughout the project, and it is at this 
stage that I will try to offer the most specific account of mv own view of how universal rights 
are grounded. But in fact it seems grandiose to call ths  discussion a climax, because it is 
really just a straightforward fitting together of pieces of the puzzle that we have alreadv 
worked hard to mould. Particularh-, the aim of this section is to show how our rights view 
that is expressed in 5.1 is applied to the shared reasons we discussed in 4.3. Universal rights 
are on mv view derilred from shared reasons, and this derixTation proceeds along the same 
lines as the derivation of non-unilTersal rights from unshared reasons. This  discussion, then, 
is intended as an explanation and justification of (a), the last of the points which compose the 
summary of mv 1-iew. 
Since the conceptual story behind universal rights enjovs so manv similarities to the 
one we have already discussed behind non-universal rights, the best wav to discuss it is 
simply to show how it works in an example. Consider the example of a universal right not to 
be caused pain. How might we have such a right? If our discussion of 4.3 is correct, we all 
have a pro tanto reason to a1Toid pain. This  appears also to make it true that we all would 
ha\Te a pro tanto reason to reject the principles of someone who would cause us pain, and this 
is the necessary and sufficient condition to have a right not to be caused pain. As with non- 
universal rights, our universal rights are facts about the pro tanto reasons we would have to 
reject the principles of someone who appeared to wrong us in the relevant way. In other 
words, they are facts about the relevant pro tanto R-reasons we would have. The difference 
with universal rights, though, is that evervone would have the pro tanto R-reasons in 
question. To stay with our current example, it is true of everyone that they would have a pro 
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tanto reason to reject the principles of someone who causes them pain. This follows from the 
fact that everyone has a pro tanto reason to avoid pain, which itself follows from facts about 
the nature of pain that I tried to bring out in 4.3. 
Let us see how the derivation works in another example. I suggested in 4.3 that we 
all have a pro tanto reason to secure various opportunities and resources, among them the 
good of education. My current suggestion is that this gives us a universal right to education. 
Our pro tanto reason to secure education entails that we would have a pro tanto reason to 
reject the principles of anvone who denies us an opportunitv to be educated1-';, should anvone 
try to do this. The fact that we would have such a pro tanto R-reason means that we have a 
right to be educated. It is evervone, not just some people, who have this right, because it is 
evervone who has the pro tanto reason to secure education. The fact that evervone has this 
pro tanto reason follows from our discussion of the good of education in 4.3. 
The simplicity of these discussions bears out the claim in (4) that the derivation of 
universal rights is not fraught with special problems. But has this treatment been too quick? 
Perhaps there is a problem lurking in the shadows after all. I have suggested that a pro tanto 
reason to secure a certain good x gives us a pro tanto reason reject the principles of someone 
who would in some wav infringe x. This is a different wav of obtaining pro tanto R-reasons 
than the wavs we encountered in our prelrious examples that applied to unshared reasons. In 
the case of John and Mar\r, for example, it was the fact that John had promised Marv which 
gave Mar\' her pro tanto R-reason against him. Facts about the nature of promising were 
important to that case. In the case of the child bread thief, it was the fact that the bread was 
my (legitimate) possession that was important (e.g. let us sa\' I bought it from the local 
market). Thus facts about legitimate transactions played a role in creating mv pro tanto R- 
reason. But in the case of universal rights, I am suggesting that the fact that I have a pro tanto 
reason to secure x makes it true that I would have a pro tanto reason R-reason against anvone 
who violated it. This seems to be a new claim, and we might wonder if it is justified. 
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The claim is one of entailment. It is that P’s pro tanto reason to secure good x’entails 
that a certain fact is true, namely that P would have a pro tanto reason to reject the principles 
of Q when Q attempts to infringe upon P’s attainment, exercise, or continued possession of x. 
Its plausibility hinges partlv on what is meant bv ’infringe’ in this context. If infringement is 
construed narrowlv to refer onlv to interference in the securing of x, then I think the 
entailment relation I am proposing is quite plausible. It is difficult to see how it could be true 
on our contractualist picture, for example, that I have a pro tanto reason to preserve my life, 
but that I nonetheless have no reason (not even a pro tanto one) to reject the principles of 
someone who tries to murder me. This would seem just incoherent. The entailment claim is 
perhaps more controversial if we understand it to applv to the provision of goods or saving of 
others. For example, is it true that my pro tanto reason to preserve m\r life gives me a reason 
(even a pro tanto one) to reject the principles of someone who refuses to put her own life at 
risk to rescue me from drowning? Bv extension, do we have a right to be saved in this 
situation? Tlus case is clearly more difficult, and I will not attempt to answer it here. I shall 
be content to understand the entailment relation cautiouslv, so that the scope of anv given 
shared pro tanto R-reason does not exceed the scope of its corresponding pro tanto reason to 
secure a certain good x. Thus mv pro tanto reason to avoid pain entails that I would have a 
pro tanto reason to reject the principles of anvone who caused me pain, though it may not 
entail that I would have a pro tanto reason to reject the principles of someone who failed to 
save me from being abused. 
The defeasibility of universal rights works in just the same way as the defeasibilih: of 
non-universal rights. All universal rights are, at least in principle, defeasible. Their 
defeasibilihr is goITerned bv whether the relevant pro tanto R-reasons become genuine or not. 
This  in turn is governed partlJ7 . I I  b77 intuition and judgement about individual cases. This  
should all sound familiar from our discussion of (2). As I have already argued in 4.3, the 
shared nature of shared reasons (and now, by extension, the universality of rights) does not 
We will recall that we have been purposely vague about what such a denial would entail. Our right 
might be merely to non-interference, or, more strongly, it might be to the provision of education. This 
11- 
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necessarily bestow upon them absolute force, or even greater normative force than their 
unshared (and non-universal) brethren. But even if it is untrue that universal rights iizust 
have greater normative force than non-universal rights, there is yet some reason to think that 
they will have greater force, at least much of the time. This is correspondinglv true for shared 
reasons over unshared ones. As we saw in 4.3, shared reasons apply to concerns that are 
among the most central that human beings have. As such, pro tanto shared reasons are 
unlikely often to be overridden. Bv the same token, some of these reasons are more central 
than others, and are likelv to thus be more difficult to override. Considerations that override 
our reasons to preserve our lives or to avoid great pain such as that caused bv torture, for 
example, will be exceedinglv rare. If ths  i s  true, then the same comments about defeasibility 
apply to universal rights. 
Just as I offered a list of shared reasons in 4.3, so I will now offer a corresponding list 
of our universal rights. Since I suggested that my list of shared reasons may not be 
comprehensive, so I offer the same disclaimer with regard to these universal rights. 
Consistent with our discussion since Chapter 4, reasons of autonomv should here be 
understood to be reasons to pursue, attain, secure, or protect the goods in question. Universal 
rights should be understood to be the reasons we have to expect the goods in question not to 
be infringed, and to take appropriate action if the\- are. Although for the sake of simplicity I 
will not list the releiTant R-reasons, keep in mind that shared R-reasons serve as a middle step 
between shared reasons of autonomv and universal rights. Keep in mind also that the content 
of our shared reasons of autonomy, and thus the content of our universal rights, is 
determined ultimately d d  b~7 the implications of Dworkin’s account of the sacred, as I argued in 
4.3. 
is an important issue which unfortunately I will not be able to discuss in depth. 
Reasons of autonomy Universal rights 
individual lives 
avoidance of pain 
health 
respect from others 
self-respect 





life, i.e. not to be murdered 
not to be caused pain, including torture 
not to have one’s health impeded 
to be respected by others 
to be able to respect oneself 
to enjoy a sphere of autonomy 
to be dealt with honestlv 
to be provided with enough monev to subsist 
to be provided with an adequate level of health care 
to be provided with an adequate l e l d  of education 
Note that I have adopted the cautious formulation of non-interference for most of these rights, 
for the reasons I argued above. The exceptions to this rule are the last three rights, which 
correspond to reasons of autonomy that we specificallv identified in 4.3 as reasons that 
pertain to access to certain opportunities and resources. I have not ruled out the possibilitv 
that, e.g., a right to life might entail a right to be saved when one’s life is in danger, but I have 
not established it either. We will recall as well from our discussion in 4.3 that we have not 
tried to specif\- the thresholds that are a crucial part of many of the above formulations (e.g. 
an ’adequate level’ of a given good). Thus, although the rights view I have presented may 
contain some promise, it does not 1eal.e us with a shortage of work to do in the future. 
I trust that I do not need at this stage a separate discussion of the importance of 
universal rights. If it is important that we derive non-universal rights from unshared reasons, 
then it is also important that we derive universal rights from shared reasons. There is nothing 
about shared reasons that makes them immune from our arguments concerning the 
importance of rights. More strongly, I suggested in Chapter 1 some reasons whv universal 
rights are particularly important kinds of rights in a proper understanding of moral theory. 
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Since I have nothing new to add in defence of those arguments, I will proceed to a 
consideration of two general objections that might arise to the view I have presented in the 
chapter. 
5.4 Objections 
Following on the heels of our extended defence of contractualism in the preikms 
chapter, our account of rights in this one has in~olved a sort of balancing act. On the one 
hand, we have been constrained bv the need to present an account of rights that remains 
adequate117 faithful to the picture of contractualism we defended. If our rights view straved 
too far from the basic tenets of contractualism, or if it presented a significant revision of those 
tenets, then this would call into question the \due of our discussion in Chapter 4. On the 
other hand, there might be a problem with being too faithful to the contractualist framework, 
insofar as this might indicate that our account of rights is superfluous, and does not do anv 
important work. Contractualism, after all, seemed to be a reasonably comprehensilre moral 
framework on its own. This scenario presents for us a dilemma that can be understood as two 
objections. The first is that our account of rights has presented too radical a reL7ision of 
contractualism to be compatible with our defence of the previous chapter. The second is that 
rights on mv account simpl~r do not do enough work to justifv their existence, and should 
thus be disposed of. A consideration of these two objections will serve as a conclusion to the 
chapter. 
Let us first consider the charge that I have presented in this chapter a sufficiently 
radical revision of contractualism to call into question the value of my extended defence of a 
more orthodox version of contractualism in Chapter 4. This objection is not one that 
(necessarily) concerns the coherence or plausibility of my rights \Fiew, but rather questions the 
usefulness of the previous chapter in the context of the thesis. My replv to it is that mv rights 
view has been intended as an amendment to contractualism, not a revision of it. The 17iew of 
rights I have presented leaves untouched all of the important features of contractualism. 
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Contractualism is still what determines the wrongness of actions (and, bar extension, rightness 
as well), and it is still the mechanism b\7 which our duties are generated. The contractualist 
formula C still lies at the very centre of our moral picture, and the contractualist process still 
involves the same conceptual storv that we outlined in 4.2. As a result, evervthing we argued 
in Chapter 4 applies to the view I have presented in Chapter 5. To be sure, our rights view 
has added important elements into the contractualist picture. Rights are a new category of 
reasons, and thej7 are possessed by virtue of facts that hold about our pro tanto reasons to 
reject given sets of principles, facts that we did not discuss in the previous chapter (although 
we did discuss the reasons to which thev correspond). But the important point to note here is 
that none of the additions that our rights view makes to contractualism disturbs the original 
features of contractualism that we defended at length in Chapter 4. So it is difficult to see 
how our discussion of rights in this chapter can be said to supplant or undermine the 
discussion of contractualism in the previous one. 
But if such a thorough defence can be mustered against the first charge, we might 
wonder if we are particularlv vulnerable to the second one. If rights fit so seamlesslv into the 
contractualist picture, can thev possibly do enough work to seem anything other than 
superfluous? This is the more serious of the two objections against us, because a superfluous 
\Tiew of rights would fail to bring to fruition the conclusions we drew in favour of the 
importance of rights, and would call into question whether we have fulfilled the promise of 
the thesis to find a grounding for a credible \Tiew of rights, particularly universal rights. Not 
onl17 is this objection the more serious of the two, but it also seems the more plausible. It gains 
plausibilihr from a point I made in my defence against the last objection, namelv that rights 
leave untouched contractualism’s role in determining wrongness and generating duties. It is 
contractualism alone which determines when a given act is wrong, doing so through the 
notion of the reasonable rejection of principles that underlie moral acts. And it is 
contractualism alone which gives us our duties. As we have seen, if I act b~7 principles that 
are reasonably rejectable, then mv commitment to contractualism gives me a dutv to reject mv 
principles. While this all sounds encouraging for a defender of contractualism, it ma7’ seem to 
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leave a defender of rights in a slightly uncomfortable position. Many rights theorists, after all, 
think that it is rights that determine wrongness and generate duties. They believe an act to be 
wrong because it violates a right, and they believe people to have duties hecausc others have 
rights. Indeed, many rights theorists believe that these tasks are the most important work that 
rights do in morality. On my view there is an exact correspondence between P having a right 
violated and P being wronged, and there is also an exact correspondence between P having a 
right and some Q having a dutv. But rights do not generate wrong acts or duties. We might 
wonder, then, if we need rights at all. 
My reply to this objection is that we do need rights, and we need them for all the 
reasons I argued both in Chapter 1 and in 5.2. None of those reasons depended on the claims 
that rights determine whch acts are wrong, or that rights generate duties. Thev did both 
depend, however, on the claim that rights correspond with wrongness and duties in the wa~7 
thev do on m\7 account. Consider, for example, the argument from the first chapter that the 
possession of rights is the best wav to achieve self-respect. I argued that the exercise of rights, 
or the act of claiming, increases our self-respect bv offering us the chance to assert ourselves 
in a consistent and confident manner. In order for this to be true, it must be the case that we 
believe there to be a strong correspondence between thinking we have been wronged and 
asserting our rights. We also must believe there is a strong correspondence between asserting 
our rights and having others act accordinglv, i.e. having others possess duties and act on 
them. But nothing on this view requires that the rights themsel1Tes shape the normative kind 
of wrongness, or that rights themselves create duties. My other argument in favour of the 
connection between rights and self-respect was that the possession of rights gives us a healthv 
degree of control over the actions of others. Thev allow us to hold others to their duties or 
release them, which affirms for us our importance in the moral sphere. Again, what is needed 
here is an exact correspondence between P’s rights and Q’s duties. What is not needed, 
however, is the claim that the rights themselves create the duties in question. The crucial 
point in both examples is that rights plav a vital role that no concepts on an orthodox 
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contractualist view would play. They provide us with easily identifiable claims against others 
that affirm our importance in the moral sphere. 
Similar points apply to our arguments in 5.2, though different points apply as well. 
Since the first argument there is really just an application of the arguments above from the 
first chapter, it does not need to be discussed separatelv. The second argument, the one 
which claims that rights help to fulfil the ideal of interpersonalisation, focuses on the relation 
between rights and wrongness. Here the sting is taken out of the objection more quicklv than 
in other examples, because here rights make a substantial contribution to wrongness. As we 
have seen, rights do not influence which acts are wrong (as ever, this is determined by 
contractualism), but thev influence the iony in which those actions are wrong. Thev 
personalise wrongness by calling attention not just to the fact that we have committed a 
wrong, but to the fact that we have wronged someone. We might say, then, that although 
rights do not determine the shape of the normative kmd answering to ’wrong,’ they 
nonetheless determine the directedness of that normative kind. As I argued previously, this is 
work which would not be done b17 any other concepts, and it is difficult to see what other 
concepts could do the work in question. The third argument of 5.2 revisits the relation 
between rights and duties in claiming that rights can help to account for the disproportionate 
phenomenological pull of duties. Again, this does not rely on the claim that rights create 
duties, but it does rely on a tight correspondence between rights and duties. Like the 
previous example, it makes use of the idea that rights do conceptual work that is not done by 
other concepts, i.e. by personalising wrongness. It is a possible application of the second 
argument, and its plausibilih. lends credibilihr to the idea that rights personalise wrongness. 
I conclude that neither of the two objections considered here are a gral’e threat to the 
view of rights I have presented. Dealing success full^^ with both objections involves a difficult 
balancing act, but I hope to have successfullv steered the required middle path. More 
broadlv, this brings the chapter to a conclusion. The project of the chapter has been 
ambitious: I have tried to present nothing less than a new theory of rights. I shall consider the 
chapter to have been a success if the view is coherent and has some plausibility, but I do not 
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pretend that it is free of any problems to sort out in the future. To list just a few examples, 
more precision could be achieved in describing what kind of reasons that rights are, and how 
these reasons differ from other kinds. The project of determining the threshold levels of 
universal rights (e.g. what qualifies as an ’adequate’ l e ~ l  of personal autonomy) looms before 
us, and is a very large project. And I have a lingering suspicion that, despite Scanlon’s 
reluctance to delineate complete conditions for reasonable rejectabilitv in advance, more 
precision can be achieved regarding the conditions under which given rights are defeated by 
competing considerations. The view I have presented, then, is reallv just a beginning, and it 
has not pretended to be more than that. I hope that the cumulative argument of the thesis, 
though, has presented it as a particularly promising beginning. 
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Conclusion 
Since the argument of the thesis has already been summarised in the thesis abstract 
and the introduction, I will refrain from summarising it again here. Instead I will trv to 
address where we stand, at the end of the thesis, in the broader landscape of rights theor\? and 
moral theory generally. I have been able to address important and e n g a p g  questions about 
rights, but the need to address these questions in depth has inei7itably led me to address other 
questions inadequately, or not at all. Mv neglect of these issues has not been intended as a 
comment on their lack of importance, so I think it is important at least to acknowledge them 
here and to sa\’ a few words about them. After doing so I will offer a few thoughts about the 
value of my project to the philosophical community. 
Several issues touched upon in my thesis deserve a fuller treatment than I have been 
able to give them. I hare, at least in most cases, endeavoured to be honest about ths  fact 
when the issues in question were raised in the body of the thesis. Nonetheless it is 
worthwhile to point them out here and to indicate what sorts of further discussions might be 
appropriate in the future, given the starting points I have car17ed out. One of the most 
important and interesting of these issues concerns the scope of universal rights. It is verv 
much a live debate among believers in universal rights just how ’universal’ those rights are. 
Do they (or at least some of them) extend only to persons, to humans, to some animals, to all 
animals, to trees, or even to planets? I have suggested that mv own view about the scope of 
unilrersal rights is that at least some of them extend not only to all humans, but to at least 
some animals as well. But this has been no more than a suggestion: I have not provided an 
argument in farour of it. I suggested in Chapter 1 that we might govern the scope of 
universal rights bv arguing that a creature is sacred just when it participates in a given 
21  1 
number of Dworkinian processes. My hope is that this suggestion at least has some promise, 
and indicates a way forward for those interested in the debate about the scope of universal 
rights. But, clearly, more deserves to be said about this issue. 
Though I addressed the defeasibilih. of rights in Chapter 5, I think this is another 
issue that merits further exploration. Particularlv, I think that more can be said to justify the 
intuition that our universal rights, though defeasible, will not often be overridden, and that 
some rights, such as a right not to be tortured, will almost never be overridden. As I 
suggested in Chapter 5, I think that the explanation for the strong normative force of 
universal rights lies with the fact that thev address concerns that are at the heart of what it is 
to be human. This  is borne out b~7 the fact that thev derive ultimately from Dworkin’s account 
of the sacred, which concerns our fundamental value. But, even if this is true, more can be 
said about the general difference in normative force between universal rights and non- 
universal rights. If mv \+ew of rights has anv merit, then I have at least contributed a 
framework in which to conrinue a discussion of the normative force of rights generall~r, and 
universal rights in particular. 
As I indicated in Chapter 5, I have also neglected to specif~7 the threshold levels that 
compose a crucial part of the content of manv universal rights. For example, I have suggested 
that we ha1.e a right to an adequate realm of personal autonomv, an adequate level of 
education, and an adequate level of respect from others. But I have not tried to specifv what 
the adequate levels in question are. To do so would be a huge undertaking. Or, more 
accuratelv, it would be several huge undertakings, as a thorough discussion of the relevant 
threshold levels for each good in question could comprise a chapter (if not a thesis) in itself. 
What I ha1.e tried to provide is the material for such a discussion, i.e. I have tried to indicate 
which goods should be included in debates about threshold levels, and why. By emphasising 
Dworkin’s account of the sacred, I have perhaps also pointed to a source that hints at what 
some of the relevant threshold levels should be. But there is still plentl. of room for debate in 
this area. 
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Derivative universal rights are another issue that merits a more thorough treatment. 
In the final chapter I mentioned these rights, and argued in favour of several rights that can 
be derived from our rights to the two forms of respect. This  discussion followed from our 
discussion of derivative shared reasons in Chapter 4, and included rights to an adequate level 
of health and personal autonomy, a right to be treated honestly, and a right to certain 
opportunities and resources. I argued in favour of these rights on the basis that thev could be 
justified b17 reference to Dworkin’s account of the sacred. Now, it mav be the case that more 
rights might be derived from the two forms of respect through the same avenue of 
justification. It mav also be the case that a good such as personal autonom~ might itself vield 
derivative rights. There are manv rights, such as a right to live under a democratic regime 
and a right to a fair trial, whch I a m  inclined to support but did not mention in the bodv of 
the thesis. These rights and others, though, might well be shown to be derived from rights 
that I did mention. A complete delineation of deril~ative rights is a project that deserves 
further attention. I a m  not certain, for that matter, that I have identified all of the ~ z m -  
derivative universal rights suggested b\7 Dworkin’s account. But rights to the two forms of 
respect are at the very least some of the most important non-derivative rights, as is the equallv 
central right to aIToid pain. 
The issues I have discussed so far have all been issues that I touched upon in my 
lm-ious discussions, but neglected to treat adequately. However, there are some rights issues 
of great importance which I did not mention even in passing in the bodv of mv work. These 
have mostl\r been issues that are conceptuallv posterior to my project, and involve not the 
grounding of rights but the instituting or implementation of them. If we take ourselves to 
believe in universal rights, how might thev best be instituted and enforced? Would thev be 
implemented best within existing political structures, or would entirelv new structures be 
more helpful and appropriate? These are fascinating questions, and they are of the highest 
philosophical and political importance. As I said in my introduction, one reason I have 
written a thesis concerning the grounding of rights and not their implementation is because I 
believe that the latter issue is often currently discussed to the neglect of the former. But this 
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does not mean that I consider the question of how rights are best instituted to be unimportant 
by any means. On the contrary, I hope that mV arguments can help rights advocates to feel 
more secure that rights (particularlv universal ones) are well-grounded, and to shift with 
confidence to questions of implementation. 
Another important question I do not address in the bodv of mv thesis concerns the 
relation between moral rights and legal rights. Th is  relates to the previous point about 
implementation, because it seems likely that the effecti1.e implementation of moral rights will 
involve some storv about their correspondence with legal rights. Though moral rights are 
important for all the reasons I indicated in Chapters 1 and 5, still there are some situations in 
which thev are likelv to seem hopelesslv inadequate without enjoving a correspondence with 
legal rights. It is an unfortunate fact that there are, and probablv alwavs will be, some 
individuals and groups who care so little for the concerns or even lives of others that thev are 
whollv unmoved bv anv appeals to moral rights. Against such people we need legal rights 
and the full baclung of the law, with its police, its courts, its jails and perhaps even ultimately 
its rnilitaries. There is a general recognition among moral rights advocates that this is the 
case, whch helps to explain wh\T human rights advocates currently have such an interest in 
and optimism about the International Criminal Court. But more should be said about the 
establishment of a sufficiently tight connection between moral rights and legal rights. 
As I said at the outset of the conclusion, I have mentioned onl\7 some of the rights 
issues that I neglected to treat adequate117 in the thesis. Those that I have omitted here in the 
conclusion have the dubious honour of having been doublv neglected. But the field of rights 
is a vast one, and a sufficiently deep treatment of anv set of problems is bound to be given at 
the expense of others. I will take some comfort from the fact that it would be difficult to 
dispute the importance of the central issues that m\i thesis does manage to cover. If I am also 
correct in m17 suspicion that these issues concerning the grounding of rights have been 
relatively neglected by rights advocates latelv, then so much the better for the usefulness of 
mv project. 
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I will finish by saying a few words about the value of m\7 project. I am of course not 
in a very advantageous position to assess the value of something to which I am so close, and 
which is so personal to me. Nonetheless I will trv to identify the various ways in which the 
thesis aspires to be valuable to the philosophical communitv, without being so presumptuous 
as to take a stand on preciselv which of these aspirations are fulfilled. I hope that even if the 
thesis does not succeed in fulfilling all of its ambitions, it does succeed in filling some of its 
more modest ones, and that this success might be sufficient to justify the time and effort it has 
taken. 
The thesis can be read as operating at several different levels of ambition. It is useful 
to list the these different levels in order from most ambitious to least. Thus the thesis might 
be seen to attempt 
1. to provide what is demonstrablv the best possible grounding of universal 
rights. 
2. to provide a strong, coherent grounding of universal rights that enjovs 
si,anificant advantages over manv competitors, and can be understood to 
be defeasibly the best available. 
3. to provide a view of universal rights that merits consideration as one of 
manv available. 
4. to provide an interesting discussion of the interfacing of three principal 
texts, Feinberg’s ’The Nature and Value of Rghts,’ Dworkin’s ’What is 
Sacred?,’ and Scanlon’s Wluzt Wc Oi(1c to E A C ~  Othcr. 
Let us consider which of these ambitions the thesis is likelv to have accomplished. I began 
writing the thesis with the aim of trying to accomplish (l), and there rnav vet be remnants of 
that aspiration in the wav I have expressed mvself at various points. But there is good reason 
to think that (1) is too lofhr a goal for a single thesis. It would require that I work out mv 1Tiew 
in greater detail, considering more objections that might be posed against it. It would also 
require that I offer persuasive and thorough arguments in support of why I consider mh7 view 
to be superior to al l  other groundings of universal rights that have been proposed. That is, I 
would need to provide a wide-ranging eliminative argument concerning all other rights 
theories. This project could easily span an entire thesis or two in itself. Certainly, it seems 
beyond the scope of a single thesis to provide such an argument in addition to a thorough 
presentation of an original rights view. I mention (l), then, as a sort of ideal toward which 
thesis has worked, but it was always more of an ideal than an attainable goal. 
(2) is a more achievable goal, and it is the highest one that my thesis has a realistic 
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chance of fulfilling. Indeed, it has been mv stated goal throughout the course of the thesis. 
The thesis might be said to achieve (2) if it offers convincing arguments in all of its major 
phases. The thesis would have to be convincing on the subject of the importance of rights 
(including universal rights), in its critical arguments against other kinds of universal rights 
views (and its arguments against other objective bases for rights), and in the original rights 
view it presents, including its defence of the Scanlonian contractualist framework. If it is 
successful in all of these phases, then we could be said to have a view of universal rights 
whch appears, given the range of views covered in the thesis, to be the best available. 
Though this is not as ambitious as (l), it would still seem to be a considerable contribution to 
the rights literature. As I said previously, though, it is not mv role to judge whether the thesis 
has in fact achieved h s .  
(3) and (4) are possible accomplishments the thesis might claim even if it does not 
fulfil all of its stated ambitions. (3) may look much the same as (2), but there is an important 
difference between the two goals. (3) is not concerned with whether the view I have 
presented is better (even defeasiblv better) than rival views - it is concerned rather that m~ 
rights view has enough originalitv to be recogrused as a view distinct from others, and 
enough coherence and plausibility to merit serious consideration. An attainment of (3) 
indicates that it is at least true that I have presented a rights view that should be considered as 
one possibility out of manv. We might accomplish this ambition but not (2) if it is the case 
that our original view has promise, but that our arguments against other rights views have 
been less than fully convincing. %le this would be less than ideal, I think it would be far 
from disastrous. Surely the presentation of a new way to think about rights would still be of 
interest to rights theorists, even if no reason has been provided to prefer it to other views. At 
worst, rights theorists might regard the determination of how this new theory fares against 
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rivals to be a separate project. So although (3) represents a step down from our stated 
ambitions, I think it would still represent an accomplishment of some merit. 
(4) is a relatively modest ambition. I am fairlv confident that the thesis manages to 
accomplish at least this goal. Even if serious problems emerge about the rights view I present, 
and even if the other phases of the project are equallv problematic, it could still be the case 
that I have pointed out interesting connections that can be drawn between the three texts 
under consideration. Though the mere establishment of these connections would be 
considerably less than I have hoped to acheve, it would still seem to be of some value to the 
philosophcal communih.. To my knowledge, no similar studv has been conducted linking 
the relevant Feinberg, Dworkin, and Scanlon texts, and noting the ways that thev can 
complement each other to suggest a coherent moral picture. I suspect this is partlv because 
the Scanlon text has been published only recentlv, and partlv because Dworkin’s argument, as 
we noted, is made explicitlv as an nltcnzntiz~c to rights-talk, thus seeming to put it at odds with 
Feinberg’s piece. But if I ain correct that Dworlun’s account of the sacred is nonetheless 
compatible with the inclusion of rights, then this last point need not worry us. So as long as 
the three texts under consideration independently enjov sufficientlv high regard from 
philosophers, a project which brings out their potential interconnections would seem like117 to 
generate some interest. 
There are other respects in which mv project may be of value that do not fit easilv into 
the hierarchv of ambitions described abo\re. Most of these have been suggested at some point 
in the bodv of the thesis. The first chapter, for example, would seem to be of interest to 
anvone concerned about whether there is a need for rights (especiallv universal rights) in 
moralitv. This is an issue that has been surprising117 under-discussed in the literature since 
the publication of Feinberg’s piece, and my arguments concerning it might be interesting even 
to those who do not have much interest in the Scanlonian work of my later chapters. My 
exploration of the relationship between universal rights and moral objectivism might be of 
interest to philosophers who specialise in meta-ethics, even if they are not particularly 
svmpathetic to rights. And, as I mentioned preliouslv, my work in the last two chapters, and 
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particularly my comments concerning how contractualism is improved by the introduction of 
rights, should be of interest to the growing number of scholars taking an interest in Scanlon’s 
contractualism. 
As I have said, my greatest hope is that I have succeeded in presenting a new rights 
view that will be regarded as one that enjovs advantages o\Ter others and is worth taking 
seriouslv. MY priorilx has particularlv been to find a grounding for universal rights that is 
both sufficientlv deep and sufficientlv plausible. As I said previouslv, this project has been 
more of a beginning than an end. I have indicated in this conclusion several conceptual rights 
issues that I would like to investigate further in order to fill out mv view. If I am able to do 
this, and to handle the objections that will inevitably come, then I would like to mo\’e on to a 
discussion of how mv view is best implemented. It seemed to me at the beginning, and it 




Evil and the Need For Universal Moral Rights 
The fact that we live in a world that contains eF4l can hardly be denied. Wanton 
murder, torture, rape, and various kinds of terrible betraval are all a part of the human 
experience, and cannot be easilv justified or dismissed bv appeals to some allegedlv greater 
purpose thev serve. Our world would be better if it contained no evil, vet evil has been with 
us from our beginnings, and any attempts to eradicate it from the world entirely are likelv to 
seem hopelessly nayve. In fact I do not believe our world will ever be free of evil, but I do 
tlunk that we can take steps to minimize evil acts, and to offer some hope of constructive 
redress when evil acts are perpetrated. I would like to suggest one such step that I consider to 
be particularlv important, that of establishing a concept of universal moral rights. I will argue 
that universal moral rights are essential as a deterrent to, and safeguard against, evil acts, in 
the sense that they play a significant role in directing us awav from evil, and because no other 
moral concepts can duplicate their work in tlus regard. 
The argument will be made in several steps. First I will defend a version of the moral 
impoverishment thesis of Joel Feinberg, which states that worlds without moral rights are 
morallv impo~erished.14~ I will be particularlv interested in defending Feinberg’s claim that 
possessing rights is the best wav to secure self-respect and respect for (and from) others. I 
will then argue that these two forms of respect are essential goods, and that their essential 
goodness can be seen in the wav that thev protect us from, and minimize the occurrence of, 
This piece has been accepted for publication in the forthcoming This b’mleeded Garden: Evil in 11s 
Theolop,, Philosophjl, arid Practice. ed. Stephen Morris (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002). It has not yet 
been edited. I have preserved elements of the formatting required by Rodopi. 
Joel Feinberg, “The Nature and Value of Rights” in Joirrnal q f  T’aluc /nquir:\* 4 ( 1970), reprinted 
with postscript in Joel Feinberg, Rights, Justice. am’ the Boiinds q f  Libei-c, (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1980), 143- 155. All page references to this paper refer to the reprinted version. 
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evil acts. Third, I will argue that all humans share a fundamental minimal value, and that this 
claim combines with our first claim to suggest that evervone possesses rights. Fourth, I will 
suggest that at least some of the rights that a given individual possesses are rights that all 
humans share, because there are universal rights pertaining at least to essential goods. Finallv 
I will argue that universal moral rights gain full effectiveness in practice onlv when they 
correspond with legal rights, upheld bv a multinational bodv. The argument is wide-ranging 
and ambitious, but I hope at least to show in ths  limited space the structure required of an 
argument that moves from a consideration of evil to a consideration of universal rights. 
I will follow Feinberg in my understanding of the nature of moral rights. Feinberg 
understands rights to be valid claims, and the validih. of claims to be governed by the general 
moral principles under which we are operating. We have a claim when we are in a 
(legitimate) position to make a claim, and though Feinberg does not specifv what determines 
legitimacy in this context, a determinant consistent with the rest of his account would be the 
same principles that govern the validitv of claims. Thus our account is not right-based, 
because principles will underlie rights. It is thus important to our argument that the issue of 
the importance of rights in morality can and should be kept separate from the issue of 
whether moralih. is right-based. We might better understand the distinction between these 
two issues b\7 seeing them as connected bv an entailment relation that works in one direction 
onlv: the claim that moralih. is right-based would entail that rights are essential in moraliw, 
but the claim that rights are essential does not entail that moralihr is right-based. Now, as for 
universal moral rights, I will understand them to be moral rights that evervone possesses, 
leaving open the possibilih that ”evervone” might include onlv persons, all humans, or e\’en 
perhaps all humans and some animals. It is the fact that animals might fall within the range 
of these rights which leads me to prefer the term ”universal rights” to the more exclusive- 
sounding (but more widely-used) term ”human rights.” Finally, I will understand legal rights 
to be rights specified by a given legal code, and universal legal rights to be rights specified bv 
a legal code that applies to everyone. 
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It is important to have a broad conception of evil acts w7ith which to work, even if we 
must acknowledge that there will sometimes be controversies concerning how its details are 
worked out in practice. Laurence Thomas suggests four necessarv and sufficient conditions 
that must be met in order for an act to qualifv as evil: 1.) The act must be harmful; 2.) The act 
must have sufficient moral gravitv; 3.) The perpetrator of the act must delight in the act’s 
performance; and 4.) The perpetrator must not be animated br7 understandable 
considerations.150 This  account seems both to capture and to sharpen our widely-held 
intuitions about what counts as an eiil act. Obviouslv all four conditions present us with 
thresholds to meet, and regardless of where those thresholds are placed there will be difficult 
borderline cases concerning whether given acts qualifv as evil. But it seems likelv that any 
reasonable placement of the relevant thresholds will indicate that some acts clearly qualify as 
elril, and can be recopsed as such with little or no deliberation. We need not concern 
ourselves with fine points of interpretation in order to realise that the Holocaust was evil, that 
the Khmer Rouge’s reign of terror was evil, or that the Hutu genocide in Rwanda was evil. 
We can recognise the elril of these acts because we can see the pain and suffering thev caused, 
and we can see the complete inabilitv, and often disinclination, of the perpetrators to justifv 
their actions to their victims or others.151 
I. 
With these preliminary remarks out of the wav let us turn to the first part of our 
argument, which is a defence of Feinberg’s moral impoverishment thesis. Feinberg claims 
that moral rights are essential in a proper understanding of moral theorv because we need to 
15’ Laurence Mordekhai Thomas, P’essels of Evil (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993), 77. 
For a discussion of pain-infliction as an evil, see my ‘The Disvalue of Pain and Pain-Infliction’ in 
Earth ’s Abonzinations: Philosophical Essaj~s 011 Evil (forthcoming). For a discussion of j ustification to 
others as a necessary condition of right action see T.M. Scanlon, ?+’hat @’e f i l e  to Each Other 
(Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1998). 
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think of ourselves as right-holders in order to possess self-respect and respect from others.15’ 
A point he does not emphasize as much as he might (but to which I think he would agree) is 
that the second good, respect from others, is best seen as a conjunction: respect both from and 
for others. If it is true that we should all have respect from others, then it is also true that we 
will need to have respect for others. What are we to think of these alleged connections 
between rights and self-respect, and rights and respect from others? Derrick Darby points out 
in his recent commentary on Feinberg that the moral impoverishment thesis can be read in a 
stronger and a weaker version.153 The strong reading would be that rights are the onlv way to 
achieve the two forms of respect under consideration, while the weak reading would be that 
rights are the best of possiblv manv wavs to achieve them. While Feinberg himself mav 
fa\-our the stronger reading, I wish to pursue a defence of the weaker one. It seems 
empirically true that persons can and do respect themselves and others for many different 
reasons, and this makes Feinberg’s claim on the stronger reading implausible. An adherence 
to the weaker reading, though, requires that we specify in what sense possessing rights (and 
being conscious of our possession) is the “best” way to acheve the two forms of respect. I 
propose that rights are best in this regard because the possession of rights is the most effective 
means of allowing evervone to achieve these goods that manages to avoid extravagant 
philosophical 
discussion that follows. 
The meaning of these criteria will become more clear in the 
If it is true that rights are the best way to achieve self-respect and respect from others, 
and if it is also true that both of these forms of respect are as important as Feinberg implies, 
then our argument requires only that we establish the appropriate connection between rights 
and one of them. Accordingly, although I do not doubt that rights are in the relevant sense 
the best way to achieve respect from others, I will focus on the connection between rights and 
‘j’ Feinberg also speaks of a connection between rights and a third entity, dignity. But I omit this good 
because I cannot see that it plays a role distinct from the two forms of respect mentioned. 
’” Derrick Darby, “Are Worlds Without hgh t s  Morally Impoverished?” in Southern Joirrnal of 
Philosophj? 37 ( 1999). 397-4 17. 
also in arguments such as that of W.K. Clifford’s in “The Ethics of Belief.” See W.K. Clifford, 
Lectures and Essajs, Vol. 2 (London: MacMillan and Co.. 1879), 177-2 1 1.  
My concern to avoid extravagant philosophical commitments has its roots both in Occam’s razor and 1 5 1  
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self-respect. My discussion of this connection relies on an empirical claim that Feinberg 
makes, namely that persons without rights (or consciousness thereof) tend to develop servile 
characters. Darby correctly points out that an empirical claim like this cannot be proved by 
philosophical argument, but I find it too plausible to discard, and think a strong case can be 
made for it by appealing to further empirical claims that help to explain it. Specifically, I wish 
to appeal to two psychological facts about humans regarding self-respect: first that our self- 
respect tends to increase if we are able to consistently assert ourselves, and particularly if we 
do so believing in the correctness or justness of what we say; and second, that our self-respect 
is also bolstered by a sense of control we have oi’er our own lives and the lives of others. I 
contend that the possession and exercise of rights helps both in matters of self-assertion and 
in matters of control, allowing us to attain and secure self-respect. 
Consider first the case of self-assertion. The actilriw of exercising our rights requires 
us to assert ourselves, and our belief in the validitv of our claims encourages us to do so in a 
self-confident manner. The consistent acts of such self-confident self-assertion required by the 
exercise of our rights seems likely to help us to acquire and maintain self-respect. Self- 
assertion that is consistent and self-confident seems a natural antidote to the insecurities or 
even despair that come from knowing we are a tiny part of a vast and confusing world. We 
might tlunk of ourselves as only one person in several billion, or as existing during an 
infinitesimal span of the universe’s time, and the lost and hopeless feeling that can result may 
seem somehow more legitimate than our evervdav - i  feeling of comparative security. From this 
wider, detached perspective we all sometimes take, our lives can seem absurd and devoid of 
meaning.155 By consistently asserting ourselves, and especiallv i I  bv believing that those 
assertions are ones that others will find important and interesting, we are demanding to be 
My discussion here is influenced by Sartre’s notion of forlornness in his “Existentialism is a 
Humanism” in Exister?rialisiii (New York: Philosophical Library, Inc., 1947), reprinted as “Free Will, 
Self-Construction, and Anguish” in Reasoii and Responsibili[i*, ed. Joel Feinberg (London: Wadsworth, 
1996), 456-463. It is also influenced by Thomas Nagel‘s concept of the objective standpoint and his 
discussion of its psychological dangers. See Thomas Nagel, The l’ieit- From Notishere (New York: 
Oxford University Press. 1986), Chapter 1 1 .  
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recognised as important entities. This bears out the truth of Feinberg’s assertion that the 
possession of rights allows us to ”stand up like men” and ”look others in the eye.”156 
In the case of control, it is not so much the exercise of our rights that is important but 
the knowledge that we have them. As I have claimed, rights give us an important degree of 
control both over our own lives and over the lives of others. The~7 give us control over our 
own lives by protecting certain spheres of action. If I have a right to freedom of speech, I 
know I can express mvself as I wish, and that ths  actilritv is protected against the 
encroachments of others. Since mv abilitv to speak freelv in such a case is not within the 
control of others, and it is clearlv in soimonc‘s control, it is in my own control. This assurance 
of control over my own life gives me a deeper sense of self bv assuring me that, at least in the 
spheres of action to whch mv rights pertain, I am in a full sense the author of mv own 
actions. It increases mv self-respect bv assuring me that, in the relevant spheres of action, I 
am not a pawn subject to the whms of others. 
The claim that rights gi1.e us a degree of control over the lives of others is closelv 
related to the claim that they give us a degree of control over our own lives; it is reallv the 
same issue seen from a different angle. The claim depends on the fact that rights connect verv 
closely with duties: if x has a right against y, then y has a duty toward x. The exact wav in 
which rights and duties connect is controversial, but the fact that thev enjov a close connection 
of some sort is not - in fact, the connection is thought bv many to be an analytic truth. The 
connection \Fields important consequences for right-holders. Most importantly, a right-holder 
x has a particular kind of power over the person y who owes the duty: x can hold y to the 
dutv in question (therebv exercising XIS right), or x can release v from the duh.. Our 
experience of this sort of control, especially on a consistent basis, helps us to see ourselves as 
significant individuals and to respect ourselves accordingly. It provides an antidote, 
analogous to the one provided bv self-assertion, to the lost or neglected feeling we might 
sometimes have in the complex and bewildering realm of human relations. The fact that we 
have a certain power over others is a clear indication to ourselves, and to others, that we are 
“The Nature and Value of Rlghts.” 15 1. 
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sigruficant individuals who cannot be dismissed as non-entities. We are reminded of this 
every time we have a right against someone, and others are reminded of it every time they 
have a duty toward us. Yet there is no danger of any right-holder x falling into a trap of 
megalomania, because the tables will sometimes be turned, and x will owe duties to y (or 
someone else). What results from these interactions is a communitv where each individual 
can feel like an important entity, - -  yet not fundamentallv more important than others. 
Being a right-holder thus helps us to maintain and secure our self-respect, and as 
such it is, in a sense, a reason to respect oneself. But we will recall that our argument requires 
more than this, for it demands that we establish that being a right-holder is the best reason to 
respect oneself, in the sense that rights are the most effective means of evervone achieving 
self-respect that airoids extraiqant philosophical commitments. The best wav to show this is 
to consider a list of plausible alternative reasons and to shorn7 how thev are mferior to rights 
bv the standard I have indicated. Accordinglv I will discuss five possibilities mentioned by 
Darby, and add one of m17 own. 
Darbv first suggests that the fact that we have a certain social status might be a good 
reason to respect ourselves, but this suggestion is perhaps h s  most dubious one. Intuitivelv, 
at least, most people would be inclined to regard this basis of self-respect as unacceptablv 
superficial and arbitrary. Surelv in order to be a good reason to respect oneself, that reason 
must make reference to features of ourselves that we generallv regard as intrinsic or essential. 
MY reason for ha\ing self-respect must make reference to mv genuine self, as I have tried to 
show that rights-related reasons do. But our social status connects, if at all, onlv very looselv 
with our essential selves. Neither Donald Trump nor the Sultan of Brunei are paradigms of 
human virtue, nor are sufferers of crushing poverty in the Third World necessarilv deserving 
of their fate. While it is empirically true that persons of high social status often have a great 
deal of self-respect and self-confidence, the question of whether they are justified in doing so 
is a separate one. Social status depends largelv on chance, and thus seems an arbitrarv basis 
for self-respect. 
225 
It might be contended, though, that the preceding argument has presupposed a 
contemporary Western viewr of the way in which social status is achieved. It is true that Plato, 
in the Rqublic, offered a vision of societv in which an individual’s social status was to be 
directly determined by that person’s essential character traits. Even in our own time, the 
Hindu caste system claims to achieve a similar connection between worth and social status bv 
contending that our social status in our present life is determined b77 our deeds in our past 
life. But I do not thnk either of these counter-examples is particularlv convincing. Plato’s 
scheme requires that an outside par& make a determination of an agent’s essential character 
traits and then place that person accordingly in socieh-, but this seems too difficult to achieve 
reliably in practice. The Hindu view would be a promising wav to explain social status if 
only the metaphvsical claims it relied upon were true, but the mvsteries regarding 
reincarnation are perhaps too great to be accepted. I conclude, then, that the gap between 
social status and our essential selves is too great to allow us to accept Darbv’s first suggestion. 
Darby’s second shggestion is that our status as human beings gives us a good reason 
to respect ourselves. This  is more intuitively plausible than the first suggestion, and is 
probably accepted (at least implicitly) bv some defenders of human rights. But what is it 
exactly about being human that is so valuable? Both religiouslv-inclined and Cartesian 
defenders of this position might say that humans have souls while animals do not, but like the 
Hindu claim about reincarnation, this sort of claim about the existence of souls is a 
metaphvsical extravagance I thmk we should avoid if possible. In claiming this I do not wish 
to commit mj7self to a phvsicalist view of the mind, as it could be that we have souls insofar as 
we have minds. But if this is the case, it would appear that, contrarv to what Descartes 
claims, higher animals as well as humans would have souls, which would render the 
argument about souls useless in the present context. Otherwise it is not clear, at least on the 
face of the matter, in what wav being an infant or a severely disabled human (or for that 
matter even a fully-functional adult) is more ”respectable” than being a higher animal such as 
an ape or a dolphin. To simply assume that humans are more respectable than other animals 
b~7 their nature is to subscribe to the sort of prejudice Peter Singer has labelled “speciesism.” 
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Darby’s third suggestion is that we might legitimatelv respect ourselves because we 
are persons. Here we encounter the problem of how personhood is defined. If we define it in 
terms of the possession of rights (which Feinberg suggests but I am not mvself endorsing) 
then it will only confirm the primacy of rights as the best reason for self-respect. If we define 
it in an57 other waj7 then the claim “we should respect ourselves because we are persons” 
reduces to a claim about respecting ourselves in terms of whatever personhood is defined in 
terms of. This may reduce to one of Darby’s other reasons to respect oneself, such as being 
human or acting for reasons. If it reduces to something else, then we need to know what that 
sometlung is, and how it connects with personhood. So I thmk t h s  suggestion is unhelpful as 
it stands. 
Darbv also suggests that the fact that we can act for reasons is as good a reason as anv 
to respect ourselves. I think there is a sense in which this fact is a good reason to respect 
ourselves, but it is nonetheless not a threat to our claim that being right-holders is the best 
reason to respect ourselves. The fact that w7e can act for reasons does not suffer from any of 
the problems we have seen in our previous examples, and indeed there is a sense in which 
being able to act for reasons allows us to assert ourselves, and to exhibit some control over 
our own lives and those of others. Being a right-holder, though, allows us to assert ourselves 
and to exhibit the relevant h d s  of control in a more dvnamic and prominent wav. To take 
just one example, Burmese peasants may be able to exhibit some control over their own lives 
b~7 protesting the hardships they endure (and thus acting for a reason), but without rights 
their punishment will be swift and brutal. This sort of ’control’ is clearly verv weak, and 
similar examples can be devised for self-assertion and control over the lives of others. 
Darbfs final suggestion is that we should respect ourselves because we have the 
abilih. to live in accordance with personal or moral standards of conduct. Interestinglv, 
Darbv seems to have in mind the sort of principles we have seen are important in Feinberg’s 
account of rights, but he does not indicate that the content of these principles is particularlv 
important. It seems that, for Darbv, consistently following any set of principles might be 
sufficient to legitimately respect oneself. But, at least intuitively, most people would probably 
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find this unacceptable. It could be argued that Hitler was true to a set of moral principles, but 
we would not want to say that he would have been justified in respecting himself as a result. 
It is more plausible to say we are justified in respecting ourselves because we adhere to a good 
set of moral principles. But since rights follow so closelv from our principles anywav, to 
claim that we should respect ourselves because we adhere to a good set of principles seems 
tantamount to claiming that we should respect ourselves because we are right-holders. 
Darby’s fifth suggestion, then, is either unappealing or insufficient117 distinct from our ori,oinal 
claim to pose a problem. 
We might in addition consider a final alternative that involves religious belief. It 
seems true that some people respect themselves because  the^ are religious believers, and that 
this reason might carry a certain intuitive weight that, e.g., social status does not. This  reason 
for self-respect might well seem just as good or better than any alternative to those who hold 
it. Nonetheless there is still an important respect in which it seems to be not as ”good” a 
reason as being a right-holder, namely that it requires us to believe in metaphvsical doctrines 
for which there is inadequate justification. Religious beliefs require that a believer take a 
positive position on profound metaphysical mysteries, and the increasing secularization of the 
world shows that manv persons are unwilling to do this. Because the arguments concerning 
the importance of rights do not involve similar extravagances, they seem superior in the sense 
that they will seem reasonable to a greater ranger of persons. 
I conclude that being a right-holder is the best reason to respect oneself in the sense 
that we have specified. We might briefly note that we have also gone some way toward 
establishing a similar connection between rights and respect from others, though more work 
would have to be done if the task is to be completed. We might be tempted to say that 
possessing self-respect is necessary but not sufficient to gaining respect from others, but this 
claim is called into doubt bv the fact that we wish for babies and severely disabled persons, 
who are unable to respect themselves, to be considered worthy of the respect of others. We 
will have to wait until the third section of our argument in order to better see how babies and 
the disabled can be included as beings worthv of respect, and are thus worthy of being 
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considered right-holders. It is my hope in the meantime that our argument in this section has 
demonstrated why rights are so important for beings capable of respecting themselves. 
11. 
Until now we have assumed that self-respect and respect from others are the 
important goods Feinberg implies thev are, but it is time to trv to justify this assumption. 
Feinberg himself offers surprisingly little in the wav of this sort of justification, but I propose 
that these two forms of respect are essential goods in the sense that thev are good for 
everyone, and that their positive contribution to our lives cannot be duplicated b\7 other 
goods. Put another way, essential goods are those goods that make a unique contribution to 
the flourishing or well-being of e\rervone.157 I will explain in the next section whv it is 
important that these goods applv to ever17 individual and not just some. One way in which 
these goods make a contribution to our well-being is bv minimizing the occurrence of, and 
offering us redress to, evil acts. Nou7, it might be true that if there were disvalue but not e141 
in the world, the two forms of respect under consideration might still be essential in the sense 
that contribute to our flourishing, for such a contribution could invol~e more than just the 
avoidance of e ~ i l .  But a consideration of the relation of our two forms of respect to evil acts is 
a particularl~7 clear wav to bring out their essential value. 
We can see this both from the perspective of the potential evildoer, and from the 
perspective of the potential victim. Let us first consider the perspective of the potential 
e17ildoer. Persons who have adequate self-respect will, everything else being equal, be much 
less likel\T to commit evil acts than they would be if they had little or no self-respect. Many 
wicked acts are fuelled at least in part bv a feeling of indifference and even loathing toward 
the self. This seems especially true of perpetrators of some of the worst kinds of evil, such as 
This conception of essential goods is thus similar to John Rawls's conception of primary goods. See 15- 
John Rawls, -4 Tlieoq> o_f Justice (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1972 1. 62. It is importantly 
different, though. from the various concepts of iiztrinsic goods that have been advanced in the recent 
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those who go on reckless killing sprees. More often than not it is the plan of these murderers 
to finish their rampage by killing themselves in a gruesome climax. If potential evildoers had 
an adequately high level of respect for themselves, it seems unlikelV thev would be motivated 
to engage in acts of wanton murder or torture. Even if thev lacked much feeling for others, 
they would regard such evil acts as beneath them, and an affront to their sense of self. While 
it is possible that an evildoer could have a (no doubt misguided) sense of self-respect, it seems 
nonetheless true that the possession of self-respect will generally discourage the performance 
of evil acts. 
It is perhaps even more obvious from the point of triew of the potential elrildoer that 
respect for and from others would discourage him from committing evil acts. Having 
genuine respect for others is simplv incompatible with treating them in an evil war7 - it would 
not allow a person to act in such a wa\7 as to fulfil1 anv of the four criteria we examined from 
Thomas. Respect from others would, like self-respect, help to prevent the sort of raging 
alienation that often characterizes the psvchological states of evildoers. Persons who know 
thev are respected by others are more likelv to show respect in return, and less likely to feel a 
need to engage in the sort of angry and aggressive behaviors that usually characterize e\+l 
acts. Respect from others helps us to feel we are part of a meaningful communitv, and 
generally we are not inclined to try to damage or destroy that to which we genuinely feel we 
belong. 
We can see the value of our two forms of respect just as clearly from the perspective 
of the potential victim of evil as we saw it from the perspective of the potential evildoer. Just 
as self-respect and respect from others help to decrease the chances an evil act will be 
committed, so they help victims of those acts to achieve redress for their suffering. The self- 
respect held bv victims of evil helps them to have the courage to seek justice in wavs that mav 
be painful or even humiliating. I think here of rape lictims who prosecute their antagonists 
even though it means recounting in livid detail the violation of their bodies, or victims of 
literature. For a discussion of these see John O’Neill, “The Varieties of Intrinsic Value” in Monist 7 5 2  
(1992), 119-137; also Ken O’Day, “Intrinsic Value and Investment” in Utilitas I 1 :2 (1999), 194-2 14. 
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torture who do the same. Without adequate self-respect these victims might feel 
overwhelmed and ineffectual, neglecting anv chance to seek justice or perhaps even to share 
their experiences with anyone. The more self-respect thev have, though, the more thev are 
likely to do whatever they can to heal themselves and to seek justice. 
Respect from others will similarlv help victims of evil to cope with their predicament, 
to allow their wounds to heal, and to seek whatever avenues of justice mav be appropriate 
and available. It can restore the victim’s faith in humanity, and help the victim to feel a part 
of a comrnunihi again. Respect for others discourages victims from committing crimes of 
retribution, which are a si,gnificant problem in man\’ areas of the world where el i l  acts recur 
in a sort of ghastlv cvcle. Without a strong sense of respect for others, victims of evil are likelv 
to become evildoers themselves, perpetrating on their antagonists (or those connected with 
their antagonists) what has been done to them. The result is the sort of depressing cvcle of 
violence and evil that we find in places such as the Middle East and Northern Ireland. To 
have respect for others in this sense is, of course, not incompatible with prosecuting them to 
the fullest extent, agitating for political change if necessarv, and so on. But having respect for 
others is, as we have seen, incompatible with subjecting them to evil acts such as wanton 
murder or torture. 
Clearlv, then, self-respect and respect for others are effective means of minimizing 
e141 acts and helping us to address them when thev do occur. The arguments I have made 
may not apply to psvchopaths, but it has meant to a p p l ~  onlv to moral agents, and 
psvchopaths are not usually understood to qualifv as moral agents. Now, we will recall that 
we have also claimed that the two forms of respect achieve these goals to an extent that no 
other goods can duplicate. This is particularly seen in the effects the two forms of respect 
have on potential eITildoers: giving them a chance to respect themselves and others seems the 
best way to discourage them from committing evil acts. This  is not to say that all potential 
evildoers would actually respect themselves and others even if they realized that thev and 
others have rights. It is only to sav there is a chance that some would, and that this chance 
presents us with the best available scenario for minimising and addressing evil acts. M\7 
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emphasis on the two forms of respect is not meant to implv that thev are the only goods 
needed in a full understanding of morality. Just as rights are not the onlv moral concepts we 
will need (we will at least need duties, and possibly7 goals and/or virtues as well), there will 
undoubtedly be other goods needed in addition to the two forms of respect, such as love, 
kindness, compassion, etc. Yet it seems unlikelv that these goods, either individually or in 
combination, would be able to duplicate the work done by our two forms of respect in 
directing us away from evil. Let us take love as an example. We love a narrower range of 
persons than we respect, and even among those we love we might sometimes commit e141 
against them (think of a husband who flies into a rage upon catching his wife in bed with 
another man). The stabilihr and wide applicability of respect make it particularlv effective as 
a safeguard against evil acts, and allow the two forms of respect under consideration to play a 
crucial role in minimising evil acts, and addressing them when thev do occur, that is not 
duplicated bv other goods such as love. I conclude, then, that self-respect and respect for 
(and from) others are essential goods in the sense I have suggested. 
111. 
So far we have seen that possessing rights is the best wav to achieve self-respect and 
respect from others, and that these goods enjoy the sort of essential importance that makes the 
possession of rights essential bv extension. At t h s  stage we must begin to make the crucial 
step from a consideration of moral rights generally to a consideration of universal moral 
rights. More accurately, we might see this "step" as two separate steps which will 
respectivelr? - -  trv to establish the following claims: 1.) It is essential that evervone ha1.e (at least 
some) rights; and 2.) It is essential that everyone have (at least some of) the same rights. 
Ultimatel\r our goal is to establish (2), but in order to do so we must first trv to establish (1). It 
maV appear that we have alreadv done this bv arguing that rights play an essential role in 
moraliw, but it might be argued in return that although rights are important overall, some 
agents do not possess any rights because the\? are morallv negligible. The establishment of 
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(l), then, requires us to argue that every individual has at least a minimal moral value that 
cannot be taken away. If we can do this, we will then be in a position to address (2).IB 
A helpful place to begin when discussing the value of each individual is with a 
distinction made by Gregory Vlastos. Vlastos suggests that we should distinguish between 
two kinds of value possessed by individuals, human merit and human worth. He conceives 
of human merit as consisting of all the features in respect of which agents can be evaluated. 
Human worth, by contrast, is the value evervone has simplv * i  bv virtue of being human.15q We 
immediatelv notice that Vlastos confines himself in tlus distinction to a consideration of 
humans; I will stay within the terms of this discussion for the moment, but suggest later in the 
section how claims about worth might be broadened to include animals. Vlastos’s distinction 
is a useful one insofar as it allows us to account for the great discrepancy in the kind and 
quantitv of attractive qualities agents possess, vet nonetheless preserve the idea that each 
human being possesses an essential 1Falue that cannot be taken away. 
Justifving the claim about worth, though, has proven difficult. I am not certain it has 
been addressed in a satisfactory way, but I will nonetheless defend an account that I think 
may have promise, namelv that of Ronald Dworkin.16” Dworkin argues that each life is sacred 
in the sense that it is inliolable, and that this is so because the complex processes that create 
and shape each life are themselves wonderful and valuable. It is not entirely clear what 
Dworkin himself understands inviolabilitv to entail, but Vinit Haksar offers the promising 
suggestion that inviolabilitv should amount to irreplaceabilitv, e.g. we cannot rectifv the loss 
of one life by creating another life, or even multiple new lives.Jhl This suggestion fits well 
with the Dworkin account, which holds that the complex combination of processes which 
The discussion that follows partially overlaps with a discussion of human worth made in my “The 
Disvalue of Pain and Pain-Infliction.” But I have also revised my view in important ways. 
Gregory Vlastos, “Justice and Equality” in Social Justice. ed. hchard  B. Brandt (Englewood Cliffs, 
NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 3 1-72. 
Ronald Dworlun, “What is Sacred?” in L$e ’s Donziiziorz (London: HarperCollins, 1993), 68- 10 1. 
Dworlun’s argument is made in the context of the moral permissibility of abortion, but need not be 
confined to that context. There is an irony in the usage to which I put Dworlun’s argument, insofar as 
he presents his discussion of the sacred as an alternative to rights-talk. while I am suggesting that it can 
be part of the basis for universal rights. But this is no more than an irony: Dworlun’s account is not 
incompatible with rights. 
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Vinit Haksar, “Collective fights and the Value of Groups” in Znquii:\9 3 1 ( 1998), 22. 161 
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composes each individual life is unique, and once lost cannot be replicated. What are these 
processes? Dworkin lists three kinds that compose human lives: the evolutionary natural 
processes that produce new lives; the complex cultural processes in which human beings 
participate; and the process by which individuals evolve through the decisions they make. 
Dworkin believes that these processes apply to groups as well as individuals, so that, e.g., 
species too can be regarded as sacred. While I believe this claim to be promising, I will myself 
focus on the implications of his account for individuals. Because each life exhibits the features 
he lists above, each life is valuable; and because each life realises these features in a unique 
way, each life is sacred. We know that the processes and their various complex permutations 
are valuable because we wonder at them. Thus the processes are, in the most literal sense, 
wonderful. 
I find this account promising largelv because of its phenomenological plausibilih.. It 
seems that we do wonder at the processes, both natural and human, that compose each life. 
This is why it is possible even for persons of a secular outlook to regard a birth as a sort of 
miracle: the natural processes involved are so awesome as to inspire a sort of mvstical 
reverence. It also explains why, upon the death of a person who has lived long and achieved 
much, their life can seem to take on a sort of mvthology of its own. The full weight of the 
processes (especiallv the human processes) that made up the individual’s life can seem 
overwhelming, and can seem to give that person a towering stature whose dimensions seem 
greater than human. An advantage of Dworlun’s account is that it helps to explain these 
quasi-religious feelings of wonder to the satisfaction of those who find overtly religious 
commitments philosophically unacceptable. A more obvious advantage is that it helps to 
explain the common intuition that each life is of some value. 
Dworkin’s account of the sacred has been criticised in several ways, most of which I 
will not address here, but I would like to defend his view against two criticisms which are 
perhaps among the most fundamental. The first is that it is not immediately clear why the 
processes Dworkin speaks of can be said to be valuable. At one point Dworkin suggests they 
are 17aluable because the products they 2 -  vield are valuable, but it seems this cannot be correct, 
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because elsewhere he claims the products are valuable in virtue of the processes that comprise 
them. To claim both is to be guiltv of an unhelpful circularitv. Elsewhere in Dworkin’s 
discussion it seems that it is the complexity of the processes that gives them their value. Yet if 
complexity is a necessary condition for a process being valuable, it seems unlikely to be 
sufficient. AIDS is complex but we do not consider it valuable as a result. The Third Reich 
was an enormouslv complex political entib, but to ask whether it was valuable just seems an 
entirely separate question. 
We might make progress on this issue if we consider more close117 the wonder we feel 
at the natural and human processes in question. Part of what we marvel at does seem to be 
the complexity of the processes. To participate in such intricate and powerful processes is to 
feel we are becoming part of something greater than ourselves, and ths  inspires our awe. But 
it is also true that we can, to some extent, wonder at the sheer complexitv of the Third Reich, 
abstracting its structural complexitv from its moral horrors. The important point, though, is 
that our wonder at the complexity of the Third Reich seems importantly different from our 
wonder at the processes Dworkin mentions, and that this reveals something important about 
whv Dworkin’s processes are lraluable and the Tlurd Reich is not. Any wonder we might feel 
at the complexity of the Nazi regime is surely only an intellectualized appreciation for its 
structure and order, recogruzing that such strict order might, fashioned in the right wav, be a 
laudable feature of other human pursuits. But our wonder at the processes Dworkin 
mentions seems something more than this. It may well contain the sort of intellectualized 
appreciation alreadv mentioned, but it also seems to contain a normative endorsement that is 
missing from the previous example. We admire Dworlun’s natural and human processes 
because thev are not onlv complex but good for us: like the two forms of respect, the17 make a 
special contribution to our well-being.16‘ This is why the wonder we feel for them feels 
different from the wonder we might feel at the complexity of the Third Reich. It is the 
positive contribution these processes make that sets them apart from the Third Reich example, 
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that explains the normative element of our wonder at them, and ultimatelv that makes them 
valuable in a way that the Third Reich is not. But if th is is the case, then whv do  we not 
similarly wonder at the two forms of respect? It is true that the two forms of respect 
contribute to our well-being, but thev seem to be less complex than evolutionarv processes or 
human participation in culture. It seems to be the case that we wonder at x when x is 
sufficiently complex, and that we wonder at it in a full and complete wav when (and onlv 
when) it is both complex and contributes to our well-being. It is in this way that an 
examination of wonder helps to explain why Dworkm’s processes are valuable. 
T h i s  discussion leads to a second, related concern, that of limiting the scope of beings 
whose lives are sacred. So far we have discussed Dworkin’s processes onlj7 as thev applv to 
humans, but the scope of applicabilih. might be extended further. It is unclear how wide a 
scope Dworkin hmself has in mind; he may envision onlv human beings as sacred, or he may 
wish to include at least some higher animals as well. Depending on how we read him, the 
scope could possiblv be much wider, for if a given entitv needs onlv to participate in one of 
the three kinds of processes he mentions, then even non-living things will qualifv as sacred. 
Not onl17 do humans and animals participate in evolutionarv processes, but so do  trees, 
plants, mountains, rocks, and just about evervthing else. Is evervthing sacred? This is 
perhaps going too far. The obvious way in which to limit the scope of sacred entities is to 
raise the bar of qualification by demanding that sacred entities participate in more of 
Dworkin’s processes than just evolutionary ones. If we require that beings participate in all 
three kinds of processes, it seems that onl\7 human beings will be sacred, and even then 
perhaps not all humans, for we would need to find ways to include infants and disabled 
humans. Alternatively we could require that participation in two out of the three processes is 
sufficient. I will not attempt to place the threshold here, or to deal with the ine1Titable trickv 
borderline cases that would arise. M y  own inclination, for what it is worth, is that all humans 
A similar explanation for the value of Dworlun’s processes is offered by Linda Barclay, though my I62 
argument in support of this conclusion is my own. See Linda Barclay, “Rights, Intrinsic Value, and the 
Politics of Abortion” in Utilitas 1 1 :2 ( 1999). 2 15-229. 
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and at least some animals are sacred in the Dworkin sense. Until it is tailored by further 
argument, Dworkin’s view is compatible with this conclusion but does not entail it. 
It is my hope that we have made a persuasive case both for the idea that rights are 
essential in morality, and also for the idea that each human life is valuable. When considered 
together, these two premises suggest a conclusion that each human being has (at least some) 
rights, though admittedly thev do not entail that conclusion. The possibilitv must be admitted 
that although rights are essential in moralitv, and although each human life is valuable, there 
is nonetheless some reason whv some humans do not have anv rights. But it is not clear what 
this reason could be. To take just one example, let us sa\’ that we believe babies and the 
severelv disabled to be valuable, vet deny that thev have rights because thev are not rational. 
Would we real117 be comfortable simultaneouslv adhering to the claims that babies are 
valuable, vet possess no rights, not even a right to life? If such claims are not contradictorv, 
they are at least greatlv ir? tension. Until better reasons to doubt our position are provided, 
then, it seems safe to proceed on the belief that we have established with reasonable certainty 
the claim that evervone has (at least some) rights. 
IV. 
We are now read\r to turn our attention to the importance of universal moral rights. 
In terms of our overall argument we must now move from ”evervone has (at least some) 
rights” to ”evervone has (at least some of) the same rights.” The first claim alone would not 
be sufficient for the establishment of universal rights, because it allows for the possibilitv that 
evenrone has different sets of rights, and that no single right is held bv evervone. Now, if 
some rights are held bv evervone, these rights will l ike l~  concern the goods we have 
described as essential. As we have seen, essential goods make unique contributions to our 
well-being, and this applies not just to some agents but to all. Thus if it is also true that rights 
are essential in moralitv, it seems that some rights will be shared by all agents, and that these 
will be rights concerning the acquisition and/or preservation of essential goods, or goods 
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derivative of them. Although I have not attempted to give a full discussion of what essential 
goods there are, I have (directly or indirectly) indicated a few, such as self-respect, respect 
from others, and individual lives. The latter good derives from our discussion of Dworkin, 
and might be expanded to include an adequate level of health as well. Other plausible 
candidates for essential goods might include education, various freedom, and access to 
various goods like a fair judicial svstem. I do not have space to justifv each of these goods at 
length. I am satisfied to make the more general point that, whatever a full account of essential 
goods turns out to be, it seems there will be universal rights relating to those goods, both 
because essential goods apply to evervone, and because rights are essential in moralitv. 
Th is  account might seem to present us with a danger of redundancv regarding the 
goods of self-respect and respect from others. That is, if agents already acheve self-respect 
and respect from others bv having rights gciirrrrlly (as we saw in our defence of Feinberg), 
whv must they further secure these goods by having specific rights f o  them? There are two 
points to note about this apparent redundancy. First, even if it is true, it does not invalidate 
our argument that there are universal rights whch pertain to essential goods. As we have 
begun to see, there are other essential goods aside from the two forms of respect for whch no 
danger of redundancy will arise. Furthermore, redundancies can be tolerated: it mav be 
conceptually untidy to secure the two forms of respect twice, as it were, but the problem need 
not be seen as deeper than this. 
Second, though, I am not certain the alleged redundancv exists, because specific 
rights to self-respect and respect from others often seem to do important work that is not done 
merely by securing the two forms of respect by means of having rights generall~r. The 
difference comes out clearlv in a case in which I am tortured (which we can sav is contrarv to 
the essential good of respecting others). If I have a specific right to receive respect from 
others, and especiallv if this right is enshrined in law, I may gain some sort of justice for the 
agony I have endured. This recompense would serve as a reminder and reaffirmation that 
respecting others is important. Consider now the other case, in which I have some rights, but 
not specifically the right to receive respect from others. In ths  case I will similarly have self- 
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respect (by virtue of our argument in the first section), but I will not have a similar recourse 
against my tormentors who fail to respect me. I can point out that thev should not have done 
what they did, and that they should have respected me because I am a right-holder, but I 
cannot demand specific redress in the way I could in the previous case. The only sorts of 
recourse I have are those entailed bv the specific rights I possess. Put another way, particular 
rights are performative in a way that the possession of rights generallv is not. Thus it seems 
that universal rights to self-respect and respect from others would do useful work that would 
not be done by the possession of rights generally, even though the possession of any rights 
helps to increase our self-respect and respect from others. So the problem of redundancy that 
we identified seems only to halre been apparent, and I take the importance of universal moral 
rights to have been established. 
V. 
Before I close I would like to explore the implications for our argument of an 
important point that Feinberg makes, namely that although rights are necessarj’ in morality, 
they are not sufficient. There are a number of respects in which rights are insufficient to 
account for a complete and well-rounded moral theory, some of whch we have touched 
upon. The particular kind of insufficiencv that I wish to focus on, though, involves the way 
that the moral and legal realms relate. Specifically, it seems that moral rights must 
correspond with legal rights in order to fully protect the goods that inform their content. 
Especially7 in the face of great evil, moral rights (eiren universal ones) are likely often to seem 
hopelessly inadequate if the17 do not enjov a correspondence with legal rights. Even if it can 
be said that Kosovars had a moral right not to be slaughtered by Milosevic, that Ken Saro- 
Wiwa had a moral right not to be hanged bv Abacha, and that thousands of Chileans had a 
moral right not to ”disappear” under Pinochet, these rights appear not to have achieved much 
by themselves. Under leaders so diabolical moral rights can be trampled so mercilesslv that 
they seem almost to have never existed. Cases like these indicate that each universal moral 
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right should be the basis for a universal legal right of similar content. For example, my 
universal moral right to respect from others should correspond with a universal legal right to 
respect from others. Just as we will need to determine for the moral right what exactly 
constitutes respect from others, so will need to tailor our legal right along similar lines. Such 
a determination will indicate what derivative moral rights (and, correspondinglv, what 
derivative legal rights) there are. Regardless of exactlv how our universal legal rights are 
tailored, we will need them to have all the advantages of a legal svstem in order to be fullv 
effective. Thev must be enforceable b17 courts of law, bv penal svstems, and ultimately even 
bv military force. 
This  mav seem to raise a new problem of redundancv for moral rights. If universal 
legal rights are so important, we might wonder if we can do without the concept of universal 
moral rights after all. But ths  turns out not to be a great problem. First, universal moral 
rights still plav an important instrumental role, in the sense that we still must have universal 
moral rights in order to bestow legitimacv upon universal legal rights. Tlus is of the greatest 
importance, because if we are to ha1.e universal legal rights and corresponding global legal 
institutions, we must take the greatest care not to overstep the bounds of legitimacv in our 
delmeation of these rights. Over-zealousness in such a powerful arena could lead to coercion 
or even a sort of despotism. The best wav to make sure that each of our universal legal rights 
is legitimate is to insist that it correspond to a universal moral right, whch is itself legtimized 
bv reference to our moral principles. To be sure, underpinning universal legal rights with 
universal moral rights is not the only option available. Utilitarians might believe in universal 
legal rights, vet believe that such rights are justified bv the greatest happiness principle. The 
problem for utilitarians, though, is that their theorv requires trade-offs between individuals 
that seems, at least in principle, at odds with the Dworkin notion that each individual life is 
sacred. Admittedlv, it seems true that even Dworkin would have to allow for trade-offs 
between two sacred parties, such as a human being versus a species of animal. Nonetheless 
our rights view seems likelv to involve the sacrifice of fewer sacred beings than utilitarianism 
would allow. 
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Second, the instrumental value enjoved bv universal moral rights is not their only 
value. Even if there were no universal legal rights, universal moral rights would sti l l  plav an 
essential role in a proper understanding of moral theorv. MJT broadly-recogused right to self- 
respect would deter many persons from acting in a wav that violates that right, and would 
convince others that I deserve recompense if m\7 self-respect has been violated. Universal 
moral rights would still crucially protect essential goods in a wav that recoguses the 
fundamental value of each indixidual. E\rervthing we hare discovered about them prior to 
our consideration of legal rights would still apply. Universal moral rights would still protect 
essential goods importantly, though thev would fail to protect these goods optimally. So it 
seems that there is no danger of unilrersal moral rights becoming redundant when we 
consider the usefulness of universal legal rights. 
I have argued that universal moral rights are necessarv for the well-being of humans, 
and that ths  can be seen in the wa\7 that they help to minimize the occurrence of, and offer us 
redress to, e151 acts. For those still unconvinced b\7 the argument I have presented I 1eal.e a 
series of questions. How could we better save some of the sufferers of great evil in our time 
than by having in place a concept of universal moral rights coupled with the effective 
institution of universal legal rights? What better wax7 would there be to bring their 
persecutors to justice? How might we have better saved ordinarv Chechnvans from being 
murdered by Russian troops, or Wei Jingsheng from torture and imprisonment in China, or 
the Tutsis from their slaughter in Rwanda? And a final question to consider. When we think 
of the greatest e1.g of the Twentieth Century, our memories are likely to turn back to the 
Holocaust and its horrific murders, tortures, imprisonments and degradations. We may recall 
that the reaction of the world community to this litany of atrocities was to try the perpetrators 
for crimes against humanih7 and to draft the UN Declaration of Human Rights, revilring an 
idea of universal rights that had had little currencv just a decade previoushr. Terrible evil and 
the institution of universal rights: was this more than historical happenstance? 
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The Disvalue of Pain and Pain-Infliction 
The project of this paper is to argue that pain has essential disvalue, and that it 
follows from pain's disvalue that pain-infliction has moral disvalue. After establishing these 
two claims, I will conclude bv suggesting some implications of the discussion for pain as a 
natural evil, and pain-infliction as a moral evil. In the context of ths  collection, my aim is to 
do the groundwork for establishing the claim that both pain and pain-infliction can, in some 
circumstances, be said to be elyil. The bulk of my discussion, though, will be in terms trving to 
demonstrate the disvalue of these things, because this is a prerequisite to claiming they are 
(sometimes) eiril. 
The project involves the establishment of two different but related claims. The first is 
that pain is essentially bad: the disvalue of pain is a constitutive feature of it, and a world 
without pain would, evervthing else being equal, be better than our world which includes it. 
Th is  is a x~iew of pain whch has been advanced bv Kurt Baier, Thomas Nagel, and Irwin 
Goldstein, among others.'" The second is that inflicting pain has at least a priiizn facie moral 
badness, preciselv because such an action brings about or prolongs a state of affairs whch has 
disvalue. So the second claim depends on the establishment of the first one, though it relies 
on some additional arguments as well, as we shall see. 
I begin with two points of clarification. First, in speaking of pain's phenomenological 
disvalue I will speak of it as being "unpleasant," "awful," and words to this effect. I am not 
163 This piece has been accepted for publication in the forthcoming Earth 's Abonzinatioizs: 
Philosophical Essnjs on Evil, ed. Daniel N. Haybron (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002). This draft contains 
Haybron's edits. I have preserved elements of  the formatting required by Rodopi. 
University Press, 1958). For Nagel cf. The T'ieir, From Nowhei-e (New York: Oxford University Press, 
For Baier cf. The Moi-a1 Point o f  Vieit.: .4 Rational Basis of Ethics (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
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entirely happy with the ability of any single word to capture what we might call the “ouch!” 
quality of pains. It is an interesting fact about language, and perhaps about pain as well, that 
we seem to lack the means to speak articulately of pain’s felt disvalue. Nonetheless I will try 
to speak of it, and we will keep in mind the limitations of the words involved. Secondly, I 
will assume there is a very close connection between pain’s disvalue and our inclination to 
avoid it. While I am not defining pain’s disvalue in terms of its behavioral manifestations, it 
nonetheless seems true that, if pain is truly awful, the rational behavioral response to it is to 
seek its avoidance or relief. David Lewis suggests that a madman might respond to a pain 
sensation not bv seeking its avoidance but bv concentrating on mathematics, crossing his legs 
and snapping his fingers.lh5 1 do not know whether there could be such a man or not, but as 
long as we can safely call him mad he does not pose a problem for us, because I have 
suggested that attempting to avoid pain is a mf iond  response to feeling pain, and madmen are 
by definition irrational. 
Mv ethical discussion will, following Nagel, Parfit and T.M. Scanlon, be made in 
terms of what YC~SOI IS  we have for action.lh6 I will also make use of their distinction between 
agent-relative reasons (reasons possessed onlv + d  b\7 a specific agent or group) and agent-neutral 
reasons (reasons possessed by anyone). Agent-relative reasons for pain avoidance and relief 
are much easier to establish than are agent-neutral reasons. We can see ths  clearlv in the case 
of pain relief. Let us say I have a pain which I find awful and wish to be rid of. I certainly 
think I have a reason to be rid of it, and it is difficult to see (except perhaps in very special 
circumstances) how this reason could be morally unjustified - it would be a strange moraliw 
indeed which told me I am not justified in removing the hand 1 have accidentallv placed on a 
hot stove. So I can be said to have an agent-relative reason to relieve the particular pain I am 
feeling. This pain is awful for i m ,  so I have a reason to alleviate it. Similarly, if I find all pains 
~ 
1986), 156-1 63. For Goldstein, cf. “Pleasure and Pain: Unconditional, Intrinsic Values” in Philosophl. 
arid Phenonzeriological Research 502 ( 1989), 255-276. 
Cf. David Lewis, “Mad Pain and hlartian Pain” in Readings in Philosophj- o f  Psycholog!., Iol. Z, ed. 
Ned Block. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1980), 2 16-222. 
For Nagel cf. op cir., 152- 156. For Parfit cf. Reasons and Persoiis (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984). 




to be awful, it can be said that I have a reason to relieve them all, and that pain, in a general 
sense, is bad for me. 
Pain, then, is bad for those who dislike it. But this sounds like such a commonplace it 
is perhaps not very interesting. A more engaging (and difficult) project is to try to determine 
whether pain is bad not just for certain individuals, but in itself. If we can make such a 
general claim about the nature of pain, then there is some hope that we can make a 
correspondingly general claim about the moral wrongness of pain-infliction. Put another 
way, we are seeking to discover whether there are agent-neutral reasons to avoid pain, and to 
refrain from inflicting pain. 
But first another clarification. The phrase "pain has essential disvalue" could vield at 
least two possible meanings. It could mean that the phrase "pain is bad" is analvtic, i.e. that it 
is part of the meaning of the word "pain" that disvalue is included. As intuitivelv appealing 
as some may find tlus claim, I would not know how to establish its truth, and, as we shall see, 
some people do in fact feel comfortable spealung of pains they do not mind. So there is some 
reason to doubt that the awfulness of pain could be part of pain's meaning. Rather than going 
the linguistic route, I think we should favor the metaphvsical one of attempting to 
demonstrate that the disvalue of pain is an essential feature of it. If pain is any sort of entity 
at all, it must have constitutive features, and perhaps unpleasantness can be shown to be one 
of them. 
If we are to succeed in showing this, though, we will have to find a war7 to counter 
the sort of 14ew advanced by 
propert\' of pain, but it is a propertv not always manifested. That is, he thinks it is perfectlv 
possible to conceive of a pain which is not unpleasant, and cites examples we experience of 
this sort of "pain." He thinks that if I lightly drag the point of a pin across mv skin, I will feel 
pain, Vet not consider that pain unpleasant. He calls this pain-without-unpleasantness 
"painl" and pain-with-unpleasantness "pain?." He thinks that pain? pains are composed of 
Hare believes that badness is not onlv a contingent 
"- Cf. R.M. Hare. "Pain and Evil" in '4ristotelian Socieclt Sirpplenzentai:19 ?olrrnzc 38 ( 1  964). 91-106. 
Some may wonder why I focus on this old chestnut when so much has been written on the subject of 
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both a ”bare sensation” (which I will simplv call a sensation) and a quality of unpleasantness, 
while pain1 pains are composed of the sensation alone. The constitutive feature of pain for 
Hare is not unpleasantness but the sensation or limited range of sensations which all pains 
share. 
The first point to note in response is that an equallv coherent storv can be told in 
Hare’s terms about unpleasantness being a constitutive feature of pain. There seems little 
doubt that man\T people could perform Hare’s needle experiment and not find the experience 
unpleasant, but the example does not demonstrate what Hare wishes. The bare facts of the 
matter can be described in this wav: when I drag the tip of a pin across my skin, I feel a 
certain sensation but no unpleasantness, and the sensation I feel resembles the sensation I 
would feel if I pressed hard enough to draw blood. The only phenomenological difference 
seems to be that while the light dragging of the pin is not unpleasant, the deeper cut is. But 
these facts alone do not give us any reason at all to call the first scenario an instance of pain. 
We could sav with equal coherence that onlv Hare’s pain2 is actuallv a case of pain, and that 
pain1 is something other than pain. Hare admits that in psvchological case studies there is no 
consensus to be found on what people call instances of his painl. Some call it pain and some 
do not. Hare thinks he can fall back on another argument: that as long as we can imagine an 
instance of pain without unpleasantness then such a thing must be possible, and disvalue 
cannot be a constitutive feature of pain. But Hare’s strategy here of appealing to whether we 
can imagine x to demonstrate possibilitv of x’s existence has since fallen out of favor, as it 
seems that we sometimes think we can imagine things we reallv cannot. 
At this point we have two equallv plausible stories about pain with no clear wav to 
choose between them. Some thinkers, including Dennettlh8, have despaired that we are stuck 
here, and that there is no wav to resolve the matter. But I think that even if we mav not be 
able to decide the matter with absolute certain@, there is some reason to favor the view that 
unpleasantness is a constitutive feature of pain. As we have seen, Hare thinks that a pain 
pain since its publication. I think it still stands as a paradigmatic treatment of the badness of pain, 
particularly of the position I wish to oppose. 
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consists essentially of only a sensation. There are two ways we might interpret this thought. 
It might mean that all pains share the same sensation, or it might mean that pains are 
characterized by a specific range of sensations. Since it is easv to devise examples of different 
pains which have different sensations (for example, a dull toothache versus frostbite), the only 
plausible interpretation is the second one. But is it true even that the sensations of pains fall 
within an identifiable range? It is difficult to see what the sensations of getting jabbed with 
needle, having a dull ache in mv back, and getting scalded bv boiling water have in common. 
But these experiences do have one thing in common: the17 all hurt! 
I suggest it is more plausible that we think of pains as being composed of both a 
sensation and a feeling of awfulness. But obviouslv we must speak of sensation in a different 
way than Hare does if we are to a1Toid the problem he faces. The wav we can do so is to say 
that the necessary conditions for pain to be pain are that it be composed of anv sensation 
accompanied by a feeling of dislike. There is not a pressing need for our class of pains to be 
held together bv a limited range of sensations, because our class is already limited bv the fact 
that pains must have a qualitv of awfulness. So although we have allowed that pains can 
have any sensation, it by no means follows that anv feeling we have will qualifv as a pain. 
I should emphasize at this point that I am only trying to sketch the necessarv 
conditions for pain. The sufficient conditions are a different matter, and are in fact a verv 
difficult problem which I avoid with some relief. It remains to be worked out, for example, 
whv we are inclined to differentiate bad itches, or feelings of nausea, from pains. Both meet 
m\7 necessarj- criteria for pain, vet my intuitions accord with those of most other persons in 
telling me that these feelings are somehow different from pains. The way in which thev are 
different remains to be worked out, but doing so will not be part of mv project. Admittedly, it 
could be that itches and feelings of nausea turn out to be differentiated from pains bv a 
consideration of sensation alone, but it is far from clear this will be the case. Another 
possibilihi is that these phenomena are distinguished at least in part by a distinct qualitv of 
I h X  Cf. Daniel C. Dennett, “Why You Can’t Make a Computer that Feels Pain” in Brainstoi-ins: 
Pliilosopliicul Essuj~i 011 Mind aiid Psycholog\* (Hassocks, Sussex: Harvester Press. 1978). 190-229. 
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awfulness each possesses. It may well turn out to be that a correct account of pain’s sufficient 
conditions will not present an57 problem for mv account of pain’s necessary conditions. 
I think, then, that we have some reason to prefer the view that unpleasantness is an 
essential feature of pain. But this claim mav * -  vet be too strong. It seems possible that 
unpleasantness is a contingent feature of pain, but happens alwavs to be manifested. Perhaps 
in some possible world it is not manifested, or perhaps in our own world there ma57 at some 
future time be pains which are not unpleasant. I do not know how to prove that the 
proposition that pain is contingent is false. But it seems safe to saV that if the most coherent 
explanation of pain involves the claim that all pains are unpleasant, then the connection 
between pain and unpleasantness is more likely than not to be an essential one. So with this 
pro\.iso in mind, I will continue to speak of the connection as essential. 
One feature of this account of pain that some ma~7 find curious is that it clearlv makes 
room onl\7 for phi/sicnl pain. Tlus mav seem troubling, because we do often speak of 
emotional pains: the pains of grief, betraval, longing, embarrassment, etc. In fact, manv 
people would undoubtedlv say that these emotional distresses are the greatest pains of all. I 
do not, of course, deny that negative emotional experiences are a part, indeed a central part, 
of human experience -but the problem then arises of how to justifv - d  mv claim that the onl\7 
real pains are phvsical pains. One waj7 out of the problem would be to take a materialist 
stance, and claim that emotional experiences are merely physical events aniway. But there is 
a less ambitious alternative we might prefer. It seems we can still speak of emotional pains on 
mv account, provided that when we do so we understand ourselves to be speaking of pain in 
a metaphorical sense. When we say we feel the “pain of despair” we are saying that our 
despair causes us to feel something very much like the phvsical sort of pain (sensation plus 
disvalue) detailed above. Of course, it is possible that certain strongly negative emotional 
experiences will be so bad that they cause us to have real phvsical pains, and any reference to 
these manifested feelings as pains would be literal, not metaphorical. But negative emotional 
experiences whch fail to yield feelings which have both sensations and feelings of disvalue 
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are not (literally) pains, nor do thev (literallv) produce pains. To say this, though, is not to 
discount their importance or belittle their awfulness. 
At this point I will consider five objections to mv claim that badness is a constitutive 
feature of pain. The first is that a defender of the essential badness of pain cannot explain the 
existence of the masochist. I have suggested that if pain is trulv bad then ever\’ rational 
person will try to avoid it. Yet it is a fact about the world that some people do (in at least 
some circumstances) seem to pursue pain and find it pleasurable, and at least some of these 
people are not ob14ousl~7 irrational. This seems to point us back to a view of pain more like 
the one expressed by Hare. But although it mav seem self-evident that masochists pursue 
pain for its own sake and find it pleasurable, a storv of at least equal plausibilitv can be 
devised which gives the masochist’s motivations more complexitv. It seems possible that the 
masochst is not reallv pursuing pain as an ultimate end, but is pursuing pleasure only. It is 
possible the masochist can achieL7e certain pleasures onlv I -  bv experiencing pain, because pain 
experiences are essential means to certain ps~~chological states such a person finds enjovable. 
In a response to Hare’s paper, P.L. Gardiner suggests what two of these states might be: 
perhaps feelings of guilt are assuaged by the pain experience, or perhaps the seelung of pain 
is an attempt to transfer responsibilitv to the punisher.lhy Undoubtedly other possibilities 
exist along these lines. The crucial point is that the existence of such a psychologcal state, 
though pleasurable and brought about by pain, does not entail that the pain which is a means 
to it is pleasurable. It makes sense to say that the pain is bad because it is unpleasant, but that 
the experience as a whole (which we will for now call the pain plus the resultant 
psvchological state) is one the masochist finds valuable, because the value of the resultant 
psychological state outweighs the disvalue of the pain. Perhaps someone might think this last 
point shows that the masochist’s pain is actually valuable after all, because its instrumental 
lh9 Cf. P.L. Gardiner, “Pain and Evil” in A)-istotelian Socieh, S~qydcnientai:~? kolcmic 38 ( I964), 107- 
124. It is interesting that the general picture of the masochist I have advanced is reported by Virginia L. 
Warren to have become the mainstream view among psychiatrists by the mid- 1980’s. Cf. Virginia L. 
Warren, “Explaining Masochism” in Jotivnal~for. the Theoq> qfSocial Behaviour 15 (July 1 985), 103- 
130. 
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value outweighs its essential phenomenological disvalue. This brings us to an issue I will take 
up in my responses to later objections, so I will delav comment until then. 
I think tlus picture of the masochist is to be preferred to one which might emerge 
from an account like Hare’s. If he delved more deeply into the implications of his view of 
pain for masochism, Hare would find himself faced with two equally unattractive 
alternatives. He might sa\‘ that the pains the masochist pursues are all instances of painl. 
That would allow him to say that there are at least some cases in which the masochist finds 
the mere sensation of pain pleasurable. Perhaps the masochist even feels some pains as pain] 
which other people would feel as pain.. But although this is possible, it seems to take all the 
sting out of masochism (so to speak). Do we reallv wish to say that it is onlv the sensation of 
being hit with the crack of a wlup that the masochist craves? Or is it perhaps necessary that 
such a person feels pain in the sense of pain. in order to satisfv certain desires? We ordinarily 
thmk of the masochist as seeking an experience of pain., and indeed I think this is the only 
plausible wav of seeing the issue. If sensations alone were being pursued, then the masochist 
would most likelv seek out manv which are not ordinarily thought of as unpleasant, and 
pursue them for the same reasons that sensations ordinarily conceived as unpleasant are 
pursued. But there is no evidence the masochist does this. 
Alternati\Tel\r, Hare could say that the masochist does indeed pursue experiences of 
pain., and finds such experiences pleasurable. But this seems just incoherent. It is mvsterious 
(to me, an\way) how an~one  could find pleasurable an experience which is genuinely 
dislikable. This would mean the same experience is found to be simultaneously pleasurable 
and unpleasurable, which seems impossible. There may be some hope of salvaging this line 
of argument bv appealing to second-order considerations. We might be able to say that the 
masochist’s pain experience involves simultaneouslv a first order displeasure and a second- 
order pleasure. But I do not know if we can make sense of the concept of second-order 
pleasures. 
I will now turn to the second objection, which is that the testimonv of some patients 
who have undergone lobotomies suggests that there are such things as pains which we do not 
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find unpleasant. When a patient receives a lobotomy, all (or at least most) subsequent 
”pains” are felt by that patient onlv in the sense of what Hare would call pain]. That is, a 
lobotomy patient feels the sensations of pain in their full intensity, but without the dislike 
which would normally accompany them. Interestinglv, manv of these patients are inclined to 
speak of such experiences in terms of feeling pains but not minding them, which seems to 
support Hare’s view. But while I admit this fact about lobotomv patients does not favor my 
view, but I do not think it favors Hare’s very stronglv either. Not all lobotomv patients speak 
of feeling pains which are not unpleasant: manj’ do, but not an overwhelming majority. Of 
those who do speak of feeling such pains, there might be some reason to doubt their word. 
Although I am otherwise happv to support the thesis that people are incorrigible about their 
own pains, there might be some reason to doubt incorrigibiliw in the case of patients who 
have undergone such a traumatic experience as a lobotomv. Also, as I have argued, I think 
the conceptual storv which supports mv own view is independently stronger than the one 
behind Hare’s, and if I am right about tlus then the burden of proof is rather high in the 
lobotomv case. That is, I tlunk the testimony of lobotomv patients would have to support 
Hare’s view ovenvhelminglv in order to cause undue concern. 
The third objection is that the fact that some people pursue pain as a means to a 
worthv end shows that at least those pains can be valuable. An example might be someone 
who goes on a hunger strike to protest oppressive government policies. Such a person suffers 
the pains of hunger, vet these pains are valuable as a political instrument. In fact, it may well 
be that the instrumental value of these pains far outweighs their essential disvalue, so can we 
not say that the pains are good in an overall sense? I think that if we were to do so we would 
be locating the value in the wrong place. Certainly, somethmg is valuable here, but is it reallv 
the pain itself? Value is located in the situation the hunger striker wishes to bring about (e.g. 
bringing about a change of government policy). There is also value in the particular relation 
this person’s hunger has to the state of affairs at which it aims, and it is this value we are 
referring to when we talk of the hunger’s instrumental value. But the pain itself is no more 
valuable than anv other pain. To sav, then, that the pain of the striker’s hunger has 
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instrumental value is just to say that it enjovs a certain valuable relation with a state of affairs 
which is itself valuable (indeed, it seems the value of the relation is derived from the value of 
the state of affairs). The only way the value of the relation could say anything interesting 
about the value of the pain itself is if the relation is a necessary one, and obviously this is not 
the case - we can think of examples of any of these means-to-an-end pains which are clearly 
bad. In fact, the very instrumental effectiveness of pains like the hunger striker’s depends on 
the fact that the pains will be perceived as having disvalue. If no one thought the pains of 
starvation were bad, no one would likelv be moved bv this sort of protest. 
A fourth objection is that some people who are not clearly masochists pursue pain for 
deeply considered reasons, and that their pains can be said to be valuable. For example, some 
ascetics choose to lead a life of hardship, deprivation and pain. They seem to be different 
from both the masochist, whose reasons for pursuing pain are usually sexual, and the hunger 
striker, who would choose a less painful form of protest if it was likely to succeed. The 
reasons of the ascetic for choosing pain seem to be tied quite closelv to a considered 
judgement about the human condition. Conceptually speaking, though, I think the ascetic 
inevitably falls into the camp of either the hunger striker or the masochist. Manv ascetics (e.g. 
monks) live as they do because they believe themselves to be following strict guidelines set 
down by religious authorities, and as such they believe that their life of pain will \field 
rewards in another life. Of course, a c\mical view of their activities suggests that thev are 
living a life of pain only to receive a reward, and that if their religion allowed them to live in 
an easier wav they would gratefully accept. Obviously in this case their pain experiences 
would have the means-to-an-end quality of the pains of the hunger striker. But even if we 
take a less cmical view and claim that (at least some) monks believe in their hearts that a life 
of pain is a holv one, this may not change the fundamental point. It seems their positive 
valuation of pain would still be informed by a religious context which promises them 
salvation. Manv would not value pain if the\- did not also believe in other elements of their 
religious framework (such as salvation). 
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Now, it is possible that there are monks who would live a life of pain and hardship 
even if they were convinced of the untruth of salvation. Similarly there mav be ascetics who 
seek out some forms of pain and who choose asceticism for non-religious reasons. Man17 
would be uncomfortable calling such people masochists, because, as I have mentioned, the 
term masochist is usuallv used to refer to someone who pursues pain as a means to sexual 
pleasure. The ascetic mav seem radically different from the masochist, because the ascetic 
pursues pain for deeply-considered, perhaps mvstical, reasons. Yet I think that, for our 
purposes, these non-religious ascetics (and hardened monks) fall conceptually into the 
masochist’s camp. They pursue pain for the sake of something else, such as a moral ideal or 
psychological state, they cannot obtain by anv other means. The fact that the masochist is 
after sexual pleasure while ascetics are pursuing some other end is not relevant to the 
argument, so our initial inclination to call the masochist and the ascetic strange bedfellows 
proves to be unfounded. 
I have saved what is perhaps the most common objection for last. It is that pain 
cannot be a bad t h g ,  because it serves as a useful warning about serious dangers to one’s 
health. The pain of cutting my skin, for example, is said to be a good thing because it keeps 
me from cutting myself too often or too deeply and losing too much blood (or perhaps 
exposing mvself to infection). The pain I have in a certain muscle when I overexert mvself is 
said to be good because it calls mv attention to the fact that if I strain the muscle further, I 
might do serious damage to it. The pain of a headache at the onset of the flu is good because 
it causes me to be more restful, whch helps to prevent me from becoming more ill. 
I do not think anyone would dispute the fact that pains do often have this sort of 
instrumental value, and we might further think there is something about this general 
instrumental LTalue of pains which makes this case different from the ones we examined in the 
third and fourth objections. The connection between pain and usefulness here seems so close 
that we might wonder if it is a necessary one. If pains are necessarily useful, then it seems 
unlikelv we can call pain essentially disvaluable. But the connection between pain and 
usefulness cannot be a necessary one, because it is clear that not all pains have instrumental 
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value. For example, sometimes we have rather ordinary aches or cramps which do not serve 
as any particular warning to us. The case can be more extreme: think of the intense pain 
which might be suffered by someone who has acute arthritis. This pain does not seem to 
serve any purpose whch helps to guide the sufferer’s behavior. Even pains that have some 
connection with instrumental value, such as the pains of a burn victim, might present us with 
a case in which the phenomenological disvalue of the pain is far more intense and prolonged 
than it needs to be to have instrumental use. 
It is clear, then, that the supposed instrumental value of pain turns out to be a value 
which applies contingentlv, and to onlv some pains. So, as in the case of the religious ascetics 
of the fourth objection, the useful pains of the fifth objection ultimatelv cannot escape the 
argument we advanced in the context of the third objection. For pains that have instrumental 
value, the value of each pain is located in the relation it has to a particular fact or set of facts. 
For example, the instrumental value of mV pain when I cut myself arises from the relation of 
the pain to various facts: the fact that the cut causes me to bleed; the fact that a deeper cut 
would cause me to bleed more; the fact that if I bleed too much I will die, and so on. There is 
an interesting wav, though, in which this conceptual story differs from the one we told in the 
case of the hunger striker. In that example, the value of the relation between the pain and the 
fact or set of facts with which it was connected (the bringing about of a change of government 
policv) depended on the positive value of the fact or set of facts itself. But in our present 
example, the value of the relation depends on the disvnluc of the facts with which it is 
connected: bleeding excessively, getting infected, dying and the like are all bad things. This  
difference follows from the different roles that pain is playing in the two examples - in the 
first instance of bringing about something good, in the second one of warning us about 
something bad. But the important point is that, in both cases, the value that some might think 
to be in the pain itself is actuallv located in the relation the pain has to a fact or set of facts. 
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The way I have defended m\i position, though, may lead to yet another objection, one 
which combines a representationalist theorv of pain with evolutionary considerations. 170 It 
might be argued that humans (and other animals) have evolved in such a way that pains are 
csscnfidtj tlscftlZ as representations of disturbances in the body. Pain cannot be bad, because 
the very purpose of pain is to alert us to bodilv disturbances or damage. The objection 
contends that I have made too much of the exceptional cases in which certain pains are not 
useful. Representational theory entails the possibilitv of misrepresentation, and thus the 
possibilitv of pains which are not useful. Furthermore, biologically our pain system is a 
natural system, and natural svstems are imperfect, so not only are useless pains conceptually 
possible - thev will in fact sometimes occur. The objection’s point, though, is that pains are 
good because thev are essential to playing the helpful role that they play. That is, the job 
pains perform is vital117 important, and their must have phenomenological disvalue to do this 
job. 
But it is not clear, to me anIwav, that we need somethmg unpleasant like pain in 
order to carrv out the function pain does. Do warnings about bodilv damage need to be 
awful (and sometimes even unbearable)? There would certadv be a problem if such 
warnings were pleasurable, insofar as such a scenario might lead us to seek out experiences 
which are actuallv detrimental to our well-being and survival. But perhaps warnings about 
bodilv damage could be sensations which are neither pleasant nor unpleasant. Admittedly, 
there is a danger that such sensations would be less noticeable than disvaluable ones, but we 
could solve tkus problem bv saving that our warning sensations could be lTalue-neutral vet 
utterlv unlike any other sensations. Even if this point is granted, some might insist that we 
still need the unpleasantness of pain as a sort of paternalistic feature of our biologv, to guard 
against a natural carelessness or even self-destructiveness in our behavior. I am not sure 
there is actually such a carelessness which resides in our nature, but even if there is, the 
argument is not clearly successful. A world in which we cause ourselves more bodily damage 
For a representationalist theory of pain, cf. Michael Tye, Ten Problems o f  Consciouswss: -4 I 7 0  
Representational Theor?, of the Phenonzenal Mind (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1995), 1 1 1 - 1 16. 
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but feel no pain is not clearly worse than one in which we cause ourselves less damage but 
suffer quite a bit of pain. In fact, it might well be better. The comparison would undoubtedly 
turn on just how much bodilv damage, versus how much pain, we are talking about, and 
devising the weightings might be a complicated task. But I, for one, would be willing to 
accept some increase in bodilv damage if it meant living a life free of the unpleasantness of 
pain. And, as I have said, this choice rnav well be irrelevant anvway. I think that it is quite 
possible a phenomenologically distinctive neutral sensation could perform the job of warning 
us about bodilv danger as well as pain does. 
Let us now turn our attention to moral considerations concerning the infliction of 
pain. I must admit that I do not halye the space to give this topic anything like a 
comprehensive treatment, but I think that some discussion of pain-diction is still better than 
none. Accordingly I will limit my ambitions to accomplishing just a few things. I hope to 
make a case for the claim that there is an agent-neutral reason not to inflict pain on others, 
and I will also suggest some circumstances in which ths  reason might be overridden. 
Otherwise I will be content to point out some of the main issues which still must be addressed 
if we are to round out a treatment of the badness of pain-infliction. 
We have seen previously that agent-relative reasons are generally easier to establish 
than are agent-neutral reasons. This is certainly true in the case of having a reason not to 
inflict pain on another. In order to have such an agent-relative reason, it seems these 
necessary and sufficient conditions must be fulfilled: 1.) vou dislike pain; 2.) I know vou 
dislike pain; and 3.) I care about your well-being. I will have an agent-relative reason not to 
harm vou if and only if you dislike pain and I am aware of this, and vou are someone close to 
me, such as a friend or a family member. Now, Hume thought that we have a natural 
svmpathv for all other people, not just (some of) those with whom we happen to associate. If 
this were true it would raise the possibility that agent-relative reasons might applv to a wider 
scope of people than just those who we know and like. The third condition would applv to 
anyone, and the first two conditions might well be satisfied bv our establishment of the claim 
The objection as I present it was brought to my attention by my colleague &chard Gray. 
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that pain is essentially bad. Sadly, though, I thmk there is little evidence that humans do 
naturally have such a generalised benevolence as a simple matter of their psychological make- 
up. Perhaps some do, but it seems that so manv do not that thev are not reallv an exception to 
the rule so much as a rebuke of it. If we are to establish a very general reason against pain- 
infliction which applies to evervone, it seems we must do so in an agent-neutral fashion. 
To review, an agent-neutral reason is one which is possessed by anvone. In our 
context, ”I have a reason not to inflict pain on vou” has the form of an agent-relative reason, 
while ’ ’ A y m e  has a reason not to inflict pain on you” has the form of an agent-neutral one. 
How can we demonstrate that anvone can have such a reason? We can begin bv devising 
necessary and sufficient conditions to be met, as we did in the agent-relative case. The 
conditions will mimic our agent-relative ones in their content, but also reflect the greater 
scope agent-neutral reasons possess. I suggest, then, that there is an agent-neutral reason not 
to inflict pain on x if and onlv if 1.) x dislikes pain; 2.) anvone can be expected to believe x 
dislikes pain; and 3.) anvone has a reason to consider x valuable. If I am right about the 
badness of pain, then the first condition is automaticallv satisfied. Some masochists (and 
perhaps some others) might be confused about their attitudes toward pain, but if the\’ 
understood the matter correctlv they would admit that, strictlV speaking, they dislike pain. 
Satisfaction of the second condition is almost as easy, even if we cannot expect everyone to 
know the complexities of the arguments about pain’s disvalue. This  is because the 
commonsensical assumption for anvone to make about a stranger’s opinion of pain is that 
such a person finds it dislikable. Even those who (mistakenly) think that masochists 
genuinel~r like pain itself are aware that masochists make up a small percentage of the overall 
population. Even if thev do not know anything about x, and believe masochists like pain, they 
nonetheless know x is unlikely to be a masochist. So, although it is not true that evervone 
k?ZOi(jS that x dislikes pain, it is true that evervone can be expected to believe it as a default 
assumption. 
It is the satisfaction of the third condition which is the most difficult. I have already 
expressed m\’ doubts about the claim that it is a m t u r d  fnct about human beings that we have 
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a general sympathy for each other. Yet what is at issue in the third condition is whether 
anyone has a reason to care about x. This includes those who have never met x ,  as well as 
those who have met x and have a negative opinion of him. If it is not a simple psychological 
fact about such people that they care about x, could the77 perhaps consider x valuable in a 
more abstract, intellectualized fashion? I think there is some hope that they can, though I am 
afraid I cannot give the argument the full treatment it deserves. Nonetheless, I think the best 
hope for satisfying the third condition lies in some arguments which have been advanced in 
the context of the equality of persons. Vlastos makes a distinction between human worth and 
human merit.171 Each person (understood here as human being) has a worth equal to all other 
persons, even if the merit (understood as a collection of qualities we can evaluate) of different 
persons varies greatly. So, for our purposes, everyone should care about X I S  pain because x 
has human worth. So far our claim about worth is unjustified, but I think that the way 
forward is pointed by Joel Feinberg, who suggests that when we attribute worth to evervone, 
we are expressing an attitude of respect toward their humanitv.1~~ This concept of humanity 
is not reducible to specific characteristics, but is appreciated by an attitude that is ultimate in 
itself. The attitude of respect we are speakmg of here is a natural one insofar as agents 
recognize the value of their own humanity, and see that other agents are relevantly similar to 
them. Of course, some agents will fail to adopt this attitude of respect, and this failure might 
result from anv number of factors, but the attitude seems to be one whch, in principle, 
anyone could adopt. It also seems reasonable to say that the attitude is one that we should 
adopt, and that anvone who fails to adopt it is morally deficient. Again, more needs to be 
said on this subject, particularly on the topic of just what our operative notion of ”humanitf’ 
is. But I hope I have pointed the way toward how the third criterion might be satisfied: 
anVone has a reason to consider x valuable because anyone is capable of adopting an attitude 
of respect toward XIS humanity, and anyone is capable of realizing thev should do so. 
Cf. Gregory Vlastos, “Justice and Equality” in Sociul Jtrsrice, ed. Richard B. Brandt (Englewood 
Cf. Joel Feinberg. Social Philosoply, (Englewood Cliffs. NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1973), 88-94. 
Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962), 3 1-72. 
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I have suggested that the agent-neutral reason not to inflict pain is not absolute, and 
here I wish to suggest a couple circumstances in which the reason might be overridden, 
acknowledging that there may be others I have not thought of. One such case occurs when 
the object of the reason desires the pain as a means to an end, as in several different examples 
we examined previously. Let us see this in the case of our old friend the masochist. If the 
pleasure of the masochist’s total pain experience (the pain plus the relation it has to a gi~7en 
fact or set of facts) outweighs its displeasure and no one else is harmed bv the masochstic 
activities in question, then I do not see whv we should condemn anvone who inflicts pain on 
this person accordinglv. MY argument for a certain interpretation of masochism was never 
meant as an expression of moral disapproval, and if masochists are all consenting, then I do 
not see anv reason to break up their party. 
A second kind of exception from our agent-neutral reason might derive from 
paternalistic considerations. For example, there might be a small chld who needs a 
vaccination but fears the pain of a needle. In such a case it seems appropriate for the doctor to 
inflict the pain of the shor despite the child’s reservations. The crucial consideration here 
seems to be that a fully rational person would choose to receive the vaccination and endure 
the temporary pain it causes. Many children, though, are just unable to appreciate the full 
complexitv of their own interests. It could be that this sort of paternalism can applv to others 
besides vomg children, but of course we should be wary of extending the scope too far. 
Many other issues arise from the claim that there is an agent-neutral reason not to 
inflict pain on others, but unfortunately I do not have space to cover them. Among them are 
the question of exactly to whom the reason does and does not apply. The subject of the 
reason clearlv has to be a person, but what about the object? Can it be anv human (as 
opposed to a person), or for that matter an animal? Also, if there is an agent-neutral reason 
not to inflict pain, is there an agent-neutral reason to help others in pain? If there is, moralitv 
would become much more demanding. I am sure there are many other issues concerning 
pain-infliction about which I have been similarlv negligent. 
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Of all the authors in this collection, I have probably taken the longest to talk about 
evil (at least explicitly), but at last I would like to close with a few thoughts about it. In doing 
so I only hope to show that I have laid the groundwork for the consideration of pain and pain- 
infliction as evils - I have not made arguments to show exactlv which pains, and instances of 
pain-infliction, are evil, and I have space onlv to attempt the broadest of sketches. I am 
hoping a broad sketch is better than none. 
Anv discussion of the implications of mj7 paper for evil will of course depend on what 
we mean by evil, and this is itself huge117 controversial. Nonetheless I will quickly offer a few 
thoughts. First, in the case of natural evils, it seems that the onlj7 sort of thing evil could be is 
an extreme kind of badness. The tradition of seeing evil as something different in kind than 
badness seems not to make much sense when we speak of the evil of natural phenomena. On 
the other hand, when it comes to moral evil, conceiving of evil as something different in kind 
from badness seems to make a great deal of sense. For example, we are not content to sav that 
Hitler’s treatment of the Jews was very, \.er\’ bad (no matter how many ”vervs” we include). 
It was not bad, it was evil. So moral e141 seems to be a fundamentally different sort of 
phenomenon from natural evil. 
With this two-fold picture of elril in mind, let us see how it applies to pain and pain- 
infliction. It seems straightforward to sav that some pains will turn out to be natural evils. 
Just as there is a point (for natural evils) at which a bad thing becomes an evil, so there will be 
a corresponding point at which a pain which is bad becomes a pain which is a natural evil. 
Since both degrees of badness and intensities of pain can be seen as existing on continuums, 
the matter is easv to conceptualize. To be sure, there are difficult projects to be undertaken in 
this area. For example, it will not be easy to determine at exactly what point a bad t h g  
becomes a natural evil, or correspondingly at what point a bad pain becomes an e\vil one. 
This is clearlv a topic which desenres a separate treatment. 
Because moral evil seems more complex than natural evil, the eiril of pain-infliction is 
clearlv going to be more complex than that of pain itself. If moral evil is different in kind than 
badness, then what sort of entih. is it? I will suggest two necessary broad conditions an 
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agent’s action must meet if it is to be considered a moral evil (I am not suggesting these 
conditions are sufficient). First, there must be some consideration of the agent’s intention. 
The intention must be something like that of harming another simplv for the sake of it. There 
is a gratuitous quality of evil acts which we must try to capture with this condition. Secondly, 
it seems there must be a certain amount of harm done. Even with the darkest of intentions, if 
I‘ inflicts only a pinprick on Q, then we would be hard-pressed to call the action evil. Stalin’s 
murder of millions of his own citizens was more evil than would have been the murder of 
onlv a few. 
With these two necessarv conditions in mind, it seems likelj7 that some instances of 
pain-infliction will be moral evils. It is entirely possible that someone could inflict a great 
deal of pain with a great deal of malice (and sadl~7 ths  point is often demonstrated). 
Whatever other conditions might turn out to be sufficient for moral evil, it is difficult to see 
that any plausible candidates would rule out instances of pain-infliction. Again, though, this 
is the barest sketch of the topic, and much work remains to be done. Particularlj7, we need a 
clearer idea of the sufficient conditions for moral evil, as well as how exactly to determine 
when an intention is e161 and when the amount of harm done rises to a level we can call evil. 
In the context of this volume mv project has been to lay the groundwork for the claim 
that pain can be a natural evil and pain-infliction a moral one. I have tried to do this 
primarily d ,  bv demonstrating the weaker claims that pain has essential disvalue, and that we 
haire an agent-neutral reason not to inflict pain. I have also tried to make some suggestions 
on the topic of evil to point the wav forward. But there is obviously much work vet to do, and 
I hope someone will be sufficient117 intrigued to carry the argument further. 
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